Rolling code security system

Information

  • Patent Grant
  • 6690796
  • Patent Number
    6,690,796
  • Date Filed
    Friday, January 21, 2000
    24 years ago
  • Date Issued
    Tuesday, February 10, 2004
    20 years ago
Abstract
A rolling code transmitter is useful in a security system for providing secure encrypted RF transmission comprising an interleaved trinary bit fixed code and rolling code. A receiver demodulates the encrypted RF transmission and recovers the fixed code and rolling code. Upon comparison of the fixed and rolling codes with stored codes and determining that the signal has emanated from an authorized transmitter, a signal is generated to actuate an electric motor to open or close a movable barrier.
Description




BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION




The invention relates in general to security systems which allow operation upon the receipt of a properly coded signal. More particularly, the invention relates to a security system or to a barrier operator system, such as a garage door operator, employing a transmitter and a receiver which communicate via code streams having at least a portion thereof which changes with multiple operation of the device.




It is well known in the art to provide garage door operators or other barrier operators which include an electric motor connectable through a transmission to a door or other movable barrier which is to be opened and closed. Since many of these systems are associated with residences, as well as with garages, it is important that opening of the barrier be permitted only by one who is authorized to obtain entry to the area which the barrier protects. Some garage door operator systems have in the past employed mechanical lock and key arrangements associated with electrical switches mounted on the outside of the garage. While these systems enjoy a relatively high level of security, they are very inconvenient to use for a person because it necessitates them exiting their vehicle in order to send the command to open the garage door. This also may present some danger to people when the exit the relative security of their vehicle if someone may be waiting to do injury to them.




It is also well known to provide radio-controlled garage door operators which include a garage door operator unit having a radio receiver and a motor connected to be driven from the radio receiver. The radio receiver is adapted to receive radio frequency signals or other electromagnetic signals having particular signal characteristics which, when received, cause the door to be opened. More recently, such transmitter and receiver systems have become relatively more sophisticated in that they use radio transmitters which employ coded transmissions of multiple or three-valued digits, also known as “trinary bits” or other serial coded transmission techniques. Among these systems are U.S. Pat. No. 3,906,348 to Willmott, which employs a transmitter and receiver system wherein a plurality of mechanical switches may be used to set a stored authorization code.




U.S. Pat. No. 4,529,980 to Liotine et al. discloses a transmitter and receiver combination for use in a device such as a garage door operator wherein the transmitter stores an authorization code which is to be transmitted to and received by the receiver via a radio frequency link. In order to alter or update the authorization code contained within the transmitter, the receiver is equipped with a programming signal transmitter or light emitting diode which can send a digitized optical signal back to the transmitter where it is stored. Other systems also employing encoded transmissions are U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,037,201, 4,535,333, 4,638,433, 4,750,118 and 4,988,992.




While each of these devices have provided good security for the user, it is apparent that persons wishing to commit property or person-related crimes have become more sophisticated as well. It is known in the security industry today that devices are being made available that can intercept or steal rolling code.




Transequatorial Technology, Inc. sells integrated circuit code hopping encoders identified as Keeloq Model NTQ105, NTQ115, NTQ125D and NTQ129. Some of the keeloq code hopping encoders generate serial codes having fixed portions, i.e., which do not change with repeated actuation of the encoding portion of the chip and rolling code portions which alter with each actuation of the encoding portion of the chip. In order to avoid, however, having the problem of the encoding portion of the chip having been inadvertently enabled and causing the rolling code to be altered on successive enabling attempts thereby leading to a rolling code which is transmitted and not recognized by a receiver, the keeloq code hopping encoders provide a window forward system, that is they are operable with systems having code receivers which recognize as a valid code not a single rolling code, but a plurality of rolling codes within a certain code window or window of values which are the values which would be generated on a relatively small number of switch closures as compared to the total number of rolling codes available. The problem with such a system, however, might arise if a user was away for a period of time or had inadvertently caused codes to be transmitted excluding the number of codes normally allowed within the valid forward code window. In that case, the rolling code would not be recognized by the receiver and the user could not gain entry without taking other measures to defeat the locking system or the garage door operator system which might involve the intervention of a trained engineer or technician.




Texas Instruments also has a prior system identified as the Mark Star TRC1300 and TRC1315 remote control transmitter/receiver combination. The system involves the use of a rolling code encoder which increments or rolls potentially the entire code, that is it does not leave a fixed portion. The system also includes a forward windowing function which allows an authorized user to be able to cause the receiver to be enabled within a limited number of key pushes. Like the keeloq system, if the forward window is exceeded, the Texas Instruments system must be placed in a learn mode to cause the system to relearn the code. In order to place the system into the learn mode, the person must obtain direct access to the receiver to cause a programming control system associated with the receiver to be hand actuated causing the receiver to enter a learn mode. Once the receiver has learned the new code, the receiver will then construct a new valid forward code window within which valid rolling codes may be received. The problem, of course, with such a system is that if, for instance in a garage door operator, the only portal of entry to the garage door is through the overhead door controlled by the garage door operator, the user will not be able to obtain entry to the garage without possibly having to do some damage to the structure. This problem is sometimes referred to in the industry as a “vaulted garage.”




What is needed is an economical encoding system which provides good security by using a rolling code, but which enables a user of the system to proceed via a gradually degraded pathway in the event that the receiver detects a signal condition indicative of what might be a lack of security.




SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION




The invention relates in general to an electronic system for providing remote security for entry of actuation of a particular device. Such a system may include a transmitter and receiver set, for instance with a hand-held transmitter and a receiver associated with a vehicle such as an automobile or the like. The transmitter, upon signaling the receiver, causing the vehicle to start up or to perform other functions. The system may also be useful in a barrier operator system such as a garage door operator by allowing the garage door to be opened and closed in a relatively secure fashion while preventing persons who may be intercepting the radio frequency signals from being able to, although unauthorized, cause the vehicle to begin running or to allow access to the garage.




The system includes a transmitter generally having means for developing a fixed code and a rolling or variable code. The rolling or variable code is changed with each actuation of the transmitter. The fixed code remains the same for each actuation of the transmitter. In the present system, the transmitter includes means for producing a 32-bit frame comprising the fixed portion of the code and a second 32-bit frame comprising the variable portion of the code. The 32-bit rolling code is then mirrored to provide a 32-bit mirrored rolling code. The 32-bit mirrored rolling code then has its most significant bit “deleted” by setting it to zero. The transmitter then converts the 32-bit fixed code and the mirrored variable code to a three-valued or trinary bit fixed code and a three-valued or trinary bit variable code or rolling code.




