These and other objects and advantages of this invention will become more fully apparent from the following detailed description taken with the accompanying drawings in which:
Hereinafter, a description will be given of an embodiment of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings.
A terminal device 1 includes a built-in HDD 2, a CPU 3, a RAM 5, a ROM 4, and an external interface 7. The built-in HDD 2 is made up of a normal area 8 having no access limit, and a backup area 9 that can be accessed by only a specific command which cannot be directly operated by a user.
The CPU 3 executes program that has been recorded in the ROM 4. In the ROM 4 are recorded a certificate 102 of the terminal device 1, a master key 121 unique to the terminal device 1, a device class public key 105, a device class private key 106, a device public key 111, a device private key 112, and a program (refer to
The tamper resistant area 6 is configured in such a manner that, for example, the upper portion of a circuit is covered with a plastic resin, and a signal is not read from the external through an interface between the interior of the tamper resistant area and the external. Interfaces 71 and 72 are external interfaces which are connectable to an external storage medium.
A mobile storage device 11 includes a magnetic disc 10, a CPU 18, a RAM 17, a ROM 15, and an interface 12. The magnetic disc 10 is made up of a normal area 14 having no access limit, and a secure area 13 that can be accessed by only a specific command which cannot be directly operated by a user. The CPU 18 executes program that has been recorded in the ROM 15. In the ROM 15 are recorded a certificate 103 of the mobile storage device 11, unique backup information 118 unique to the storage device, a device class public key 107, a device class private key 108, a device public key 113, a device private key 114, and a program (refer to
The RAM 17 is used as a memory when the CPU 18 executes the program. The CPU 18, the RAM 17, and the ROM 15 are installed in a tamper resistant area 16. The tamper resistant area 16 is an area which cannot be illegally accessed from the external. The tamper resistant area 16 is configured in such a manner that, for example, a circuit is covered with a plastic resin, and a signal is not read. The interface 12 is, for example, an HDD interface such as ATA.
In this embodiment, “secure” means that original data cannot be used when the backup data is restored, that is, a copy is not increased in number even if the backup is executed.
In this embodiment, a system in which encrypted contents and a contents key for decrypting the encrypted contents are distributed, independently, is assumed. Since the contents cannot be used so far as the contents are decrypted, the copy or backup of the contents can be freely performed. On the other hand, the copy or backup of the contents key is limited in order to prevent the unfair use of the contents.
Referring to
Upon starting the backup, the mobile storage device 11 obtains a master key Kmas (121) that holds the terminal device 1 that is to back up data. The mobile recording device 11 instructs the backup key generation section 208 to generate a backup key KB (117) by use of a backup unique information BU_ID (118) which are recorded in the ROM 15 and the master key Kmas (121) is not recorded in ROM 15. The backup key KB (117) is generated, for example, by XORing the backup unique information BU_ID (118) and the master key Kmas (121). The backup key KB (117) may be generated through another method when the backup key KB (117) can be generated from the backup unique information BU_ID (118) and the master key Kmas (121).
The mobile storage device 11 encrypts the copy of the original data that has been read from the secure area 13 through the encryption and decryption section 205. After the encryption, the master key Kmas (121) of the terminal device is deleted from the mobile storage device 11. Thereafter, the mobile storage device 11 transmits the encrypted backup data to the terminal device 1. The terminal device 1 records the received encrypted backup data in the backup area 9 of the terminal device 1.
The mobile storage device 11 first transmits the certificate 103 indicative of the validity of the device class public key of the mobile storage device 11 to the terminal device 1 (302). The certificate 103 is based on, for example, X.509 recommended by ITU (International Telecommunication Union). The terminal device 1 verifies the received certificate 103 (307). Then, the terminal device 1 encrypts the provisional key K1 (311) that has been generated by the random number generator 310 with a device class public key KPdc_A (107) of the mobile storage device 11 which has been obtained by the verification of the certificate 103 (313). Then, the terminal device 1 transmits data obtained by combining the encrypted data with the device class public key certificate 102 of the terminal device 1 to the mobile storage device 11 (303).
The mobile storage device 11 performs the verification of the certificate and the decryption of the encrypted data (326), and obtains the provisional key K1 (311) and the device class public key KPdc (105) of the terminal device. The mobile storage device 11 doubly encrypts the provisional key K2 (315) that has been generated by the random number generator 328 and the device public key KPd_A (113) of the mobile storage device 11 with the provisional key K1 (331) and the device class public key KPdc (105) of the terminal device 1 (331). Then, the mobile storage device 11 transmits the encrypted data to the terminal device 1 (304).
