Patent Grant
7921450
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to security systems for data and, more particularly, to security systems that protect data in an inter/intra enterprise environment.
2. Description of Related Art
The Internet is the fastest growing telecommunications medium in history. This growth and the easy access it affords have significantly enhanced the opportunity to use advanced information technology for both the public and private sectors. It provides unprecedented opportunities for interaction and data sharing among businesses and individuals. However, the advantages provided by the Internet come with a significantly greater element of risk to the confidentiality and integrity of information. The Internet is an open, public and international network of interconnected computers and electronic devices. Without proper security means, an unauthorized person or machine may intercept any information traveling across the Internet and even get access to proprietary information stored in computers that interconnect to the Internet, but are otherwise generally inaccessible by the public.
There are many efforts in progress aimed at protecting proprietary information traveling across the Internet and controlling access to computers carrying the proprietary information. Cryptography allows people to carry over the confidence found in the physical world to the electronic world, thus allowing people to do business electronically without worries of deceit and deception. Every day hundreds of thousands of people interact electronically, whether it is through e-mail, e-commerce (business conducted over the Internet), ATM machines, or cellular phones. The perpetual increase of information transmitted electronically has lead to an increased reliance on cryptography.
One of the ongoing efforts in protecting the proprietary information traveling across the Internet is to use one or more cryptographic techniques to secure a private communication session between two communicating computers on the Internet. The cryptographic techniques provide a way to transmit information across an unsecure communication channel without disclosing the contents of the information to anyone eavesdropping on the communication channel. Using an encryption process is a cryptographic technique whereby one party can protect the contents of the data in transit from access by an unauthorized third party, yet the intended party can read the data using a corresponding decryption process.
A firewall is another security measure that protects the resources of a private network from users of other networks. However, it has been reported that many unauthorized accesses to proprietary information occur from the inside, as opposed to from the outside. An example of someone gaining unauthorized access from the inside is when restricted or proprietary information is accessed by someone within an organization who is not supposed to do so. Due to the open nature of the Internet, contractual information, customer data, executive communications, product specifications, and a host of other confidential and proprietary intellectual property remain available and vulnerable to improper access and usage by unauthorized users within or outside a supposedly protected perimeter.
Many businesses and organizations have been looking for effective ways to protect their proprietary information. Typically, businesses and organizations have deployed firewalls, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to provide protection. Unfortunately, these various security means have been proven insufficient to reliably protect proprietary information residing on private networks. For example, depending on passwords to access sensitive documents from within often causes security breaches when the password of a few characters long is leaked or detected. Consequently, various cryptographic means are deployed to provide restricted access to electronic data in security systems.
Various security criteria, such as encryption or decryption keys, are often used to facilitate the restricted access in the security systems. However, prolonged use of the security criteria, if not updated, can impose threats to the security of the protected data. While periodic updates to keys can help preserve security, the generation and distribution of key (such as in a network-based system) is a significant burden to system resources. When the system maintains a large number of keys for numerous file and users, the demand of system resources is even more taxing. Therefore, there is a need to provide more effective ways to utilize the security criteria (e.g. the keys) for security systems to secure and protect resources.
The present invention relates to improved approaches for centralized storage of access restrictions which are associated with public keys. The access restrictions serve to limit access to files secured by a security system. According to one aspect of the present invention, identifiers, or encoded versions thereof are used as public keys to identify particular access restrictions. The identifiers to the access restrictions are used in a decentralized manner for public keys, while the access restrictions themselves are maintained in a centralized manner. As compared to the access restrictions, the public keys based on identifiers tend to be smaller and more uniform in size. The centralized storage of the access restrictions also facilitates subsequent changes to access restrictions for previously secured files.
The public keys are arbitrary strings that embed or encode identifiers to access restrictions. Many expressions can be used as the identifiers. Examples of identifiers include Global Universal Identifiers (GUIDs), pointers or Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs). The access restrictions can be used to enforce access control policies. The public keys are used to encrypt some or all portions of files to be secured. Private keys are used to decrypt the portions of the files that have been encrypted with the public keys. By centrally storing access restrictions associated with public keys, administration of access restrictions in a decentralized manner can be simplified.
The invention can be implemented in numerous ways, including as a method, system, device, and computer readable medium. Several embodiments of the invention are discussed below.
As a method for encrypting a file, one embodiment of the invention includes at least the acts of: obtaining access rules to be imposed; producing a rules string in accordance with the access rules; storing the rules string in a central location; obtaining an identifier for the rules string; generating a public key based on the identifier for the rules string; obtaining a file key; encrypting the file key with the public key; and encrypting at least a portion of the file using the encrypted file key.
As a method for decrypting a secured file that has been previously encrypted, one embodiment of the invention includes at least the acts of: obtaining an identifier for a rules string associated with the secured file to be decrypted; obtaining the rules string associated with the identifier; identifying access rules associated with the rules string; evaluating the access rules to determine whether a user requesting access to the secured file is permitted access to the secured file; denying access to the secured file when the evaluating determines that the access rules do not permit the user to access the secured file; generating a private key based on the access rules and a master key when the evaluating determines that the access rules permit the user to access the secured file; and decrypting, following the generating, at least a portion of the secured file for access thereto by the user through use of the private key.
As a computer readable medium including at least computer program code for encrypting a file, one embodiment of the invention includes at least: computer program code for obtaining access rules to be imposed; computer program code for producing a rules string in accordance with the access rules; computer program code for obtaining an identifier for the rules string; computer program code for generating a public key based on the identifier for the rules string; and computer program code for encrypting at least a portion of the file using the public key or other key encrypted with the public key.
As a computer readable medium including at least computer program code for decrypting a secured file that has been previously encrypted, one embodiment of the invention includes at least: computer program code for obtaining an identifier for a rules string associated with the secured file to be decrypted; computer program code for obtaining the rules string associated with the identifier; computer program code for identifying access rules associated with the rules string; computer program code for evaluating the access rules to determine whether a user requesting access to the secured file is permitted access to the secured file; computer program code for denying access to the secured file when the evaluating determines that the access rules do not permit the user to access the secured file; computer program code for generating a private key based on the access rules and a master key when the evaluating determines that the access rules permit the user to access the secured file; and computer program code for decrypting at least a portion of the secured file for access thereto by the user through use of the private key.
As a computer readable medium including at least computer program code for encrypting a file, another embodiment of the invention includes at least: computer program code for obtaining access rules to be imposed; computer program code for producing a rules string in accordance with the access rules; computer program code for obtaining an identifier for the rules string; computer program code for obtaining a key block of the file to be encrypted, the file including at least the key block and a data block; computer program code for generating a public key based on the identifier for the rules string; and computer program code for encrypting the key block portion of the file using the public key or other key encrypted with the public key.