To provide further security, the fixed code and the rolling codes are shuffled so that alternating trinary bits are comprised of a fixed code bit and a rolling code bit to yield a total of 40 trinary bits. The 40 trinary bits are then packaged in a first 20-trinary bit frame and a second 20-trinary bit frame which have proceeding them a single synchronization and/or identification pulse indicating the start of the frame and whether it is the first frame or the second frame. Immediately following each of the frames, the transmitter is placed into a quieting condition to maintain the average power of the transmitter over a typical 100 millisecond interval within legal limits promulgated by the United States Federal Communications Commission. The first trinary frame and the second trinary frame are used to modulate a radio frequency carrier, in this case via amplitude modulation to produce an amplitude modulated encrypted signal. In a preferred embodiment, the radio frequency signal is amplitude modulated. The amplitude modulated signal is then launched and may be received by an AM receiver. In the preferred embodiment, the AM receiver receives the amplitude modulated signal, demodulates it to produce a pair of trinary bit encoded frames. The trinary bits in each of the frames are converted on the fly to 2-bit or half nibbles indicative of the values of the trinary bits which are ultimately used to form two 16-bit fixed code words and two 16-bit variable code words. The two 16-bit fixed code words are used as a pointer to identify the location of a previously stored rolling code value within the receiver. The two 16-bit rolling code words are concatenated by taking the 16-bit word having the more significant bits, multiplying it by 3


10


and then adding it to the second of the words to produce a 32-bit encrypted rolling code. In order to make certain that if the transmitter was inadvertently actuated a number of times, the authorized user can still start his car or gain entry to his garage. The 32-bit encrypted code is then compared via a binary subtraction with the stored rolling code. If the 32-bit code is within a window or fixed count, in the present embodiment 1000, the microprocessor produces an authorization signal which is then responded to by other portions of the circuit to cause the garage door to open or close as commanded. In the event that the code is greater than the stored rolling code, plus 1000, indicative of a relatively large number of incrementations, the user is not locked out of the garage, but is allowed to provide further signals or indicia to the receiver that he is an authorized user without any significant degradation of the security. This is done by the receiver entering an alternate mode requiring two or more successive valid codes to be received, rather than just one. If the two or more successive valid codes are received, the garage door will open. However, in order to prevent a person who has previously or recently recorded a recent valid code from being able to obtain access to the garage, a trailing window, in this case starting at a count of 300 less than the present stored count and including all code values between the present stored count and 300 less is compared to the received code. If the received code is within this backward window, the response of the system simply is to take no further action, nor to provide authorization during that code cycle on the assumption that the code has been purloined.




Thus, the present system provides important advantages over the previous garage door operator systems and even previous rolling code systems. The system provides a multiple segmented windowed system which provides a valid code window, a second relatively insecure code window in which two successive valid codes must be received and finally a window in which no valid codes are recognized due to the likelihood of the receiver having been stolen.




It is a principal object of the present invention to provide a security system involving a radio frequency transmitter and receiver wherein multiple security conditions may exist requiring different levels of signal security.




It is another object of the present invention to provide a secure radio transmitter receiver system which may rapidly and easily decode a relatively large code combination.











Other advantages of the invention will become obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art upon a perusal of the following specification and claims in light of the accompanying drawings.




BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS





FIG. 1

is a perspective view of an apparatus for moving a barrier or garage embodying the present invention;





FIG. 2

is a block diagram of a transmitter for use with a garage door operator of

FIG. 1

;





FIG. 3

is a block diagram of a receiver positioned within a head unit of the garage door operator shown in

FIG. 1

;





FIG. 4

is a schematic diagram of the transmitter shown in

FIG. 2

;





FIGS. 5A-5B

is a schematic diagram of the receiver shown in

FIG. 3

;





FIG. 6

is a timing diagram of signals generated by a portion of the transmitter;





FIGS. 7A

, B and C are flow diagrams showing the operation of the transmitter; and





FIGS. 8A

, B, C, D, E and F are flow charts showing the operation of the receiver.











DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT




Referring now to the drawings and especially to

FIG. 1

, more specifically a movable barrier door operator or garage door operator is generally shown therein and includes a head unit


12


mounted within a garage


14


. More specifically, the head unit


12


is mounted to the ceiling of the garage


14


and includes a rail


18


extending therefrom with a releasable trolley


20


attached having an arm


22


extending to a multiple paneled garage door


24


positioned for movement along a pair of door rails


26


and


28


. The system includes a hand-held transmitter unit


30


adapted to send signals to an antenna


32


positioned on the head unit


12


and coupled to a receiver as will appear hereinafter. An external control pad


34


is positioned on the outside of the garage having a plurality of buttons thereon and communicate via radio frequency transmission with the antenna


32


of the head unit


12


.




An optical emitter


42


is connected via a power and signal line


44


to the head unit. An optical detector


46


is connected via a wire


48


to the head unit


12


.




Referring now to

FIG. 2

, the transmitter


30


is shown therein in general and includes a battery


70


connected by a pushbutton switch


72


to a power supply


74


which is coupled via leads


75


and


76


to a microcontroller


78


. The microcontroller


78


is connected by a serial bus


79


to a non-volatile memory


80


. An output bus


81


connects the microcontroller to a radio frequency oscillator


82


. The microcontroller


78


produces coded signals when the button


72


is pushed causing the output of the RF oscillator


82


to be amplitude modulated to supply a radio frequency signal at an antenna


83


connected thereto. More specifically, as shown in

FIG. 4

, details of the transmitter


30


are showntherein, including a plurality of switches


72


. When switch


72


is closed, power is supplied through a diode


100


to a capacitor


102


to supply a 7.1 volt voltage at a lead


103


connected thereto. A light emitting diode


104


indicates that the transmitter button has been pushed and provides a voltage to a lead


105


connected thereto. A Zener diode


106


provides voltage regulation and causes the back biased diode


107


to cause the crystal


108


to be energized, thereby energizing the microcontroller


78


, a Zilog 125C0113 8-bit microcontroller in this embodiment. The signal is also sent via a resistor


110


through a lead


111


to a P


32


pin of the microcontroller


78


. Likewise, when a switch


113


is closed, current is fed through a diode


114


to the lead


103


also causing the crystal


108


to be energized, powering up the microcontroller at the same time that pin P


33


of the microcontroller is pulled up. Similarly, when a switch


118


is closed, power is fed through a diode


119


to the crystal


108


as well as pull up voltage being provided through a resistor


120


to the pin P


31


. It should also be appreciated that pin P


34


of the microcontroller is configured via a connection with the resistor


123


to be an RS232 input port


124


.




The microcontroller is coupled via the serial bus


79


to a chip select port, a clock port and a DI port to which and from which serial data may be written and read and to which addresses may be applied. As will be seen hereinafter in the operation of the microcontroller, the microcontroller


78


produces output signals at the lead


81


, which are supplied to a resistor


125


which is coupled to a voltage dividing resistor


126


feeding signals to the lead


127


. A 30-nanohenry inductor


128


is coupled to an NPN transistor


129


at its base-


130


. The transistor


129


has a collector


131


and an emitter


132


. The collector


131


is connected to the antenna


83


which, in this case, comprises a printed circuit board, loop antenna having an inductance of 25-nanohenries, comprising a portion of the tank circuit with a capacitor


133


, a variable capacitor


134


for tuning, a capacitor


135


an a capacitor


136


. An 30-nanohenry inductor


138


is coupled via a capacitor


139


to ground. The capacitor has a resistor


140


connected in parallel with it to ground. When the output from lead


81


is driven high by the microcontroller, the transistor Q


1


is switched on causing the tank circuit to output a signal on the antenna


83


. When the transistor Q


1


is switched off, the output to the drive the tank circuit is extinguished causing the radio frequency signal at the antenna


83


also to be extinguished.




