System and method to perform digital authentication using multiple channels of communication

Information

  • Patent Grant
  • 12061682
  • Patent Number
    12,061,682
  • Date Filed
    Monday, July 19, 2021
    3 years ago
  • Date Issued
    Tuesday, August 13, 2024
    3 months ago
Abstract
Embodiments are generally directed to techniques and devices to communicate a first communication to a mobile device, the first communication including first data to cause the mobile device to download a mobile application, communicate a second communication to the mobile device, the second communication comprising second data comprising a task identifier, the second data to cause the mobile application to perform an authentication task associated with the task identifier, determine the user is authenticated by the authentication task, and enable the mobile device to perform sensitive actions.
Description
BACKGROUND

Today's banks provide a number of services online through the Internet. For example, a customer may download a banking application on their mobile device and interface with a banking system to perform tasks, such as check their account balance, change their personal information, update their settings, pay bills, and so forth. However, current banking systems require users to setup an online account with personal information to login into to perform these tasks. However, a subset of customers typically performs their banking tasks using traditional methods, e.g., by going to the bank and speaking with a teller in person or calling a banking representative on the phone. The experience for these customers is typically more inconvenient. One downside is that the customers are still required to go through an authentication process that generally requires the user to provide some piece of information to be authenticated. For example, current systems and methods for authenticating a customer include requesting sensitive data from the customer, such as an account number, a transaction card number, a social security number, a mother's maiden name, a password, and/or other personal data. Because certain information may be known by fraudsters, “something you know” authentication techniques force obscure questions such as “What is your grandfather's middle name?” Also, if customers forget the answers to certain questions such as “Who was your favorite teacher?” the customer could be prevented from performing a task. Current authentication processes, therefore, are not only burdensome for customers but also time-consuming and costly for companies providing customer service to these customers. These and other drawbacks exist.


BRIEF SUMMARY

Embodiments may be generally directed to systems, devices, and techniques including a system configured to authenticate unauthenticated users to perform sensitive actions. The system may include one or more processors, and memory coupled with the one or more processors. The memory is configured store instructions that when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to communicate a first communication to a mobile device, the first communication comprising first data to cause the mobile device to download a mobile application, communicate a second communication to the mobile device, the second communication comprising second data comprising a task identifier, the second data to cause the mobile application to perform an authentication task associated with the task identifier, and determine the user is authenticated by the authentication task. In response to the user being authenticated the one or more processors may enable the mobile device to perform sensitive actions.


Embodiments may be generally directed to systems, devices, and techniques including a computing device configured to authenticate unauthenticated users to perform sensitive actions. The computing device may include processing circuitry, and memory coupled with the processing circuitry. The memory is configured store instructions that when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to receive a first communication from a system to authenticate a user, the first communication comprising first data to install a mobile application, install the mobile application based on invocation of the first data, receive a second communication from the system, the second communication comprising second data comprising a task identifier, the second data to cause the mobile application to perform an authentication task associated with the task identifier, initiate the authentication task based on invocation of the second data to determine the user is authenticate, and receive an indication that the user is authenticated based on performance of the authentication task, and the user is enabled to perform sensitive actions.





BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS

To easily identify the discussion of any particular element or act, the most significant digit or digits in a reference number refer to the figure number in which that element is first introduced.



FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a system 100 in accordance with embodiments.



FIG. 2 illustrates an example configure of a computing device 102 and a system 104 in accordance with embodiments.



FIG. 3 illustrates an example of sequence flow 300 in accordance with embodiments.



FIG. 4 illustrates a routine 400 in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 5 illustrates a routine 500 in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 6A illustrates an example of a sequence flow 600 in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 6B illustrates a continuation of the sequence flow 600 in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 7 illustrates a contactless card 700 in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 8 illustrates a transaction card component 800 in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 9 illustrates a sequence flow 900 in accordance with one embodiment.



FIG. 10 is a diagram of a key system 1000 according to an example embodiment.



FIG. 11 is a flowchart of a method 1100 of generating a cryptogram according to an example embodiment.



FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart of a method 1200 in accordance with embodiments.



FIG. 13 illustrates a computer architecture 1300 in accordance with embodiments.





DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Today's technology makes it easier for users and customers to take advantage of many different services in a secure manner. For example, most people have mobile devices configured with different types of mobile applications that allow users to perform many daily tasks. Users may communicate with their friends, family, and work colleagues through applications, such as text messaging applications, phone applications, video calling applications, email applications, and so forth. Users may also spend their leisure time playing games on one of the multitudes of available gaming applications. Mobile devices, when configured correctly, also provide a secure platform to enable users to perform more sensitive tasks, such as interfacing with their bank through a banking application, speaking with their doctor through a medical application, making investments with their broker through their brokerage account application, and so forth. However, these more secure applications typically need to be linked to the service provider's system through a secure interface and require an established level of trust with the customers to ensure that they are authorized users to perform the task. Typically, a service provider will have a user establish an account with a single sign-on username and password that must be correctly entered into the application each time a user wants to perform a sensitive task, e.g., review/change personal information, perform an action with their bank account, discuss private medical information, etc.


However, for any number of reasons, a subset of these users never establishes an account and SSO with the service provider. Therefore, these users cannot fully utilize the features of the mobile application to perform the more sensitive tasks. In some instances, the setup process may be too confusing or take too long. Some other users may trust performing these tasks in-person or speaking to another person on the phone or in a chat window. However, these users are generally difficult to authenticate in a quick, secure, and effective manner. Embodiments discussed solve these issues by utilizing a communication channel other than the voice or chat channel established with the customer to authenticate the customer.


Specifically, embodiments may be directed to systems, devices, and techniques to perform authentication operations for unauthenticated users. Embodiments include providing a mobile application associated with the service provider and then performing an authentication operation with the mobile application to authenticate the user. In one example, a system, such as a banking system or other service-providing system, may generate and communicate a first communication to a user's device in response to the user wanting to perform a sensitive task. The first communication includes an embedded link that may cause the mobile device to download and install a mobile application associated with the system. The system may generate and send a second communication to the device. The second communication may include an embedded link to cause the application to launch or execute on the device. The second communication may also include data, such as a task identifier, that may be provided to the application to locate and execute the instructions to perform the authentication operation.


Specifically, the application on the mobile device utilizes the task identifier to identify a task to perform for the user, e.g., the authentication operation to authenticate the user. The authentication operation may include the user providing a token or other authentication information that may be authenticated by the system or another authentication server or service. Upon authentication, the application may be enabled to perform the sensitive task for the customer. These and other details will be discussed more fully in the following description.



FIG. 1 illustrates a schematic of an exemplary system 100, consistent with disclosed embodiments. As shown, system 100 includes a computing device 102 and a system 104 that may communicate with each other via network 106 (e.g., via the Internet). The network 106 may include one or more wireless and/or wired interconnects configured to enable communication between devices, such as the computing device 102 and the system 104. The computing device 102 is representative of any type of network-enabled computing devices, such as mobile devices, mobile phones, smartphones, tablet computers, wearable devices, laptops, portable gaming devices, and the like. Further, FIG. 1 illustrates one computing device 102; however, embodiments are not limited in this manner. In practice, system 100 may include one or more computing device 102, which can communicate with system 104. The system 104 may include one or more servers having processing circuitry (processors), memory, storage, interfaces, etc. System 104 is representative of any type of computing system, such as a server farm, workstation, compute cluster, cloud computing platform, a virtualized computing system, and the like.



FIG. 2 illustrates examples details of components of the computing device 102 and the system 104 to perform the operations discussed herein. Note that FIG. 2 only illustrates a limited number of components for illustrative purposes and computing device 102 and system 104 can include other components, devices, circuitry, controllers, networking devices, memory, etc. As shown, the computing device 102 may include processor(s) 202, interfaces 204, and memory 206. In some instances, the computing device 102 may include more than one processor 202, each having one or more cores. The processor(s) 202 may be coupled with the interfaces 204 and the memory 206. The memory 206 may be any type of memory, including volatile and non-volatile memory configured to store instructions for processing by the processor(s) 202. The interfaces 204 may include wired and wireless networking interfaces configured to communicate to other devices including computing device 102. Moreover, the interfaces 204 may be configured to communicate in accordance with one or more protocols, such as cellular communication protocols (e.g., WiMAX/LTE/5G), local area network protocols (e.g., 102.11 series), and short-range communication protocols (e.g., near-field communication (NFC)/Bluetooth).


Further, the computing device 102 includes storage 208 such as a hard disk drive, a solid-state drive, or the like. The storage 208 is configured to store software, such as application(s) 210 and an operating system 212. Examples of an operating system 212 include the Android® OS, iOS®, macOS®, Linux®, and Windows® operating systems.


