The present invention relates to a support vector machine learning system and a support vector machine learning method.
In recent years, big data business has been getting popular, which collects and analyzes an enormous volume of data to extract valuable knowledge. Since analyzing the enormous volume of data requires a large-capacity storage, a high-speed CPU, and a system that performs a distributed control for these devices, it is conceivable to leave the analysis to external resources such as a cloud service. However, in the case where data processing is outsourced, problems concerning privacy are raised. For this reason, a privacy-preserving analysis technique is receiving attention in which data are sent to an outsourcing service for analysis after a privacy protection technique such as encryption is applied to the data. For example, in Non Patent Literature 1, when support vector machine learning is performed, a client of an analysis provides an executor of the analysis with feature vectors that have been linearly transformed with a random matrix, and the learning is performed using reduced SVM.
However, the technique disclosed in NPL 1 allows the executor of the analysis to understand what classification has been made because information on whether each label is positive or negative is provided to the executor. In addition, since linear transformation is used for concealing feature vectors, if the feature vectors can be associated before and after the transformation and the number of the associated combinations is the same as the number of dimensions of the feature vector space, it is possible for the executor to identify feature vectors before the linear transformation from the feature vectors after the linear transformation.
The present invention is made in view of the above background, and an object thereof is to provide a support vector machine learning system and a support vector machine learning method that are capable of reliably concealing a label of a supervisory signal when support vector machine learning is performed.
A main aspect of the present invention in order to solve the above problems is a support vector machine learning system that performs support vector machine learning, including a learning data management apparatus and a learning apparatus. The learning data management apparatus includes: a learning data storage part that stores a set of learning data including a label and a feature vector, the set of learning data being subjected to the support vector machine learning; an encryption processing part that encrypts the label of the learning data using an additive homomorphic encryption scheme; and a learning data transmitting part that transmits encrypted learning data including the encrypted label and the feature vector to the learning apparatus. The learning apparatus includes: a learning data receiving part that receives the encrypted learning data; and an update processing part that performs update processing with a gradient method on the encrypted learning data using an additive homomorphic addition algorithm.
Other problems and solutions to the problems disclosed in this application will be apparent with reference to the section of description of embodiments and the drawings.
According to the present invention, it is possible to reliably conceal a label of a supervisory signal when support vector machine learning is performed.
Hereinafter, descriptions are provided in detail for a data learning analysis system according to an embodiment of the present invention, based on
==Definition==
First, terminology of the encryption method and the data analysis used in the embodiment is defined. In the embodiment, the same one of additive homomorphic encryption schemes is used throughout the embodiment.
The additive homomorphic encryption scheme used in the embodiment is an encryption algorithm having additive property among encryption schemes having homomorphism (in this embodiment, public key encryption schemes are assumed). For example, additive homomorphic encryption schemes have additive property between encrypted texts, in addition to asymmetric property to an encryption key and a decryption key, which ordinary public key encryption schemes have. In other words, using two sets of encrypted text, it is possible to calculate the encrypted text the plaintext of which is the arithmetic sum (hereinafter simply referred to as addition or sum, and the operator symbol used for the arithmetic sum is denoted by “+”) of two sets of plaintext corresponding to the two sets of encrypted text, by using only public information (without using a secret key or the plaintext). Accordingly, when the encrypted text of plaintext m is E(m), the formula E (m1)+E (m2)=E (m1+m2) holds true. Also in the following descriptions, E(m) represents the encrypted text of plaintext m.
The algorithm for generating a secret key/a public key for additive homomorphic encryption means a secret key/a public key generating algorithm defined by the additive homomorphic encryption algorithm described above. The command input of the algorithm is a security parameter and a key seed, and the output thereof is a secret key/a public key with a certain bit length.
The encryption algorithm for additive homomorphic encryption means the encryption algorithm defined by the additive homomorphic encryption algorithm described above. The input of the encryption algorithm for additive homomorphic encryption is plaintext and a public key, and the output thereof is the encrypted text.
