The present disclosure relates generally to the processing of secure electronic messages and information. In particular, the instant disclosure is directed to a system and method for resolving mismatches that may occur between, for example, an e-mail address contained in the certificate of a sender or recipient of an electronic message, and the e-mail address actually used in the sender or recipient field of an e-mail.
Exchanging secured electronic messages and data, such as, for example, e-mail messages, is well known. Secure electronic messaging may involve the use of digital signatures, encryption, or the like. For example, a recipient of an electronic message may verify that the sender of an electronic message is trusted by comparing the address of the sender to an address that may be contained in a certificate or certificate chain of the sender.
Some organizations, such as, for example, government agencies like the Department of Defense, are moving to systems in which a user has an e-mail address that they will keep for the life of their tenure with that organization. This sort of lifelong address will typically be contained within the user's certificate. As a user moves around within the organization, the address for their account may change, for example, based on location. For example, the lifelong address may appear as John.Doe@agency.gov, while the address being used when the user is working at a particular site within the organization may change to reflect the location of the user, for example, John.Doe@locationA.agency.gov. Thus, in this example, as John Doe moves about throughout the agency, the lifelong address of John Doe will not change, but John Doe's outlook address may change based on John Doe's location.
This arrangement can create many problems with signed electronic messages, such as, for example, S/MIME, because it depends on the e-mail address found in the user's certificate matching the e-mail address of the account for verification. In this example, if someone wants to send an e-mail to John Doe when he is stationed at location A, the system would search for the certificate containing the address John.Doe@locationA.agency.gov, but the address contained in John Doe's lifelong certificate is John.Doe@agency.gov. This difference will result in a mismatch. Similarly, if John Doe were to send a signed e-mail to someone, when the recipient attempts to verify it, the recipient will see the originating address is John.Doe@locationA.agency.gov, but the address in the certificate is John.Doe@agency.gov. Again, this will result as an e-mail mismatch error.
What is needed is a system and method for resolving the potential mismatch errors, for example, those that might occur in organizations that use lifelong e-mail addresses and shorter term addresses that are used as the user moves around within the organization.
These and other objects and advantages of exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be better understood and appreciated in conjunction with the following detailed description of exemplary embodiments taken together with the accompanying drawings, in which:
In view of the foregoing, we have now identified an efficient, accurate and easy to implement system and method for handling e-mail address mismatches between the address contained within a user's certificate or certificate chain, and the account address actually being used. In order to resolve address mismatches one or more canonical, e.g., generic, domain name(s) may, for example, be used as a lifelong address of a user that is contained in the user's certificate. Upon detection of an address mismatch, the system and method disclosed herein may automatically re-check the certificate or search for a certificate containing the canonical or generic domain or user name to attempt to resolve the mismatch. This mismatch resolution is preferably transparent to the user and occurs automatically. The canonical or generic domain or user names that are available to the device may be typically controlled by IT policy that is in place on the system for the device. While this system is suitable for any type of electronic messaging system, it has particular applicability to systems that use mobile wireless communication devices with electronic messaging capability.
According to an exemplary embodiment, if a search for a recipient's certificate, or when performing an address mismatch check when receiving a signed message, a canonical or generic domain name may be included in the search. Thus, if someone is trying to send an e-mail to John.Doe@locationA.agency.gov, and a matching certificate is not found, the search may be retried using a canonical or generic domain name, such as, for example, John.Doe@agency.gov. The system may be preferably configured to automatically retry a certificate search of a recipient using the canonical or generic domain name, or in the case of an address mismatch when attempting to verify a received message, retry the check substituting the canonical or generic domain name(s). A faster and perhaps even more efficient approach when searching for a certificate or attempting to resolve a mismatch, is to automatically check certificates for both the address of the account being used and canonical or generic domain name simultaneously, and transparently provide the user with the matching result. While it is preferred in this example to perform these certificate checks at the device level, it is also envisioned that a server or service resident on a server within the system, such as, for example, an e-mail server may perform these checks thereby increasing the speed and efficiency of the search, while alleviating processor overhead of the device. As with the device, a server-based implementation, the canonical or generic domain names that are available to the device via the server may be typically controlled by IT policy that is in place on the system.
According to another exemplary embodiment, the system may be configured to search for a generic name that includes canonical or generic user name(s) in place of (or in addition to) a canonical or generic domain name to search for a certificate or to resolve a mismatch. Typically, e-mail addresses are composed of two main parts—the user name and the domain name, for example, user name@domain name. The examples set forth above are described with respect to using a canonical or generic domain name when searching for a certificate or when attempting to resolve a mismatch. However, it is also contemplated that a canonical or generic user name may be used to search for a certificate or resolve a mismatch. For example, the user name may change as an employee moves or is assigned to different departments within an agency. For instance, the lifelong address may be John.Doe@agency.gov, but the user name may change as John Doe is assigned to different offices or departments within the agency, for example,
In yet a further exemplary implementation, using a combination of canonical or generic domain names and user names to search for a certificate or to resolve a mismatch may also be used to provide a more robust solution.
