In many circumstances, it is important to verify that a mobile device is in the hands of a valid user prior to communicating with the device.
For example, as discussed in U.S. application Ser. No. 14/798,155, “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR MOBILE NUMBER VERIFICATION,” filed Jul. 13, 2015 (commonly owned with the present application and hereby incorporated by reference), an arrangement is disclosed for confirming that the user of a mobile device user has not changed (such as by a mobile device being deactivated and the mobile number re-assigned to a different user) prior to a bank or other institution using an automatic telephone dialing system to make a call to the mobile device.
Verifying or authenticating a mobile device can be especially important when a mobile device is being used to conduct a financial transaction. For example, mobile device users conducting financial transactions are often given one-time passwords to authenticate the user and complete a transaction. A one-time password is intended to prevent a fraudster from gaining access to a user's permanent password and using it for fraudulent transactions. However, sending a one-time password may itself involve some risk, e.g., when the password (even if encrypted) is sent over a public network, such as the internet or a wireless provider network, where it can be intercepted and decrypted.
For this reason, systems have been developed for sending one-time passwords over out-of-band communications channels, such as disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 8,806,592, “METHOD FOR SECURE USER AND TRANSACTION AUTHENTICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT,” which is hereby incorporated by reference. Using out-of-band communications channels improve security since data is generally less accessible to hackers than data sent over a public network (e.g., where data is being entered at a website). The user receiving the one-time password can, e.g., enter the received password at a website, thus confirming that the user has in fact received the one-time password at the user's known mobile device. However, such arrangements also carry some risk, since a fraudster may hack a mobile device and control its operation, and thereby redirect or forward communications having passwords and other sensitive information to the fraudster's phone. Thus, the security of one-time passwords over out-of-band communications can also be compromised (e.g., when a fraudster attempting to access an account at an online banking website has gained control of a user's mobile device and redirected messages to the fraudster's phone, thus enabling the fraudster to receive the one-time password and enter that password at the website to gain access to the account).
There is thus arisen the need for providing enhanced security when communicating with a mobile device, such as when communicating a one-time password to complete a financial transaction.
There is provided, in accordance with embodiments of the present invention, a system and method for authenticating a mobile device being used for a transaction.
In some embodiments, authenticating a mobile device when sending a one-time password fortifies or enhances the security of the one-time password, by confirming that authenticated mobile device was in fact the device that received the one-time password.
In other embodiments, authenticating a mobile device is accomplished without a transaction requiring the entry of a one-time password. In such embodiments, the mobile device can be authenticated by sending a message to the mobile device, with the authenticity of the phone verified by a message returned to a security server. Thus, the entity with whom the transaction is being conducted is a assured that it is dealing with the authorized user/mobile phone (even without entry of a one-time password).
A more complete understanding of the present invention may be derived by referring to the detailed description of the invention and to the claims, when considered in connection with the Figures.
There are various embodiments and configurations for implementing the present invention. Generally, embodiments provide systems and methods for authenticating a mobile device when being used to conduct a transaction, in addition to any authentication of the user operating the mobile device. As an example, when a customer is accessing an on-line banking website (either through the use of a mobile device or at a computer or other device separate from the mobile device), the website operator may send a message (out-of-band) to the customer's mobile device confirming that the customer is attempting the access. In some cases a fraudster may have hacked the customer's mobile device (and is redirecting messages to a device of the fraudster). Embodiments of the invention permit the website operator (such as a bank) to confirm that any message sent to the customer has in fact been sent to the authenticated customer mobile device.