As a computer readable medium including at least computer program code for decrypting a secured file that has been previously encrypted, another embodiment of the invention includes at least: computer program code for obtaining an identifier for a rules string associated with the secured file to be decrypted; computer program code for obtaining the rules string associated with the identifier; computer program code for identifying access rules associated with the rules string; computer program code for evaluating the access rules to determine whether a user requesting access to the secured file is permitted access to the secured file; computer program code for denying access to the secured file when the evaluating determines that the access rules do not permit the user to access the secured file; computer program code for obtaining an encrypted key block of the secured file; computer program code for generating a private key based on the access rules and a master key when the computer program code for evaluating determines that the access rules permit the user to access the secured file; computer program code for decrypting the encrypted key block using the private key to obtain a file key; and computer program code for thereafter decrypting at least a portion of the secured file for access thereto by the user through use of the file key.
Other objects, features, and advantages of the present invention will become apparent upon examining the following detailed description of an embodiment thereof, taken in conjunction with the attached drawings.
These and other features, aspects, and advantages of the present invention will become better understood with regard to the following description, appended claims, and accompanying drawings wherein:
The invention relates to improved approaches for centralized storage of access restrictions which are associated with public keys. The access restrictions serve to limit access to files secured by a security system. According to one aspect of the present invention, identifiers, or encoded versions thereof, are used as public keys to identify particular access restrictions. The identifiers to the access restrictions are used in a decentralized manner for public keys, while the access restrictions themselves are maintained in a centralized manner. As compared to the access restrictions, the public keys based on identifiers tend to be smaller and more uniform in size. The centralized storage of the access restrictions also facilitates subsequent changes to access restrictions for previously secured files. The present invention is particularly suitable in an enterprise environment.
The public keys are arbitrary strings that embed or encode identifiers to access restrictions. The identifiers can, for example, be considered Global Universal Identifiers (GUIDs), pointers or Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs). The access restrictions can be used to enforce access control policies. The public keys are used to encrypt some or all portions of files to be secured. Private keys can be generated to decrypt the portions of the files that have been encrypted with the public keys. By centrally storing access restrictions associated with public keys, administration of public keys produced in a decentralized manner can be simplified.
As used herein, a user may mean a human user, a software agent, a group of users, a member of the group, a device and/or application. Besides a human user who needs to access a secured document, a software application or agent sometimes needs to access secured files in order to proceed. Accordingly, unless specifically stated, the “user” as used herein does not necessarily pertain to a human being.
Secured files are files that require one or more keys, passwords, access privileges, etc. to gain access to their content. According to one aspect of the present invention, the security is provided through encryption and access rules. The files, for example, can pertain to documents, multimedia files, data, executable code, images and text. In general, a secured file can only be accessed by authenticated users with appropriate access rights or privileges. In one embodiment, each secured file is provided with a header portion and a data portion, where the header portion contains, or points to, security information. The security information is used to determine whether access to associated data portions of secured files is permitted.
In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. However, it will become obvious to those skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without these specific details. The description and representation herein are the common meanings used by those experienced or skilled in the art to most effectively convey the substance of their work to others skilled in the art. In other instances, well-known methods, procedures, components, and circuitry have not been described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring aspects of the present invention.
Reference herein to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment can be included in at least one embodiment of the invention. The appearances of the phrase “in one embodiment” in various places in the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment, nor are separate or alternative embodiments mutually exclusive of other embodiments. Further, the order of blocks in process flowcharts or diagrams representing one or more embodiments of the invention do not inherently indicate any particular order nor imply any limitations in the invention.
Embodiments of the present invention are discussed herein with reference to
According to one embodiment, the client computer 100 is loaded with a client module that is capable of communicating with a server 104 or 106 over a data network (e.g., the Internet or a local area network). According to another embodiment, the client computer 100 is coupled to the server 104 through a private link. As will be further explained below, a document or file created by an authoring tool can be secured by the client module. The client module, when executed, is configured to ensure that a secured document is secured at all times in a store (e.g., a hard disk or other data repository). The secured documents can only be accessed by users with proper access privileges. In general, an access privilege or access privileges for a user may include, but not be limited to, privileges pertaining to viewing, copying, printing, editing, transferring, uploading/downloading, and location.
According to one embodiment, a created document is caused to go through an encryption process that is preferably transparent to a user. In other words, the created document is encrypted or decrypted under the authoring application so that the user is not aware of the process. A key (referred to herein as a user key) can be used to retrieve a file key to decrypt an encrypted document. Typically, the user key is associated with an access privilege for the user or a group of users. For a given secured document, only a user with a proper access privilege can access the secured document.
In one setting, a secured document may be uploaded via the network 110 from the computer 100 to a computing or storage device 102 that may serve as a central repository. Although not necessary, the network 110 can provide a private link between the computer 100 and the computing or storage device 102. Such link may be provided by an internal network in an enterprise or a secured communication protocol (e.g., VPN and HTTPS) over a public network (e.g., the Internet). Alternatively, such link may simply be provided by a TCP/IP link. As such, secured documents on the computer 100 may be remotely accessed.
In another setting, the computer 100 and the computing or storage device 102 are inseparable, in which case the computing or storage device 102 may be a local store to retain secured documents or receive secured network resources (e.g., dynamic Web contents, results of a database query, or a live multimedia feed). Regardless of where the secured documents or secured resources are actually located, a user, with proper access privilege, can access the secured documents or resources from the computer 100 or the computing or storage device 102 using an application (e.g., Internet Explorer, Microsoft Word or Acrobat Reader).
The server 104, also referred to as a local server, is a computing device coupled between a network 108 and the network 110. According to one embodiment, the server 104 executes a local version of a server module. The local version is a localized server module configured to service a group of designated users or client computers, or a location. Another server 106, also referred to as a central server, is a computing device coupled to the network 108. The server 106 executes the server module and provides centralized access control management for an entire organization or business. Accordingly, respective local modules in local servers, in coordination with the central server, form a distributed mechanism to provide distributed access control management. Such distributed access control management ensures the dependability, reliability and scalability of centralized access control management undertaken by the central server for an entire enterprise or a business location.
According to one embodiment, a local module can be a customized version of the server module that runs efficiently for only a few locations or a group of users. For example, a local server 104-A is only responsible for the users or computers 102-A in location A, while a local server 104-B is only responsible for the users or computers 102-B in location B. As a result, even if the central server 106 has to be taken down for maintenance or is not operative at the time a user needs to access secured documents, the access control will not be disrupted. The detailed operation of the local servers 104 in cooperation with the central server 106 will be further described below.