Referring now to

FIG. 3

, the receiver is shown therein and includes a receiver antenna


200


coupled to an amplitude modulated receiver


202


driven from a power supply


204


connectable to a source of alternating current


206


. The receiver


202


provides a demodulated output via a bandpass filter


210


to an analog-to-digital converter


212


which provides input to a microcontroller


214


having an internal read-only memory


216


and an-internal random-access memory


218


. A serial non-volatile memory


220


is connected via a memory bus


222


to the microcontroller


214


to send and receive information thereto. The microcontroller has an output line


226


coupled to a motor controller


228


which may include a plurality of relays or other standard electromechanical features which feeds electrical current on lines


230


and


232


to an electric motor


234


.




Referring now to

FIGS. 5A-5B

the antenna


200


coupled to a reactive divider network


250


comprised of a pair of series connected inductances


252


and


254


and capacitors


256


and


258


which supply an RF signal to a buffer amplifier having an NPN transistor


260


, at its emitter


261


. The NPN transistor


260


has a pair of capacitors


262


and


264


connected to it for power supply isolation. The buffer amplifier provides a buffered radio frequency output signal on a lead


268


. The buffered RF signal is fed to an input


270


which forms part of a super-regenerative receiver


272


having an output at a line


274


coupled to the bandpass filter which provides digital output to the bandpass filter


212


. The bandpass filter


212


includes a first stage


276


and a second stage


278


to provide a digital level output signal at a lead


280


which is supplied via an averaging circuit


282


to an input pin P


32


of the microcontroller


214


.




The microcontroller


214


may have its mode of operation controlled by a programming or learning switch


300


coupled via a line


302


to the P


25


pin. A command switch


304


is coupled via a jumper


306


to a line


308


and ultimately through a resistor to the input pin P


22


. A pin P


21


sinks current through a resistor


314


connected to a light emitting diode


316


, causing the diode to light to indicate that the receiver is active. The microcontroller


214


has a 4 MHz crystal


328


connected to it to provide clock signals and includes an RS232 output port


332


that is coupled to the pin P


31


. A switch


340


selects whether constant pressure or monostable is to be selected as the output from output terminals P


24


and P


23


which are coupled to a transistor


350


which, when switched on, sinks current through a coil


352


of a relay


354


, causing the relay to close to provide an actuating signal on a pair of leads


356


and


358


to an electric motor.




It may be appreciated that the power supply


204


may receive power from an external transformer or other AC source through a jack


370


which is connected to a pair of RJ uncoupling capacitors


372


and


374


. The input signal is then set to a full-wave rectifier bridge


376


which provides an output current at a resistor


378


. An 18-volt Zener diode


380


is connected between ground and the resistor


378


and includes high frequency bypass capacitor


382


connected in parallel with it. An 8.2-volt Zener diode


384


is connected in back-biased configuration to the resistor


378


to receive a signal therefrom to guarantee that at least an 8.2-volt signal is fed to a resistor


390


causing an LED


392


to be illuminated and also causing power to be supplied to a 5-volt 78LO5 voltage regulator


396


. The voltage regulator


396


supplies regulated voltage to an output line


398


. Filtering capacitors


400




a


,


400




b


,


400




c


and


400




d


limit the fluctuations at the power supply.




The program code listing for the transmitter is set forth at pages A-


1


through A-


19


and for the receiver at pages A-


20


through A-


51


of the attached appendix. Referring now to

FIGS. 7A through 7C

, the flow chart set forth therein describes the operation of the transmitter. A rolling code is incremented by three in a step


500


, followed by the rolling code being stored for the next transmission from the transmitter when the transmitter button is pushed. The order of the binary digits in the rolling code is inverted or mirrored in a step


504


, following which in a step


506


, the most significant digit is converted to zero effectively truncating the binary rolling code. The rolling code is then changed to a trinary code having values 0, 1 and 2 and the initial trinary rolling code is set to 0. It may be appreciated that it is trinary code which is actually used to modify the radio frequency oscillator signal and the trinary code is best seen in FIG.


6


. It may be noted that the bit timing in

FIG. 6

for a 0 is 1.5 milliseconds down time and 0.5 millisecond up time, for a 1, 1 millisecond down and 1 millisecond up and for a 2, 0.5 millisecond down and 1.5 milliseconds up. The up time is actually the active time when carrier is being generated. The down time is inactive when the carrier is cut off. The codes-are assembled in two frames, each of 20 trinary bits, with the first frame being identified by a 0.5 millisecond sync bit and the second frame being identified by a 1.5 millisecond sync bit.




In a step


510


, the next highest power of 3 is subtracted from the rolling code and a test is made in a step


512


to determine if the result is equal to zero. If it is, the next most significant digit of the binary rolling code is incremented in a step


514


, following which flow is returned to the step


510


. If the result is not greater than 0, the next highest power of 3 is added to the rolling code in the step


516


. In the step


518


, another highest power of 3 is incremented and in a step


520


, a test is determined as to whether the rolling code is completed. If it is not, control is transferred back to step


510


. If it has, control is transferred to step


522


to clear the bit counter. In a step


524


, the blank timer is tested to determine whether it is active or not. If it is not, a test is made in a step


526


to determine whether the blank time has expired. If the blank time has not expired, control is transferred to a step


528


in which the bit counter is incremented, following which control is transferred back to the decision step


524


. If the blank time has expired as measured in decision step


526


, the blank timer is stopped in a step


530


and the bit counter is incremented in a step


532


. The bit counter is then tested for odd or even in a step


534


. If the bit counter is not even, control is transferred to a step


536


where the output bit of the bit counter divided by 2 is fixed. If the bit counter is even, the output bit counter divided by 2 is rolling in a step


538


. The bit counter is tested to determine whether it is set to equal to 80 in a step


540


. If it is, the blank timer is started in a step


542


. If it is not, the bit counter is tested for whether it is equal to 40 in a step


544


. If it is, the blank timer is tested and is started in a step


544


. If the bit counter is not equal to 40, control is transferred back to step


522


.




Referring now to

FIGS. 8A through 8F

and, in particular, to

FIG. 8A

, the operation of the receiver is set forth therein. In a step


700


, an interrupt is detected and acted upon from the radio input pin. The time difference between the last edge is determined and the radio inactive timer is cleared in step


702


. A determination is made as to whether this is an active time or inactive time in a step


704


, i.e., whether the signal is being sent with carrier or not. If it is an inactive time, indicating the absence of carrier, control is transferred to a step


706


to store the inactive time in the memory and the routine is exited in a step


708


. In the event that it is an active time, the active time is stored in memory in a step


710


and the bit counter is tested in a step


712


. If the bit counter zero, control is transferred to a step


714


, as may best be seen in

FIG. 8B and a

test is made to determine whether the inactive time is between 20 milliseconds and 55 milliseconds. If it is not, the bit counter is cleared as well as the rolling code register and the fixed code register in step


716


and the routine is exited in step


718


.




In the event that the inactive time is between 20 milliseconds and 55 milliseconds, a test is made in a step


720


to determine whether the active time is greater than 1 millisecond, as shown in FIG.


