Patent Application
20080129501
Electronics systems and products containing proprietary information are subject to the risk of unauthorized examination at all levels of assembly including a closed chassis. A broad range of reverse engineering methods can be applied to obtaining unauthorized access to the confidential internal workings, data, etc. inside such a chassis. Such methods include removing access panels, drilling, or other means of gaining access to the proprietary information residing inside the chassis.
Protective methods and apparatus are used to delay the success of such reverse engineering attempts. However, given the necessary resources and time, these methods can be defeated. A known, successful reverse engineering attack renders the protective method or apparatus vulnerable to future attacks, and thereby ends the usefulness. New methods and apparatus are, therefore, needed to detect and/or thwart reverse engineering attacks on systems with proprietary property.
In one embodiment, a secure chassis is provided. The secure chassis comprises a plurality of walls, wherein each wall comprises an inner portion; an outer portion; and a tamper sensor disposed between the inner portion and the outer portion of each wall, the tamper sensor configured to detect unauthorized tamper events; wherein the plurality of walls are coupled together to form an enclosure to house one or more components.
The present invention can be more easily understood and further advantages and uses thereof more readily apparent, when considered in view of the description of the following figures in which:
Like reference numbers and designations in the various drawings indicate like elements.
In the following detailed description, reference is made to the accompanying drawings that form a part hereof, and in which is shown by way of illustration specific illustrative embodiments in which the invention may be practiced. These embodiments are described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to practice the invention, and it is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized and that mechanical and electrical changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention. The following detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense.
Embodiments of the present invention enable the detection of unauthorized attempts to gain access (e.g. tamper events) to the inside of a secure chassis. For example, embodiments of the present invention detect attempts to drill through a chassis, remove a chassis lid, etc. In addition, to detecting tamper events, embodiments of the present invention allow easy handling and assembling of a chassis system by preventing the tamper sensors from interfering with the placement of components inside a secure chassis.
In addition, it is to be understood that, although chassis 102 is shown as rectangular in
In the embodiment in
Each of sides 107, base 105 and lid 104 comprise an outer portion 114, an inner portion 110, and a tamper sensor 112. Inner portion 110 and outer portion 114 are made of any appropriate material for the application in which chassis 102 is to be used. For example, suitable materials include, but are not limited to, composite materials (such as fiber reinforced polymers, metal alloys, etc.), metals (such as iron, lead, etc.), and ceramic materials (such as boron carbide, alumina, ceramic metal composites (cermets), etc.). Criteria upon which the material can be selected includes, but is not limited to, stress resistance of the material, ability of the material to prevent x-radiation or infrared detection, cost of the material, ease of manufacture of the material, etc.
Container 106 and lid 104 form a secure sealed enclosure for housing various components. Components that can be housed inside chassis 102 include but are not limited to, volatile and non-volatile data storage devices, such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), processing units, and other controllers, etc. For example, in
Unauthorized tamper events include, but are not limited to, removing access panels, drilling, or other means of gaining access to sensitive equipment or electronic components inside chassis 102. For example, in some embodiments, tamper sensor 112 is a fiber optic matrix which is configured to detect interference with the light traveling through the fiber optic matrix. In such embodiments, drilling through the fiber optic matrix, for example, will disrupt the light in the fiber optic matrix. The disruption will trigger a detected tamper event. In other embodiments, tamper sensor 112 is an electrical sensor configured to detect changes in electrical properties, e.g. resistance, due to unauthorized tamper events such as excessive pressure on or puncturing of tamper sensor 112. It is to be understood that tamper sensor 112 can be implemented as any appropriate type of sensor configured to detect unauthorized tamper events.
Coupled to tamper sensor 112 is monitoring coupler 126. Monitoring coupler 126 couples the tamper sensor 112 in container 106 and/or lid 104 to a monitoring device 128. Monitoring device 128 monitors tamper sensor 112 for any detected tamper events. If a tamper event is detected, monitoring device 128 controls a response to protect sensitive data. For example, monitoring device 128 can erase sensitive data, encrypt sensitive data, or physically destroy components holding the sensitive data, such as circuit card 124.
In addition, in some embodiments, tamper sensor 112 in container 106 is coupled to tamper sensor 112 in lid 104 via a coupler 130. For example, coupler 130 can include, but is not limited to, a mechanical optocoupler or a fusion of the termini of two optical fibers extending from tamper sensors 112 in lid 104 and container 106. Coupler 130 enables the tamper sensors to function together rather than separately. Therefore, a detected tamper event by tamper sensor 112 in either container 106 or lid 104 will trigger a response by monitoring device 128 without requiring that both tamper sensors 112 be individually coupled to monitoring device 128. In embodiments having separate walls for each of sides 107, a coupler 130 can be used to couple tamper sensor 112 in each of the plurality of sides 107 to at least one other tamper sensor 112. Furthermore, in some embodiments, mounting holes 108 are coupled to tamper sensor 112 in container 106 and/or lid 104 such that a forced removal of lid 104 from container 106 will cause tamper sensors 112 to detect the forced removal.
Embodiments of the present invention, therefore, enhance security of sensitive data by providing tamper sensor 112 throughout a perimeter of chassis 102 to detect unauthorized attempts to gain access to the inside of chassis 102. In addition, by placing tamper sensor 112 between inner portion 110 and outer portion 114 of each of container 106 and lid 104, visibility of tamper sensor 112 is minimized. This enhances the probability that tamper sensor 112 will detect an unauthorized tamper event because reverse engineers are less likely to attempt to circumvent tamper sensor 112 since it is hidden from their view.
In addition, embodiments of the present invention improve efficiency of handling and assembling system 100. For example, during assembly, chassis 102 is essentially handled as a conventional non-secure chassis since tamper sensor 112 does not interfere with the placement of other components inside of chassis 102, such as circuit card 124. Tamper sensor 112 does not interfere with the placement of other components because tamper sensor 112 is located between inner portion 110 and outer portion 114 rather than inside the enclosure of chassis 102 with the other components.
A tamper event detected by either tamper sensor 212 or tamper sensor 236 causes a monitoring device (such as monitoring device 128) to control a response to the detected tamper event. Although, chassis 202 is used with secure connector 236 in this embodiment, it is to be understood that chassis 202 can be used with any type of connector in other embodiments. In particular, chassis 202 can be used with conventional non-secure connectors instead of secure connector 234.
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and described herein, it will be appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that any arrangement, which is calculated to achieve the same purpose, may be substituted for the specific embodiment shown. This application is intended to cover any adaptations or variations of the present invention. Therefore, it is manifestly intended that this invention be limited only by the claims and the equivalents thereof.
This application is related to co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. ______, filed on ______ entitled “SECURE CONNECTOR WITH INTEGRATED TAMPER SENSORS”, attorney docket number H0012757-5809, hereby incorporated herein by reference, and referred to herein as the “'12757 Application”. This application is related to co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. ______, filed on ______, entitled “CARD SLOT ANTI-TAMPER PROTECTION”, attorney docket number H0013121-5809, hereby incorporated herein by reference, and referred to herein as the “'13121 Application”.