The decryption algorithm for additive homomorphic encryption means the decryption algorithm defined by the additive homomorphic encryption algorithm described above. The input of the decryption algorithm for additive homomorphic encryption is encrypted text and a secret key, and the output thereof is the plaintext corresponding to the encrypted text.
The addition algorithm for additive homomorphic encryption means the algorithm to perform addition operation between sets of encrypted text, which is defined by the additive homomorphic encryption algorithm described above. The command input of this algorithm is multiple sets of encrypted text, and the output thereof is the encrypted text corresponding to the sum total of the multiple sets of plaintext, each corresponding to the multiple sets of encrypted text. For example, if the command input is encrypted text E(100) corresponding to 100 and encrypted text E(200) corresponding to 200, the output is encrypted text E(300) corresponding to 300 (100+200).
(6) Support Vector Machine (hereinafter also referred to as SVM)
The support vector machine is one of discrimination methods using supervised learning. When the following set of learning data are given as a subject of SVM learning:
D={(xi, yi)|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1} i=1, 2, . . . , n},
the SVM calculates the hyperplane or the hypersurface having the maximum margin among the hyperplanes or the hypersurfaces that separate the xi vectors specified by yi=1 and the xi vectors specified by yi=−1 within Rm. Here, the margin of a hyperplane or a hypersurface is a distance from the xi vector closest to the hyperplane or the hypersurface among the xi vectors specified by yi=1 and the xi vectors specified by yi=−1. In addition, in the embodiment, each xi vector is called a feature vector.
Moreover, the feature vectors xi specified by yi=1 are called positive label feature vectors, and the feature vectors xi specified by yi=−1 are called negative label feature vectors. Meanwhile, yi is a class to classify data with the pattern classifier (see
When the set of learning data described above:
D={(xi, yi)|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1}i=1, 2, . . . , n}
is given, an algorithm to obtain the hyperplane that maximizes the margin within Rm is called an SVM learning algorithm, and the problem of obtaining the hyperplane is called an SVM problem. More specifically, this problem comes down to a problem of searching for real number coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , am) ∈ Rm that maximizes an objective function L(a1, a2, . . . , an). Here the objective function L is expressed as the following formula:
Here, all the ai≧0, and the following constraint condition is satisfied:
The gradient method is an algorithm to search for a solution on an optimization problem based on information on the gradient of a function. On the above SVM problem, the optimum solution (a1, a2, . . . , an) that maximizes the objective function L is obtained using the gradient method.
The i-th component L′i of the gradient vector of the function L is expressed as follows:
Accordingly, it is possible to obtain an optimum solution or an approximate solution thereof by recursively updating the coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , an) using the gradient method with an update rate y as below:
As described above, in the data learning analysis system of the embodiment, when the SVM learning is performed, (a) learning data are encrypted, and (b) dummy data are added to the learning data.
In the embodiment, the label yi of learning data is encrypted and provided to an analysis executing apparatus 200, which executes the SVM: learning. By doing so, the contents of the label yi (whether it is +1 or −1) are concealed from the analysis executing apparatus 200 side. Concealing the contents of the label yi makes it difficult for the analysis executing apparatus 200 to give significant meaning to the learning data.
The additive homomorphic encryption scheme is used for the algorithm for encryption. As described above, as for encrypted data using the additive homomorphic encryption scheme, it is possible to perform addition of encrypted text as encrypted data (without decryption), and the result of decryption of added encrypted text agrees to the result of adding corresponding sets of plaintext. When the gradient method is used to calculate the optimum solution (or an approximate solution) of the SVM learning, the above update formula (4) can be modified to be the following formula (5):
Here, if (a1, a2, . . . , an), (x1, x2, . . . , xn), and γ have been known, the right-hand side of the update formula (5) is the sum of the scalar products in regard to yi. Accordingly, even though encrypted text E(y1) by the additive homomorphic encryption is given instead of yi, and plaintext yi is not given, it is possible to calculate the update formula (5) by utilizing the additive property of the additive homomorphic encryption. In other words, the following formula (6) can be calculated as an update formula:
In the data learning analysis system of the embodiment, SVM learning is performed using the above formula (6) as the update formula in the analysis executing apparatus 200. This makes it possible to perform SVM learning using the encrypted text E(yi) without providing the analysis executing apparatus 200 with the plaintext on the label yi.