The application(s) 210 may be referred to as mobile applications, mobile apps, apps, applets, or the like. The application(s) 210 includes communication applications, such as a texting application, a web browser application, a telephone application, an electronic mail (e-mail) application, a video chat application, a text chat application, and so forth. The texting application may be configured to send and receive data and messages in accordance with one or more message protocols (e.g., short message service (SMS), rich communication services (RCS), and multimedia messaging service (MMS)). Other applications of the computing device 102 may include gaming applications, multimedia applications, camera or image applications, and so forth. In computing device 102 may also include applications to access services. For example, service provider applications a banking application, a stock management application, a mobile payment service application, human resource application, a medical application, and so forth. In embodiments, the computing device 102 enables users to delete application, update applications, and download and install new applications. For example, the computing device 102 have an application store to control the applications on the computing device 102. Examples of an application store include the Google® Play Store, the Apple® App Store, the Amazon® Apps & Games Store, etc. In embodiments, the applications 210 enable users of the computing device 102 to interact with the device and perform actions. For example, users may utilize the application(s) 210 to send and receive emails, send and receive text messages, play games, review/edit documents, send and receive money, make phone calls, and so forth. In general, each of the application(s) 210 may provide a service or feature for a user.


In embodiments, the users can download and install one or more of the application(s) 210 to conduct or perform sensitive actions or high-risk actions. These applications may be provided by service providers, and interface with the service provider's system. A sensitive action may be any action or service that requires the user to be authenticated to perform. A sensitive action may be an action that will enable the user to view, change, and/or interact with private/personal information, financial information, health information, sensitive corporate information, etc. Examples may include providing personal information to the user, enabling the user to wire or send money to another person, applying for a loan, perform checking/saving account operations, and so forth. Embodiments discussed herein enable users that typically do not take advantage of these services provide through applications 210 to be quickly and easily be authorized.


As previously discussed, typically users configure an account with a username/password such that they can log into a secure area of a website or application to perform the sensitive actions. However, some users never configure or establish an account or username/password and are unauthenticated. Thus, when these users want to perform a sensitive action, they are not trusted until they go through an authentication operation. Embodiments discussed herein enable system 104 to authenticate users via computing devices 102 and based on a trusted piece of data or information, e.g., providing a token from a contactless card, verifying government-issued identification information, providing a biometric, etc. System 104 first determines that a customer is not authenticated and then performs operations to authenticate the customer, including installing application on the customer's computing device 102 to perform the authentication, causing an authentication operation to be performed, and enabling the user to perform the sensitive task if they are authenticated.


In embodiments, the system 104 may be a sub-system of the service providers system. For example, the system 104 may be part of a call or help center operated by the service provider and is setup to handle calls and chats to help customers perform the various actions. In one example, the system 104 may enable human or computer operators to speak or chat with users and to perform authentication operations discussed herein including enabling the users to perform sensitive actions. The system 104 may include one or more devices, such as servers having one or more processor(s) 214, interfaces 216, and memory 218. The system 104 also includes storage 220 that may store applications and/or instructions to perform the operations discussed herein.


The storage 220 may include operation services 222, configuration services 224, and authentication services 226. The operation services 222 include instructions configured to enable operators to interface with customers and provide services. The configuration services 224 include instructions configured to facilitate the configuration of the computing devices for users to install an application and perform authentication operations via the application. The authentication services 226 include instructions to perform authentication operations and/or process the results of authentication operations for the system 104.


In embodiments, the operation services 222 provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for an operator to interact and communicate with users and computing devices. Moreover, the operation services 222 provide an interface for the users to communicate with the operators. For example, the operation services 222 may include instructions to handle and process phone calls and chat sessions. The operations services 222 may be configured to receive a phone call or chat initiation and direct the call or chat to an operator.


The operations services 222 may also enable the operator to communicate with the users, e.g., send communications (voice or data) back and forth between the system 104 and computing devices 102. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the operation services 222 may be automated to automatically communicate with users either via voice communication channels or data communication channels. For example, the operation services 222 may automatically detect requests made by users, generate responses based on the requests, and communicate the responses back to the users. The responses may be interactive responses and are responsive based on the requests made by the users. The operation services 222 may include instructions that are configured to convert the user's spoken word into text and then analyze the text to determine a response. The instructions may also be configured to generate responses based on analyzed text and communicate the response verbally on the phone or though chat in a chat window.


