The present invention concerns a self-powered detection device which comprises a sensor, activated by a physical or chemical action or phenomenon applied on it with at least a given strength or intensity, and a non-volatile memory (NVM) for storing information relative to the detection of at least one physical or chemical action or phenomenon detected by said sensor. In particular, the present invention concerns a tamper event detection device for detecting a penetration in a protected zone or in a closed case or container.
By ‘self-powered detection device’ it is understood that there is no need for an internal or external power source supplying the device for allowing its sensor to be activated and to detect a specific physical or chemical action or phenomenon. However, such a self-powered detection device can be supplied with power source for other functions in defined time periods, e.g. for reading the state of a memory or for resetting such a memory. In the following description of the invention, the physical or chemical action or phenomenon to which the sensor is sensitive is also named an external event. By ‘external event’ it is thus understood an action or a phenomenon that the sensor can detect, i.e. an action or a phenomenon applied on the sensing element of this sensor, and not an electrical signal from an external power source supplying the electronic circuit of such a sensor or a further electronic circuit associated to the sensor.
The invention further specifically deals with the reduction of the power consumption of self-powered detection devices and with the increase of their efficiency. In particular, the invention concerns such self-powered detection devices comprising a read circuit or being arranged to be coupled to such a read circuit for reading the state of the NVM and, in a particular case wherein the self-powered detection device can be reset, further comprising a reset circuit or being arranged to be coupled to such a reset circuit.
The detection of an attempt to recover secrets from/within a protected zone, a closed case or a container through the use of an electronic circuit is often implemented by mechanical means external and adjacent to the electronic circuit which permanently records the attempt by changing a physical structure of, or related to this electronic circuit in a way not easily noticed by the perpetrator. This physical change can then be established by the fact that the electronic circuit is no longer functional or by measuring an electrical parameter of the electronic circuit that has been modified directly or indirectly by the mechanical means.
Another method for the detection of an external event consists of the integration of electrical detection means internal to the electronic circuit, powering this electronic circuit and waiting for the event to occur while powered. For example, the detection means can be a sensor that is configured to provide a detection signal when the sensor and the electronic circuit are powered, the occurrence of this signal being stored in a memory via a write control circuit which is also powered by a power source. Thus, the supply of power for the event detection device needs to be a battery or another power source supplying continuous power. Without such a power source or if the power source is OFF or if the energy stored in the battery becomes too low, this device will not be functional, i.e., it will be incapable of detecting and recording an event. It is indeed possible to limit the current consumption of such a detection device by implementing a ‘sleep mode’. However the detection device will be functional only when supplied. Furthermore, in the case of an internal power source like a battery, such a device will have a limited lifetime or the internal power source will have to be changed after a certain time period. This causes a security problem first because there is a risk that the detection device becomes no longer functional when an interruption of the power supply occurs, and secondly because a perpetrator could cause an interruption of the power source, stopping the electrical supply of the detection device during the time period of the attempt.
The patent application EP 0 592 097 proposes a penetration detection system which overcomes the above mentioned problem concerning the power supply. This detection system comprises a sensing piezoelectric transducer and a memorizing piezoelectric transducer. The positive pole and the negative pole of the sensing piezoelectric transducer are respectively connected to the negative and positive poles of the memorizing piezoelectric transducer. The memorizing transducer comprises a layer of piezoelectric material having a thickness selected such that, upon mechanical probing of the sensing transducer, an electrical signal produced by this sensing transducer will be sufficient to effect a reversal in the poling of the memorizing transducer. This system defines a self-powered detection device. However, this detection device is expensive and not well adapted to be integrated in a small volume device because it comprises two distinct piezoelectric transducers. As shown in this patent application, these two transducers form two separate discrete units which are electrically connected and the memorizing transducer is linked to other classical electronic elements which are not manufactured with a same technology as this memorizing transducer. Thus, an integration of the memorizing piezoelectric transducer with further electronic elements, e.g. a reading circuit, will not be possible with a classical microelectronic process. Further, the reading means are complex and not adapted to integrated circuits.
