Patent Application
20250225228
Embodiments disclosed herein relate generally to device management. More particularly, embodiments disclosed herein relate to systems and methods to manage authority over devices in distributed systems.
Computing devices may provide computer-implemented services. The computer-implemented services may be used by users of the computing devices and/or devices operably connected to the computing devices. The computer-implemented services may be performed with hardware components such as processors, memory modules, storage devices, and communication devices. The operation of these components, and hosted entities such applications, may impact the performance of the computer-implemented services.
Embodiments disclosed herein are illustrated by way of example and not limitation in the figures of the accompanying drawings in which like references indicate similar elements.
Various embodiments will be described with reference to details discussed below, and the accompanying drawings will illustrate the various embodiments. The following description and drawings are illustrative and are not to be construed as limiting. Numerous specific details are described to provide a thorough understanding of various embodiments. However, in certain instances, well-known or conventional details are not described in order to provide a concise discussion of embodiments disclosed herein.
Reference in the specification to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in conjunction with the embodiment can be included in at least one embodiment. The appearances of the phrases “in one embodiment” and “an embodiment” in various places in the specification do not necessarily all refer to the same embodiment.
References to an “operable connection” or “operably connected” means that a particular device is able to communicate with one or more other devices. The devices themselves may be directly connected to one another or may be indirectly connected to one another through any number of intermediary devices, such as in a network topology.
In general, embodiments disclosed herein relate to methods and systems for managing authority in a distributed system. To manage authority, endpoint devices may be onboarded.
During onboarding, authority over the endpoint devices may be established. To establish the authority, ownership vouchers and/or other data structures may be presented to the endpoint devices. The endpoint devices may utilize these data structures to identify the entities that have authority over the endpoint devices.
The ownership vouchers may delegate authority over the endpoint devices by including public keys. The public keys may be used to demonstrate that an entity alleged to have authority of the endpoint device has access to corresponding private keys.
In some cases, other entities that were not delegated authority over the endpoint devices utilize the services provided by the endpoint devices. To do so, the owners of the endpoint devices may generate cryptographically verifiable data structures usable to extend certificate chains from ownership vouchers. The extended certificate chains may enable authority of the other entities over the endpoint devices to be validated.
By doing so, embodiments disclosed herein may facilitate establishment of authority while limiting key proliferation. For example, private keys maintained by the other entities may not need to be distributed. Accordingly, a system in accordance with embodiments disclosed herein may be less like to suffer and suffer at reduced levels from compromises of devices that may expose keys used to establish authority over other devices.
Accordingly, embodiments disclosed herein may address, among others, the technical problem of establishing authority in a distributed system. The disclosed embodiments may do so by using supplemental certificates and/or other data structures to extend delegation from keys that are restricted from being proliferated to other more usable keys.
In an embodiment, a method for managing endpoint devices is provided. The method may include, after an onboarding of an endpoint device of the endpoint devices that cryptographically establishes an owner of the endpoint device: obtaining, by the endpoint device and from a requesting device via a direct connection while network access is not available to the endpoint device, a request; attempting, by the endpoint device, to cryptographically verify authority of the requesting device over the endpoint device using, at least in part, information from an ownership voucher used during the onboarding of the endpoint device; in a first instance of the attempting where the authority is not successfully verified: refusing, by the endpoint device, the request; and in a second instance of the attempting where the authority is successfully verified: performing, by the endpoint device, at least one action to service the request.
The endpoint device may be a consumer product, and performing the at least one action may include activating at least one actuator of the consumer product to change a physical state of the consumer product. For example, the endpoint device may be part of a lock, and the actuator may be a locking mechanism of the lock.
The direct connection may be a point to point connection via a wireless channel.
Attempting to cryptographically verify the authority may include issuing, by the endpoint device, a challenge to the requesting device; obtaining, by the endpoint device, a signed response to the challenge from the requesting device; attempting, by the endpoint device, to establish a certificate chain between a root of trust and a public key usable to verify a signature of the signed response.
Performing the at least one action may include generating, by the endpoint device, a supplemental certificate using a key specified by the request, the supplemental certificate enrolling the key with the endpoint device.
The method may also include, after performing the at least one action to service the request: obtaining, by the endpoint device and from a second requesting device via a second direct connection while the network access is not available to the endpoint device, a second request; and attempting, by the endpoint device, to cryptographically verify authority of the second requesting device over the endpoint device using, at least in part, the information from the ownership voucher used during the onboarding of the endpoint device and the supplemental certificate.
The supplemental certificate may indicate that a public key maintained by the second requesting device has authority over the endpoint device.
Attempting to cryptographically verify the authority may include reading, by the endpoint device, a permission certificate from the request; attempting, by the endpoint device, to establish a certificate chain between a root of trust and a public key usable to verify a signature of the permission certificate.
Attempting to cryptographically verify the authority may also include, in an instance of the attempting to establish the certificate chain where the chain is established: comparing a permission delegated to the requesting device by the permission certificate to an action to be performed by the endpoint device as specified by the request to ascertain whether the action is within the permission delegated to the requesting device.
The requesting device may not be owned by the owner of the endpoint device.
In an embodiment, a non-transitory media is provided. The non-transitory media may include instructions that when executed by a processor cause the computer-implemented method to be performed.
In an embodiment, a data processing system is provided. The data processing system may include the non-transitory media and a processor, and may perform the method when the computer instructions are executed by the processor.
Turning to
To provide the computer implemented services, any number of endpoint devices may be deployed to a deployment. The endpoint devices may cooperatively provide the computer implemented services.
To manage the endpoint devices to provide the computer implemented services, authority over the endpoint devices may need to be established. In other words, the endpoint devices must be able to ascertain that they are under the authority of a particular entity. Based on this authority, the entity may, for example, issue work orders and/or other types of instructions to manage the operation of the endpoint devices to provide desired computer implemented services.