Note that in the case where the additive homomorphic encryption scheme does not have multiplicative property like Paillier's encryption scheme, multiplication of the encrypted text E (y) is necessary when two or more times of recursive updates are performed using the update formula (6). Hence, in the embodiment, the update is performed only once.
Meanwhile, dummy data are added to the set of learning data in this embodiment. By doing so, on the analysis executing apparatus 200 side which are provided with the set of learning data, it is difficult to even estimate significant meaning given to the learning data, for example, by using the deviation of the distribution of the learning data.
The dummy data added to the set of learning data are given a label yi of 0, which is neither +1 nor −1. Giving 0 as a label makes the terms concerning the label yi of the dummy data become 0 in the right-hand side of the update formula (5), and does not affect the update formula (5). The same applies to the update formula (6), which utilizes the additive homomorphic encryption scheme having additive property.
On the other hand, since the labels are encrypted in a side of an analysis executor, it is possible to make the analysis executor unable to determine whether or not learning data are dummy data. In addition, by adding dummy data such that the set of learning data comes close to a uniform distribution, it will be more difficult to give meaning to the learning data.
Hereinafter, descriptions are provided in detail.
The analysis requesting apparatus 100 and the analysis executing apparatus 200 are designed to be capable of sending and receiving information to and from each other through a network 300. The network 300 is, for example, the Internet or a local area network (LAN), which is built using, for example, Ethernet (registered trademark), optical fiber, wireless communication channels, public telephone networks, dedicated telephone
The analysis requesting apparatus 100 transmits a set of learning data to the analysis executing apparatus 200 through the network 300. The analysis executing apparatus 200 performs SVM learning on the learning data received from the analysis requesting apparatus 100, and transmits the result of the SVM learning (hereinafter referred to as learning result) to the analysis requesting apparatus 100 through the network 300. The analysis requesting apparatus 100 generates a pattern classifier using the learning result.
Meanwhile, the analysis executing apparatus 200 also includes the same hardware configuration illustrated in
The learning data storage part 121 and the dummy data storage part 122 are implemented as part of the storage areas provided by the auxiliary storage device 102 and the memory 103 included in the analysis requesting apparatus 100. The dummy data addition processing part 123, the encryption processing part 124, the learning data transmitting part 125, the learning result receiving part 126, the decryption processing part 127, and the pattern classifier generating part 128 are implemented by the CPU 101, included in the analysis requesting apparatus 100, loading the program codes stored in the auxiliary storage device 102 into the memory 103 and executing the program codes.
The learning data storage part 121 stores a set of learning data D. Note that the set of learning data is expressed as follows as described above:
D={(xi, yi)|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1} i=1, 2, . . . , n}
The dummy data addition processing part 123 adds dummy data to the set of learning data D. The dummy data are data including the label y of “0.” The dummy data addition processing part 123 adds the dummy data such that the distribution of the feature vectors included in the set of learning data D is uniform in the feature space. The dummy data addition processing part 123 may receive input of feature vectors from the user that makes the distribution of the feature vectors uniform. Alternatively, the dummy data addition processing part 123 may partition the feature space, select partitions in which the number of feature vectors included in the partition is small, and generate feature vectors such that the feature vectors are included in one or more selected partitions until it is judged using a chi-square test or the like that the feature space has become uniform, for example. Furthermore, the dummy data addition processing part 123 may randomly rearrange (change the subscript i randomly) the learning data (feature vectors with labels). The dummy data addition processing part 123 stores information indicating the dummy data (for example, the subscript i that indicates dummy data) in the dummy data storage part 122.