According to another embodiment, a local module is a replicated version of the server module and exchanges any updates with the server module when connected (e.g., periodically or at request). Depending on implementation, part or all of the server module can be duplicated in a local server to ensure that communications with users or their client machines are efficient and fault tolerance. As a result, even if the central server 106 has to be taken down for maintenance or is not operative at the time a user needs to access secured documents, the access control will not be disruptive. For example, in such a situation, any of the local servers 104 can step up and take the place of the central server. When the central server 106 is running or communicating with the local servers 104, information collected at the respective local servers about the users or their activities is sent back to the central server 106. The detailed operation of the local servers 104 in cooperation with the central server 106 in this regard will also be further provided below.
Main memory 132, such as random access memory (RAM), is also interfaced to data bus 120 to provide the CPU 122 with instructions and access to memory storage 136 for data and other instructions. In particular, when executing stored application program instructions, such as for document securing or document accessing, the CPU 122 is caused to manipulate the data to achieve results contemplated by the program instructions. Read-only memory (ROM) 134 is provided for storing executable instructions, such as a basic input/output operation system (BIOS) for operation of keyboard 140, display 126 and pointing device 142 which may be present.
In one embodiment, the computing device 118 is capable of storing secured items (e.g., secured files) in the main memory 132 or the storage 136. The main memory 132 provides non-persistent (i.e., volatile) storage for the secured items and the storage 136 provides persistent (i.e., non-volatile) storage for the secured items. Hence, the computing or storage device 102, or more particularly, the main memory 132 and/or the storage 136, can act as a storage device for the secured items.
Referring now to
To ensure that only authorized users or members of an authorized group can access the secured file 208, a set of access rules 204 for the document 200 is received or created and associated with the header 206. In general, the access rules 204 determine or regulate who and/or how the document 200, once secured, can be accessed. In some cases, the access rules 204 also determine or regulate when or where the document 200 can be accessed.
In addition, security clearance information 207 can be added to the header 206 if the secured file 208 is classified. In general, the security clearance information 207 is used to determine a level of access privilege or security level of a user that is attempting to access the contents in the secured file 208. For example, a secured file may be classified as “Top secret”, “Secret”, “Confidential”, and “Unclassified”. According to one embodiment, the security clearance information 207 includes another layer of encryption of the file key with another key referred to herein as a clearance key. An authorized user must have a clearance key of proper security level in addition to an authenticated user key and proper access privilege to retrieve the file key. As used herein, a user key or a group key is a cipher key associated with an authenticated user and may be used to access a secured file or secure a file, or create a secured file. Additional detail on obtaining such a user key upon a user being authenticated is provided in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/075,194, which is hereby incorporated herein by reference.
According to another embodiment, the security clearance information 207 includes a set of special access rules to guard the file key. The retrieval of the file key requires that the user pass an access rule measurement. Since access privilege of a user may be controlled via one or more system parameters (e.g., rules or policies), the access rule measurement can determine if the user has sufficient access privilege to retrieve the file key in conjunction with the corresponding user key.
In accordance with the security clearance information 207, a user may be assigned a hierarchical security clearance level based on, perhaps, a level of trust assigned to the user. A level of trust implies that one user may be more trusted than another and hence the more trusted user may access more classified files. Depending on implementation, a level of trust may be based on job responsibility of the user or a role of the user in a project or an organization background checks, psychological profiles, length of service, etc. In any case, a level of trust assigned to the user is an additional aspect to the access privilege of the user such that the user must have proper security clearance to access a classified secured file even if the user is permitted by the access rules to access the file.
In general, a header is a file structure, preferably small in size, and includes, or perhaps links to, security information about a resultant secured document. Depending on implementation, the security information can be entirely included in a header or pointed to by a pointer that is included in the header. The security information further includes the file key and/or one or more clearance keys, in some cases, an off-line access permit (e.g., in the access rules) should such access be requested by an authorized user. The security information is then encrypted by a cipher (i.e., an encryption/decryption scheme) with a user key associated with an authorized user to produce encrypted security information 210. The encrypted header 206, if no other information is added thereto, is attached to or integrated with the encrypted data portion 212 to generate the resultant secured file 208. In a preferred embodiment, the header is placed at the beginning of the encrypted document (data portion) to facilitate an early detection of the secured nature of a secured file. One of the advantages of such placement is to enable an access application (i.e., an authoring or viewing tool) to immediately activate a document securing module (to be described where it deems appropriate) to decrypt the header if permitted. Nevertheless, there is no restriction as to where the encrypted header 206 is integrated with the encrypted data portion 212.
It is understood that a cipher may be implemented based on one of many available encryption/decryption schemes. Encryption and decryption generally require the use of some secret information, referred to as a key. For some encryption mechanisms, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption; for other mechanisms, the keys used for encryption and decryption are different. In any case, data can be encrypted with a key according to a predetermined cipher (i.e., encryption/decryption) scheme. Examples of such schemes may include, but not be limited to, Data Encryption Standard algorithm (DES), Blowfish block cipher and Twofish cipher. Therefore, the operations of the present invention are not limited to a choice of those commonly-used encryption/decryption schemes. Any cipher scheme that is effective and reliable may be used. Hence, the details of a particular scheme are not further discussed herein so as to avoid obscuring aspects of the present invention.
In essence, the secured document 208 includes two parts, the encrypted data portion 212 (i.e., encrypted version of the document itself) and the header 210 that may point to or include encrypted security information for the secured document 208. To access the contents in the encrypted data portion 212, one needs to obtain the file key to decrypt the encrypted data portion 212. To obtain the file key, one needs to be authenticated to get a user or group key and pass an access test in which at least the access rules in the security information are measured against the user's access privilege (i.e., access rights). If the secured file is classified, it further requires a security level clearance on the user. In general, the security clearance level of the user must be high enough before the file key can be retrieved.
In general, the data portion of a secured item is a document or file encrypted with a cipher (e.g., a symmetric or asymmetric encryption scheme). Encryption is the transformation of data into a form that is impossible to read without appropriate knowledge (e.g., a key). Its purpose is to ensure privacy by keeping information hidden from anyone to whom it is not intended, even those who have access to other encrypted data. Decryption is the reverse of encryption. Encryption and decryption generally require the use of some secret information, referred to as a key. For some encryption mechanisms, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption; for other mechanisms, the keys used for encryption and decryption are different.
For the purpose of controlling the access to the document, the key or keys, referred collectively to as a file key, may be the same or different keys for encryption and decryption and are preferably included in the security information contained in, or pointed to by, the header and, once obtained, can be used to decrypt the encrypted document. To ensure that the key is not to be retrieved or accessible by anyone, the key itself is guarded by the access privileges and rules. If a user requesting the document has the proper access privileges that can be granted by the access rules and system policies if there are any, the key will be retrieved to proceed with the decryption of the encrypted document.