To facilitate ascertaining of the authority over them, the endpoint devices may utilize secrets. The secrets may allow the endpoint devices to cryptographically verify delegations of authority over the endpoint devices from a root of trust (e.g., a trusted key of a manufacturer) to another entity (e.g., an owner).
Overtime the resources requirements for providing computer implemented services may change, endpoint devices may need to be replaced, and/or new endpoint devices may be added to provide additional types of services. For example, additional services may be desired to be provided, different types of services may be desired to be provided, etc. In another example, an endpoint device that contributed to the computer implemented services may cease to operate thereby reducing the quantity of resources available to provide the computer implemented services. To satisfy the resource requirements based on these changes to an exist systems, additional endpoint devices may be onboarded and thereby contribute to the resources available to provide the computer implemented services. While described with respect to computer implemented services, the point devices may provide other types of services. For example, the endpoint devices may be part of consumer devices (e.g., smart locks, appliances, etc.), and may manage the activity of the consumer devices.
However, after onboarding, an owner/manager of the endpoint devices may wish to allow other entities to manage the endpoint devices. Because authority over the endpoint devices by the other entities is not established during onboarding, the endpoint devices may be unable to verify authority over them.
In general, embodiments disclosed herein may provide methods, systems, and/or devices for managing endpoint devices to improve their likelihood of being able to cryptographically verify authority over them thereby allowing them to contribute to desired services. To improve the likelihood, embodiments disclosed herein may provide a framework for managing endpoint devices after onboarding in a manner that allows for the endpoint devices to verify authority over them without the proliferation of cryptographic information (e.g., private keys managed by owners of devices, by third parties, etc.). Further, the disclosed verification methods may be performed while the endpoint devices lack network connectivity. Thus, the disclosed methods may be tolerant of poor network conditions.
To provide the above noted functionality, the system of
Manufacturer system 100 may be a system used by a manufacturer of endpoint devices 102. Manufacturer system 100 may include, for example, factories, assembly plants, distribution facilities, and/or other types of facilities for creating endpoint devices 102. Endpoint devices 102 may be data processing systems which may be usable to provide various computer implemented services.
When manufactured, manufacturer system 100 may put endpoint devices 102 in condition for subsequent onboarding (e.g., zero touch onboarding) to various deployments (e.g., 130) and/or other environments (e.g., data centers, edge systems, etc.) in which endpoint devices may be positioned to provide desired computer implemented services.
To place endpoint devices 102 in condition for subsequent onboarding, manufacturer system 100 may (i) establish a root of trust for each endpoint device, (ii) record various information regarding the endpoint devices (e.g., hardware/software loadout, identifiers of various components positioned therein, etc.), and (iii) install various pieces of software, establish various configuration settings, update various hardware components, and/or perform other actions so that only entities to which authority over the endpoint devices has been delegated from the root of trust are able to control and/or otherwise use the endpoint device. The pre-programmed information may not allow for a future owner/manager to be verified without other information that is subsequently developed. Refer to
Once constructed, endpoint devices 102 may be sold directly to end users and/or placed into the stream of commerce (e.g., sold to resellers, etc.) and through which endpoint devices 102 eventually reach end users (e.g., owners/managers). Refer to
As ownership over the endpoint devices changes, information regarding the changes in ownership and/or authority may be recorded in an ownership voucher (e.g., in a cryptographically verifiable manner, back to the root of trust). The ownership voucher may allow an end user to establish authority over the endpoint device such that the endpoint device will be usable by the end user. However, if third parties are to manage or otherwise utilize the services provided by the endpoint devices, when the ownership vouchers may lack sufficient information to enable the endpoint device to cryptographically verify that the third parties have been delegated authority over them by the owners.
Voucher management system 110 may document and manage information regarding changes in ownership and authority over endpoint devices 102. To do so, voucher management system 110 may generate ownership vouchers. An ownership voucher may be a cryptographically verifiable data structure usable to establish which entities have authority (e.g., ownership, with an implicit right to control) over endpoint devices 102.
For example, an ownership voucher may include certificate chains that document the changes in ownership and authority over endpoint devices 102. Each certificate may be signed using various keys. The keys used to sign (e.g., private keys) and keys included in (e.g., public keys) in ownership vouchers may enable endpoint devices to ascertain whether to trust various data structures, such as work orders which may be signed. Refer to
When one of endpoint devices 102 is obtained by an end user, the end user may add the endpoint devices to a collection such as deployment 130. When so added, an orchestrator (e.g., 132) or other entity may attempt to utilize a corresponding ownership voucher from voucher management system 110 to establish authority over the endpoint device. In this manner, any number of endpoint devices (e.g., 134) may be onboarded and brought under the control of a control plane which may include any number of orchestrators (e.g., 132). Different endpoint devices (e.g., 136, 138) may be onboarded at different points in time and/or for different purposes.
However, the ownership voucher provided by voucher management system 110 may delegate authority over the endpoint device to the end user (e.g., the owner) by establishing a public key of a public private key pair maintained by the end user as having been delegated authority over the endpoint device. To issue verifiable work orders or other types of instructions to the endpoint device (e.g., using only information from the ownership voucher), the work order may need to be signed by the private key of the public private key pair. However, for security and/or other purposes, the end user may retain the private key in a user device (e.g., 139), which may be separate from orchestrator 132. Further, in scenarios in which an owner of an endpoint device wishes to allow other to directly manage the endpoint devices, then other user devices used by the other users may lack access to the necessary keys to issue the workorders. Thus, the other user devices may not have access to the private key to which the ownership voucher delegates authority.