The encryption processing part 124 generates the encrypted text E(y) by encrypting the label y of the learning data using the encryption algorithm for the additive homomorphic encryption and generates learning data in which the encrypted text E(y) is used instead of the label y (hereinafter referred to as secret learning data, and represented by E (D)). The secret learning data E(D) is expressed as follows:
E(D)={(xi,E(yi))|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1, 0} i=1, 2, . . . , N}.
The learning data transmitting part 125 transmits the secret learning data to the analysis executing apparatus 200.
The learning result receiving part 126 receives the processing result of the SVM learning transmitted from the analysis executing apparatus 200. As will be described later, in this embodiment, what the analysis requesting apparatus 100 receives from the analysis executing apparatus 200 as the processing result is not real number coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , am) ∈ Rm, but encrypted text {E(aiyi)|i=1, 2, . . . , N} (hereinafter referred to as secret learning result) of values obtained by multiplying the coefficients by the labels {aiyi|i=1, 2, . . . , N} (hereinafter referred to as learning result).
The decryption processing part 127 decrypts the secret learning result and obtains (a1y1, a2y2, aNyN) The decryption processing part 127 also identifies the dummy data in the learning result decrypted based on the information stored in the dummy data storage part 122, and extracts (a1, a2, . . . , an) by removing the dummy data from the learning result. In addition, when a coefficient becomes negative, the decryption processing part 127 may use as the learning result an orthogonal projection vector obtained by orthogonally projecting the vector (a1, a2, . . . , an) onto the orthogonal complement of (y1, y2, . . . , yn)
The pattern classifier generating part 128 generates a pattern classifier using the coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , am) ∈ Rm. Note that for the pattern classifier generating method, the same method as with that used when a general SVM learning is performed is employed and descriptions thereof are omitted in this description.
The learning data receiving part 221 receives the set of secret learning data transmitted from the analysis requesting apparatus 100.
The coefficient generating part 222 generates the coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , aN) of the objective function L. In this embodiment, the coefficient generating part 222 generates a random number N times and uses the numbers as the coefficients. However, predetermined initial values (for example, all the ai′s can be set to 0) may be set for the coefficients.
The update processing part 223 performs update processing using the update formula (6) described above. The update processing part 223 uses an addition process using the additive homomorphic encryption scheme for the operation represented by the operator symbol “+” concerning the update formula (6). In addition, in this embodiment, it is assumed that an additive homomorphic encryption scheme having no multiplicative property, such as Paillier's encryption scheme, is used as an additive homomorphic encryption scheme. Accordingly, the update processing part 223 generates the set of encrypted text E(aiyi) obtained by providing the update formula (6) with randomly set coefficients and the set of secret learning data, so as to use it as the secret learning result without any processing.
The learning result transmitting part 224 transmits the secret learning result to the analysis requesting apparatus 100.
First, in the analysis requesting apparatus 100, the encryption processing part 124 generates a secret key/a public key to be used hereafter using the algorithm for generating a secret key/a public key based on the additive homomorphic encryption scheme (S100). Then, the dummy data addition processing part 123 adds the dummy data including the label yi=0 and the feature vectors {(xi,0) i=n+1, N} of the dummy to the set of learning data D={(xi, yi)|xi ∈ Rm, yi∈ {−1,1} i=1, 2, . . . , n} stored in the learning data storage part 121 to generate the new set of learning data D={(xi,yi)|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1,1, 0} i=1, 2, . . . , N} (S150). Here, the dummy data addition processing part 123 may randomly rearrange the learning data.
Next, the encryption processing part 124 generates the encrypted text E(yi) using the encryption algorithm for the additive homomorphic encryption with the public key generated in (S100) using the label yi as plaintext and generates the secret learning data E(D)={(xi,E(yi))|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1, 0} i=1, 2, . . . , N} using the set of learning data D={(xi,yi)|xi ∈0 Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1, 0} i=1, 2, . . . , N} (S200). The learning data transmitting part 125 transmits the secret learning data (D100) to the analysis executing apparatus 200.