In embodiments, the operation services 222 may also be configured to determine whether users are authenticated to perform sensitive actions. For example, the operations services 222 may provide an interface for an operator to search and/or perform a lookup in a database to determine whether a particular is authenticated to perform a sensitive and/or their computing device is configured to perform the authentication operations. In some embodiments, the operation services 222 includes instructions to automatically perform the lookup based on the analysis of the user's speech/text. Embodiments discussed herein facilitate instances when the user is not authenticated and their computing device 102 is not configured to perform authentication operation, e.g., the user does not have an account established with an SSO.


In one specific example, a user may call or initiate a chat to perform a sensitive task. The operation services 222 are configured to provide an operator or agent of the system 104 to interface with the user and to perform task. For example, the operation services 222 may perform a lookup in a database to determine if the user is authenticated to perform the sensitive task. The operator may perform the search through a GUI interface and determine if the customer has configured an account with the service provider and/or has an SSO established. In some instances, one or more of the operations may be automated. For example, the operation services 222 may include instructions to automatically determine if the user is authenticated (e.g., by interpreting the action to be performed and automatically performing the lookup to determine if the user has an account). If the user is authenticated, the user may be permitted to perform the sensitive task. However, embodiments discussed herein aim to help users that are not unauthenticated with system 104 and/or do not have a trust relationship established with the service provider. The system 104 also includes the configuration services 224 and the authentication services 226 to authenticate the user and enable the user to perform the sensitive task.


The configuration services 224 include instructions to configure a computing device 102 of the user to authenticate the user. Specifically, the configuration services 224 generate and communicate information to the user's computing device 102 to install a mobile application associated with the service provide. In embodiments, the configuration services 224 may generate a text message including an indication to download the application. For example, the text message may include an embedded link that, when activated, causes the computing device 102 to download the application. The text message may include text, such as “Here's a link to install our application: https://appstore/application.” A user may select the embedded link and automatically be directed to the application store to download the application. The embedded link may be a location to directly download the application (e.g., a home page to download the app). In some instances, the embedded link may be configured to cause the computing device 102 to automatically redirect to the application store without the user selecting the embedded link.


The text message may be communicated to the computing device 102 via a text message service, such as SMS, MMS, or RCS. In some instances, the configuration services 224 may automatically detect the phone number from which the user is calling and send the text message to the computing device 102. In other instances, the operator may ask the user for the phone number, the user may provide the number, and the operator may manually and/or automatically enter the provided number into the system 104 to send the message. In some embodiments, the configuration services 224 may apply voice-to-text instructions to the user's provided number and automatically send the message to the given phone number. Note that embodiments are not limited to utilizing text messages. In some instances, a quick response (QR) code including the embedded link may be generated by the configuration services 224 and provided to the user on a display. The user may use a scanning application and a camera to scan the QR code, which may automatically read the embedded link and redirect to the application download store to download the application.


In embodiments, the system 104, including the configuration services 224, may determine that the application is installed on the computing device 102. For example, the user may tell the operator that the application is successfully installed, and the operator may input an indication into the system 104. In other instances, the configuration services 224 may receive an indication from the installed application that it is successfully installed. The indication may be provided to system 104 by the application communicating with the system 104 through an application programming interface (API), for example. Once the application is installed, the system 104 may initiate an authentication operation with the computing device 102 to authenticate the user. The authentication operation includes having the user provide a trusted token to the system 104 (or another authentication system), and authenticating the user, e.g., is the person that was previously authenticated with the token.


In embodiments, the system 104 may utilize the downloaded application to perform the authentication operation. For example, the system 104 may include authentication services 226 that may generate another message to cause the application installed on the computing device 102 to perform the authentication operation. The authentication services 226 may generate or determine a task identifier associated with performing the authentication operation. In some instances, the task identifier may be predetermined, and the application may include instructions to execute the authentication operation upon receiving the task identifier. The task identifier may be a combination of alphanumeric characters to identify the authentication operation.


In embodiments, the authentication services 226 may generate a text message, embed the task identifier in the text message and communicate the text message to the computing device 102 for the application to process. The text message may include an embedded link to cause the application to execute and provide the task identifier to the application. If the application is already executing on the computing device 102, the embed link may pass the task identifier to the application. In one specific example, the text message may include an embedded link such as “app.launch/task identifer,” that when activated or selected, will launch the application and provide the task identifier (task identifier) to the application. The task identifier may be an element of a function that will execute when the application is launched. The application may determine the task (e.g., authentication operation) corresponding to the task identifier and perform the task. Embodiments are not limited to embedding the task identifier in a text message, and the task identifier may also be embedded in a QR code. Again, the user may use QR scanning software to scan the code with a camera to receive the data, including the task identifier.