As an example, in order to authenticate a user when conducting a transaction at a website, a one-time password (OTP) may be sent to the user to be entered at the website. Such a one-time password provides greater security than a permanent or multi-use password that, over time, could be compromised (such as by a fraudster observing a user when entering a password or by hacking into a system that stores user passwords). The one-time password may be sent to the user via an out-of-band (OOB) communications channel, i.e., a communications channel that is separate and independent of the website being used (such email or text). In some cases, the OOB communications channel may send the one-time password to a device separate from the one being used to conduct the transaction. A description of the use of one-time passwords being sent over OOB communications channels can be found, for example, in aforementioned U.S. Pat. No. 8,806,592. One embodiment of the present invention enhances the security associated with one-time passwords by essentially requiring a mobile device, at which a one-time password is being received, to also authenticate itself. In alternative embodiments to be described, authentication may be achieved without the user receiving a one-time password, such as by sending an OOB message to a device of the user that requires a response (such as by clicking on a link), and examining a message sent by the mobile device in response to the activated link to confirm whether it has been sent by the actual device of the authorized user.
In one described embodiment, a mobile device to which a one-time password may be sent is examined for a unique mobile ID, such as international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) data that is stored at a subscriber identification module (SIM) in the mobile device. The IMSI is unique to the mobile device and is used by the mobile service provider in communicating with the mobile device. In this described embodiment, the IMSI is retrieved from the SIM in response to the user selecting a hyperlink provided to the mobile device. The activation of the link may, for example, launch an application resident on the mobile device that causes the mobile device to retrieve the IMSI from its SIM. The retrieved IMSI is sent to a security server that compares the retrieved IMSI to a valid or correct IMSI for that mobile device (i.e., the IMSI used by the mobile service provider in communicating with the mobile device). A mobile ID database associated with the security server may store a valid IMSI for mobile devices that have been enrolled for conducting transactions using one-time passwords.
In this particular embodiment, if the phone has been authenticated by a valid IMSI, the one-time password may then be sent from the security server to the mobile device, to be entered at the mobile device for authenticating the user. Alternatively, the one-time password may be incorporated (e.g., as metadata) in the previously mentioned hyperlink that is sent and selected at the mobile device in order to retrieve the IMSI. The activation of the hyperlink may, for example, launch an application at the mobile device that automatically populates the one-time password in the appropriate data field at the website being used for the transaction, but the transaction is not approved until the security server authenticates the mobile device by matching the mobile ID retrieved from the device to a valid mobile ID (e.g., a valid IMSI stored at the mobile ID database associated with the security server).
In other embodiments, the mobile device can be authenticated without a one-time password being sent to the mobile device and entered at a website being used for a transaction. For example, in some preferred embodiments, messages between a security server and a mobile device can confirm that the mobile device is associated with a unique mobile ID (phone number, IMSI, IMEI, etc.) that matches a mobile ID known to the entity (e.g., a bank) with whom the user is attempting a transaction.
For example, in just-referenced embodiments of the invention, OOB communications channels can be used to authenticate a mobile device that is known to be used by a person authorized to conduct a transaction (e.g., at a banking website), without requiring that the customer enter a one-time password. When a customer enrolls for using an online banking website, the customer may be asked to provide an authorized mobile phone number (MSISDN). When a transaction is to be conducted, an OOB text message can be sent to the phone at the authorized phone number, requiring that the customer respond in order to complete a website transaction, such as by activating or clicking on a link provided with the OOB message. The activation of the link causes an http message to be sent back to a security server, and a header in the message can be examined for the phone number of the mobile device sending the message. If the phone number matches the authorized phone number, the security server authenticates the mobile device. If the phone number does not match the authorized phone number (e.g., in a case where the customer's phone may have been hacked and a fraudster is receiving messages and responding, and the fraudster's phone number is returned in the header of the message), the security server can alert the bank that someone other than the customer is responding to the OOB message and may be attempting to fraudulently access the customer's account at the website. In this particular embodiment, if the mobile device is authenticated, authentication at and entry to the website is accomplished without requiring the user of the mobile device to enter a one-time password.
Referring now to
As explained earlier, communicating a one-time password by way of the out-of-band communications channel 145 provides security for a transaction, but such security could be undermined, e.g., by a fraudster surreptitiously gaining access to the mobile phone through the wireless provider network. The fraudster could then forward out-of-band communications (e.g., emails or text messages) from the mobile device 110 to a device used by the fraudster, thus permitting the fraudster to use the one-time password to access the user's account. In accordance with some embodiments of the invention, and in order to prevent the one-time password from being used at an unauthorized device, the security server 140 will also require that the mobile device 110 be authenticated.