To enable the other user devices (e.g., cell phones, personal computing devices) to establish authority over an endpoint device without having access to the private key, the other user devices may utilize (i) a supplemental certificate, (ii) a permission certificate, and/or other type of cryptographically verifiable data structure usable to either (a) enroll new keys in the endpoint devices (e.g., so that the new keys are trusted) or (b) extend chains of delegations included in ownership vouchers to keys managed by the other user devices (e.g., in contrast, the user devices of the owners of the endpoint devices may have use of the keys to which the ownership vouchers delegate authority). A supplemental certificate may be a cryptographically verifiable certificate that further delegates authority from the end user to another entity such as one of the other user devices (and/or a manager/owner of orchestrator 132, which may be a third party such as a management organization). For example, the delegation statement in the certificate may delegate authority to a key managed by the other user devices. Refer to
In other words, the supplemental certificate may establish an additional delegation (beyond the delegations in the ownership voucher) by adding an addition certificate (or multiple) to the certificate chain included in an ownership voucher. The combination of the ownership voucher and supplemental certificate may allow the endpoint device to establish a verifiable chain of delegations of authority from the root of trust to an entity (e.g., orchestrator 132, or owner/manager of orchestrator 132) designated by the owner of the endpoint device.
Likewise, the permission certificates may enable workorders or other signed data structures to be verified through extension of the aforementioned chains.
When one of endpoint devices 102 initially powers on after manufacturing, the endpoint device may reach out to rendezvous system 120. Rendezvous system 120 may be a system that directs endpoint devices to entities such as orchestrator 132 that will onboard the endpoint devices.
To do so, the entities such as orchestrator 132 may provide rendezvous system 120 with information usable to authenticate that orchestrator 132 will manage the endpoint devices. For example, orchestrator 132 may provide information from ownership vouchers, supplemental certificates, and/or other sources to rendezvous system 120. Once verified, rendezvous system 120 may redirect endpoint devices to the corresponding entities when the endpoint devices reach out to rendezvous system 120 after being powered on.
Once onboarded, endpoint devices 134 may perform various operations to complete onboarding. The operations may include any number and type of operation (e.g., configuration operations, security operations, software installation operations, account establishment operations, etc.), and the operations may be directed by orchestrator 132. Once onboarded, the endpoint devices may begin to contribute to computer implemented services by deployment 130.
When providing their functionality, any of manufacturer system 100, endpoint devices 102, voucher management system 110, rendezvous system 120, deployment 130, orchestrator 132, endpoint devices 134, and/or user devices 139 may perform all, or a portion, of the processes, interactions, and methods illustrated in
Any of manufacturer system 100, endpoint devices 102, voucher management system 110, rendezvous system 120, deployment 130, orchestrator 132, endpoint devices 134, and user devices 139 may be implemented using a computing device (also referred to as a data processing system) such as a host or a server, a personal computer (e.g., desktops, laptops, and tablets), a “thin” client, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a Web enabled appliance, a mobile phone (e.g., Smartphone), and edge device, an embedded system, local controllers, an edge node, and/or any other type of data processing device or system. For additional details regarding computing devices, refer to
It will be appreciated that any of the endpoint discussed herein may be integrated into other types of products (e.g., consumer products, industrial products, etc.). When so integrated, the endpoint device of the integrated device may manage the operations of the integrated device. For example, the endpoint devices may control actuators, sensors, user input devices, and/or other components of the integrated devices.
Any of the components illustrated in
While illustrated in
As discussed above, endpoint devices (e.g., 102) may traverse through a stream of commerce between when the endpoint devices are manufactured and when the endpoint devices reaches a final owner. Turning to
In
The stream of commerce may begin, for example, at manufacturer facility 150. Manufacturer facility 150 may be a facility operated by a manufacturer of endpoint devices. During manufacturing, the manufacturer may establish a root of trust for an endpoint device (e.g., 103). Refer to
Once the root of trust is established, endpoint device 103 may be sold and resold to various intermediate owners. These intermediate owners may operate various intermediate owner facilities (e.g., 152), such as warehouses, distribution centers, sales rooms, etc. When sold, endpoint device 103 may be shipped to these various facilities.
Finally, once purchased from an intermediate owner, a final owner may operate a final owner facility (e.g., 154), such as a data center, edge deployment, and/or other type of computer deployment to which endpoint device 103 may be onboarded. Refer to
Turning to
Root of trust 160 may be a public key of a public private key pair controlled by the manufacturer of endpoint device 103. The public private key pair may be established using any process.
To install root of trust 160, root of trust 160 may be stored in endpoint device 103. The storage location and security precautions taken with respect to storing root of trust 160 may vary depending on the architecture of endpoint device 103.
For example, endpoint device 103 may host or include a security manager (e.g., 162). Security manager 162 may be implemented using a discrete hardware component, or may be a software component. Security manager 162 may enforce various security policies on endpoint device 103. For example, the security policies may require that endpoint device 103 validate authority over it back to root of trust 160 before complying with any instructions from other entities that allege to have authority over endpoint device 103.
To validate entities having authority over endpoint device 103, endpoint device 103 may utilize ownership vouchers and/or supplemental certificates.
Turning to
To add a certificate to ownership voucher 176, transfer process 174 may be performed. During transfer process 174, ownership transfer data 170 and private key 172 may be obtained. Ownership transfer data 170 may document a change in ownership and/or authority over an endpoint device. For example, when an endpoint device is sold, a public key of a public private key pair controlled by the purchaser may be added to ownership transfer data 170, along with other types of information regarding the transfer. This public key may be usable to verify signed work orders or other signed data structures from the new owner (e.g., the new owner may be able to use the corresponding private key for signing). The information in ownership transfer data 170 may be treated as a delegation statement, which an endpoint device may parse to identify entities having authority over it.