The analysis executor terminal 200, which has received the secret learning data (D100), performs the learning process illustrated in
In the analysis requesting apparatus 100, the learning result receiving part 126 receives the secret learning result (D200) transmitted from the analysis executing apparatus 200, and the decryption processing part 127 decrypts the secret learning result (D200) using the secret key generated in (S100) and obtains the learning result (a1y1, a2y2, . . . , aNyN) (S400). The decryption processing part 127 removes the results corresponding to the dummy data from (a1y1, a2y2, . . . , aNyN) and finally generates the column of coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , an). If a coefficient ai<0, the decryption processing part 127 changes the value of ai such that ai=0. As described above, the post-processing ends (S500). Here, if necessary, the decryption processing part 127 may orthogonally project the vector (a1, a2, . . . , an) onto the orthogonal complement of (y1, y2, . . . , yn) such that the following formula is satisfied:
and may treat the orthogonal projection vector as the column of coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , an). The pattern classifier generating part 128 generates a pattern classifier using the column of coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , an) (S600).
The learning data receiving part 221 receives the secret learning data (D100), in other words, E(D)={(xi,E(yi))|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1, 0} i=1, 2, . . . , N} (S301), and the coefficient generating part 222 generates random coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , aN) to use them as initial coefficients and sets the update coefficient γ>0 (S302). Note that the coefficient generating part 222 uses a predetermined constant such as, for example (γ=0.001) or any other suitable constant in this embodiment.
Next, the update processing part 223 calculates the above update formula (6) in regard to the initial coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , aN) and the secret learning data (D100) (S303). The learning result transmitting part 224 transmits the processing result of the secret learning {E(aiyi)|i=1, 2, . . . N} (D200) calculated from the update formula (6) to the analysis requesting apparatus 100 (S304).
As described above, in the data learning analysis system of this embodiment, applying the additive homomorphic encryption scheme to the gradient method makes it possible to perform the SVM learning using the gradient method with the labels remaining encrypted (without decryption). Accordingly, it is possible to conceal the labels added to the feature vectors as a supervisory signal from the analysis executing apparatus 200 side.
In addition, in the data learning analysis system of this embodiment, the labels are encrypted instead of being linearly transformed. For example, in the case of the learning method disclosed in NPL 1, because all the feature vectors are linearly transformed using the same matrix, for example, in the case where combinations of a feature vector after the secret process and its original feature vector are leaked out, and the number of the leaked combinations agrees to the dimension of the feature vector space, it may be possible to identify the matrix used for the transformation and thereby identify the original feature vectors. However, since additive homomorphic encryption schemes such as Paillier's encryption scheme are resistant to chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack, even if the combinations of feature vectors, the number of which is equal to or larger than the dimension of the feature vector space, are leaked out, it will be difficult to identify the labels. Thus, this makes it possible to reliably conceal the labels from the analysis executing apparatus 200 side and the improvement of the security can be expected.
In addition, in the data learning analysis system of this embodiment, since the labels are encrypted in addition to adding the dummy data to the set of learning data, it is difficult to estimate the labels from uneven distribution of feature vectors, or the like. Thus, the security can be improved. In the case where the distribution of feature vectors is uneven, it is conceivable that the labels maybe estimated from the distribution. However, in the data learning analysis system of this embodiment, since the dummy data are added such that the feature vectors come close to a uniform distribution, it is difficult to estimate information on the original feature vectors from the set of the encrypted feature vectors. Thus, it is possible to reliably conceal the labels from the analysis executing apparatus 200 side. Consequently, the security can be improved more.