Briefly, in accordance with one embodiment, the authentication of the mobile device 110 requires that the mobile device provide a unique mobile ID associated with the mobile device 110, such as (in a specific embodiment) the IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) stored on a SIM (subscriber identification module) located within the mobile device. The unique mobile ID is retrieved from the mobile device 110 and provided to the security server 140. The retrieved unique mobile ID is compared to the correct or valid mobile ID for the mobile device 110 that is stored at a mobile device ID database 150. In embodiments to be more fully described below, the mobile device 110 retrieves its mobile ID in response to the activation of a hyperlink that is sent by the security server 140 to the mobile device 110 over the out-of-band communications channel 145 (e.g., via email or text message). The OOB message may also include an alert to the user that a transaction is being attempted (e.g., against an account of the user). The retrieved mobile ID (retrieved in response to clicking on the link) is sent to the security server 140 where it is compared to the correct mobile ID for the mobile device 110. If there is a match, the security server 140 notifies the transaction server 130 (via the networks 120) that the mobile device has been authenticated and the transaction can be completed (assuming the user has also entered the correct one-time password at the website).
It should be noted that, in some embodiments of the invention, variations in the operation of the system 100 are possible. For example, while the described embodiment uses the IMSI for authenticating the mobile device, other unique data or attributes of the mobile device could be used for such purpose. For example, in some wireless networks a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) performs, among other things, functions similar to those of a SIM and may include an IMSI or similar unique identifier (for purposes of the invention, the term “SIM” is intended to include a UICC and similar devices). Further, a SIM may include unique identifiers other than an IMSI, such as an Integrated Circuit Card Identifier (ICCID) that could be used in lieu of the IMSI. In currently described embodiments, it is noteworthy that the unique mobile ID is an identifier that would not be typically known or easily accessible to the public. Thus the unique mobile ID would not be a publicly used identifier, such as mobile telephone number. Rather, in the presently described embodiment, the IMSI or a similar internal identifier would typically only be known to the wireless service provider.
In some embodiments, a mobile device might have other unique information that could be used as the mobile ID and that would only be present at the authentic mobile device conducting the transaction, such as attributes of the mobile device (the specific configuration of hardware components and software applications and their individual internal identifiers), a hardware identifier (IMEI), or other data that is specific to the mobile device (personal contact information pertaining to the authorized user of the mobile device) that is stored at the mobile device. As should be apparent, these variations would require that the specific attributes or data be provided to the security server 140 in advance of being used for authentication, such as during enrollment of the mobile device. Further, in its broadest sense, the term “subscriber identity module” or “SIM” is used herein to refer to component of a mobile device that contains an established mobile identifier that uniquely identifies the mobile device (and is not publicly known), as contemplated by the foregoing description. However, in alternative embodiments to be described later, the particular operation of the messages and calls between the mobile device (using a mobile or wireless carrier) and the transaction server and security server permit the phone number (MSISDN) associated with the mobile device to be used to authenticate the phone.
Further, while the currently described embodiments use a hyperlink sent to the mobile device 110 that causes (when selected) the mobile ID to be retrieved from within the mobile device, the authentication of the mobile ID could be in response to other events initiated at the mobile device when a transaction is requested. For example, public and private keys could be stored in the mobile device as part of enrollment, and when transactions are later initiated the exchange of both the public and private keys between the mobile device and the security server could authenticate the mobile device. Alternatively, an application could be loaded at the mobile device during enrollment, and the application could automatically generate a reply text or other message to the security server (after user interaction at the website) confirming that the text with the one-time password arrived at the intended device.