Private key 172 may be a private key of a public private key pair controlled by an entity that has authority over an endpoint device at the time authority over the endpoint device changes (e.g., via sale or other mechanism). In a scenario in which the manufacturer is the seller, the private key corresponding to the root of trust may be private key 172. Similarly, in a scenario in which an intermediate owner is the seller, private key 172 may be the private corresponding to the public key included in the delegation statement in ownership voucher 176 that establishes the intermediate owner has the owner of the endpoint device. In other words, to establish a delegation of authority, the entity that has authority over the endpoint device as defined by the certificates of ownership voucher 176 may need to sign the ownership transfer data 170 to further delegate ownership and authority over the endpoint device. By doing so, a chain of delegations that are cryptographically verifiable back to the root of trust may be established. Refer to
Any number of certificates may be added to ownership voucher 176 thereby enabling certificate chains that establish chains of delegation from the root of trust for an endpoint device. Ownership voucher 176 may, as discussed above, be used during onboarding.
Turning to
Delegation 179A may include information documenting a delegation of authority/ownership over an endpoint device. For example, delegation 179A may include a public key, and indicate what is delegated to the entity that has control over the public private key pair of which the public key is a member. The extent of what is delegated may be specified at a macro level (e.g., ownership) or a micro level (e.g., limited authority).
Cryptographic data 179B may include signature usable to verify the integrity of delegation 179A and ascertain whether delegation 179A is valid.
To determine whether certificate 178 includes a valid delegation, an endpoint device may attempt to establish a chain of delegations back to the root of trust.
Turning to
Turning to
As seen, certificate 184 may include delegation 185 which includes a public key (e.g., 186) of a second entity. The delegation statement may indicate that a first entity is delegating authority to the second entity.
Certificate 184 may include signature 187. Signature 187 may be generated using a private key controlled by the first entity that delegated authority to the second entity. In this example, the private key may correspond to root of trust 160 (e.g., may be a private corresponding to the public key installed when an endpoint device is manufactured).
To establish a certificate chain, signature 187 may be checked using root of trust 160. If verified as having been signed using the private key corresponding to the root of trust, then certificate 184 may be treated as being valid.
Like certificate 184, certificate 188 may include delegation 189 which includes a public key (e.g., 190) of a third entity, and in this example the owner. The delegation statement of delegation 189 may indicate that the second entity is delegating authority to the third entity (i.e., the owner).
Certificate 188 may include signature 191. Signature 91 may be generated using a private key controlled by the second entity that delegated authority to the third entity. In this example, the private key may correspond to the public key (e.g., 186) of the second entity which may be included in delegation 185.
To extend the certificate chain, signature 191 may be checked using public key of second entity 186. If verified as having been signed using the private key corresponding to public key of second entity 186, then certificate 188 may be treated as being valid.
Once the chain is established, the delegations (e.g., 185, 189) in the chain may be parsed to identify keys to which authority has been delegated from root of trust 160. These public keys may then be used to decide whether various work orders are valid, which entities have authority of an endpoint device, and/or for other purposes.
For example, during onboarding, an endpoint device may evaluate whether to perform various work orders using the keys to which authority has been delegated.
Turning to
When a work order (e.g., 196) is received by an endpoint device, the endpoint device may evaluate whether the entity issuing the work order has authority over the endpoint device. To do so, the endpoint device may parse the certificates to identify the public keys to which authority over the endpoint device has been delegated.
The endpoint device may then, using the keys, check a signature (e.g., 198) included in the work order. If the signature can be verified as having been generated using the private key corresponding to one of the public keys to which authority over the endpoint device has been delegated, then the endpoint device may treat work order 196 as having been issued by an entity with authority over it. For example, signature 198 may be checked using public key of owner entity 190, in this example.
The endpoint device may then, for example, process various statements 197 included in work order 196, and take action based on those statements. These statements may include instructions that change the manner of operation of the endpoint device to, for example, comply with security requirements of a new owner, and/or perform other actions.
However, in some cases, other user devices may lack access to the private key to which public key of owner entity 190 and/or other public keys in the certificate chains delegate authority over the endpoint device. Thus, the other user devices may not be able to issue workorders that are verifiable using only the ownership vouchers. To address this issue, as will be further discussed with respect to
For example, turning to
However, if other signed data (e.g., 216) is signed using keys (e.g., maintained by third party managed orchestrators) that cannot be validated as having authority delegated using ownership voucher certificate chain 202, then the endpoint device may treat the other signed data as not being trustworthy.
To enable other signed data to be validated, embodiments disclosed herein may utilize supplemental certificates (e.g., 214) and/or other types of data structures such as permission certificates, enrolled keys, etc.
Turning to
To enable signed data 216 that is signed using keys that cannot be validated using ownership voucher certificate chains (e.g., 212), a supplemental certificate 214 may be utilized. Supplemental certificate 214 may be used to extend the chains of certificates and delegation statements from those included in ownership voucher certificate chain. Refer to
By extending the certificate and delegation chains, signed data 216 may be validated as having been signed using a key to which authority has been delegated all the way back to root of trust 210. For example, supplemental certificate 214 may further delegate authority from an owner to another key controlled by orchestrators (e.g., owned/managed by third parties). In this manner, the endpoint device may extend the chain of delegations to keys that may be controlled by orchestrators (e.g., that are owned/managed by third parties, which may not have access to the keys maintained by the owner of the endpoint devices). Accordingly, the orchestrators may not need to have access to the keys controlled by the owner and to which ownership has been delegated in ownership vouchers. Similar extensions may be established with permission certificates, enrolled keys, etc. Refer to
Turning to
For example, supplemental certificate 220 may include delegation 222 and cryptographic data 224. Delegation 222 may be a delegation statement that delegates authority over an endpoint device from an owner to an other device such as one of the other user devices. The delegation may be made, for example, by including a public key of a public private key pair controlled by the device (or owner/manager of the device) to which authority over the endpoint device is being delegated.
Cryptographic data 224 may include a signature generated using a private key controlled by the owner of the endpoint device. The corresponding public key may be included in a delegation statement in an ownership voucher. Thus, the public key in the ownership voucher may be used to verify the integrity and authenticity of supplemental certificate 220. In other words, supplemental certificate 220 may extend a certificate/delegation chain included in the ownership voucher.