8


C. If it is not, a test is made in a step


722


to determine whether the inactive time is less than 0.35 millisecond. If it is, a frame


1


flag is set in a step


728


identifying the incoming information as being associated with frame


1


and the interrupt routine is exited in a step


730


. In the event that the active time test in step


722


is not less than 0.35 millisecond, in the step


724


, the bit counter is cleared as well as the rolling code register and the fixed register and the return is exited in the step


726


. If the active time is greater than 1 millisecond as tested in step


720


, a test is made in a step


732


to determine whether the active time is greater than 2.0 milliseconds. If it is not, the frame


2


flag is set in a step


734


and the routine is exited in step


730


. If the active time is greater than 2 milliseconds, the bit counter rolling code register and fixed code register are cleared in step


724


and the routine is exited in step


726


.




In the event that the bit counter test in step


712


indicates that the bit counter is not


0


, control is transferred to step


736


, as shown in FIG.


8


A. Both the active and inactive periods are tested to determine whether they are less than 4.5 milliseconds. If either is not less than 4.5 milliseconds, the bit counter is cleared as well as the rolling code register and the fixed code registers. If both are equal to greater than 4.5 milliseconds, the bit counter is incremented and the active time is subtracted from the inactive time in the step


738


, as shown in FIG.


8


D. In the step


740


, the results of the subtraction are determined as to whether they are less than 0.38 milliseconds. If they are, the bit value is set equal to zero in step


742


and control is transferred to a decision step


743


. If the results are not less than 0.38 milliseconds, a test is made in a step


744


to determine if they difference between the active time and inactive time is greater than 0.38 milliseconds and control is then transferred to a step


746


setting the bit value equal to 2. Both of the bit values being set in steps


742


and


746


relate to a translation from the three-level trinary bits


0


,


1


and


2


to a binary number.




If the result of the step


744


is in the negative, the bit value is set equal to 1 in step


748


. Control is then transferred to the step


743


to test whether the bit counter is set to an odd or an even number. If it is set to an odd number, control is transferred to a step


750


where the fixed code, indicative of the fact that the bit is an odd numbered bit in the frame sequence, rather an even numbered bit, which would imply that it is one of the interleaved rolling code bits, is multiplied by three and then the bit value added in.




If the bit counter indicates that it is an odd number trinary bit being processed, the existing rolling code registers are multiplied by three and then the trinary bit value obtained from steps


742


,


746


and


748


is added in. Whether step


750


or


752


occurs, the bit counter value is the tested in the step


754


, as shown in FIG.


8


E. If the bit counter value is greater than 21, the bit counter rolling code register and fixed code register are cleared in the step


758


and the routine is exited. If the bit counter value is less than 21, there is a return from the interrupt sequence in a step


756


. If the bit counter value is equal to 21, indicating that a sink bit plus trinary data bits have been received, a test is made in a step


760


to determine whether the sink bit was indicative of a first or second frame, if it was indicative of a first frame, the bit counter is cleared and set up is done for the second frame following which there is a return from the routine in the step


762


. In the event that the second frame is indicated as being received by the decision of step


760


, the two frames have their rolling contributions added together to form the complete inverted rolling code. The rolling code is then inverted or mirrored to recover the rolling code counter value in the step


764


. A test is made in the step


766


to determine whether the program mode has been set. If it has been set, control is transferred to a step


768


where the code is compared to the last code received. If there is no match, as would be needed in order to get programming, then another code will be read until two successive codes match or the program mode is terminated. In a step


770


, the codes are tested such that the fixed codes are tested for a match with a fixed code in non-volatile memory. If there is a match, the rolling portion is stored in the memory. If there is not, it is stored in the non-volatile memory. Control is then transferred to step


772


, the program indicator is switched off, the program mode is exited and there is a return from the interrupt. In the event that the test of step


766


indicates that the program mode has not been set, the program indicator is switched on in a step


774


, as shown in FIG.


8


F. The codes are tested to determine whether there is a match for the fixed portion of the code in the step


776


. If there is no match, the program indicator is switched off and the routine is exited in step


778


. If there is a match, the counter which is indicative of the rolling code is tested to determine whether its value is greater than the stored rolling code by a factor or difference of less than 3,000 indicating an interval of 1,000 button pushes for the transmitter. If it is not, a test is made in the step


786


to determine whether the last transmission from the same transmitter is with a rolling code that is two to four less than the reception and, if true, is the memory value minus the received rolling code counter value greater than 1,000. If it is, control is transferred to a step


782


switching off the program indicator and setting the operation command word causing a commanded signal to operate the garage door operator. The reception time out timer is cleared and the counter value for the rolling code is stored in non-volatile memory, following which the routine is exited in the step


784


. In the event that the difference is not greater than 1,000, in step


786


there is an immediate return from the interrupt in the step


784


. In the event that the counter test in the step


780


is positive, steps


782


and


784


are then executed thereafter.




While there has been illustrated and described a particular embodiment of the present invention, it will be appreciated that numerous changes and modifications will occur to those skilled in the art, and it is intended in the appended claims to cover all those changes and modifications which fall within the true spirit and scope of the present invention.



Claims
  • 1. A receiver for receiving an encrypted signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal, comprising:receiving apparatus for receiving an encrypted radio frequency signal; a demodulator for demodulating the encrypted radio frequency signal into a demodulated encrypted signal; code separating apparatus for synchronizing with and separating the demodulated encrypted signal into a variable code portion and a fixed code portion; testing apparatus for testing the fixed code portion and generating a portion receipt signal in response thereto; window testing apparatus for testing whether a rolling code value is within a windowed range of rolling code values to avoid false triggering on a spurious rolling code having been transmitted by a person not having permission to authorize generation of the actuator signal and producing a rolling code signal in response thereto; a code updater for updating the variable code to an incremented rolling code; and signal generating apparatus for producing an actuator signal to produce an actuator command in response to the verified fixed code portion and the variable code.
  • 2. A receiver for receiving an encrypted signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal, comprising:a receiver for receiving an encrypted radio frequency signal; a demodulator for demodulating the encrypted radio frequency signal into a demodulated encrypted signal; a first comparator for comparing the encrypted signal to a first plurality of signal code values defining a valid signal window and in response thereto generating an actuator signal; a second comparator for comparing the encrypted signal to a second set of values and generating a security code signal in response thereto; a third comparator for comparing a second signal transmission; and a fourth comparator responsive to said security code signal for comparing a second successive transmission to said second window values and producing an actuation signal in response thereto and an inhibitor for inhibiting actuation responsive to receipt of a signal having a value within a trailing signal window.
  • 3. A receiver for receiving an encrypted signal from a transmitter for generating an actuation signal according to claim 2, further comprising apparatus for determining whether the second of the two successive codes is valid by comparing the first received code to the second received code and producing the actuation signal only when the first received code and the second received code are separated by a single rolling code increment.
  • 4. A receiver for receiving an encrypted signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal according to claim 2, further comprising a code signal generator for generating a fixed code signal in response to said encrypted radio frequency signal, said fixed code signal being compared to a stored fixed code signal and enabling actuation only upon a match.
  • 5. A receiver for receiving an encrypted signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal according to claim 2, wherein said demodulated encrypted signal comprises an interleaved fixed code portion and a variable code portion both said fixed code and said variable code portions comprising multi-valued digits and each digit having at least 3 possible values.
  • 6. A receiver for receiving an encrypted signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal according to claim 5, further comprising a converter for converting said multi-valued digits to binary digits.
  • 7. A receiver for receiving an encrypted signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal according to claim 5, further comprising a converter for converting the demodulated encrypted signal into a binary fixed code signal and a binary variable code signal.
  • 8. A receiver for receiving an encrypted radio frequency signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal, comprising:a receiver for receiving an encrypted radio frequency signal; a demodulator for demodulating the encrypted radio frequency signal into a demodulated encrypted signal; a rolling code generator responsive to the demodulated encrypted signal for producing a rolling code signal; a forward tester for testing whether the rolling code signal is within a forward rolling code window and generating an actuation authorization in response thereto; a backward tester for testing whether the rolling code is within a backward rolling code window and inhibiting actuation of an actuator in response thereto; a resynchronization tester for testing whether the rolling code is within a rolling code resynchronization window and generating a resynchronization signal in response thereto; a rolling code resynchronizer for resynchronization of a receiver rolling code value in response to the resynchronization signal; and a control signal generator for generating a control signal in response to the actuation authorization for control or actuation of the actuator.
  • 9. A receiver for receiving an encrypted radio frequency signal from a transmitter and for generating an actuation signal according to claim 8 further comprising:an authenticity determiner for determining the authenticity of the rolling code and the decrypted fixed code signal and generating a control signal in response thereto for control or actuation of an actuator.
Parent Case Info