To ensure that the security information or the header is not readily revealed, at least a portion of the header itself can be encrypted with a cipher. Depending on an exact implementation, the cipher for the header may or may not be identical to the one used for the document. The key (referred to as a user key) to decrypt the encrypted header can, for example, be stored in a local store of a terminal device and activated only when the user associated with it is authenticated. As a result, only an authorized user can access the secured document. In one embodiment, the key is associated with a user's login to a local server or a central server. Appropriate access privileges associated with the user can then be validated if the user has been authenticated or previously registered with the server and properly logged in. Optionally, the two portions (i.e., the header (possibly encrypted) and the encrypted document) can be encrypted again and only decrypted by a user key. In another option, the encrypted portions (either one or all) can be error-checked by an error-checking portion, such as using a cyclical redundancy check to ensure that no errors have been incurred to the encrypted portion(s) of the secured document.
In general, each of the users in a security system is assigned a user key or user keys (e.g., a user public key and a private key). In some cases, the user key is also referred to as a group key if a user is a member of group (e.g., Engineering) that has uniform access privilege. In one application, the user public key is used to encrypt some or all of the security information in the header and the user private key is used to get into the security information or header for the purpose of retrieving the file or document key so as to decrypt the encrypted data portion or the encrypted document. Unless specified otherwise, a user key herein indicates either or both of the user public key and the private key or a security key that is needed in the system to retrieve the file key to decrypt the encrypted data portion.
In a typical enterprise environment, different users may have different access privileges, some may access all secured files while others may access some of the secured files with restricted actions (i.e., printing, reading or editing, but not forwarding). Whether a user can ultimately achieve the access to the encrypted data portion in a secured file is controlled by the access rules or additional key(s) in the security information of the header. Limited by a user's access privilege, a user key associated with the user may facilitate access to all secured files.
All access rules are encrypted with a user key (e.g., a public user key) and stored in the rule block 312. A user attempting to access the secured file uses must have a proper user key (e.g., a private user key) to decrypt the access rules in the rule block 312. The access rules are then applied to measure the access privileges of the user. If the user is permitted to access the secured file in view of the access rules, the protection key 320 in the key block 310 is retrieved to retrieve the file key 309 so as to access the encrypted data portion 304. However, when it is detected that the secured file is classified, which means that the file key can not be retrieved with only the protection key, the user must posses a clearance key. Only the user that has the clearance key and the retrieved protection key 320 is able to retrieve the file key 309 and proceed with the decryption of the encrypted data portion 304.
According to one embodiment, the encrypted data portion 304 is produced by encrypting a file that is non-secured. For example, a non-secured document can be created by an authoring tool (e.g., Microsoft Word). The non-secured document is encrypted by a cipher with the file key. The encryption information and the file key are then stored in the security information, namely, the file key block 308 of the header 302.
According to another embodiment, the non-secured document (data) is encrypted using the following aspects, a strong encryption using a CBC mode, a fast random access to the encrypted data, and an integrity check. To this end, the data is encrypted in blocks. The size of each block may be a predetermined number or specific to the document. For example, the predetermined number may be a multiple of an actual encryption block size used in an encryption scheme. One of the examples is a block cipher (i.e., a type of symmetric-key encryption algorithm that transforms a fixed-length block of plaintext (unencrypted text) data into a block of ciphertext (encrypted text) data of the same length. This transformation takes place under the action of a cipher key (i.e., a file key). Decryption is performed by applying the reverse transformation to the ciphertext block using another cipher key or the same cipher key used for encryption. The fixed length is called the block size, such as 64 bits or 128. Each block is encrypted using a CBC mode. A unique initiation vector (IV) is generated for each block.
Other encryption of the non-secured data can be designed in view of the description herein. In any case, the encryption information and the file key are then stored in the security information. One aspect of the present invention is that the integration of a header and the encrypted data portion will not alter the original meaning of the data that is otherwise not secured. In other words, a designated application may still be activated when a secured file is selected or “clicked”. For example, a document “xyz.doc”, when selected, will activate an authoring tool, e.g., Microsoft Word, commonly seen in a client machine. After the document “xyz.doc” is secured in accordance with the present invention, the resultant secured file is made to appear the same, “xyz.doc” that still can activate the same authorizing tool, except now the secured file must go through a process to verify that a user is authenticated, the user has the proper access privilege and (if imposed) sufficient security clearance.
Further, with the protection key, the file key can be updated without having to modify the key-blocks. For example, with respect to
In the above-described embodiment in
It should be noted that the header in a secured document may be configured differently than noted above without departing from the principles of the present invention. For example, a secured document may include a header with a plurality of encrypted headers, each can be accessible only by one designated user or a group users. Alternatively, a header in a secured document may include more than one set of security information or pointers thereto, each set being for one designated user or a group of users while a single file key can be used by all. Some or all of the access rules may be viewed or updated by users who can access the secured document.
In another alternative representative data structure for a secured file, the header can include at least one pointer which points to a remote data structure stored in a storage device. The remote data structure can store some or all of the security information, thereby shortening the size of the header and improving manageability of security information. The storage device is typically a local storage device. In other words, the alternative data structure and the remote data structure are typically stored on a common machine (e.g., desktop or portable computer). The data structure stores security information. Additional details on the alternative data structure can be found in U.S. application Ser. No. 10/132,712, filed Apr. 26, 2002, and entitled “METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING MANAGEABILITY TO SECURITY INFORMATION FOR SECURED ITEMS,” which is hereby incorporated herein by reference.
According to one embodiment, the access rules are present in a descriptive language such as text or a markup language (e.g., HTML, SGML and XML). In a preferred embodiment, the markup language is eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) that is essentially an XML specification for expressing policies for information access. In general, XACML can address fine-grained control of authorized activities, the effect of characteristics of the access requestor, the protocol over which the request is made, authorization based on classes of activities, and content introspection (i.e., authorization based on both the requestor and attribute values within the target where the values of the attributes may not be known to the policy writer). In addition, XACML can suggest a policy authorization model to guide implementers of the authorization mechanism.
The security system according to the invention can, in general, include or make use of one to many user computers and at least one central server. The security system can also include or make use of one or more local servers as desired. In other words, the security system can operate in a distributed fashion.
Referring now to
Administration Interface 326:
As the name suggests, the administration interface 326 facilitates a system administrator to register users and grant respective access privileges to the users and is an entry point to the server module from which all sub-modules or the results thereof can be initiated, updated and managed. In one embodiment, the system administrator sets up hierarchy access levels for various active folders, storage locations, users or group of users. The privileges may include, but not be limited to: open, read, write, print, copy, download and others. Examples of the other privileges are: altering access privileges for other users, accessing secured documents from one or more locations, and setting up a set of access rules for a folder different from those previously set up (perhaps by the system administrator). The respective user IDs assigned to the users facilitate the management of all the users. Unless specifically stated differently, a user or a corresponding user ID is interchangeably used herein to identify a human user, a software agent, or a group of users and/or software agents. Besides a human user who needs to access a secured document, a software application or agent sometimes needs to access the secured document in order to proceed forward. Accordingly, unless specifically stated, the “user” as used herein does not necessarily pertain to a human being. In general, a user that will access a secured document is associated with a user key to allow an encrypted header in a secured document to be unlocked (decrypted). The expiration or regeneration of a user key may be initiated by the system administrator. According to one embodiment, the administration interface 326 is a user graphic interface showing options for various tasks that an authenticated system administrator or operator may need to perform.