To further clarify embodiments disclosed herein, interactions diagrams in accordance with an embodiment are shown in
In the interaction diagrams, processes performed by and interactions between components of a system in accordance with an embodiment are shown. In the diagrams, components of the system are illustrated using a first set of shapes (e.g., 110, 120, 132, 136, etc.), located towards the top of each figure. Lines descend from these shapes. Some descending lines are drawn in dashing to indicate that the device is not operating during corresponding periods of time, while other lines are drawn solid to indicate that the devices are operating during the corresponding period of time. For example, in
Processes performed by the components of the system are illustrated using a second set of shapes (e.g., 242, 254, etc.) superimposed over these lines. Interactions (e.g., communication, data transmissions, etc.) between the components of the system are illustrated using a third set of shapes (e.g., 240, 244, etc.) that extend between the lines. The third set of shapes may include lines terminating in one or two arrows. Lines terminating in a single arrow may indicate that one way interactions (e.g., data transmission from a first component to a second component) occur, while lines terminating in two arrows may indicate that multi-way interactions (e.g., data transmission between two components) occur.
Generally, the processes and interactions are temporally ordered in an example order, with time increasing from the top to the bottom of each page. For example, the interaction labeled as 240 may occur prior to the interaction labeled as 244. However, it will be appreciated that the processes and interactions may be performed in different orders, any may be omitted, and other processes or interactions may be performed without departing from embodiments disclosed herein.
Turning to
To onboard endpoint device 136, orchestrator 132 may, at interaction 240, send a voucher request to voucher management system 110. The voucher request may be a request for an ownership voucher for an endpoint device (e.g., 136). In the example interactions shown in
When received, voucher management system 110 may attempt to validate the voucher request by performing validation process 242. During validation process, credentials and/or other information from orchestrator 132 may be evaluated to ascertain whether an ownership voucher should be provided. Presuming that the validation process is successful, at interaction 244, voucher management system 110 may send an ownership voucher to orchestrator 132.
Once obtained, at interaction 248, orchestrator 132 may send a registration request to rendezvous system 120. The registration request may be a request to have rendezvous system 120 redirect endpoint device 136 to orchestrator 132. The registration request may include information usable by rendezvous system 120 to verify that orchestrator 132 should have authority over endpoint device 136.
Once endpoint device 136 reaches a destination location (e.g., a data center, edge deployment, etc.), endpoint device 136 may be powered on and may, at interaction 250, send a request to rendezvous system 120 regarding which entity to contact as part of an onboarding procedure.
Presuming the rendezvous system 120 registered orchestrator 132 based on the registration request, rendezvous system may, at interaction 252, provide onboarding data to endpoint device 136. The onboarding data may include, for example, various validation information and re-direct information (e.g., network address) for orchestrator 132.
Once obtained, endpoint device 136 may perform validation process 254. During validation process 254, endpoint device 136 may attempt to validate the onboarding data. If successfully validated, endpoint device 136 may, at interaction 256, generate and send an onboarding request to orchestrator 132. The onboarding request may request, for example, cryptographic data such as ownership vouchers. The request may initiate a cooperatively performed onboarding process 258 by endpoint device 136 and orchestrator 132.
During onboarding process 258, orchestrator 132 may provide endpoint device 136 with the ownership voucher and/or other information to enable endpoint device 136 to ascertain whether orchestrator 132 (or owner/manager thereof) has authority over endpoint device 136. To do so, endpoint device 136 may, as discussed above, attempt to validate certificate chains and delegation statements to establish a chain of delegation of authority from the root of trust to orchestrator 132 (e.g., the delegation statements may identify a particular public key for which orchestrator 132 controls a corresponding private key, and/or to a key managed by the owner/manager of orchestrator 132). Endpoint device 136 may issue various challenges (e.g., signing challenges) to orchestrator 132, and endpoint device 136 may test the signed responses to the challenges using the particular public key. If the signed responses can be validated using the public key, then endpoint device 136 may conclude that orchestrator 132 has authority over it.
If successfully validated as having authority over it, endpoint device 136 may continue to participate in the onboarding by, for example, evaluating the trustworthiness of signed work orders issued by orchestrator 132, and complying with any signed work orders that can be validated as having been signed with the private key corresponding to the particular public key.
The aforementioned work orders may cause endpoint device 136 to, for example, modify its configuration, install/remove software, enable/disable various hardware components, establish accounts for end users, and/or perform other operations as directed by orchestrator 132. The aforementioned operations may place endpoint device 136 in an operating state specified by the owner of endpoint device 136.
Once onboarded, endpoint device 136 may be able to vet work orders obtained over time that are signed by orchestrator 132 and/or owner user devices (e.g., that manage keys to which authority is delegated in the ownership vouchers). However, endpoint device 136 may not be able to verify work orders from other user devices. Refer to
Turning to
To issue a workorder, owner user device 260 may, at interaction 270, send an authentication request to the endpoint device. In response, at interaction 272, endpoint device 136 may issue a challenge back to owner user device. The challenge may include a nonce and request that owner user device 260 sign the nonce with a key to which authority over endpoint device 136 has been delegated. Because owner user device 260 has access to the private key corresponding to the public key to which authority has been delegated, owner user device 260 may, at interaction 274, sign an send the signed challenge and/or a command back to endpoint device 136.
Once obtained, endpoint device 136 may perform evaluation process 276. During evaluation process 276, endpoint device 136 may attempt to verify the signature of the signed challenge. In this example, the signature is verifiable using the public key to which authority in the work order has been delegated. Consequently, endpoint device 136 may trust the response and perform the command.
Turning to
To delegate authority over endpoint device 136 to other devices, owner user device 260 may obtain new key 277. New key 277 may be a new public key, which may be subsequently assigned (e.g., along with a corresponding private key) to one of the other user devices. To enable the other user device to issue verifiable instructions to endpoint device 136 using the private key corresponding to new key 277, at interaction 270, owner user device 260 may again send an authentication request as discussed with respect to
Once received, at interaction 278, owner user device 260 may again sign the challenge using the private key corresponding to the public key to which authority has been delegated by the ownership voucher. Owner user device 260 may send the signed challenge and a command to enroll new key 277.