This is a division, of prior application Ser. No. 08/873,149, filed Jun. 11, 1997, which was a continuation of application Ser. No. 08/446,886, filed May 17, 1995, now abandoned, which is hereby incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

US Referenced Citations (162)
Number Name Date Kind
2405500 Guannella Aug 1946 A
3716865 Willmont Feb 1973 A
3735106 Hollaway May 1973 A
3792446 McFiggins et al. Feb 1974 A
3798359 Feistel Mar 1974 A
3798360 Feistel Mar 1974 A
3798605 Feistel Mar 1974 A
3845277 Voss et al. Oct 1974 A
3890601 Pietrolewicz Jun 1975 A
3906348 Willmott Sep 1975 A
3938091 Atalla et al. Feb 1976 A
4037201 Willmott Jul 1977 A
4064404 Willmott et al. Dec 1977 A
RE29525 Willmott Jan 1978 E
4078152 Tuckerman, III Mar 1978 A
4138735 Allocca et al. Feb 1979 A
4178549 Ledenbach et al. Dec 1979 A
4195196 Feistel Mar 1980 A
4195200 Feistel Mar 1980 A
4196310 Forman et al. Apr 1980 A
4218738 Matyas et al. Aug 1980 A
4304962 Fracassi et al. Dec 1981 A
4305060 Apple et al. Dec 1981 A
4316055 Feistel Feb 1982 A
4326098 Bouricius et al. Apr 1982 A
4327444 Court Apr 1982 A
4328414 Atalla May 1982 A
4328540 Matsuoka et al. May 1982 A
RE30957 Feistel Jun 1982 E
4380762 Capasso Apr 1983 A
4385296 Tsubaki et al. May 1983 A
4393269 Konheim et al. Jul 1983 A
4418333 Schwarzbach et al. Nov 1983 A
4426637 Apple et al. Jan 1984 A
4445712 Smagala-Romanoff May 1984 A
4447890 Duwel et al. May 1984 A
4454509 Buennagel et al. Jun 1984 A
4464651 Duhame Aug 1984 A
4471493 Schober Sep 1984 A
4491774 Schmitz Jan 1985 A
4509093 Stellberger Apr 1985 A
4529980 Liotine et al. Jul 1985 A
4535333 Twardowski Aug 1985 A
4574247 Jacob Mar 1986 A
4578530 Zeidler Mar 1986 A
4581606 Mallory Apr 1986 A
4590470 Koenig May 1986 A
4593155 Hawkins Jun 1986 A
4596898 Pemmaraju Jun 1986 A
4596985 Bongard et al. Jun 1986 A
4599489 Cargile Jul 1986 A
4602357 Yang et al. Jul 1986 A
4611198 Levinson et al. Sep 1986 A
4623887 Welles, II Nov 1986 A
4626848 Ehlers Dec 1986 A
4628315 Douglas Dec 1986 A
4630035 Stahl et al. Dec 1986 A
4633247 Hegeler Dec 1986 A
4638433 Schindler Jan 1987 A
4646080 Genest et al. Feb 1987 A
4652860 Weishaupt et al. Mar 1987 A
4670746 Taniguchi et al. Jun 1987 A
4686529 Kleefeldt Aug 1987 A
4695839 Barbu et al. Sep 1987 A
4703359 Rumbolt et al. Oct 1987 A
4710613 Shigenaga Dec 1987 A
4716301 Willmott et al. Dec 1987 A
4720860 Weiss Jan 1988 A
4723121 van den Boom et al. Feb 1988 A
4731575 Sloan Mar 1988 A
4737770 Brunius et al. Apr 1988 A
4740792 Sagey et al. Apr 1988 A
4750118 Heitschel et al. Jun 1988 A
4754255 Sanders et al. Jun 1988 A
4755792 Pezzolo et al. Jul 1988 A
4758835 Rathmann et al. Jul 1988 A
4761808 Howard Aug 1988 A
4779090 Micznik et al. Oct 1988 A
4794268 Nakano et al. Dec 1988 A
4794622 Isaacman et al. Dec 1988 A
4796181 Wiedemer Jan 1989 A
4799061 Abraham et al. Jan 1989 A
4800590 Vaughan Jan 1989 A
4802114 Sogame Jan 1989 A
4807052 Amano Feb 1989 A
4808995 Clark et al. Feb 1989 A
4825200 Evans et al. Apr 1989 A
4825210 Bachhuber et al. Apr 1989 A
4831509 Jones et al. May 1989 A
4835407 Kataoka et al. May 1989 A
4845491 Fascenda et al. Jul 1989 A
4847614 Keller Jul 1989 A
4855713 Brunius Aug 1989 A
4856081 Smith Aug 1989 A
4859990 Isaacman Aug 1989 A
4870400 Downs et al. Sep 1989 A
4878052 Schulze Oct 1989 A
4881148 Lambropoulous et al. Nov 1989 A
4885778 Weiss Dec 1989 A
4888575 De Vaulx Dec 1989 A
4890108 Drori et al. Dec 1989 A
4905279 Nishio Feb 1990 A
4912463 Li Mar 1990 A
4914696 Dudczak et al. Apr 1990 A
4918690 Markkula, Jr. et al. Apr 1990 A
4922168 Waggamon et al. May 1990 A
4922533 Philippe May 1990 A
4928098 Dannhaeuser May 1990 A
4931789 Pinnow Jun 1990 A
4939792 Urbish et al. Jul 1990 A
4942393 Waraksa et al. Jul 1990 A
4951029 Severson Aug 1990 A
4963876 Sanders Oct 1990 A
4979832 Ritter Dec 1990 A
4980913 Skret Dec 1990 A
4988992 Heitschel et al. Jan 1991 A
4992783 Zdunek et al. Feb 1991 A
4999622 Amano et al. Mar 1991 A
5001332 Schrenk Mar 1991 A
5023908 Weiss Jun 1991 A
5049867 Stouffer Sep 1991 A
5055701 Takeuchi Oct 1991 A
5058161 Weiss Oct 1991 A
5060263 Bosen et al. Oct 1991 A
5103221 Memmola Apr 1992 A
5107258 Soum Apr 1992 A
5126959 Kurihara Jun 1992 A
5144667 Pogue, Jr. et al. Sep 1992 A
5146067 Sloan et al. Sep 1992 A
5148159 Clark et al. Sep 1992 A
5153581 Hazard Oct 1992 A
5159329 Lindmayer et al. Oct 1992 A
5168520 Weiss Dec 1992 A
5193210 Nicholas et al. Mar 1993 A
5224163 Gasser et al. Jun 1993 A
5237614 Weiss Aug 1993 A
5252960 Duhame Oct 1993 A
5278907 Snyder et al. Jan 1994 A
5361062 Weiss et al. Nov 1994 A
5363448 Koopman, Jr. et al. Nov 1994 A
5365225 Bachhuber Nov 1994 A
5367572 Weiss Nov 1994 A
5369706 Latka Nov 1994 A
5412379 Waraksa et al. May 1995 A
5414418 Andros, Jr. May 1995 A
5420925 Michaels May 1995 A
5442341 Lambropoulos Aug 1995 A
5471668 Soenen et al. Nov 1995 A
5473318 Martel Dec 1995 A
5479512 Weiss Dec 1995 A
5485519 Weiss Jan 1996 A
5517187 Bruwer et al. May 1996 A
RE35364 Heitschel et al. Oct 1996 E
5563600 Miyake Oct 1996 A
5594429 Nakahara Jan 1997 A
5598475 Soenen et al. Jan 1997 A
5608723 Felsenstein Mar 1997 A
5657388 Weiss Aug 1997 A
5686904 Bruwer Nov 1997 A
5778348 Manduley et al. Jul 1998 A
5872519 Issa et al. Feb 1999 A
5898397 Murray Apr 1999 A
Foreign Referenced Citations (45)
Number Date Country
32 34 538 Mar 1984 DE
32 34 539 Mar 1984 DE
32 44 049 Sep 1984 DE
33 09 802 Sep 1984 DE
3309802 Sep 1984 DE
33 20 721 Dec 1984 DE
3309802 Jul 1985 DE
33 09 802 Jul 1985 DE
34 07 436 Aug 1985 DE
3407 436 Aug 1985 DE
