This subject invention relates to safe and arm systems for munitions.
Safe and arm systems for munitions including weapons, explosives, and the like are well known and typically require the activation of more than one switch and/or the use of special keys or codes in order to fire the weapon, detonate a blasting cap, launch a missile, or the like. Many such systems are complex and expensive.
The applicant's successful Talon™ robot is used by the military, for example, to remotely inspect possible dangerous scenarios including road side bombs. The Talon™ robot can be equipped with munitions such as a weapon, a blasting cap, and other explosive devices. It is important that the fire control subsystem for such a robot ensures the munition is not activated or fired unintentionally. Unintentional firing could occur when the fire control subsystem is first connected to the munition in the proximity of the user with or without power supplied to the robot, when the robot is powered and then driven to a desired location, and/or upon the robot's return to its user.
No known system provides safe multi-device firing capability in a way that prevents inadvertent firing sequences in a simple and secure manner. Complex and expensive safe and arm systems cannot be used in connection with a robot such as the Talon™ robot and any safe and arm system for such a robot must be compact, simple in design, and inexpensive.
It is therefore an object of this invention to provide a safe and arm system which provides safe multi-device firing capability.
It is a further object of this invention to provide such a safe and arm system which prevents inadvertent firing sequences.
It is a further object of this invention to provide such a safe and arm system which is simple in design and which can be implemented in a compact and inexpensive unit carried by a robot.
It is a further object of this invention to provide such a safe and arm system which, although easy to use, provides security in a reliable manner.
The subject invention results from the realization that a simple in design and yet reliable safe and arm system providing multi-firing capability without being susceptible to inadvertent firing sequences is effected by the inclusion of three circuits which monitor each other and control the munition connection terminals which are initially unpowered, without a ground, and shorted together. A power supply control circuit is configured to supply power to the firing circuit. A ground supply circuit is configured to ground one terminal. A terminal shorting circuit is configured to remove the short across the pair of terminals. In this way, the munition is initiated only after first and second arm switches and a fire switch are activated in the proper sequence.
The subject invention, however, in other embodiments, need not achieve all these objectives and the claims hereof should not be limited to structures or methods capable of achieving these objectives.
This subject invention features a safe and arm system comprising an operator subsystem including a first arm switch, a second arm switch, and a fire switch. A fire control subsystem is responsive to the control subsystem and includes at least a pair of terminals for connection to a munition. The terminals are initially shorted together and without a ground. A power supply control circuit is configured to supply power to the terminals. A ground supply circuit is configured to ground one terminal. A terminal shorting circuit is configured to remove the short across the pair of terminals. The power the supply control circuit, the ground supply circuit, and the terminal shorting circuit are configured to ground one terminal, remove the short across the pair of terminals, and to supply power to the terminals but only if the first and second arm switches and the fire switch are all activated in a predetermined sequence.
A typical operator subsystem includes a microcontroller programmed to monitor activation of the first arm switch, the second arm switch, and the fire switch and to monitor feed back from the power supply control circuit, the ground supply circuit, and the terminal shorting circuit to confirm the predetermined sequence has been followed. The microcontroller may be programmed to provide an error message if the second arm switch is activated before the first arm switch or the fire switch is activated before the second arm switch.
A typical fire control subsystem includes two isolated power supply inputs, a first power supply input for supplying power to the circuitry of the fire control subsystem and a second power supply input for supplying power to the terminals. The first power supply input may be connected to the fire control subsystem only when the first arm switch is activated. The power supply control circuit may include a first relay between the first power supply input and three independent processors. The ground supply circuit and the terminal shorting circuits include a relay controlled by one or more of the three independent processors. The typical operator subsystem includes indicators confirming the fire control subsystem has received and acted on predetermined commands via the first arm switch, the second arm switch, and the fire switch.
The subject invention also features a method of safely and securely initiating munition connected to a pair of terminals. The preferred method comprises initially shorting the terminals together, initially removing any ground from the terminals, initially providing no power to the terminals. The munition is connected the terminals. The short across the terminals is removed, a ground is supplied to one terminal, and power is supplied to the terminals to initiate the munition but only if three activations occur in a predetermined sequence. An operator control unit is typically supplied with a first arm switch, a second arm switch, and a fire switch and the three activations include activating the first arm switch, the second arm switch, and the fire switch in order.
Other objects, features and advantages will occur to those skilled in the art from the following description of a preferred embodiment and the accompanying drawings, in which:
Aside from the preferred embodiment or embodiments disclosed below, this invention is capable of other embodiments and of being practiced or being carried out in various ways. Thus, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited in its application to the details of construction and the arrangements of components set forth in the following description or illustrated in the drawings. If only one embodiment is described herein, the claims hereof are not to be limited to that embodiment. Moreover, the claims hereof are not to be read restrictively unless there is clear and convincing evidence manifesting a certain exclusion, restriction, or disclaimer.