Account Manager 328:
Essentially, the account manager is a database or an interface to a database 327 (e.g., an Oracle database) maintaining all the registered users and their respective access privileges, and perhaps corresponding user keys (e.g., private and public keys). In operation, the account manager 328 authenticates a user when the user logs onto the server 320 and also determines if the user can access secured documents from the location the user's current location.
System Parameters Manager 330:
This module is configured to manage system parameters within the server module 322. These system parameters include, for example, user access privileges, system rules, and one or more keys. The system parameters manager 330 can be used to add, delete or modify any of the system parameters. The system parameters manager 330 can also interact with local modules and client modules to supply the system parameters to these distributed modules. For example, a user key can be expired (deleted) for security reasons when a user leaves the organization or when its time to replace the user key. As another example, a file key may be rotated on a periodic or on-demand basis. The system parameters can be supplied to local modules and client modules by a “push” of system parameters to the other distributed modules or by a response to a “pull” request for updated system parameters. Optionally, the system parameters manager 330 may be further configured to act as a key manager managing all keys used in the security system.
User Monitor 332:
This module is configured to monitor user's requests and whereabouts. Typically, a user is granted to access secured documents from one or more designated locations or networked computers. If a user has a higher access privilege (e.g., to permit access from other than the locations or networked computers), the user monitor 332 may be configured to ensure that the user can have only one access from one of the registered locations or computers at all times. In addition, the user monitor 332 may be configured and scheduled to interact with the system parameters manager 330 to “push” an update of system parameters or respond to a “pull” request for an update of system parameters.
Local Server Manager 334:
This module is designed to be responsible for distributing an appropriate local module for a local server servicing a predetermined location or a predetermined group of users. According to one embodiment, the local server manager 334 replicates some or all of the server module 322 being executed on the server 320 and distributes the replicated copy to all the local servers. As a result, a user can access secured documents anywhere within the network premises covered by the local servers without being authenticated at a single central server, namely the server 320. According to another embodiment, the local server manager 334 replicates some of the server module 322 being executed on the server 320 and distributes the replicated copy to a corresponding local server. In this embodiment, each of the local servers will have its own customized replication from the server module 322.
Partners Access Manager 336:
A special module to manage non-employees accounts. The non-employees may be consultants to a business that requires the consultants to access certain secured documents. The partners access manager 336 generally works in accordance with other modules in the server but puts additional restrictions on such users being directly managed by the partners access manager 336. In one application, the partners access manager 336 generates a request to the user key manager 330 to expire a key or key pair for a consultant when an engagement with the consultant ends.
Access Report Manager 338:
A module is configured to record or track possible access activities and primarily works with a corresponding sub-module in a client module being executed in a client machine. The access report manager 338 is preferably activated by the system administrator and the contents gathered in the access report manager 338 and is typically only accessible by the system administrator.
Rules Manager 339:
In general, the rules manager 339 is an enforcement mechanism of various access rules. According to one aspect, the rules manager 339 is configured to specify rules based on i) data types (e.g., Microsoft Word), ii) group users or individual, iii) applicable rights, and iv) duration of access rules. Typically, a set of rules is a policy (namely, a security policy). A policy can be enabled, disabled, edited, deployed and undone (e.g., one or two levels). Policies managed by the rules manager 339 operate preferably on a global level. The rules (as well as other system parameters) are typically downloaded to the client machine during the login process (after the user is authenticated) and can be updated dynamically. In addition, respective policies may be associated with active folders (i.e., those designated places to store secured documents). These polices are also downloaded and updated on the client machine. Simple policies can also be embedded in the document and provide document specific policies.
According to one embodiment, a header is received by a local server from a client and the access rules from the header are retrieved. The key manager 330 can be called upon to decrypt the encrypted security information in the header. The rules manager 339 can then parse the access rules from the security information and evaluate or measure the access rules against the access privileges of the user to determine whether the secured document can be accessed by the user. If the evaluation or measurement succeeds, a file key is retrieved and sent back to the client.
It should be pointed out that the server module 322 in
The configuration of a user's access to secured documents is sometimes referred to as a provisioning process. The dynamic provisioning that has been described above is believed to provide the necessary security means needed by a large enterprise having employees in several locations without the loss of the centralized access control management at a central server. Further, the use of multiple local servers to support the central server can provide increased dependability, reliability and scalability.
Referring now to
Access Report Module 364:
This module is a software agent configured to record access activity and associated with an authenticated user. It reports to an access report module in the central server so that a record may be established as to what secured document has been accessed by which user during what time. In particular, the access report module 364 can be activated to capture access activities of the user when the client machine is not networked. The access activities will be later synchronized with the counterpart in the server to facilitate the access control management for the offline access.
Key Manager 368:
One of the purposes for the key manager 368 is to ensure that a secured document is still usable when the secured document is being accessed by an application that suddenly crashes. According to one embodiment, after the encrypted header is decrypted, the file key is then copied or a copy thereof is stored (cached) into the key manager 368. The file key is then used to decrypt the encrypted document. A clear document is now available to the application. If the application crashes due to power outage or interfered by another application or OS, the file key in the header could be damaged. If no copy of the file key is available, the secured document may not be usable any more because the encrypted document would not be decrypted without the file key. In this case, the reserved key maintained in the key manager 368 can be used to replace the damaged key and decrypt the encrypted document. After the user saves the file again, the file key is put back into the header. Another purpose for the key manager 368 is to cache other keys (e.g., user key(s)) for use in accessing secured documents.
User Verifying Module 370:
This module is responsible for determining if a user accessing a secured document has been authenticated otherwise it will initiate a request for authentication with a local server or a central server. In other words, the user verifying module 370 is always consulted before a permission is granted to the user seeking access to a secured document. According to one embodiment, a user key or keys of an authenticated user are stored (cached) in the key manager 368 once the user is authenticated by the user verifying module 370 via the server. When a secured document is accessed, the user key must be retrieved from the key manager 368 to decrypt the encrypted security information in the header of the secured document.
Document Securing Module 371:
As described above, the DSM 371 includes a cipher 372 that is used to generate a file/user key and encrypt/decrypt a document/header. In addition, other securing means may be implemented in the DSM 371, for example, a filter to block copying contents in a secured document into a non-secured document or a link from a secured document/original source to another document or recipient source.