34 07 469 Sep 1985 DE
3407 469 Sep 1985 DE
35 32 156 Mar 1987 DE
3532 156 Mar 1987 DE
3636822 Oct 1987 DE
36 36 822 Oct 1987 DE
0 043 270 Jan 1982 EP
0 103 790 Mar 1984 EP
0 244 332 Nov 1987 EP
0 155 378 Jul 1988 EP
0 154 019 Aug 1988 EP
0 311 112 Apr 1989 EP
0 335 912 Oct 1989 EP
0 311 112 Dec 1989 EP
0 459 781 Dec 1991 EP
2 606 232 May 1988 FR
2 607 544 Jul 1988 FR
2 685 520 Jun 1993 FR
0 023 899 Jan 1980 GB
2 023 899 Jan 1980 GB
2 051 442 Jan 1981 GB
2 099 195 Dec 1982 GB
2 099 195 Dec 1982 GB
2 118 614 Nov 1983 GB
2 131 992 Jun 1984 GB
2 133 073 Jul 1984 GB
2 18 774 Jul 1987 GB
2 184 774 Jul 1987 GB
9320538 Oct 1993 WO
WO 9320538 Oct 1993 WO
WO 9411829 May 1994 WO
9411829 May 1994 WO
904088 May 1990 ZA
89 8225 Jun 1990 ZA
89 08 225 Jun 1990 ZA
Non-Patent Literature Citations (116)
Entry
Kobus Marneweck, Guidelines for KeeLoq® Secure Learning Implementation, TB007, 1987 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-5.
Chris R. Burger, Secure Learning RKE Systems Using KeeLoq® Encoders, TB001, 1996 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-7.
Keeloq® Code Hopping Encoder, HCS300, 1996 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-20.
Steven Dawson, Keeloq® Code Hopping Decoder Using Secure Learn, AN662, 1997 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-16.
Keeloq® Code Hopping Decoder, HCS500, 1997 Microchip Technology, Inc., 1-25.
Keeloq® NTQ 105 Code Hopping Endocer, Nanoteq (Pty.) Ltd., Jul. 1993, 1-8.
Keeloq® NTQ 125D Code Hopping Decoder, Nanoteq (Pty.) Ltd., Jul. 1993, 1-8.
Keeloq® NTQ 115 Code Hopping Encoder, Nanoteq (Pty.) Ltd., Jul. 1993, 1-8.
Keeloq® NTQ 129 Code Hopping Decoder, Nanoteq (Pty.) Ltd., Jul. 1993, 1-9.
G. Davis, Marcstar™ TRC1300 and TRC1315 Remote Control Transmitter/Receiver, Texas Instruments, Sep. 12, 1994, 1-14.
NM95HS01/NM95HS02 HiSeC198 (High Security Code) Generator, National Semiconductor, Jan. 1995, 1-19.
Charles Watts, How to Program the HiSec™ Remote Keyless Entry Rolling Code Generator, National Semiconductor, Oct. 1994, 1-4.
MM57HS01 HiSeC™ Fixed and Rolling Code Decoder, National Semiconductor, Nov. 11, 1994, 1-8.
Charles Watts and Jon Harper, How to Design a HiSeC™ Transmitter, National Semiconductor, Oct. 1994, 1-4.
Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, Privacy and Authentication: An Introduction to Cryptography, Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 67, No. 3, Mar. 1979, 397-427.
Benjamin Arazi, Vehicular Implementations of Public Key Cryptographic Techniques, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 40, No, 3, Aug. 1991, 646-653.
Ben Davis and Ron DeLong, Combined Remote Key Control and Immobilization System for Vehicle Security, Power Electronics in Transportation, IEEE Catalogue No. 96TH8184, Oct. 24, 1996, 125-132.
Doug Conner, Crytographic Techniques—Secure Your Wireless Designs, EDN (Design Feature), Jan. 18, 1996, 57-66.
Maurizio Fragano, Solid State Key/Lock Security System, IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, Vol. CE-30, No. 4, Nov. 1984, 604-607.
Abramson, Norman. “The Aloha System—Another Alternative for Computer Communications,” pp. 281-285, University of Hawaii, 1970.
“Access Transmitters—Access Security System”, pp. 1-2, Undated. htpp://www.webercreations.com/access/security.html.
Alexi, Werner, et al., “RSA and Rabin Functions: Certain Parts are as Hard as the Whole”, pp. 194-209, Siam Computing, Vol. 14, No. 2, Apr. 1988.
Allianz: Allianz-Zentrum for Technik GmbH—“Detailed Requirements for Fulfilling the Specification Profile for Electronically Coded OEM Immobilizers”, Issue 22, Jun. 1994 (Translation 5 Jul. 1994).
Anderson, Ross. “Searching for the Optium Correlation Attack”, pp. 136-143, Computer Laboratory, Pembroke Street, Cambridge CB2 3QG, Undated.
Baran, P. Distribution Communications, Vol. 9, “Security Secrecy and Tamper-free Communications”, Rand Corporation, 1964.
Barbaroux, Paul. “Uniform Results in Polynomial-Time Security”, pp. 297-306, Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 92, 1992.
Bellovi, S. M. “Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite”, pp. 32-49, Computer Communication Review, New Jersey, Undated.
Beutelspacher, Albrecht. Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 87: “Perfect and Essentially Perfect Authentication Schemes” (Extended Abstract), pp. 167-170, Federal Republic of Germany, Undated.
Bloch, Gilbert, “Enigma Before Ultra Polish Work and The French Contribution”, 11(3): 142-155, Cryptologia, Jul. 1987.
Brickell, Ernest F. and Stinson, Doug. “Authentication Codes with Multiple Arbiters”, pp. 51-55, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 88, 1988.
Burmeister, Mike. “A Remark on the Efficiency of Identification Schemes”, pp. 493-495, Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 90, 1990.
Cerf, Vinton G. and Kahn, Robert E. “A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication”, pp. 637-648, Transactions on Communications, Vol. Com-22, No, 5, May 1974.
Cerf, Vinton G. “Issues in Packet-Network Interconnection”, pp. 1386-1408, Proceedings of the IEEE, 66(11), Nov. 1978.
Coopersmith, Don. “Fast Evaluation of Logarithms in Fields of Characteristic Two”, IT-30(4): pp. 587-594, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Jul. 1984.
Davis, Gregory and Palmer, Morris. “Self-Programming, Rolling-Code Technology Creates Nearly Unbreakable RF Security”, Technological Horizons, Texas Instruments, Inc. (ECN), Oct. 1996.