When received by endpoint device 136, endpoint device 136 may perform evaluation process 276 and again find that the signed challenge can be verified. Consequently, endpoint device may enroll new key 277 by generating a supplemental certificate 214. The supplemental certificate may indicate that new key 277 has been delegated authority over endpoint device 136 by the owner. Supplemental certificate 214 may be signed by endpoint device 136.
To verify the delegation to new key 277 in the future, the signed challenge and command/new key may be stored. Consequently, in the future when work orders signed using a private key corresponding to new key 277 is received, endpoint device 136 may establish a certificate chain that leads to the signed challenge and comment/new key, which may then be linked and/or be otherwise usable to verify integrity and/or accuracy of supplemental certificate. Because supplemental certificate delegates authority to new key 277 and new key 277 is usable to verify the signature of the work order, endpoint device 136 may trust the work order and service the work order. Thus, the other user device may be able to manage and/or otherwise cause endpoint device 136 to perform various actions.
Turning to
To eliminate transmission of a private key corresponding to new key 277, owner user device 260 may send, at interaction 280, a key request to non-owner user device 262 (e.g., one of the other user devices). In response, non-owner user device 262 may obtain new key 277 (e.g., via generation, reading from storage, etc.) and, at interaction 282, send new key to owner user device 260. New key 277 may be part of a public private key pair. Consequently, non-owner user device 262 may have access to the private key without needing to obtain the private key from other devices, and owner user device 260 may have access to new key 277.
To delegate authority over endpoint device 136 to non-owner user device, at interaction 270, owner user device 260 may again send an authentication request as discussed with respect to
Once received, at interaction 284, owner user device 260 may again sign the challenge using the private key corresponding to the public key to which authority has been delegated by the ownership voucher. Owner user device 260 may send the signed challenge and a command to enroll new key 277 to endpoint device 136.
When received by endpoint device 136, endpoint device 136 may perform evaluation process 276 and again find that the signed challenge can be verified. Consequently, endpoint device may enroll new key 277 by generating a supplemental certificate 214. The supplemental certificate may indicate that new key 277 has been delegated authority over endpoint device 136 by the owner. Supplemental certificate 214 may be signed by endpoint device 136.
To verify the delegation to new key 277 in the future, the signed challenge and command/new key may be stored. Consequently, in the future when work orders signed using a private key corresponding to new key 277 is received, endpoint device 136 may establish a certificate chain that leads to the signed challenge and comment/new key, which may then be linked and/or be otherwise usable to verify integrity and/or accuracy of supplemental certificate. Because supplemental certificate delegates authority to new key 277 and new key 277 is usable to verify the signature of the work order, endpoint device 136 may trust the work order and service the work order. Thus, the other user device may be able to manage and/or otherwise cause endpoint device 136 to perform various actions.
Turning to
To enable non-owner user device 262 to issue instructions to endpoint device 136, owner user device 260 may, at interaction 290, generate and send a permission certificate to non-owner user device 262. The permission certificate may delegate authority to a key maintained by non-owner user device 262. The delegation may be limited to, for example, a subset of the functions of endpoint device 136, may include time limits on the delegation, etc. The payload (which includes the delegation statement and key) may be signed using the private key which may be verified using the public key from the ownership voucher (e.g., the owner key).
Once obtained, non-owner user device 262 may sign a request (e.g., may include instructions to perform some actions, the permission certificate), and send the request and/or the permission certificate to endpoint device 136.
Endpoint device 136 may perform evaluation process 276. During this instance of evaluation process 276, endpoint device 136 may be able to verify the delegation statement in the permission certificate using the ownership voucher. Then, endpoint device 136 may be able to verify the signature on the signed request using the public key from the permission certificate. Once verified, endpoint device 136 may evaluate the instructions to see if they are within the delegated permissions. If delegated, then endpoint device 136 may perform various actions based on the instructions.
Thus, via the interactions shown in
In such scenarios, endpoint device 136, owner user device 260, and/or non-owner user device 262 may utilize local communications such as point to point wireless communication links (e.g., Bluetooth) that do not require network access for information transmission. Consequently, even if endpoint device 136 is positioned where network access is unavailable, authority over endpoint device 136 may be dynamically delegated to other devices.
Any of the processes illustrated using the second set of shapes and interactions illustrated using the third set of shapes may be performed, in part or whole, by digital processors (e.g., central processors, processor cores, etc.) that execute corresponding instructions (e.g., computer code/software). Execution of the instructions may cause the digital processors to initiate performance of the processes. Any portions of the processes may be performed by the digital processors and/or other devices. For example, executing the instructions may cause the digital processors to perform actions that directly contribute to performance of the processes, and/or indirectly contribute to performance of the processes by causing (e.g., initiating) other hardware components to perform actions that directly contribute to the performance of the processes.
Any of the processes illustrated using the second set of shapes and interactions illustrated using the third set of shapes may be performed, in part or whole, by special purpose hardware components such as digital signal processors, application specific integrated circuits, programmable gate arrays, graphics processing units, data processing units, and/or other types of hardware components. These special purpose hardware components may include circuitry and/or semiconductor devices adapted to perform the processes. For example, any of the special purpose hardware components may be implemented using complementary metal-oxide semiconductor based devices (e.g., computer chips).
Any of the processes and interactions may be implemented using any type and number of data structures. The data structures may be implemented using, for example, tables, lists, linked lists, unstructured data, data bases, and/or other types of data structures. Additionally, while described as including particular information, it will be appreciated that any of the data structures may include additional, less, and/or different information from that described above. The informational content of any of the data structures may be divided across any number of data structures, may be integrated with other types of information, and/or may be stored in any location.