Off-Line Access Manager 374:
This module becomes effective only when the networked client machine is off the network, namely, the communication with a local server or a central server is not currently available. For example, a user is on the road and still needs to access some secured documents in a laptop computer. When live consultation is not available, the off-line access manager 374 is activated to ensure that the authorized user still can access the secured document but only for a limited time and perhaps with a limited privilege.
It should be pointed out that the client module 362 in
According to one aspect of the invention, keys that are used to secure files can use arbitrary strings. Such keys are preferably public keys (also known as identity based public keys) that are used to encrypt files (or documents). Specifically, the public keys are arbitrary strings that embed or encode identifiers to access restrictions (or access rules). The access restrictions are used to enforce access control policies. Counterpart private keys are used to decrypt the files that have been previously encrypted with the public keys. The private keys can be generated to decrypt the portions of the files that have previously been encrypted with the public keys.
Because the public keys are based on arbitrary strings, the public keys and their private key counterparts are able to be generated in a decentralized manner (as well as in a centralized manner). The ability to generate keys in a decentralized manner substantially eliminates key distribution burdens and facilitates off-line access to encrypted files. However, given that the public keys are identifiers for access restrictions (e.g., access rules), the secured files contain only the identifiers as opposed to the often complicated access restrictions. As a result, the access restrictions (e.g., access rules) are not directly contained in secured files but are instead centrally stored and pointed to by the identifiers. In the embodiments discussed below, the public keys which are arbitrary strings are preferably used as file keys to secure files. Often, the file keys are symmetric keys. However, in other embodiments, arbitrary strings can be used with other public keys besides file keys. Such other public keys might, for example, be associated with user keys (also known as a group key when the key pertains to a group of users), clearance keys, or protection keys.
The access server 402 includes an access manager 410 and a key generator 412 with a rules engine. The access manager 410 provides centralized control for management of user access to secured files. The secured files can be associated with the access server, such as stored in a file store 414, or associated with client machines 404 and 406 and stored in file stores such as file store 416 or file store 418.
In securing files, a public key is used. According to one aspect of the present invention, an identifier, or an encoded identifier, for a rules string is used as a public key. A rules string database 420 centrally stores a plurality of different rules strings. Each of the different rules strings can embed different access rules. The rules string database 420 can, for example, be accessed by the access server 402. Hence, when a file is to be secured, a user determines appropriate access rules for the file. A rules string is then formed from the access rules. Assuming that an identical rules string and associated identifier do not already exist, an identifier is created and used to point to the rules string which is stored in the rules string database 420. The identifier can be encoded to include or exclude information about date of creation, physical location in central storage, position in sequence of generated identifiers, or other information, as may be deemed appropriate. Thereafter, regardless of any further encoding, the identifier serves as a public key for use in encrypting the file. Accordingly, at least a portion of the file can be secured using the public key. Given that the rules string database 420 provides central storage for various rules strings, if desired, multiple identifiers can point to a single rules string in the rules string database 420 or like identifiers can be used with different files. It follows that rule strings can be modified without prior knowledge of, or access to, any or all files secured with identifiers to such rule strings, as previously described.
The processing for decrypting secured files is also performed by the file security system 400. The access manager 410 communicates with the key generator 412 to decide whether a particular user is granted access to a secure file. The secured file contains a public key associated with the secured file. The public key is an identifier for a rules string. The rules string associated with the identifier is accessed from the rules string database 420. The key generator 412 within the rules engine can then evaluate the rules (e.g., access rules) that are associated with (e.g., embedded or encoded within) the rules sting. If the rules engine determines that the access requested is permitted, then the key generator 412 generates a key (e.g., private key) that can be utilized in gaining access to the secure file. The generated key is supplied to the access manager 410. The access manager 410 can either gain access to the secured file using the generated key or can supply the generated key to the appropriate client machine which in turn gains access to the secured file using the generated key. In one embodiment, the generated key can be referred to as a file key.
The various processing operations performed in encrypting or decrypting a file with respect to the file security systems 400 shown in
The distributed file security system 500 includes an access server 502 and a representative client machine 504 coupled through a network 506. The access server 502 includes at least an access manager 508 that controls access to secure files managed by the distributed file security system 500. The access server 502 also couples to a rules string database 509. The rules string database 509 stores one or more rules strings. The client machine 504 couples to a file store 510 where secured files are stored. In addition, the client machine 504 couples to a hardware (HW) card 512 (e.g., a smart card). The hardware card 512 is, more generally, a peripheral device coupled to the client machine 504. As illustrated in
To secure a file, a public key is used. A user determines appropriate access rules for the file. A rules string is then formed from the access rules. An identifier is created and used to point to the rules string which is stored in the rules string database 509. The public key is an identifier, or an encoded identifier, for a rules string. The identifier locates, indexes or points to one of a plurality of different rules strings stored in the rules string database 509. Hence, when a file is to be secured, the identifier (possibly encoded) serves as a public key for use in encrypting the file.
When a user of the client machine 504 desires to access a secured file that is managed by the distributed file security system 500, the user of the client machine 504 is typically first authenticated by the access manager 508 of the access server 502. Then, an identifier for a rules string having access rules is used as a key (namely, public key) to access the secured file. The appropriate rules string is obtained from the rules string database 509 using the identifier. The key generator with rules engine 516 within the hardware card 512 receives the rule string and evaluates whether the user has sufficient privileges to access the secured file in view of the rules embedded within the rules string. When the key generator with rules engine 516 determines that the user is permitted access to the secured file, the access controller 514 produces a private key which is used to decrypt the secured file. The private key can also be stored to the key store 518. In this embodiment, the private key preferably resides within the hardware card 512 and thus is not transmitted beyond the hardware card 512. In other words, the private key is not stored on the client machine 504, nor does the client key traverse the network 506 to be stored in the access server 502.
The indirect access rules based encryption processing 600 initially obtains 602 access rules to be imposed. Namely, the access rules to be imposed are those access rules that are to be applied in securing a file. Next, a rules string is produced 604 in accordance with the access rules.
In one embodiment, the rules string can follow a predetermined format to embed the access rules. Although the rules string can vary, one example of a rules string is “9:00 am to 5:00 pm<Dec. 31, 2002” which encodes access rules that indicate that access to the associated secured file is only permitted between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm but only prior to Dec. 31, 2002. Another example is “10:00 am-2:00 pm on machine 10.200.255.213” which encodes access rules that indicate that access to the associated secured file is only permitted between 10:00 am and 2:00 pm from a machine having a specific network address. The rules string can also include an access rule that limits access to the secured file to certain groups of users. For example, a group “human resources” could be used in an access rule to limit access to personnel files to only those users that are deemed to be in the human resources group. Still another example is “Engineering, 9:00 am and 5:00 pm, Mon-Fri, off-line, MS-Word” which encodes access rules that indicate that access to the associated secured file is only permitted by a user of the Engineering group, between 9:00 am to 5:00 pm, Monday through Friday, when off-line and when using MS-Word.