Deavours, Cipher A., et al. “Analysis of the Hebern Cryptograph Using Isomorphs”, pp. 246-261, Cryptology: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Vol. 1, No. 2, Apr. 1977.
Deavours, C. A. and Reeds, James. “The Enigma, Part 1, Historical Perspectives”, 381-391, Cryptologia, 1(4): Oct. 1977.
Deavours, C. A. and Kruh, L. “The Swedish HC-9 Ciphering Machine”, 251-285, Cryptologia, 13(3): Jul. 1989.
Denning, Dorothy E. “Cryptographic Techniques”, pp. 135-154, Cryptography and Data Security, 1982. Chapter 3.
Denning, Dorothy E. “A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow”, pp. 236-238, 240, 242, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 19, No. 5, May 1976.
De Soete, Marijke. “Some Constructions for Authentication-Secrecy Codes”, pp. 57-75, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 88, Updated.
Diffie, Whitfield and Hellman, Martin E. “New Directions in Cryptography”, pp. 644-654, IEEE, Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-22, No. 6, Nov. 1976.
Diffie, Whitfield and Hellman, Martin, E. “An RSA Laboratories Technical Note”, Version 1.4, Revised Nov. 1, 1993.
Djkstra, E. W. “Co-Operating Sequential Processes”, pp. 43-112, Programming Languages, F. Fenuys. NY, Undated.
Djkstra, E. W. “Hierarchical Ordering of Sequential Processes”, pp. 115-138, Acta Informatica 1: 115-138, 1971.
ElGamal, Taher. “A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms”, pp. 469-472, IEEE, Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-31, No. 4, Jul. 1985.
ElGamal, Taher. “A Subexponential Time Algorithm for Computing Discrete Logarithms”, pp. 473-481, IEEE, Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-31, No. 4, Jul. 1985.
Feistel, Horst, Notz, Wm. A. and Smith, J. Lynn. “Some Cryptographic Techniques for Machine-to-Machine Data Communications”, pp. 1545-1554, Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 63, No. 11, Nov. 1975.
Feistel, Horst. “Cryptography and Computer Privacy”, pp. 15-23, Scientific American, Vol. 228, No. 5, May 1973.
Fischer, Elliot. “Uncaging the Hagelin Cryptograph”, pp. 89-92, Cryptologia, Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan. 1983.
Godlewski, Ph. and Camion P. “Manipulations and Errors, Delection and Localization,” pp. 97-106, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 88, 1988.
Guillou, Louis C. “Smart Cards and Conditional Access”, pp. 481-489, Proceedings of Eurocrypt, 1984.
Guillou, Louis C. and Quisquater, Jean-Jacques. “A Practical Zero-Knowledge Protocol Fitted to Security Microprocessor Minimizing Both Transmission and Memory”, pp. 123-128, Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 88, 1988.
Habemann, A. Nico, “Synchronization of Communicating Processes”, pp. 171-176, Communications, Mar., 1972.
Hagelin C-35/C-36 (The), (1 page) Undated. http://hem.passagen.se/tan01/C035.HTML.
Jones, Anita K. “Protection Mechanisms and the Enforcement of Security Policies”, pp. 228-251, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1978.
Jueneman, R. R. et al, “Message Authentication”, pp. 29-40, IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 23, No. 9, Sep. 1985.
Kahn, Robert E. “The Organization of Computer Resources into a Packet Radio Network”, pp. 177-186, National Computer Conference, 1975.
Kent, Stephen T. “Encryption-Based Protection Protocols for Interactive User-Computer Communication”, pp. 1-121, (See pp. 50-53) May 1976.
Kent, Stephen T. “Protocol Design Considerations for Network Security”, pp. 239-259, Proc. NATO Advanced Study Institute on Interlinking of Computer Networks, 1979.
Kent, Stephen T. “A Comparison of Some Aspects of Public-Key and Conventional Cryptosystems”, pp. 4.3.1-5, IEE '79 Int. Conf. on Communications; Boston, Mass., Jun. 1979.
Kent, Stephen T. et al. “Personal Authentication System for Access Control to the Defense Data Network”, pp. 89-93, Conf. Record of Eascon 82 15th Ann Electronics & Aerospace Systems Conf.; Washington, DC; Sep. 1982.
Kent, Stephen T. “Security Requirements and Protocols for a Broadcast Scenario”, Vol: com-29, No. 6, pp. 778-786, IEEE Transactions on Communications, Jun. 1981.
Kent, Stephen T. “Comments on ‘Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite’”, Computer Communication Review, Vol. 19, Part 3, pp. 10-19, Jul. 1989.
Kruh, Louis, “How to Use the German Enigma Cipher Machine: A Photographic Essay”, pp. 291-296, Cryptologia, Vol. No. 7, No. 4, Oct. 1983.
Kruh, Louis, “Devices and Machines: The Hagelin Cryptographer, Type C-52”, 78-82, Cryptologia, Vol. 3, No. 2, Apr. 1979.
Kuhn, G. J. “Algorithms for Self-Synchronizing Ciphers” Comsig 88, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, pp. 159-164, 1988.
Kuhn, G. J. et al. “A Versatile High-Speed Encryption Chip”, (Presented at the INFOSEC'90 SYMPOSIUM, Pretoria), Mar. 16, 1990.
Lemport, Leslie. “The Synchronization of Independent Processes”, pp. 15-34, Acta Informatica, Vol. 7, 1976.
Linn, John and Kent, Stephen T. “Electronic Mail Privacy Enhancement”, pp. 40-43, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1986.
Lloyd, Sheelagh. “Counting Functions Satisfying a Higher Order Strict Avalanche Criterion”, pp. 63-74, 1990.
Massey, James L. “The Difficulty with Difficulty” (4 pages), Undated. http://www.lacr.org/conferences/ec96/massey/html/framemassey.html.
McIvor, Robert. “Smart Cards” pp. 152-159, Scientific American, Vol. 253, No. 5, Nov. 1985.
Meier, Willi. “Fast Correlation Attacks on Stream Ciphers”, (Extended Abstract), pp. 301-314, Eurocrypt 88, IEEE, 1988.
