This application is related to co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/565,376, filed on Nov. 30, 2006 and Published on Jun. 5, 2008 as U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0129501, entitled “SECURE CHASSIS WITH INTEGRATED TAMPER DETECTION SENSOR,” hereby incorporated herein by reference, and referred to herein as the “'12756 Application”.
This application is related to co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/565,361, filed on Nov. 30, 2006 and Published on Jun. 5, 2008 as U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0134349, entitled “CARD SLOT ANTI-TAMPER PROTECTION,” hereby incorporated herein by reference, and referred to herein as the “'13121 Application”.
Electronics systems and products containing proprietary information are subject to the risk of unauthorized examination at all levels of assembly including a closed chassis. A broad range of reverse engineering methods can be applied to obtaining unauthorized access to the confidential internal workings, data, etc. inside such a chassis. Such methods include removing access panels, drilling, or other means of gaining access to the proprietary information residing inside the chassis.
Protective methods and apparatus are used to delay the success of such reverse engineering attempts. However, given the necessary resources and time, these methods can be defeated. A known, successful reverse engineering attack renders the protective method or apparatus vulnerable to future attacks, and thereby ends the usefulness. New methods and apparatus are, therefore, needed to detect and/or thwart reverse engineering attacks on systems with proprietary property.
The present invention described in the following specification provides a protective apparatus that addresses the need for improved anti-tamper protection in chassis-level systems.
In one embodiment, a secure connector is provided. The secure connector comprises a casing; a tamper sensor disposed inside the casing and configured to detect unauthorized tamper events; and one or more conductors configured to carry signals, the one or more conductors passing through the tamper sensor.
The present invention can be more easily understood and further advantages and uses thereof more readily apparent, when considered in view of the description of the following figures in which:
Like reference numbers and designations in the various drawings indicate like elements.
In the following detailed description, reference is made to the accompanying drawings that form a part hereof, and in which is shown by way of illustration specific illustrative embodiments in which the invention may be practiced. These embodiments are described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to practice the invention, and it is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized and that logical, mechanical and electrical changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention. The following detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense.
Embodiments of the present invention provide secure connectors configured to detect unauthorized tamper events. Conventional connectors often provide a way for reverse engineers to gain access to a chassis that is otherwise protected. Embodiments of the present invention, however, detect attempts to gain access through a secure connector. Secure connectors according to embodiments of the present invention are configured to fit the footprint of conventional connectors which enables a low cost method of increasing protection of a system without replacing the entire system.
In this example, casing 102 comprises a plurality of sides 108 which are configured to form an enclosure 110. As shown in
Tamper sensor 104 is configured to detect unauthorized tamper events. Unauthorized tamper events include, but are not limited to, removing access panels, drilling, or other means of gaining access to sensitive equipment or electronic components. For example, in some embodiments, tamper sensor 104 is a fiber optic matrix which is configured to detect interference with the light traveling through the fiber optic matrix. In such embodiments, drilling through the fiber optic matrix, for example, will disrupt the light in the fiber optic matrix. The disruption will trigger a detected tamper event. In other embodiments, tamper sensor 104 is an electrical sensor configured to detect changes in electrical properties, e.g. resistance, due to unauthorized tamper events such as excessive pressure on tamper sensor 104. It is to be understood that tamper sensor 104 can be implemented as any appropriate type of sensor configured to detect unauthorized tamper events.
As shown in
Passing through tamper sensor 104 enables conductors 106 to couple two devices together as in conventional connectors. However, connector 100, although appearing to be a conventional connector in some embodiments, includes tamper sensor 104 which detects tamper events including attempts to tamper with conductors 106. For example, as shown in
In operation, conductors 106 carry electrical signals (or optical signals in other embodiments) as in conventional connectors. However, when an attempt is made to gain unauthorized access to sensitive components or data by tampering with connector 100, tamper sensor 104 detects the unauthorized tamper event and signals its detection to a monitoring device (shown in
As described above, connector 100 can be implemented with any appropriate connector configuration. As can be seen in
Due to the conventional appearance, a reverse engineer is unlikely to be aware of tamper sensor 104 located on the inside of connector 100. Hence, the conventional appearance of embodiments of the present invention is an added benefit because reverse engineers are also less likely to attempt to circumvent tamper sensor 104 which increases the probability that tamper sensor 104 will detect an unauthorized tamper event.
It is to be understood that although connector 200-1 is coupled to device 214 in this example, other embodiments of the present invention are not so limited. In particular, connector 200-1 can be connected to monitoring device 218 only. Similarly monitoring device 218 can be coupled to device 214 using any appropriate technique known to one of skill in the art. In addition, in some embodiments, connectors 200-1 and 200-2 are each configured with a connection point (shown in
If the tamper sensor detects an unauthorized tamper event, it signals the detection of the tamper event to monitoring device 218. Monitoring device 218 is configured to initiate protective measures in response to a detected tamper event. For example, in some embodiments, monitoring device 218 erases or encrypts data on device 214. In other embodiments, monitoring device 218 physically destroys device 214. As described above, the protective measures initiated depend on the device to be protected and the application in which connectors 200 are being used.
It is to be understood that connector 300 can be used with any type of chassis and is not required to be used with secure chassis 312. In particular, connector 300 can be used in a non-secure chassis to provide increased protection by simply replacing non-secure connectors in the non-secure chassis. For some systems, it is cost prohibitive to replace the chassis. However, by replacing the non-secure connectors with secure connector 300, security of the system is still increased at a lower cost.
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and described herein, it will be appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art that any arrangement, which is calculated to achieve the same purpose, may be substituted for the specific embodiment shown. This application is intended to cover any adaptations or variations of the present invention. Therefore, it is manifestly intended that this invention be limited only by the claims and the equivalents thereof.
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