Once the rules string has been produced 604, an identifier for the rules string is obtained 606. Typically, the identifier is a unique identifier that specifies a particular rules string. The identifiers for the rules strings can be retrieved (e.g., from a cache) if already used previously or can be generated as needed. According to one embodiment, an identifier is a unique character string that can be used to retrieve the rules string from centralized storage. In one implementation, an identifier is normally generated at the time of storage of a rules string, and can have as components one or more of a timestamp, a random number, an operating system process number, a sequence number, or other data.
Next, a public key is generated 608 based on the identifier for the rules string. In one embodiment, when generating the public key, the identifier is encoded. The encoding can, for example, exclude or include additional information about date of creation, physical location in central storage, position in sequence of generated identifiers, or other information, as may be deemed appropriate. In another embodiment, the identifier is used unchanged as the public key. Here, the securing of the file uses indirection such that the public key is derived from the identifier of the rules string which in turn includes the access rules. In other words, the public key is generated based on the identifier of the rules string. Consequently, the public key is thus not supplied by a key generator (which would require distribution of public/private key pairs). Moreover, the public key is generated from the identifier for the access rules. As a result, the access rules are only indirectly used in producing the public key. The indirection thus permits after the fact alteration of the access rules without having to alter the secure files.
In any case, after the public key is available, at least a portion of the file to be secured can be encrypted using the public key. Generally, in one embodiment, the portion of the file being encrypted 608 is a data portion of the file. More particularly, according to the indirect access rules based encryption processing 600, a double encryption technique can be used to provide enhanced security. According to the double encryption technique, a file key is generated (or obtained) 610. The file key is then encrypted 612 using the public key. The encrypted file key is then used to encrypt 614 at least a portion of the file. Once at least the portion of the file is encrypted 614, the indirect access rules based encryption processing 600 ends.
According to the indirect access rules based decryption processing 700, an identifier for a rules string that is associated with the secured file is obtained 702. Then, a rules string associated with the identifier is obtained 704. Next, access rules associated with the rules string are identified 706. In one embodiment, the access rules can be embedded in the rules string. The access rules are then evaluated 708. A decision 710 then determines whether the access rules are satisfied. Here, the access rules can be compared against access privileges associated with the requestor (i.e., user) that desires access to the secured file. These access rules are not only indirectly used to formulate a public key, but also used to determine whether the requestor has sufficient privileges and rights to satisfy the access rules and thus gain access to the secured file.
When the decision 710 determines that the access rules are not satisfied, then access to the secured file is denied 712. On the other hand, when the decision 710 determines that the access rules are satisfied, then a private key is generated 714 based on the access rules and a master key. After the private key has been generated 714, at least a portion of the secured file can be decrypted using the private key. More particularly, if the secured file was previously encrypted using a double encryption technique, then the decryption of the secured file can be more involved. In one such embodiment, the secured file is decrypted 716 using the private key to produce a file key. At least a portion of the secured file can then be decrypted 718 using the file key. The portion of the secured file being decrypted is, for example, a data portion of the secured file. Following the operation 718, as well as following the operation 712, the indirect access rules based decryption processing 700 ends.
The indirect access rules based encryption processing 800 initially obtains 802 access rules to be imposed when securing a file. Next, a rule string is produced 804 in accordance with the access rules. As noted above with respect to
A public key for the key block is generated 810 based on the identifier for the rules string. Here, the public key is able to be relatively easily generated given that it is based on the rules string. In other words, the public key can be generated without requiring the generation of a private/key pair and without the need to distribute such keys. Still further, since the public key is generated based on the identifier for the rules string, the public key is not directly dependent on the rules string. This facilitates central management (e.g., alteration) of rules strings which indirectly serve as public keys. After the public key for the key block has been generated 810, the key block of the file is then encrypted 812 using the public key. The encrypted key block is then returned 814 to the requesting device. The encrypted key block is then able to be affixed to the encrypted data portion of the secured file. For example, the encrypted key block can form part of the security information of the header portion of the secured file. In one embodiment, the data portion was previously encrypted using the one or more keys within the key block.
The indirect access rules based decryption processing 900 initially obtains 902 an identifier for rules string associated with a secured file. The rules string associated with the identifier is then obtained 904. The rules strings may have been obtained from a local cache, if such caching is permitted, and of the document had been accessed previously. Next, access rules associated with the rules string are identified 906. An encrypted key block is also obtained 908. After the access rules have been identified 906, the access rules within the rules string are evaluated 910. A decision 912 determines whether the access rules are satisfied. When the decision 912 determines that the access rules are satisfied, then a private key is generated 914 based on the access rules and a master key. Then, the encrypted key block is decrypted 916 using the private key to acquire a file key. Thereafter, the file key is utilized to decrypt 918 at least a portion of the secured file using the file key. In one embodiment, at least a portion of the secured file being decrypted 918 pertains to a data portion of the secured file.
On the other hand, when the decision 912 determines that the access rules are not satisfied, then access to the secured file is denied 920. Additionally, after access to the secured file has been denied 920, additional processing can be performed to restrict unauthorized users from making additional requests to access secured files. Following the operations 918 and 920, the indirect access rules based decryption processing 900 is complete and ends.
The results of the access rules based decryption processing 700, 900 can be considered a clear file (i.e., decrypted file or decrypted data portion). The clear file refers to the fact that the previously secured file is no longer secured, and is thus usable. The clear file can be returned to the requestor. Nevertheless, the processing described above with respect to the indirect access rules based decryption processing 700, 900 shown in
A master key is used to generate a private key. Hence, access to the master key must be restricted. In one embodiment, the master key is generated or regenerated based on gathered information. The gathered information can be considered a seed to generate a master key or the master key may itself be distributed among a central server, one or more local servers, and a local device (e.g., a smart card or simply a local client machine). In other words, generation of the master key or acquisition of the master key may be shared among different machines, none could act alone to obtain the master key to proceed with the processes described herein. In one embodiment, a segment of the information is stored in the central server, another segment of the information is stored in a local server and a third segment of the information is stored in the local device (client machine). Only under the condition that the user is authenticated by the server (the central or local server), can the distributed segments of the information be gathered together to generate the master key or recover the master key. Further, the recovered or generated master key can, for example, also be configured to be valid for a certain period of time or for a fixed number of uses to enhance the security thereof.