Meyer, Carl H. and Matyas, Stephen H., Cryptography: A New Dimension in Computer Data Security, pp. 237-249, 1982.
Michener, J. R. The ‘Generalized Rotor’ Cryptographic Operator and Some of Its Applications, pp. 97-113, Cryptologia, Vol. 9, No. 2, Apr. 1985.
Niederreiter, Harald. “Keystream Sequences with a Good Linear Complexity Profile for Every Starting Point”, pp. 523-532, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 89, 1989.
Otway, Dave and Rees, Owen. “Efficient and Timely Mutual Authentication”, pp. 8-11, Undated.
Peyret, Patrice et al. “Smart Cards Provide Very High Security and Flexibility in Subscribers Management”, 744-752, IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 36(3): Aug. 1990.
Morris, Robert. “The Hagelin Ciher Machine (M-209): Reconstruction of the Internal Settings”, 2(3): pp. 267-289, Cryptologia, Jul. 1978.
Newman, David B. Jr. et al., “Public Key Management for Network Security”, pp. 11-16, IEEE Network Magazine, 1987.
“News: Key System for Security”, p. 68, Apr. 1982.
Postel, Jonathan B. et al., “The ARPA Internet Protocol”, pp. 261-271, 1981.
Postel, J. ed. “DOD Standard Transmission Control Protocol”, pp. 52-133, Jan. 1980.
Reed, David P. and Kanodia, Rajendra K. “Synchronization with Eventcounts and Sequencers”, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 115-123, Communications of the ACM, Feb. 1979.
Reynolds, J. and J. Postel. “Official ARPA-Internet Protocols”, Network Working Groups, Apr. 1985.
Saab Anti-Theft System: “Saab's Engine Immobilizing Anti-Theft System is a Road-Block for ‘Code-Grabbing’ Thieves”, pp. 1-2, Undated. http://www.saabusa.com/news/newsindex/alarm.html.
Savage, J. E. “Some Simple Self-Synchronizing Digital Data Scramblers”, pp. 449-487, The Bell System Tech. Journal, Feb. 1967.
“Secure Terminal Interface Module for Smart Card Applications”, IBM: Technical Disclosure Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 1488-1489, Sep. 1985.
Shamir, Adi. “Embedding Cryptographic Trapdoors in Arbitrary Knapsack Systems”, pp. 77-79, Information Processing Letters, 1983.
Siegenthaler, T. “Decrypting a Class of Stream Ciphers Using Ciphertext Only”, Vol. C-34, No. 1, pp. 81-85, IEEE Transactions on Computers, Jan. 1985.
Simmons, Gustavus J. “Message Authentication with Arbitration of Transmitter/Receiver Disputes”, pp. 151-165, 1987.
Smith, J. L. The Design of Lucifier: A Cryptographic Device for Data Communications, pp. 1-65, Apr. 15, 1971.
Smith, J. L. et al. “An Experimental Application of Cryptography to a Remotely Accessed Data System”, Proceedings of the ACM, pp. 282-297, Aug. 1972.
Svigals, J. “Limiting Access to Data in an Identification Card Having a Micro-Processor”, IBM: Technical Disclosure Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 1B, pp. 580-581, Jun. 1984.
“Transaction Completion Code Based on Digital Signatures”, IBM: Technical Disclosure Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 1109-1122, Aug. 1985.
Turn, Rein. “Privacy Transformations for Databank Systems”, pp. 589-601, National Computer Conference, 1973.
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. “Security Mechanisms in High-Level Network Protocols”, Computing Surveys, pp. 135-171, Vol. 15, No. 2, Jun. 1983.
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. “Security in High-Level Network Protocols”, IEEE Communications Magazine, pp. 12-25, Vol. 23, No. 7, Jul. 1985.
Voydock, Victor L. and Kent, Stephen T. “Security Mechanisms in a Transport Layer Protocol”, Computers & Security, 325-341, 1985.
Weinstein, S. B. “Smart Credit Cards: the Answer to Cashless Shopping”, IEEE Spectrum, pp. 43-49, Feb. 1984.
Weissman, C. “Security Controls in the ADEPT-50 Time-Sharing System”, AFIPS Full Joint Computer Conference, pp. 119-133, 1969.
Abrams, and Podell, “Tutorial Computer and Newtork Security”, District of Columbia: IEEE, 1987. pp. 1075-1081.
Bruwer, Frederick J. “Die Toepassing Van Gekombineerde Knvolusiekodering en Modulasie op HF-Datakommuikasie,” District of Pretoria in South Africa Jul. 1998.
Davies, D. W. and Price, W. C. “Security for Computer Networks,” John Wiley and Sons, 1984. Chapter 7, pp. 175-176.
Davies, Donald W., “Tutorial: The Security of Data in Networks,” pp. 13-17, New York: IEEE, 1981.
Diffie and Hellman, Exhaustive Cryptanalysis of the NBS Data Encryption Standard, pp. 74-84, Computer, Jun. 1977.
Diffie and Hellman. “Privacy and Authentication: An Introduction to Cryptography”, pp. 29-33, Proceedings of the IEEE 67(3), Mar. 1979.
Feistel, H., “Cryptography and Computer Privacy,” pp. 15-23, Scientific American, May 1973.
Fenzl, H. and Kliner, A., “Electronic Look System: Convenient and Safe,” pp. 150-153, Siemens Components XXI, No. 4, 1987.
Greenlee, B. M., “Requirements for Key Management Protocols in the Wholesale Financial Services Industry,” pp. 22-28, IEEE Communications Magazine, Sep. 1985.
ISO 8732: 1988(E): Banking Key Management (Wholesale) Annex D: Windows and Windows Management, Nov. 1988.
Konheim, A. G., Cryptography: A Primer, pp. 285-347, New York: John Wiley, 1981.
Ruffell, J. “Battery Low Indicator,” p. 59, Eleckton Electronics 15-165, Mar. 1989.
Seberry, J. and Pieprzyk, Cryptography—An Introduction to Computer Security, Prentice Hall of Australia, YTY LTD, 1989. pp. 134-136.
Welsh, Dominic, Codes and Cryptography, pp. 7.0-7.1 Clarendon Press, 1988.
Continuations (1)
Number Date Country
Parent 08/446886 May 1995 US
Child 08/873149 US