As discussed above, the components of
Turning to
Prior to operation 300, an endpoint device may power on, contact a rendezvous system, and be directed to an orchestrator or other device. The orchestrator may onboard the endpoint device. As part of onboarding, the endpoint device may obtain an ownership voucher that establishes an owner of the endpoint device in a cryptographically verifiable manner.
At operation 300, a request is obtained by the endpoint device. The request may be obtained from a requesting device via a direction connection while network access is not available to the endpoint device (and/or the network access may not be used if available). The request may be for performance of an action. The action may be, for example, to perform a function, to enroll a key, and/or to otherwise operate at the direction of the requesting device. The requesting device may be an owner user device, a non-owner user device, or another type of device.
At operation 302, an attempt to cryptographically verify authority of the requesting device over the endpoint device may be attempted by the endpoint device. At least information from an ownership voucher using during the onboarding of the endpoint device may be used during the attempt. For example, the ownership voucher may be used to establish a public key (e.g., of the owner) as having authority over it.
If the request is signed by a private key corresponding to the public key, then the authority over the endpoint device and by the requesting device may be cryptographically verified.
If the request is not signed by a private key corresponding to the public key, then the request may be reviewed for presence of a permission certificate. If the permission certificate is part of the request, then the permission certificate may be used to extend the certificate chain from the ownership voucher to the requesting device to cryptographically verify the authority over the endpoint device. The permission certificate may only be treated as extending the chain if the requested action by the requestor is within limits set by the permission certificate.
If the request is not signed by a private key corresponding to the public key and no permission certificate is present, then supplemental certificates may be searched to attempt to extend the certificate chain. For example, as discussed with respect to
At operation 304, a determination is made regarding whether the authority is successfully verified. The authority may be successfully verified if any of the verification procedures discussed with respect to operation 302 can be satisfied. Otherwise, the authority of the requesting device over the endpoint device may not be able to be cryptographically verified.
If the authority of the requesting device over the endpoint device can be cryptographically verified, then the method may proceed to operation 306. Otherwise the method may proceed to operation 308.
At operation 306, at least one action is performed by the endpoint device to service the request. The action may be to (i) provide desired services, (ii) enroll a key indicated by the request (e.g., by generating a supplemental certificate), and/or may include other actions. The method may end following operation 306.
Returning to operation 304, the method may proceed to operation 308 following operation 304 if the authority of the requesting device over the endpoint device cannot be verified.
At operation 308, the request is refused by the endpoint device. In other words, the endpoint device may refuse to service the request.
The method may end following operation 308.
Thus, using the method shown in
Any of the components illustrated in
In one embodiment, system 400 includes processor 401, memory 403, and devices 405-407 via a bus or an interconnect 410. Processor 401 may represent a single processor or multiple processors with a single processor core or multiple processor cores included therein. Processor 401 may represent one or more general-purpose processors such as a microprocessor, a central processing unit (CPU), or the like. More particularly, processor 401 may be a complex instruction set computing (CISC) microprocessor, reduced instruction set computing (RISC) microprocessor, very long instruction word (VLIW) microprocessor, or processor implementing other instruction sets, or processors implementing a combination of instruction sets. Processor 401 may also be one or more special-purpose processors such as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a cellular or baseband processor, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a digital signal processor (DSP), a network processor, a graphics processor, a network processor, a communications processor, a cryptographic processor, a co-processor, an embedded processor, or any other type of logic capable of processing instructions.
Processor 401, which may be a low power multi-core processor socket such as an ultra-low voltage processor, may act as a main processing unit and central hub for communication with the various components of the system. Such processor can be implemented as a system on chip (SoC). Processor 401 is configured to execute instructions for performing the operations discussed herein. System 400 may further include a graphics interface that communicates with optional graphics subsystem 404, which may include a display controller, a graphics processor, and/or a display device.
Processor 401 may communicate with memory 403, which in one embodiment can be implemented via multiple memory devices to provide for a given amount of system memory. Memory 403 may include one or more volatile storage (or memory) devices such as random access memory (RAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), static RAM (SRAM), or other types of storage devices. Memory 403 may store information including sequences of instructions that are executed by processor 401, or any other device. For example, executable code and/or data of a variety of operating systems, device drivers, firmware (e.g., input output basic system or BIOS), and/or applications can be loaded in memory 403 and executed by processor 401. An operating system can be any kind of operating systems, such as, for example, Windows® operating system from Microsoft®, Mac OS®/iOS® from Apple, Android® from Google®, Linux®, Unix®, or other real-time or embedded operating systems such as VxWorks.
System 400 may further include IO devices such as devices (e.g., 405, 406, 407, 408) including network interface device(s) 405, optional input device(s) 406, and other optional IO device(s) 407. Network interface device(s) 405 may include a wireless transceiver and/or a network interface card (NIC). The wireless transceiver may be a WiFi transceiver, an infrared transceiver, a Bluetooth transceiver, a WiMax transceiver, a wireless cellular telephony transceiver, a satellite transceiver (e.g., a global positioning system (GPS) transceiver), or other radio frequency (RF) transceivers, or a combination thereof. The NIC may be an Ethernet card.
Input device(s) 406 may include a mouse, a touch pad, a touch sensitive screen (which may be integrated with a display device of optional graphics subsystem 404), a pointer device such as a stylus, and/or a keyboard (e.g., physical keyboard or a virtual keyboard displayed as part of a touch sensitive screen). For example, input device(s) 406 may include a touch screen controller coupled to a touch screen. The touch screen and touch screen controller can, for example, detect contact and movement or break thereof using any of a plurality of touch sensitivity technologies, including but not limited to capacitive, resistive, infrared, and surface acoustic wave technologies, as well as other proximity sensor arrays or other elements for determining one or more points of contact with the touch screen.