The terminal device 1 decrypts the received encrypted data (314), and obtains the device public key KPd_A (113) and the provisional key K2 (315) of the mobile storage device 11. The terminal device 1 encrypts the device public key KPd (111) and the master key Kmas (121) of the terminal device 1 by use of the obtained device public key KPd_A (113) and provisional key K2 (315) of the mobile storage device 11 (319), and transmits the encrypted data to the mobile storage device 11 (305).
The mobile storage device 11 decrypts the received encrypted data (333), and obtains the device public key KPd (111) and the master key Kmas (121). Then, the mobile storage device 11 XORs the backup unique information BU_ID (118) and the master key Kmas (121) that has been received before to generate the backup key KB (117). Thereafter, the mobile storage device 11 encrypts the data of the original data to be backed up with the backup key KB (117) (339). The mobile storage device 11 again encrypts the encrypted backup data 322 with the device public key KPd (111) of the terminal device 1 (340), and transmits the encrypted data to the terminal device 1 (306).
The terminal device 1 decrypts the encrypted backup data 322 with the device private key Kd (112) of the terminal device 1 (321), and records the decrypted data in the backup area 9 (323). The backup data 122 is recorded in a state where the backup data 122 is encrypted with the backup key KB (117).
Subsequently, a description will be given of a method of securely restoring the data that has been recorded in the terminal device 1 with reference to the storage system shown in
The external interface 12 of the mobile storage device 11 is connected to the external interface 71 of the terminal device 1.
The mobile storage device 11 first transmits the backup unique information BU_ID (118) of the mobile storage device 11 to the terminal device 1 that is to backup the data. The terminal device 1 generates the backup key KB (117) on the basis of the master key Kmas (121) that has been recorded in the ROM (4) and the received backup unique information BU_ID (118) by the backup key generation section (207). The manufacturing method is identical with the method of generating the backup.
The terminal device 1 reads the encrypted backup data 209 that has been recorded in the backup area 9 of the terminal device 1, and decrypts the read data by use of the generated backup key KB (117) by means of the encryption and decryption section 201. After verifying the decryption of data, the terminal device 1 issues an instruction for changing over the switch of the control changeover switch 204 to the mobile storage device 11 in order to prevent the illegal restoration so that the control section of the mobile storage device 11 cannot operate. The control changeover switch 204 is “enable” in an initial value at the time of factory shipment, and becomes “disable” upon receiving a switch changeover command. When the control changeover switch 204 becomes “disable” once, the user is incapable of returning the changeover switch 204 to the “enable” state.
The terminal device 1 disables the control function of the mobile storage device 11 that records the original data 210 so as to make the original data or the data necessary for the restoration unreadable. Thereafter, the terminal device 1 transmits the decrypted backup data to another mobile storage device not shown which is connected to the external interface 72.
When the circuit of the mobile storage device 11 that records the original data 210 is destroyed, the user executes a restoring process only when the mobile storage device 11 that has records the original data 210 is not really available, to thereby enable the illegal restoration to be prevented. Also, instead of the destruction of the circuit, there are proposed a method of deleting the backup unique information BU_ID (118) of the mobile storage device 11 so as to prevent the backup from being taken again, and a method of erasing information necessary to read data from the storage medium.
The restoration is performed at two stages. At a first stage, the encrypted backup data that has been recorded in the terminal device 1 is decrypted, and at a second stage, the backup data is transmitted to another storage device.
The mobile storage device 11 first transmits the device class public key certificate (103) of the mobile storage device 11 to the terminal device 1 (502). The terminal device 1 verifies the received certificate (307). Then, the terminal device 1 encrypts the provisional key K1 (509) that has been generated by the random number generator (310) with the device class public key KPdc_A (107) of the mobile storage device 11 which has been obtained by the verification of the certificate (313). Then, the terminal device 1 transmits data obtained by combining the encrypted data with the device class public key certificate (102) of the terminal device 1 to the mobile storage device 11 (503).
The mobile storage device 11 performs the verification of the certificate and the decryption of the encrypted data (326), and obtains the provisional key K1 (509) and the device class public key KPdc (105) of the terminal device 1. The mobile storage device 11 doubly encrypts the backup unique information BU_ID (118) with the provisional key K1 (509) and the device class public key KPdc (105) of the terminal device 1 (527). Then, the mobile storage device 11 transmits the encrypted data to the terminal device 1 (504).