The patent application US 2002/0190610 describes a self-powered remote control device comprising transmitting means, a feeder circuit connected to said transmitting means, a generator supplying electric power connected to the feeder circuit, and control means associated with the electric power generator. The generator comprises at least a piezoelectric element receiving mechanical stresses produced by actuating the control means and supplying electrical power to the feeder circuit. The feeder circuit comprises a rectifier bridge and a feeder capacitor in which the electrical energy provided by the piezoelectric element is accumulated and stored. In a particular embodiment, the remote control device further comprises a data management circuit associated with a memory and a counting circuit. To be functional, such a remote control device must receive a high amount of electrical energy to be stored in the feeder capacitor. The feeder circuit itself consumes some electrical energy as well as all others circuits of this device. Thus, the piezoelectric element needs to be able to generate a relatively high amount of electrical energy and the control means have to be actuated with a relatively high force for generating such a high amount of electrical energy. This limits the potential applications of this remote control device. Further such a control device is complex and expensive.
An object of the invention is to provide a self-powered detection device comprising at least a non-volatile memory cell and a sensor which is activated by a physical or chemical action or phenomenon, in particular a tamper event, and which needs only a small amount of electrical energy for setting the non-volatile memory in a secure way, this small amount of electrical energy being provided by the sensor when it detects said physical or chemical action or phenomenon applied to it with at least a given strength or intensity. In particular, the aim of the invention is to protect such a self-powered detection device from being reset in a non-authorized manner. Another aim of the invention is to ensure an efficient reading operation or an efficient reset operation when such operations are provided by the self-powered detection device.
Thus, the present invention concerns a self-powered detection device comprising a Non-Volatile Memory unit (NVM unit) formed at least by a NVM cell and a sensor which is activated by a physical or chemical action or phenomenon, this sensor forming an energy harvester that transforms energy from said physical or chemical action or phenomenon into an electrical stimulus pulse, the NVM unit being arranged for storing in said NVM cell, by using the electrical power of said electrical stimulus pulse, a bit of information relative to the detection by the sensor, during a detection mode of the self-powered detection device, of at least one physical or chemical action or phenomenon applied to it with at least a given strength or intensity and resulting in a voltage stimulus signal provided between a set control terminal and a base terminal of said NVM unit with at least a given set voltage. The self-powered detection device also comprises a read circuit or is arranged to be coupled to such a read circuit, This self-powered detection device further comprises a clamp circuit located between the sensor and said NVM unit, this clamp circuit being arranged for passing said voltage stimulus signal on a set line connecting the sensor and said set control terminal of the NVM unit, this voltage stimulus pulse having a polarity corresponding to a set polarity of said NVM cell, and for blocking other voltage signals having approximately an amplitude corresponding to said set voltage or higher and an inverse polarity relative to the set polarity of said NVM cell, in order to avoid a possible erase of this NVM cell by such other voltage signals.
In a first variant of the invention, the clamp circuit comprises a diode arranged between the ground of the sensor and said set line.
In a further variant, the clamp circuit is arranged also for blocking voltage signals with the set polarity and having voltage amplitude over a certain threshold, this threshold being higher than said set voltage, in order to protect the NVM unit by preventing damage to the electronic circuit of the detection device. In the case of the first variant, the diode is designed to break down at a certain threshold high enough to allow a set of said NVM cell but low enough to prevent damage of the detection device.
In a preferred embodiment, the clamp circuit is further arranged for maintaining its output to the ground or to a determined low level voltage in a read mode or in a reset mode of the detection device wherein this detection device is power supplied by a temporary power source. In this embodiment, the clamp circuit thus further defines a ground or determined low level clamp.
In a variant of the preferred embodiment, the clamp circuit comprises a first switch and a second switch, the first switch being arranged on said set line between the sensor and the set control terminal of the NVM unit, thus allowing the disconnection of the NVM unit from the sensor. The second switch is arranged between the set line and the ground or determined low level voltage of a temporary power source. These first and second switches are controlled so that when the first switch is turned on, or respectively turned off, the second switch is turned off, or respectively turned on. Further, the first and second switches are controlled so that the first switch is turned on when the clamp circuit receives said voltage stimulus signal when supplied by the temporary power source or not supplied.
In a further variant of the preferred embodiment, the first and second switches are respectively formed by two complementary transistors. The respective control gates of both complementary transistors are controlled by a control signal provided by a control part of the clamp circuit, this control part being arranged so that the control signal has a first state when the amplitude of the voltage signal inputting the clamp circuit is higher than a defined intermediate voltage of said temporary power source and a second opposite state when this amplitude is lower than this intermediate voltage.
It is to be noted that, in a specific embodiment of the invention, the sensor (or a part of this sensor, e.g. its circuitry) and an electronic circuit incorporating the non-volatile memory (NVM) can be integrated or incorporated in a unique electronic unit.