According to the present invention, terminals 16a and 16b,
In this way, the safe and arm system of the subject invention prevents inadvertent firing sequences. This result is effected by the inclusion of three circuits which monitor each other and control the munition connection terminals which are initially unpowered, without a ground, and shorted together. Although the power supply control circuit, the ground supply circuit, and the shorting circuit are all independently controlled and takes three separate steps to enable them to be energized, the operation of all three occur quickly. Also, each control circuit monitors all commands that are received from the OCU 20,
Control unit 20,
Once the channel select key switch 22 is turned to select channel 1 or 2, the control unit 20 sends the appropriate command to fire control unit 12,
The fire set sequence of operation is preferably implemented as a state machine. Once the fire control unit 12,
First, the switches are reset to the safe position. If the switches are not reset prior to operation, the fire control unit 12 will not arm or fire, LEDS 32 and 34,
Next, Channel Select switch 22 is actuated to select the channel to be fired. Once the channel switch is turned to select either channel 1 or 2, the unit 20 will read the status and command the robot to provide power to the fire control unit 12,
Once the robot has acknowledged the channel select command and the channel select 32 LED has turned on steady, the operator can now “arm” the fire set. The operator must lift the mechanical switch guard exposing arm switch 26. To arm this switch, it is pushed forward into the “arm” position. Control unit 20 then sends the appropriate command to fire control unit 12,
Once the “channel select” 32 and “arm” 34 LEDS are turned on steady, “fire” switch 28 can now be used. The operator must lift up the mechanical switch guard to expose fire toggle switch 28. To execute a fire command, the operator must push and hold fire switch 28 in the fire position for a minimum of 1 second. If the switch is released prior to the one second timeout, fire control unit 12 will remain in the “armed” state and the fire switch actuation will be ignored. Once the “fire” command has been issued, fire control unit 12 set will return a “fired and safe” status message. Once this message is received by operator control unit 20, the “channel select” 32 and “arm” 34 LEDS will turn off and stay off until the system is reset as described above.
Safing the system can be accomplished in a one step action. Safing the system can be accomplished by setting channel select switch 22 into the safe position or by putting arm switch 26 into the safe position. Performing any operation out of sequence will cause fire control unit 12 to error out and will return it to the safe condition. The safe condition is described as removing the voltage and ground connections from posts 16a and 16b and engaging a shunt across the same posts.
Controller 50,
On power up, micro-controller 50 determines what “state” the switches are in. Upon power up, every switch must be in a “safe” state, meaning the key selector switch 22 is in the “safe” state, the arm switch 26 is not selected and the fire switch 28 is not selected. If any switch is not in the “safe” power up state, then controller 50 will error out and start flashing the indicating LEDS 32 and 34. If controller 50 passes the initial power up test, it will then allow the proper sequence to be initiated. Now, if the key switch 22 is changed from the “safe” to the Channel 1 select, controller 50 will read all of the switch inputs and determine what “state” the controller 50 is, meaning it will determine if it is in the “safe” state. If all the switches are in the safe state prior to selecting Channel one, then controller 50 will sense the change and send a command to fire control unit 12,
When controller 50,
When controller 50 receives a “Fire” command, it looks to determine that it is already in the “CH1” or “CH2” state and the “Arm” Switch 26 is already in the “Arm” state previous to the “Fire” selection. If either one of these conditions are not true then controller 50 will error out and Flash LEDS 32 and 34, log the error and send it out via debug serial port 54. If the “CH1” or “CH2” are selected and the “Arm” switch 26 is selected then controller 50 will send out a “Fire” command to unit 12,
The system is designed such that no single point failure can cause the system to become unsafe. The circuitry of fire control unit 12,
The outputs of PICs 74 and 72 connect to separate relays through two circuits that protect against stuck logic 90a and 90b. For example, when PIC 74 has been commanded to apply ground to the binding post, the output of PIC 74 will have to toggle its output at a period of 25 ms. If the oscillation stops high or low, the relay will be disconnected. The toggling of the PIC is not done in an ISR (Interrupt Service Routine), it is done in the main loop. However, an ISR is used to increment the timers. This ensures that the PICs are properly executing code.
The firing sequence will start by grounding the binding post, removing the short across the post, and enabling the power supply. This occurs when the last step of the firing sequence has been initiated. The unit will remain in this state for at least 3 seconds, after which all the PICs will reset. However, PIC 72 will not enable its output, even if commanded, if it does not sense that PIC 70 agrees. This goes for PIC 74 monitoring PIC 70. This ensures that the sequence does not continue if the hardware does not agree. This agreement or confirmation is accomplished through hardware bits that are an output of one PIC to the input of the next. Each input bit is de-bounced preventing any false triggers due to internal system noise or other external influences.
Since the Vbat 80 and the Fire Power (+12V) 82 inputs are isolated, two isolated power supplies are used to generate the logic power 95 and the ignition power 84. The output returns of both power supplies are connected together. There is no onboard storage of ignition power. That is, when the ignition power is finally enabled, DC-DC converter 84 supplies 24V at 3 A to terminals 16a and 16b. The current limit circuit resides in DC-DC converter 84 and limits the current to 3 A in the event of a short.
The preferred power supply control circuit of fire control unit 12,
Upon receiving an arm channel command via the RS-232 input 116,
Although specific features of the invention are shown in some drawings and not in others, this is for convenience only as each feature may be combined with any or all of the other features in accordance with the invention. The words “including”, “comprising”, “having”, and “with” as used herein are to be interpreted broadly and comprehensively and are not limited to any physical interconnection. Moreover, any embodiments disclosed in the subject application are not to be taken as the only possible embodiments. Other embodiments will occur to those skilled in the art and are within the following claims.
In addition, any amendment presented during the prosecution of the patent application for this patent is not a disclaimer of any claim element presented in the application as filed: those skilled in the art cannot reasonably be expected to draft a claim that would literally encompass all possible equivalents, many equivalents will be unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and are beyond a fair interpretation of what is to be surrendered (if anything), the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to many equivalents, and/or there are many other reasons the applicant can not be expected to describe certain insubstantial substitutes for any claim element amended.
This application claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/736,612 filed Nov. 14, 2005 entitled ROBOT TECHNOLOGY.
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