An e-mail sender system 10 may, for example, be connected to an ISP (Internet Service Provider) on which a user of the system 10 has an account, located within a company, possibly connected to a local area network (LAN), and connected to the Internet 20, or connected to the Internet 20 through a large ASP (application service provider) such as America Online (AOL). Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the systems shown in
The message server 40 may be implemented, for example, on a network computer within the firewall of a corporation, a computer within an ISP or ASP system or the like, and acts as the main interface for e-mail exchange over the Internet 20. Although other messaging systems might not require a message server system 40, a mobile device 100 configured for receiving and possibly sending e-mail will normally be associated with an account on a message server. Perhaps the two most common message servers are Microsoft Exchange™ and Lotus Domino™.
These products are often used in conjunction with Internet mail routers that route and deliver mail. These intermediate components are not shown in
The wireless gateway 85 and infrastructure 90 provide a link between the Internet 20 and wireless network 105. The wireless infrastructure 90 determines the most likely network for locating a given user and tracks the user as they roam between countries or networks. A message is then delivered to the mobile device 100 via wireless transmission, typically at a radio frequency (RF), from a base station in the wireless network 105 to the mobile device 100. The particular network 105 may be virtually any wireless network over which messages may be exchanged with a mobile communication device.
As shown in
Regardless of the specific mechanism controlling the forwarding of messages to the mobile device 100, the message 15, or possibly a translated or reformatted version thereof, is sent to the wireless gateway 85. The wireless infrastructure 90 includes a series of connections to wireless network 105. These connections could be Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), Frame Relay or T1 connections using the TCP/IP protocol used throughout the Internet. As used herein, the term “wireless network” is intended to include at least one of three different types of networks, those being (1) data-centric wireless networks, (2) voice-centric wireless networks and (3) dual-mode networks that can support both voice and data communications over the same physical base stations. Combined dual-mode networks include, but are not limited to, (1) Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) networks, (2) the Groupe Special Mobile or the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) networks, and (3) future third-generation (3G) networks like Enhanced Data-rates for Global Evolution (EDGE), integrated Digital Enhanced Network (iDEN), Evolution Data Optimized (EvDO), High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA), Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS) or the like. Some older examples of data-centric network include the Mobitex™ Radio Network and the DataTAC™ Radio Network. Examples of older voice-centric data networks include Personal Communication Systems (PCS) networks like GSM, and TDMA systems.
The central host system 300 will typically be a corporate office or other LAN, but may instead be a home office computer or some other private system where mail messages are being exchanged. Within the host system 300 is the message server 400, running on some computer within the firewall of the host system, that acts as the main interface for the host system to exchange e-mail with the Internet 20. In the system of
As shown in
In the automatic redirection system of
With reference back to the port 50 and cradle 65 connectivity to the mobile device 100, this connection path offers many advantages for enabling one-time data exchange of large items. For those skilled in the art of personal digital assistants (PDAs) and synchronization, the most common data exchanged over this link is Personal Information Management (PIM) data 55. When exchanged for the first time this data tends to be large in quantity, bulky in nature and requires a large bandwidth to get loaded onto the mobile device 100 where it can be used on the road. This serial link may also be used for other purposes, including setting up a private security key 111 such as an S/MIME or PGP specific private key, the Certificate (Cert) of the user and their Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) 60. The private key is preferably exchanged so that the desktop 35 and mobile device 100 share one personality and one method for accessing all mail. The Cert and CRLs are normally exchanged over such a link because they represent a large amount of the data that is required by the device for S/MIME, PGP and other public key security methods. However, there are situations where a user does not have the ability to establish such a link to their desktop 35 in order to update the key store of the mobile device 100 with the appropriate private keys. In these situations, the system and method described herein allow the secure transfer of cryptographic information over a wireless link.
As depicted in
The mobile communications device 100 will also typically include a main control CPU 106 that operates under the control of a stored program in program memory 108, and which has access to data memory 110. CPU 106 also communicates with a conventional keyboard 112 and display 114 (for example, a liquid crystal display or LCD) and audio transducer or speaker 116. A portion of the data memory 310 is available for storing data required for decrypting encrypted messages, such as, for example, private keys, digital certificates, and the like. Suitable computer program executable code is stored in portions of the program memory 108 to constitute stored program logic for receiving and using new or added private keys and/or digital certificates or the like as described below (for example, via a wired serial I/O port or the wireless RF antenna 102).