According to the invention, an energy harvester transforms the detected external event into electrical energy which is used to supply the electronic means arranged for storing the fact (setting a flag) that such an external event occurs. Here is a non-exhaustive list of the possible external events and related harvesters:
Other features and advantages of the present invention will appear more clearly from the following detailed description of illustrative embodiments of the detection device according to the invention, given by way of non-limiting examples, in conjunction with the drawings in which:
The aim of this detection device is to detect if a tamper event has occurred in a zone or in a case or container protected by this lock. If the lock is forced, i.e. tampered with, the spring 4 will push up the piece 6 and the spring 8 will apply a force on the piezoelectric element with at least a given strength or intensity. This external event is stored in a memory part of the detection device. Before opening the lock, an authorized user will have to first read the memory to know if a tamper event has occurred.
The electrical energy that the energy harvester (piezoelectric element and associated circuitry in the case of
For example, the piezoelectric element “PIC 151” (ceramic PZT), sold by the German company Physik Instrumente (PI), can be used to produce the needed energy and voltage to set a flag in the NVM cell. With an Input capacitance of 20 pF, 10 nJ can be generated by such a piezoelectric element having a capacity CPZT of approximately 19 pF, with a voltage value of approximately 16 V across this Input capacitance, by applying a force of about 1.25 N on the piezoelectric element. It is possible to generate more than 10 nJ, for instance 20 nJ with such a piezoelectric element by increasing the applied force. If needed, a force amplifier can be arranged between the piezoelectric element and the spring (i.e. the element generating an external force used by the energy harvester when an external event occurs). In case the piezoelectric element would generate a voltage significantly greater than the needed switching voltage for the memory cell, a protection element or circuit can be added between the piezoelectric element and the electronic unit or in an input part of such an electronic unit.
The electronic unit further comprises a readout circuit 20 allowing, when powered, the reading of the logical state of the NVM cell 18. The read circuit is only used during the reading phase (so only when the circuit is supplied). The read circuit is designed so that it will not interfere with the setting of the memory cell (whether the power supply is present or not). When the device is supplied, the read circuit will enable a read of the non-volatile memory cell and the output of the read circuit will return, e.g., a logical ‘0’ if no tamper event occurred and a logical ‘1’ if a tamper event has occurred. Since this circuit is here not resettable, it can detect only one tamper event.
The electronic unit 22 further comprises a set circuit 26 defining a switch arranged between the ground of the electronic unit and the drain DRN of the first FET transistor. This switch is preferably formed by a second FET transistor T2 having a control gate connected to the electrical stimulus input and is turned on when an electrical stimulus pulse is provided to the electronic unit, connecting the drain of the first FET transistor to ground (0 V) and thus allowing the secure setting of the non-volatile memory cell 24 to the logical ‘1’ state.
The electronic unit 22 comprises reading means of said non-volatile memory cell which is active only when supplied by a power source. This reading means is formed by a latch 28 having its input connected to the drain DRN of said first FET transistor and automatically providing at its output, when a power supply is applied by an external device/reader, a signal indicating the state of the NVM cell.
The electrical energy of the external event is collected at the electrical stimulus input of the electronic unit and a corresponding data is written in the NVM cell 34. This NVM cell has a reset input receiving a reset signal from a reset circuit 32. This reset circuit needs to be power supplied for resetting the memory cell. In a variant, the reset circuit has an input receiving the stimulus input signal.
When power is supplied is present, the reset circuit allows resetting the non-volatile memory cell after an external event has been detected and this cell set. This allows reuse of the external event detector after one detected external event. Let us consider the case of a security device in which the detection device according to this embodiment has been tampered with. When the detection device is supplied following a tamper event, the read circuit will enable a read of the non-volatile memory cell and the read output will be a logical ‘1’. Once this tamper event has been acknowledged, the user can reset the non-volatile memory cell through the reset circuit 32.
The reset circuit and the read circuit are used when the detection device is supplied by a power source. These elements are preferably designed so that they will not interfere with the setting of the memory cell during a tamper event (whether the supply is present or not).
After the reset step has been terminated, the level shifter output is turned OFF (high impedance so that it is not driven), the latch output is driven high and the read output is driven high again. Thus, the latch will then also be reset by the voltage level of the drain of memory cell T1. Then, the power supply can be removed and the detection device is again reusable as a self-powered detection device.
In the following part of the description, an embodiment of the invention and some variants will be described.