In addition, in the data learning analysis system of this embodiment, since the label of the dummy data is “0”, it is possible to eliminate effect of adding the dummy data at the update processing with the gradient method. Moreover, since the label of the dummy data is encrypted, it is impossible to estimate from the encrypted data that the effect is eliminated. Thus, it is possible to reliably conceal the learning data from the analysis executing apparatus 200 side.
Next, a second embodiment is described.
At the learning process (S300) in the first embodiment, the analysis executing apparatus 200 updates the initial coefficients using the gradient method only once (S303). Generally, in the case where the update is performed only once in the gradient method, an obtained solution is not necessarily the optimum solution as illustrated in
To address this, in the second embodiment, k initial values (a1, a2, . . . , aN) are prepared to perform the update processing, and by obtaining the sum of the update results E(aiyi), the degree of dependence on the initial values is reduced.
From the first embodiment, modifications have been made only on the learning process (S300), and the other process procedure is the same as that of the first embodiment. Hence, descriptions are provided herein only for the learning process (S300).
The learning data receiving part 221 receives the secret learning data (D100), in other words, E(D)={(xi,E(yi))|xi ∈ Rm, yi ∈ {−1, 1, 0} i=1, 2, . . . , N} (S601), and the coefficient generating part 222 determines the number k of initial values and sets an internal variable t=0. The value k only needs to be an integer larger than 0 and may also be a random integer. The coefficient generating part 222 may select the largest possible value, depending on the computation resource of the analysis executing apparatus 200 (S602). The coefficient generating part 222 generates the random coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , aN) and uses them as the initial coefficients as well as generates the update coefficient y>0 and sets the secret learning result E(aiyi) to 0 for i=1, 2, . . . , N for the initialization (S603). Note that also in this embodiment, the same constant (γ=0.001) is used for γ as in the first embodiment.
Next, the update processing part 223 gives the initial coefficients (a1, a2, . . . , aN), the secret learning data (D100), and the secret learning result {E(aiyi)|i=1, 2, . . . , N} to the following update formula:
and updates the secret learning result E(aiyi) (S604). p The update processing part 223 increments the internal variable t. If t<k, the process is returned to (S603). If t=k, the learning result transmitting part 224 transmits the secret learning result {E(aiyi)|i=1, 2, . . . , N} calculated with the above update formula (7) to the analysis requesting apparatus 100 (S606).
As above, the descriptions have been provided for the embodiments of the present invention. However, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above, and various modifications may be made within the gist of the present invention.
For example, although each of the analysis requesting apparatus 100 and the analysis executing apparatus 200 includes one Central Processing Unit (CPU) in the embodiments, the present invention is not limited this configuration. For example, at least one of the analysis requesting apparatus 100 and the analysis executing apparatus 200 may include multiple CPUs, servers, hardware processors, microprocessors, microcontrollers or any suitable combination thereof.
In addition, although the sum of the scalar products of the inner products <xi,xj> of the feature vectors is calculated on the right-hand sides of the update formulae (5) to (7), these do not need to be inner products. The update formulae (5) to (7) may be calculated using a general kernel function K(xi,xj) including the inner products.
Moreover, although the update coefficient y is set as y=0.01 in the above embodiments, the update coefficient y does not need to be this value. A value obtained from an existing algorithm for determining update coefficients of the gradient method may be used.
Furthermore, although the number k of initial values of coefficients prepared is determined by the coefficient generating part 222 of the analysis executing apparatus 200 in the second embodiment, the value k may be specified by the analysis requesting apparatus 100. This approach can be implemented by the learning data transmitting part 125, for example, receiving an input of the value k from the user and transmitting the input to the analysis executing apparatus 200 together with the secret learning data.
This application is a U.S. National Phase application under U.S.C. §371 of International Application No. PCT/JP2014/060533, filed on Apr. 11, 2014. The International Application was published in Japanese on Oct. 15, 2015 as WO 2015/155896A1 under PCT Article 21 (2) . The contents of the above applications are hereby incorporated by reference.
Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind |
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PCT/JP2014/060533 | 4/11/2014 | WO | 00 |