Also, while the embodiment of
Turning now to
At step 218, a transaction application (app) for subsequent use when conducting financial transactions is provided by the server 130. The sequence of steps seen in
As will become apparent later, and depending upon which of various embodiments are being implemented, various steps or procedures illustrated in
At step 310, the user of the mobile device 110 visits a website maintained by the server 130. The website (and the transactions conducted at that website) may require that both the user and the mobile device be authenticated and, as described earlier in conjunction with
The security server 140 sends the generated one-time password (OTP) to the mobile device (over the OOB channel 145) and to the transaction server 130 through the networks 120, step 342. At step 344, the mobile device (under the control of the transaction app) populates the one-time password into the appropriate password field of the website page present at the mobile device, from which it is sent to the transaction server 130 (in some cases, the user may be required to enter the one-time password manually). At step 346, the transaction server determines whether the one-time password has expired (for security purposes, the password has a limited use time and becomes unusable if too much time has elapsed from the time it was generated). For example, the one-time password may include, in its string of digits, certain values that represent and expiration time/date for the password, and those digits may be used by the mobile device to determine whether the password has expired. Alternatively, the security server 140 may provide an expiration time/date with the password when it is sent to the transaction server at step 342 and that expiration time/date may be used by the transaction server to determine whether the one-time password has expired. If the one-time password has expired, the transaction is declined at step 346. If the password has not expired at step 346, then the transaction server 130 compares the one-time password sent by the mobile device to the one-time password sent by the security server 140, step 348. If the one-time passwords match, step 350, then the user is authenticated and a transaction may be conducted, step 352. If the passwords do not match at step 350, then the transaction is declined.
As described earlier in conjunction with
In some embodiments, the transaction app might not be used to retrieve the IMSI from the SIM, but rather instructions/code may be included in OTHERDATA and invoke the necessary utility programs of the mobile device 110 to retrieve and send the IMSI to the security server 140.
At step 610 (
The security server then requests that an SMS text message be sent from the mobile carrier to the user mobile device at step 614, with an SMS request message 714. The SMS request message includes the phone number provided to the security server by the transaction server and an authentication URL (directed to a site at the security server) which will be used to provide a link for selection/activation by the user. At step 620, the mobile carrier sends to the mobile device, at the user's phone number provided via the security server, an SMS text message 716 that includes the authentication link. The SMS text message 716 when displayed at the mobile device may include text notifying the user that an attempt is being made to access the user's account and that the user should click on the displayed link if the user wants to proceed with that access.
At step 622, the link displayed as a result of the SMS message 716 is activated/selected by the user at step 622 and, in response, a device authentication request message 720 is sent by the user mobile device to the security server 140 (at the URL in the authentication link). A specific feature of the present embodiment is the inclusion of the mobile device phone number in the HTTP header of the message 720 sent to the security server 140 (via the mobile carrier 120). Enriched HTTP headers are commonly used by mobile carriers in messages sent to websites (see, e.g., www.techrepublic.com/it-security/why-are-websites-getting your mobile-phone-number), such as at the header field “HTTP_X_UP_CALLING_LINE_ID” illustrated in the message 720, and at step 624 the security server 140 compares the phone number received in the device authentication request 720 with the trusted phone number that it received from the transaction server in the authentication request message 712.
The security server 140 then provides, at step 630, a device authentication response message 732 to the mobile device, that includes the bank return URL, which at step 632 advances the displayed website of the bank to a device authentication page, indicating to the user's mobile device that it is in the process of being authenticated by the bank. The underlying script programming at the website then sends, at step 634, an authentication confirmation request message 734 to the security server 140 requesting that the security server provide the status of the mobile device authentication process.
In one embodiment, the determined status of the authentication process can be one of (1) a match at step 624 with the authentication confirmed (Green) so that the transaction can proceed (2) no match at step 624, indicating the authentication has failed (Red) and that the transaction should be declined, and (3) the security server is unable to perform the comparison of phone numbers (Yellow), for example, because wireless transmissions have failed or the data coverage of the mobile device will not permit the required text message or HTTP messages.