The voltage stimulus signal resulting from the electrical stimulus pulse is transferred to the electronic circuit of
According to the present invention, the self-powered detection device of
The self-powered detection device of
During a detection mode (without power supply), the voltage stimulus signal is routed to input SET of the Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) unit 52. Simultaneously, switch 60/transistor T2 is turned on driving input SET * to the same potential as GND (0V). A NVM cell within the NVM unit 52 is then written to the “set” data state (flag). In the read mode of the self-powered detection device wherein at least the read circuit 56 is powered by a temporary power source, for reading out the cell state, the input REN ‘Read Enable’ is driven high turning on a path for current to flow through output RD (Read output of the NVM unit). A high current represents one cell state of two possible cell states while a low current represents the other of the two cell states. The read circuit, in particular a Latch as shown in
Clamp A is first a negative clamp, which prevents the stimulus input from going negative with respect to VSS by more than one diode voltage drop (˜0.6V) with or without the device being supplied. Without a negative clamp, a tamperer could allow a stimulus pulse to be emitted by the sensor to set the NVM cell (when this tamperer opens a protected device or enters a protected zone), extract information or material from the device/zone under protection or interfere with its operation, and then reset the NVM cell by applying a negative pulse of sufficient amplitude thereby removing any information that tampering occurred. The negative pulse could be provided from a pulse generator to the Set terminal after disconnecting the sensor from it. Then, the sensor could be reconnected. Clamp A is designed to prevent this type of intervention by a tamperer. Such a case thus especially concerns a detection device wherein the sensor circuit is not integrated with the NVM unit in a same integrated circuit.
Clamp A is also a positive clamp. If the amplitude of the stimulus pulse is too high, then damage to transistors and other on-chip devices may occur or a phase change (PC) NVM cell may be inadvertently reset (see also the description of this PC NVM cell later). The diode of Clamp A is designed to break down shunting charge to VSS at a given positive voltage (VBREAKDOWN) high enough to allow a set of the NVM cell but low enough to prevent damage or a reset in the case of a PC NVM. It is desirable that the diode be designed and laid out to pass the charge without itself being damaged. There are many well-known design and layout techniques that can be applied from the area of electrostatic discharge (ESD) protection design. The Clamp A circuit 62 could in a different variant be formed by transistors controlled by the voltage stimulus signal in the detection mode, so as to perform the functions of Clamp A.
Clamp B is first a ground clamp. Its purpose is to drive COUT to the VSS level whenever CIN is approximately 0V. CIN can be at 0V potential if the sensor outputs 0V or if CIN is not driven or connected but discharges to 0V through a reverse-biased diode like D1 in Clamp A. It is desirable that a voltage stimulus signal can be applied at any time through it to the SET input. This would allow for tamper detection during read and reset operations.
During reset, the SET input must be preferably at a stable, unalterable 0V level in order to ensure that a large enough voltage (VReset-min) can be developed to reset the NVM cell. If SET is not well-driven to 0V, then it may couple high due to parasitic coupling capacitance to high-going signals within the powered device, reducing the reset voltage below VReset-min. The same is true for a read operation in that SET must preferably be stable, unalterable, and 0V in order to provide a source of electrons for a read current or a known, stable voltage for a FET gate controlling read current. If the impedance looking towards the sensor from input pin CIN is very high, for example in the case of a sensor that collects and delivers electrostatic charge or when resetting during wafer test, then a circuit like that in Clamp B is required for successful reset and read operations under device power supply.
In the case where V(VDD) is approximately 0V (detection mode without power supply source), OUT is not driven by T10 or T11 if IN is low. No set operation occurs when IN is low. If an external event is detected and a stimulus pulse is applied to IN, then IN goes high turning on T12 causing node A to be driven low allowing T10 to turn on while T11 is off. Therefore, the stimulus pulse is passed to the SET terminal to set the NVM cell without a power supply for the device.
A negative stimulus pulse applied to IN is generally clamped to a diode voltage drop by a (parasitic) diode existing between the N-well connection of T10 and the grounded p-type substrate preventing a reset of the NVM cell, as clamp A does. Likewise, a reset of the NVM cell is not possible through Clamp B by driving VDD negative because there is a (parasitic) diode from N-well to grounded p-substrate that prevents VDD from going negative with respect to VSS by more than a diode drop. The same diode exists for PMOS devices elsewhere whose N-well is tied to VDD.
