The present invention relates to security of electronic data on computer systems. More particularly, the present invention relates to a system and method for multi-level security on a network.
Generally, security of electronic data depends on confidentiality, availability, and integrity. Confidentiality of electronic data means that the data is only given to those who are supposed to have it. Availability of electronic data means that the data is not going to be lost. Integrity of electronic data means that the data will not be corrupted or modified. Ensuring the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of electronic data often requires complex and expensive hardware and/or software solutions that achieve security objectives without limiting the practical use of the data.
Conventional systems utilize hardware and/or software encryption techniques for security. For example, encryption devices are used to encrypt information any time the information is placed on a network that is not secure. Current networks, such as local area networks (LANs), do not support multiple security levels over a shared network with the necessary assurance. Such a capability would enable the reduction in cost, size, weight, and power of electronic systems because of the reduction in hardware and software components needed.
Multiple software applications are often used in the transportation industry for both air and ground transportation. These software applications can be at differing safety criticality and differing security levels. As such, multiple resources are typically needed, such as multiple processors and networks, so that security levels can be isolated and not compromised. The multiple resources use dedicated components that only function for a specified security level.
Thus, there is a need for modular open systems architectures to support running software application partitions at differing security levels on shared processors, shared operating systems, and shared networks. Further, there is a need for network nodes and switches having security features for different socket connections between partitions at differing security levels. Even further, there is a need for a system and method for multi-level security on a common network.
According to an exemplary embodiment, a method of communicating information in a system having multi-level security requirements includes receiving a packet having unencrypted data, routing the packet to a host, and processing the packet at the host such that data from the packet is maintained in the protected address space associated with the host. The host includes a number of software applications, a unique internet protocol (IP) address, a protected address space, and a protocol stack.
According to another exemplary embodiment, a system for communicating information having multi-level security requirements includes a node configured to route a packet having unencrypted data to a host and an operating system kernel. The host includes a number of software applications, separate and protected address space, and protocol stacks. The operating system kernel supports a number of virtual hosts operable to process the packet using the protocol stack at the virtual host and process data in the protected address space associated with the virtual host.
According to yet another exemplary embodiment, a system for communicating information having multi-level security requirements includes a means for receiving a packet having unencrypted data at a host and a means for processing the packet at the host such that data from the packet is maintained in the protected address space associated with the host. The host includes a number of software applications, a protected address space, and a protocol stack.
Other features and advantages of the present invention will become apparent to those skilled in the art from the following detailed description and accompanying drawings. It should be understood, however, that the detailed description and specific examples, while indicating exemplary embodiments of the present invention, are given by way of illustration and not limitation. Many modifications and changes within the scope of the present invention may be made without departing from the spirit thereof, and the invention includes all such modifications.
The exemplary embodiments will hereafter be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The switch 14 is preferably a high assurance ethernet switch. The switch 14 routes the packet 10 to a node 16 based on a unique MAC address contained in the packet 10 and information available to the switch 14, such as location of resources on the network. The node 16 routes the packet to an appropriate virtual host based on an IP address in the packet.
The packet 10 is communicated over a bus 18 to a host 20. The host 20 is preferably an operating system residing in a microprocessor. The host 20 is provided with programmed instructions to allocate portions of memory space in the microprocessor to virtual hosts 22, 24, 26, 28, and 30. The virtual hosts 22-30 each include one or more software applications, a unique address, separate and protected address space, and a protocol stack.
Each virtual host can have one or more software applications of the same safety criticality or security level. Further, each virtual host corresponds to one unique Internet Protocol (IP) address. The host 20 may have many IP addresses but the virtual hosts 22-30 have one IP address each.
Data from the packet 10 is processed in the protected address space of the virtual host assigned to the packet 10. As such, packets containing data needing high security are contained within a protected space of memory. Within each virtual host, the protocol stack routes data in the packets to the correct socket based on a port number.
In an operation 42, a high assurance ethernet switch on the network routes the packet to the correct node based on information in the packet. This information can include a MAC address. In an operation 44, the node routes the packet to a virtual host based on the IP address in the packet. The node can include a verified processor, such as the AAMP 7 processor available from Rockwell Collins, Inc. of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The node can also include verified internet protocol (IP) router software. A virtual host refers to a separate address space having a unique network address.
Before the node routes the packet, control checks are made using programmed instructions on a verified processor. Once control checks are performed and a socket connection is established, data can be communicated through the established socket connection. A socket corresponds to a unique IP address and port number pair. As such, there is a one-to-one correspondence between sockets and IP address and port number pairs. The application partitions are virtual dividers preventing applications from sharing the same socket connection. As such, each virtual host can have many sockets, but two virtual hosts cannot share the same socket.
In an operation 46, a protocol stack in the virtual host processes the packet. In an operation 48, application software processes data in its own protected address space.
During communication, messages are delivered having a bounded latency. Statically-defined flow control tables in the node and switch enable the system integrator to bound the latency for messages through the network and is not blocked by an excess of non-critical messages. Further, data belonging to one application partition cannot be read from an application in another partition.
Once the data is read from an input/output RAM to a system RAM by a user thread calling a receive function, the data is available in both the system RAM and the data cache. Entries in a node table allow the system integrator to specify which partition can join a particular multi-cast group. The node table can also include a source verification table to prevent impersonators by ensuring that remote addresses and internet protocol addresses match expected values for the source.
In the event of damage to components in the system, there is the ability to dynamically reconfigure information flow. Preferably, there are N statically-defined node tables. Selection of which configuration to use is based on a system equipment manager partition that outputs the correct configuration to use. Based on the desired configuration, the correct node table is copied by an application from a file system on the host to the node. Alternatively, a trusted application can perform the configuration check.
Advantageously, use of the exemplary system and method described provides for the communication of unencrypted data in a secure manner. Time and cost are saved by avoiding the need to encrypt secure data or allocate dedicated hardware resources to different safety critically levels or security levels.
While the exemplary embodiments illustrated in the Figures and described above are presently preferred, it should be understood that these embodiments are offered by way of example only. Other embodiments may include, for example, different hardware and software structures and combinations of hardware and software. The invention is not limited to a particular embodiment, but extends to various modifications, combinations, and permutations that nevertheless fall within the scope and spirit of the appended claims.
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