The terminal device 1 decrypts the received encrypted data (512), and obtains the backup unique information BU_ID (118). The terminal device 1 XORs the obtained backup unique information BU_ID (118) and the master key Kmas (121) to generate the backup key KB (117) (514). Then, the terminal device 1 decrypts the encrypted backup data 519 by use of the backup key KB (117) (518). After decrypting the encrypted backup data 519, the terminal device 1 outputs an instruction for changing over the control changeover switch 204 to the mobile storage device 11 (521). The mobile storage device 11 that has received the instruction changes over the switch to a state in which the control section 203 cannot function.
The terminal device 1 first transmits the device class public key certificate 102 of the terminal device 1 to the mobile storage device 601 (618). The mobile storage device 601 verifies the received certificate (623). Then, the mobile storage device 601 encrypts a provisional key K1 (607) that has been generated by a random number generator 625 with the device class public key KPdc (105) of the terminal device 1 which has been obtained by the verification of a certificate (626). Then, the mobile storage device 601 transmits data obtained by combining the encrypted data with the device class public key certificate (104) of the mobile storage device 601 to the terminal device 1 (619).
The terminal device 1 performs the verification of the certificate and the decryption of the encrypted data (605), and obtains the provisional key K1 (607) and the device class public key KPdc_B (109) of the mobile device 601. The terminal device 1 doubly encrypts a provisional key K2 (609) that has been generated by a random number generator 608 and the device public key KPd (111) of the terminal device 1 with the provisional key K1 (607) and the device class public key KPdc_B (109) of the mobile storage device 601 (611). Then, the terminal storage device 1 transmits the encrypted data to the mobile storage device 601 (620).
The mobile storage device 601 decrypts the encrypted data (629), and obtains the provisional key K2 (609) and the device public key KPd (111) of the terminal device. Then, the mobile storage device 601 encrypts a provisional key K3 (614) that has been generated by a random number generator 632 and a device public key KPd_B (115) of the mobile storage device 601 with the provisional key K2 (609) that has been obtained before and the device public key KPd (111) of the terminal device (635), and transmits the encrypted data to the terminal device 1 (621).
The terminal device 1 decrypts the received encrypted data (613) to obtain the provisional key K3 (614) and the device public key KPd_B (115) of the mobile storage device 601. The terminal device 1 encrypts the backup data 122 with the provisional key K3 (614) that has been obtained before and the device public key KPd_B (115) of the mobile storage device 601 (617). Then, the terminal device 1 transmits the encrypted data to the mobile storage device 601 (622). The mobile storage device 601 decrypts the data (638), and obtains the backup data 122. The backup data, that is, the contents key is stored in the secure area of a mobile storage device B.
According to this embodiment, the backup of the original data has been recorded in the plural terminals through the above protocols, thereby enabling the data to be securely restored.
For example, the backup data of the mobile storage device 11 is recorded in an STB1 (set top box) that is in a living room and an STB2 that is in a drawing room in the above-described method. In the case where the user executes the restoration of the mobile storage device 11 by use of the STB1, the control changeover switch 204 of the mobile storage device 11 is disabled before the backup data is output to another storage device from the STM1.
Even if the user again tries to connect to the mobile storage device STB2 for restoration, the control section of the mobile storage device 11 does not function. As a result, the original data and the backup unique information 118 necessary for the restoration of the backup data in STB2 are incapable of obtaining. Since the STB2 is incapable of generating the backup key for decrypting the encrypted backup data without providing the backup unique information, it is impossible to execute the restoration.
Also, the backup unique information 118 of the mobile storage device 11 can be erased instead of disabling the control switch 204.
As described above, according to this embodiment, it is possible that the backup of the contents are located in plural places with the results that even in the case where the terminal device used for the backup is destroyed or fails, it is possible to use the backup provided in another terminal device.
The foregoing description of the preferred embodiments of the invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise form disclosed, and modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teachings or may be acquired from practice of the invention. The embodiments were chosen and described in order to explain the principles of the invention and its practical application to enable one skilled in the art to utilize the invention in various embodiments and with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated. It is intended that the scope of the invention be defined by the claims appended hereto, and their equivalents.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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2006-178412 | Jun 2006 | JP | national |