It is to be noted that there is a certain redundancy in the functions of both subcircuits Clamp A and Clamp B. In some implementations Clamp B can be sufficient for the negative clamping function, i.e. for blocking voltage signals with an inverse polarity relative to the set polarity of the NVM unit and an absolute voltage level over a defined threshold which is inferior to the given set voltage of a cell forming the NVM unit. However, because this function in Clamp B is supported by a parasitic diode, the characteristics of which are often difficult to adjust, the addition of Clamp A in the clamp circuit 54 is more secure. Indeed, it is possible to better determine the characteristics of the diode 62. A configuration with only Clamp B (without Clamp A) can be sufficient for preventing a tamperer to reset in particular a PCRAM NVM cell, if the breakdown of N-well to P+ drain of T10 is properly designed.
An alternative to the Clamp B circuit of
In summary, the functions of Clamp A are:
The functions of Clamp B are:
A configuration with only Clamp A (without Clamp B) and preferably a large capacitor from SET to VSS can be functional enough for a NVFET cell with SET connected to the FET gate and for FeRAM NVM cells.
There are many different types of NVM unit 52 compatible with the general embodiment of
NVM unit output RD must not be connected to output B of the 2-terminal NVM Cell during a set operation (detection mode) or a reset operation (reset mode). This is because a signal or voltage on input SET * must not be degraded during the set or reset operation by any circuitry connected to RD.
Hereafter, three cases will be described where the storage means consists of a field effect transistor (FET) containing charge storage material, collectively named Non-Volatile FET (NVFET).
During a reset operation (reset mode), SET * is driven high causing input 1 of NVFET 72 to be driven high. At the same time, SET is driven low by subcircuit 64 ‘Clamp B’ (
During a reset operation, SET is driven low by Clamp B (
During a read operation, SET * must hold input G of NVFET 74 low via the Reset line (
During a read operation, an alternative path for current flow must be prevented. SET * low turns off T8; REN high turns off T6; and IN low turns off T7. Therefore, OUT is isolated from IN. During a set operation, the full voltage—preferably without threshold drop—must be passed from SET to input 1 of NVFET 74. SET * low, which drives input EN *, turns off T8, and IN, which is driven by SET, is high what turns on T6 via T7. REN must be low or high-impedance (not driving) in order to not conflict with T7 driving the gate of T6 low. Therefore, a high level on SET forces IN to be connected to OUT. During a reset operation, 0V must be passed from SET to input 1 of NVFET 74. SET * high turns on T8, EN low turns on T6, and IN, which is driven by SET, is low which turns off T7. Therefore, Clamp B (
During a reset operation, SET is driven low by the Clamp circuit (
During a read operation, input SET * holds input G of NVFET 80 low. When no electrical stimulus pulse is present, Clamp B (
There are at least two compatible NVFET types which can be implemented in the second, third and fourth embodiments of respectively
In the floating gate type, a polysilicon gate is sandwiched between two oxide layers which are between a polysilicon gate and a single crystal silicon substrate. The floating gate stores electrons after a high field caused by high voltage induces tunneling. The tunneling can occur
In the SONOS type, electrons are stored in a nitride layer positioned similarly to a floating gate. Electrons tunnel through oxide above a channel.
Therefore, there are two configurations for NVFETs which can be used in the second, third and fourth embodiments of the NVM unit described here-above:
For the first configuration (
Another type of NVM cell compatible with the general case described in
During a read operation, the set state is sensed as either current flow or no current flow from the free layer electrode to the pinned layer electrode through the tunnel junction.
The stimulus pulse is routed from SET to input SF of subcircuit 90 ‘Free Write Line Current Source’ and input SP of subcircuit 92 ‘Pinned Write Line Current Source’. Any of several well known circuits can be used for the current sources 90 and 92. The voltage stimulus signal routed to input SP via SET supplies power for the current sourced to output C of subcircuit 92, which is routed to input PB of MTJ Cell 84, then through the pinned write line and out of output PA to VSS. SET *, held low by transistor T2 (switch 60), is routed to input RF. This input holds output B of subcircuit 90 to 0V. The voltage stimulus signal routed to input SF via SET supplies power for the current sourced to output A, which is routed to input FA of MTJ cell 84, then through the free write line and out of output FB. The current then flows into input B of subcircuit 90 and is then routed to RF and its connection to SET *.
During a reset operation, SET is low and thus switch 60 (
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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09175792 | Nov 2009 | EP | regional |
This application is a Continuation-in-Part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/620,365, filed Nov. 17, 2009, which claims priority from European Patent Application No. 09175792.2, filed Nov. 12, 2009, the entire disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference.
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Number | Date | Country | |
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20110115540 A1 | May 2011 | US |
Number | Date | Country | |
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Parent | 12620365 | Nov 2009 | US |
Child | 12945203 | US |