At step 636, the security server 140 provides the determined status as part of an authentication confirmation response message 736, which in turn leads to the transaction server either advancing the website page to permit the transaction to proceed, or displaying a message that the transaction cannot be completed. As discussed earlier, in this described embodiment, if the mobile phone has been authenticated (e.g., the actual mobile device of an authorized customer is being used to access an account at a bank), no one-time password need be entered by the user or otherwise used to populate a field in the online banking website.
One variation of the embodiment illustrated in
The computer system 800 is shown comprising hardware elements that can be electrically coupled or otherwise in communication via a bus 805. The hardware elements can include one or more processors 810, including, without limitation, one or more general-purpose processors and/or one or more special-purpose processors (such as digital signal processing chips, graphics acceleration chips, and/or the like); one or more input devices 815, which can include, without limitation, a mouse, a keyboard and/or the like; and one or more output devices 820, which can include, without limitation, a display device, a printer and/or the like.
The computer system 800 may further include one or more storage devices 825, which can comprise, without limitation, local and/or network accessible storage or memory systems having computer or machine readable media. Common forms of physical and/or tangible computer readable media include, as examples, a hard disk, magnetic tape, or any other magnetic medium, an optical medium (such as CD-ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a read only memory (ROM) which can be programmable or flash-updateable or the like, and any other memory chip, cartridge, or medium from which a computer can read data, instructions and/or code. In many embodiments, the computer system 800 will further comprise a working memory 830, which could include (but is not limited to) a RAM or ROM device, as described above.
The computer system 800 also may further include a communications subsystem 835, such as (without limitation) a modem, a network card (wireless or wired), an infra-red communication device, or a wireless communication device and/or chipset, such as a Bluetooth® device, an 802.11 device, a WiFi device, a WiMax device, a near field communications (NFC) device, cellular communication facilities, etc. The communications subsystem 835 may permit data to be exchanged with a network, and/or any other devices described herein. Transmission media used by communications subsystem 835 (and the bus 805) may include copper wire, coaxial cables and fiber optics. Hence, transmission media can also take the form of waves (including, without limitation radio, acoustic and/or light waves, such as those generated during radio-wave and infra-red data communications).
The computer system 800 can also comprise software elements, illustrated within the working memory 830, including an operating system 840 and/or other code, such as one or more application programs 845, which may be designed to implement, as an example, the processes seen in
As an example, one or more methods discussed earlier might be implemented as code and/or instructions executable by a computer (and/or a processor within a computer). In some cases, a set of these instructions and/or code might be stored on a computer readable storage medium that is part of the system 800, such as the storage device(s) 825. In other embodiments, the storage medium might be separate from a computer system (e.g., a removable medium, such as a compact disc, etc.), and/or provided in an installation package with the instructions/code stored thereon. These instructions might take the form of code which is executable by the computer system 800 and/or might take the form of source and/or installable code, which is compiled and/or installed on the computer system 800 (e.g., using any of a variety of generally available compilers, installation programs, compression/decompression utilities, etc.). The communications subsystem 835 (and/or components thereof) generally will receive the signals (and/or the data, instructions, etc., carried by the signals), and the bus 805 then might carry those signals to the working memory 830, from which the processor(s) 805 retrieves and executes the instructions. The instructions received by the working memory 830 may optionally be stored on storage device 825 either before or after execution by the processor(s) 810.
While various methods and processes described herein may be described with respect to particular structural and/or functional components for ease of description, methods of the invention are not limited to any particular structural and/or functional architecture but instead can be implemented on any suitable hardware, firmware, and/or software configuration. Similarly, while various functionalities are ascribed to certain individual system components, unless the context dictates otherwise, this functionality can be distributed or combined among various other system components in accordance with different embodiments of the invention. As one example, the transaction server 130 and security server 140 may each be implemented by a single system having one or more storage device and processing elements, or alternatively, may each be implemented by plural systems, with their respective functions distributed across different systems either in one location or across a plurality of linked locations.
Moreover, while the various flows and processes described herein (e.g., those illustrated in
This application is a non-provisional application which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/313,542, filed on Mar. 25, 2016, the complete disclosure of which is herein incorporated by reference.
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