Once the decision 1002 determines that a request to access a secured file has been received, a decision 1004 determines whether the user and/or the client machine have been authenticated. Typically, the request is initiated by a user of a client machine. For security, both the user and the client machine are authenticated. When the decision 1004 determines that both the user and the client machine have not yet been authenticated, then authentication processing is performed 1006. The authentication processing that is performed 1006 serves to not only authenticate that the user is who the user claims he or she is, but also to determine that the client machine that the user is utilizing is one authorized to be used by the user. In the event that authentication were to be unsuccessful, the authorization process 1000 would end and the user would be unable to access the secured file. Additional details on authentication processing are provided below with reference to
On the other hand, when the decision 1002 determines that the user and the client machine have already been authenticated, as well as after the authentication processing has been performed 1006, a user key associated with the user is retrieved 1008. The user key can be retrieved 1008 from a storage location that is local or remote with respect to the computing device performing the authorization process 1000. After the user key has been retrieved 1008, part or all of the security information in the header portion of the secured file can be decrypted 1010 using the user key. As noted above, the secured file includes a header and a data portion. The header can include, among other things, security information. One component of the security information for the secured file is a file key. The file key can be used to decrypt the data portion of the secured file. Hence, after the security information in the header is decrypted 1010 using the user key, the authorization processing 1000 is complete and ends.
At a decision 1102, the server awaits a request (e.g., authentication request) from the client machine. Upon receiving the request from the client machine, the server proceeds at a decision 1104 to determine if the user and the client machine from which the user attempts to access a secured document have already been authenticated. If both have already been authenticated, processing skips to operation 1112. On the other hand, the authentication processing 1100 continues when the decision 1104 determines that the user and the client machine have not already been authenticated. In one embodiment, the server may initiate a secured link with the client machine if both the server and the client machine are coupled to an open network, such link may be over HTTPS or supported through VPN. Alternatively, there may be a direct link between the client and the server if another authentication means is employed.
Next, the server responds 1106 to the received request with an authentication response. Depending on implementation, such response may be a dialog box to be displayed on the screen of the client machine, a command or other demand. In any case, the response requires that credential information be provided by the user. As described before, the credential information may be a set of username and password or biometric information of the user and must be received from the user. A decision 1108 then causes the authentication processing 1100 to await for such credential information before the authentication processing 1100 may proceed. Upon receiving the credential information, a decision 1110 determines whether the user is authenticated. Here, the decision 1110 can determines whether the user is authenticated to access any secured files. If the decision 1110 determines that the user is not authenticated, the authentication processing 1110 goes back to the beginning of the authentication processing 1100 to continue waiting for a request. In other words, the current request to access the secured documents or login to the system is abandoned. If the decision 1110 determines that the user is authenticated, the user is then recognized as being authentic. At the same time, the client machine can undergo a similar authentication by, perhaps, an IP address thereof, or a network card identification therein, or other means that uniquely identifies the client machine.
After authentication of both the user and the client machine, the user's access privilege is activated 1112. Depending on implementation, an activation of the user's access privilege may be a downloading of a file containing the access privilege to the client machine, a decryption of a local file containing the access privilege, or simply an activation of the user in a memory space of the server. In any case, at this point, the user's access privilege(s) is readily accessible, thus permitting the user to access the secured documents from the authenticated client machine.
As described above, according to one embodiment, the secured document includes two encrypted portions, the header with encrypted security information and the encrypted data portion (i.e., the encrypted document). The two parts in the secured document are encrypted respectively with two different keys, the file key and the user key. Alternatively, the two encrypted portions may be encrypted again with another key (or use the same user key).
The invention is preferably implemented by software or a combination of hardware and software, but can also be implemented in hardware. The invention can also be embodied as computer readable code on a computer readable medium. The computer readable medium is any data storage device that can store data which can thereafter be read by a computer system. Examples of the computer readable medium include tangible media such as read-only memory, random-access memory, CD-ROMs, DVDs, magnetic tape, and optical data storage devices. Examples of transmission media include carrier waves. The tangible computer readable medium can also be distributed over network-coupled computer systems so that the computer readable code is stored and executed in a distributed fashion.
The various embodiments, implementations and features of the invention noted above can be combined in various ways or used separately. Those skilled in the art will understand from the description that the invention can be equally applied to or used in other various different settings with respect to various combinations, embodiments, implementations or features provided in the description herein.
The advantages of the invention are numerous. Different embodiments or implementations may yield one or more of the following advantages. One advantage of the invention is that public keys and identifiers therefore are used to encrypt files are not generated prior to protection. Consequently, the system does not need to generate keys in advance and then store and distribute them, and deal with the difficulties of key revocation and key rotation. Another advantage of the invention is that the public keys indirectly identify rules that provide access restrictions. The rules (access rules) are also used to generate the private keys, which protects the rules from being modified. Still another advantage of the invention is that centralized management of access rules is facilitated.
The foregoing description of embodiments is illustrative of various aspects/embodiments of the present invention. Various modifications to the present invention can be made to the preferred embodiments by those skilled in the art without departing from the true spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. Accordingly, the scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description of embodiments.
This application is a Continuation-In-Part (CIP) of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/246,079, filed Sep. 17, 2002, and entitled “SECURITY SYSTEM FOR GENERATING KEYS FROM ACCESS RULES IN A DECENTRALIZED MANNER AND METHODS THEREFOR,” which is hereby incorporated by reference for all purposes, which is a Continuation-In-Part (CIP) of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/075,194, filed Feb. 12, 2002, and entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROVIDING MULTI-LOCATION ACCESS MANAGEMENT TO SECURED ITEMS,” which is hereby incorporated by reference for all purposes, and which claims priority of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/339,634, filed Dec. 12, 2001, and entitled “PERVASIVE SECURITY SYSTEMS,” which is hereby incorporated by reference for all purposes. This application is also related to: (i) U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/262,218, filed Sep. 30, 2002, and entitled “DOCUMENT SECURITY SYSTEM THAT PERMITS EXTERNAL USERS TO GAIN ACCESS TO SECURED FILES,” which is hereby incorporated by reference for all purposes; (ii) U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/206,737, filed Jul. 26, 2002, and entitled “METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR UPDATING KEYS IN A DISTRIBUTED SECURITY SYSTEM,” which is hereby incorporated by reference for all purposes; (iii) U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/075,825, filed Feb. 12, 2002, and entitled “METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR ACCESSING SECURED ELECTRONIC DATA OFF-LINE,” which is hereby incorporated by reference for all purposes, and (iv) U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/132,712, filed Apr. 26, 2002, and entitled “METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING MANAGEABILITY TO SECURITY INFORMATION FOR SECURED ITEMS,” which is hereby incorporated herein by reference.
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| Number | Date | Country | |
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| Parent | 10246079 | Sep 2002 | US |
| Child | 10295363 | US | |
| Parent | 10075194 | Feb 2002 | US |
| Child | 10246079 | US |