IO devices 407 may include an audio device. An audio device may include a speaker and/or a microphone to facilitate voice-enabled functions, such as voice recognition, voice replication, digital recording, and/or telephony functions. Other IO devices 407 may further include universal serial bus (USB) port(s), parallel port(s), serial port(s), a printer, a network interface, a bus bridge (e.g., a PCI-PCI bridge), sensor(s) (e.g., a motion sensor such as an accelerometer, gyroscope, a magnetometer, a light sensor, compass, a proximity sensor, etc.), or a combination thereof. IO device(s) 407 may further include an imaging processing subsystem (e.g., a camera), which may include an optical sensor, such as a charged coupled device (CCD) or a complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) optical sensor, utilized to facilitate camera functions, such as recording photographs and video clips. Certain sensors may be coupled to interconnect 410 via a sensor hub (not shown), while other devices such as a keyboard or thermal sensor may be controlled by an embedded controller (not shown), dependent upon the specific configuration or design of system 400.
To provide for persistent storage of information such as data, applications, one or more operating systems and so forth, a mass storage (not shown) may also couple to processor 401. In various embodiments, to enable a thinner and lighter system design as well as to improve system responsiveness, this mass storage may be implemented via a solid state device (SSD). However, in other embodiments, the mass storage may primarily be implemented using a hard disk drive (HDD) with a smaller amount of SSD storage to act as a SSD cache to enable non-volatile storage of context state and other such information during power down events so that a fast power up can occur on re-initiation of system activities. Also a flash device may be coupled to processor 401, e.g., via a serial peripheral interface (SPI). This flash device may provide for non-volatile storage of system software, including a basic input/output software (BIOS) as well as other firmware of the system.
Storage device 408 may include computer-readable storage medium 409 (also known as a machine-readable storage medium or a computer-readable medium) on which is stored one or more sets of instructions or software (e.g., processing module, unit, and/or processing module/unit/logic 428) embodying any one or more of the methodologies or functions described herein. Processing module/unit/logic 428 may represent any of the components described above. Processing module/unit/logic 428 may also reside, completely or at least partially, within memory 403 and/or within processor 401 during execution thereof by system 400, memory 403 and processor 401 also constituting machine-accessible storage media. Processing module/unit/logic 428 may further be transmitted or received over a network via network interface device(s) 405.
Computer-readable storage medium 409 may also be used to store some software functionalities described above persistently. While computer-readable storage medium 409 is shown in an exemplary embodiment to be a single medium, the term “computer-readable storage medium” should be taken to include a single medium or multiple media (e.g., a centralized or distributed database, and/or associated caches and servers) that store the one or more sets of instructions. The terms “computer-readable storage medium” shall also be taken to include any medium that is capable of storing or encoding a set of instructions for execution by the machine and that cause the machine to perform any one or more of the methodologies of embodiments disclosed herein. The term “computer-readable storage medium” shall accordingly be taken to include, but not be limited to, solid-state memories, and optical and magnetic media, or any other non-transitory machine-readable medium.
Processing module/unit/logic 428, components and other features described herein can be implemented as discrete hardware components or integrated in the functionality of hardware components such as ASICS, FPGAs, DSPs or similar devices. In addition, processing module/unit/logic 428 can be implemented as firmware or functional circuitry within hardware devices. Further, processing module/unit/logic 428 can be implemented in any combination hardware devices and software components.
Note that while system 400 is illustrated with various components of a data processing system, it is not intended to represent any particular architecture or manner of interconnecting the components; as such details are not germane to embodiments disclosed herein. It will also be appreciated that network computers, handheld computers, mobile phones, servers, and/or other data processing systems which have fewer components or perhaps more components may also be used with embodiments disclosed herein.
Some portions of the preceding detailed descriptions have been presented in terms of algorithms and symbolic representations of operations on data bits within a computer memory. These algorithmic descriptions and representations are the ways used by those skilled in the data processing arts to most effectively convey the substance of their work to others skilled in the art. An algorithm is here, and generally, conceived to be a self-consistent sequence of operations leading to a desired result. The operations are those requiring physical manipulations of physical quantities.
It should be borne in mind, however, that all of these and similar terms are to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and are merely convenient labels applied to these quantities. Unless specifically stated otherwise as apparent from the above discussion, it is appreciated that throughout the description, discussions utilizing terms such as those set forth in the claims below, refer to the action and processes of a computer system, or similar electronic computing device, that manipulates and transforms data represented as physical (electronic) quantities within the computer system's registers and memories into other data similarly represented as physical quantities within the computer system memories or registers or other such information storage, transmission or display devices.
Embodiments disclosed herein also relate to an apparatus for performing the operations herein. Such a computer program is stored in a non-transitory computer readable medium. A non-transitory machine-readable medium includes any mechanism for storing information in a form readable by a machine (e.g., a computer). For example, a machine-readable (e.g., computer-readable) medium includes a machine (e.g., a computer) readable storage medium (e.g., read only memory (“ROM”), random access memory (“RAM”), magnetic disk storage media, optical storage media, flash memory devices).
The processes or methods depicted in the preceding figures may be performed by processing logic that comprises hardware (e.g. circuitry, dedicated logic, etc.), software (e.g., embodied on a non-transitory computer readable medium), or a combination of both. Although the processes or methods are described above in terms of some sequential operations, it should be appreciated that some of the operations described may be performed in a different order. Moreover, some operations may be performed in parallel rather than sequentially.
Embodiments disclosed herein are not described with reference to any particular programming language. It will be appreciated that a variety of programming languages may be used to implement the teachings of embodiments disclosed herein.
In the foregoing specification, embodiments have been described with reference to specific exemplary embodiments thereof. It will be evident that various modifications may be made thereto without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the embodiments disclosed herein as set forth in the following claims. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative sense rather than a restrictive sense.
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provision Patent Application 63/618,151, filed on Jan. 5, 2024, and titled “Sharing of Digital Keys and Permissions Among Real-World Devices”, and is incorporated by reference in its entirety here.
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 63618151 | Jan 2024 | US |