As depicted in
As previously described, there is a communications link (for example, depicted in dotted lines at 20 in
As depicted in
E-mail messages generated using the S/MIME and PGP techniques may include encrypted information, a digital signature on the message contents, or both. In signed S/MIME operations the sender takes a digest of a message and signs the digest using the sender's private key. A digest is essentially a checksum, CRC or other preferably non-reversible operation such as a hash of the message, which is then signed. The signed digest is appended to the outgoing message, possibly along with the certificate of the sender and possibly any required certificates or CRLs. The receiver of this signed message must also take a digest of the message, compare this digest with the digest appended to the message, retrieve the sender's public key, and verify the signature on the appended digest. If the message content has been changed, the digests will be different or the signature on the digest will not verify properly. If the message is not encrypted, this signature does not prevent anyone from seeing the contents of the message, but does ensure that the message has not been tampered with and is from the actual person as indicated on the “from” field of the message.
The receiver may also verify the certificate and CRL if they were appended to the message. A certificate chain is a certificate along with a number of other certificates required to verify that the original certificate is authentic. While verifying the signature on a signed message, the receiver of the message will also typically obtain a certificate chain for the signing certificate and verify that each certificate in the chain was signed by the next certificate in the chain, until a certificate is found that was signed by a root certificate from a trusted source, such as, for example, a large Public Key Server (PKS) associated with a Certificate Authority (CA), such as, for example, Verisign or Entrust, both prominent companies in the field of public key cryptography. Once such a root certificate is found, a signature can be verified and trusted, since both the sender and receiver trust the source of the root certificate.
In encrypted S/MIME message operations, a one-time session key is generated and used to encrypt the body of the message, typically with a symmetric cipher, such as, for example, Triple DES. The session key is then encrypted using the receiver's public key, typically with a public key encryption algorithm like RSA. If the message is addressed to more than one receiver, the same session key is encrypted using the public key of each receiver. The encrypted message body, as well as all encrypted session keys, is sent to every receiver. Each receiver must then locate its own session key, possibly based on a generated Recipient Info summary of the receivers that may be attached to the message, and decrypt the session key using its private key. Once the session key is decrypted, it is then used to decrypt the message body. The S/MIME Recipient Info attachment can also specify the particular encryption scheme that must be used to decrypt the message. This information is normally placed in the header of the S/MIME message. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that these operations relate to an illustrative example of SIMIME messaging and its associated encoding operations, namely encryption. It will also be understood that the instant disclosure is in no way limited thereto.
While the electronic mail handling system and method is described herein with respect to processing at the electronic mail device itself, it will be understood that the system and method may be implemented by any suitable means, such as, for example, an e-mail server, or the like, and that the disclosure is directed to a system and method for handling electronic mail mismatches regardless of where the certificates are stored or which device(s) in the system implement the method.
As discussed herein, the device within the system that provides the electronic message mismatch handling as described with respect to the illustrative embodiments discussed in detail above, may be any device within the system, including, but not limited to the electronic messaging device itself, a server within the system, or the like.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the system may be configured to search for a canonical or generic user name in place of (or in addition to) a canonical or generic domain name to search for a certificate or to resolve a mismatch. Typically, e-mail addresses are composed of two main parts—the user name and the domain name, for example, user name@domain name. The examples set forth above are described with respect to using a canonical or generic domain name when searching for a certificate or when attempting to resolve a mismatch. However, it is also contemplated that a canonical or generic user name may be used to search for a certificate or resolve a mismatch. For example, the user name may change as an employee moves or is assigned to different departments within an agency. For instance, the lifelong address may be John.Doe@agency.gov, but the user name may change as John Doe is assigned to different offices or departments within the agency, for example,
In yet a further exemplary implementation, using a combination of canonical or generic domain names and user names to search for a certificate or to resolve a mismatch may also be used to provide a more robust solution.
It will be understood that the methods described herein for locating a certificate of a sender or recipient of an electronic message may be embodied in executable program logic. The executable program logic may reside on the device or on a server within the system that processes electronic messages. Moreover, the executable program logic may be transmitted or received by various devices and circuits within devices of the system on a carrier wave modulated by a signal representing the corresponding program logic or executable code, or the like, or any other suitable communication medium.
While the foregoing has been described in conjunction with specific exemplary embodiments, it is evident that many alternatives, modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, the exemplary embodiments set forth herein are intended to be illustrative, not limiting. Various changes may be made without departing from the true spirit and full scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.
This application is a continuation of prior U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/896,224, filed on Oct. 1, 2010 and issued to patent as U.S. Pat. No. 8,312,165 which is a continuation of prior U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/473,313, filed on Jun. 23, 2006, which has issued to U.S. Pat. No. 7,814,161. The entire contents of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/473,313 and U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/896,224 are hereby incorporated by reference.
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Number | Date | Country | |
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20130067009 A1 | Mar 2013 | US |
Number | Date | Country | |
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Parent | 12896224 | Oct 2010 | US |
Child | 13672073 | US | |
Parent | 11473313 | Jun 2006 | US |
Child | 12896224 | US |