In embodiments, the authentication operation may execute on the computing device 102 to authenticate the user. For example, the application executing on the computing device 102 is configured to launch and execute instructions to authenticate the user based on the task identifier. The authentication operation includes the user providing a token or piece of information that can be used to authenticate the user. In one example, the service provider may be a bank, and the application may be a banking application configured to provide banking services for the user. The user may have a contactless card with the bank that can be used to authenticate the user. Specifically, the contactless card includes a token that can be provided to the authentication services 226, a different system, or authentication service to authenticate the user, e.g., a third-party system, a dedicated authentication server, or the like may authenticate the information or token. If a different system or service perform the authentication of the user, a result of the authentication operation may be communicating the application, the authentications services, or a combination therefor. Embodiments are not limited in this manner; however, in this example, the authentication services 226 may perform the authentication of the information or token.


In embodiments, the authentication services 226 may receive the token from the contactless card via the application on the computing device 102. The computing device 102 may read the token from the contactless card by performing one or more short-range communication read operations. The application may execute the authentication operation, causing a prompt to be displayed on the display of the computing device 102 for the user to provide the contactless card on the computing device 102, e.g., bring the contactless card within short-range communication operating range of the computing device 102. In one example, the computing device 102 may utilize NFC communications having an operating range of approximately 10 centimeters or less. In some embodiments, to ensure that the user brings the contactless card close enough to the computing device 102 to exchange data, the user is prompted to tap the card on the computing device 102, e.g., on the display or other surface of the computing device 102.


The computing device 102 receives a payload including a cryptogram from the contactless card. The cryptogram may include the token or authentication information, which may be one or more identification numbers, a counter value, a version number, and a shared secret, and be encrypted using diversified keys. The cryptogram may be generated, encrypted, and communicated by the contactless card to the computing device 102. In embodiments, the payload may include additional information, such as an unencrypted identifier. The unencrypted identifier may be a customer identifier to identify a customer associated with and stored on the contactless card. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.


The computing device 102 may communicate the cryptogram to the system 104 including the authentication services 226 via one or more secure communications (e.g., through one or more secure API communications). The authentication services 226 may decrypt the cryptogram from the contactless card and verify the token and/or authentication information matches stored verified data in the system 104. For example, the system 104 may determine one or more of the identification numbers, counter values, version number, and/or the shared secret match corresponding data in the system 104. If so, the system 104 verifies that the user is authenticated and can perform sensitive tasks. If not, the user is not authenticated and cannot perform the tasks.


In embodiments, alternative methods may be utilized by the system 104 to authenticate the user. For example, system 104 may utilize a photo verification system to authenticate the user. The application may prompt the user to take a photograph or picture of their government-issued (or other trusted) identification. The computing device 102 may communicate the picture to the system 104 to authenticate the user. The system 104 may use a photo ID verification service, such as BlueCheck®, or a similar service to verify the photo. Other alternative services may include verifying the user via a biometric input, such as a fingerprint, iris, facial picture, etc. Once the user is authenticated, the system 104 may enable the user to perform the sensitive operations. For example, the system 104 may set a flag or setting on the user's account that enables the user to perform tasks, such as wiring money, changing settings, paying bills, etc.



FIG. 3 illustrates an example sequence flow 300 that may be performed to authenticate an unauthenticated user to perform sensitive tasks. Examples discussed herein are in reference to system 100, and computing device 102 and system 104; however, the techniques discussed may be performed by any system to authenticate a user to perform high-risk or sensitive services. In the illustrated example, the computing device 102 may be a mobile device configured to make telephone calls via voice channels and communicate data via data channels. The system 104 may include one or more servers configured to communicate with the computing device 102 via voice and/or data channels.


In embodiments, a user may communicate to an operator and the system 104 that they wish to perform a sensitive task. The communication may be made by the user speaking with the operator of the system 104 over a voice channel or through a chat window over a data channel. The system 104 may determine that the user is not authenticated. For example, the system 104 may determine that the user does not have an electronic online account configured to perform the sensitive task. Thus, the user has not previously provided identifying information to the service provider and system 104 that may be used to authenticate the user. For example, the user does not have a username/password configured to log in to an online account provided through a web browser or mobile application (e.g., a banking app). Moreover, the system 104 may determine that the user does not have the mobile application installed on the computing device 102 configured to perform the sensitive task, e.g., the user may provide the information to the operator.


At line 302, the system 104 generates a message to communicate to the 102, including information to download the application to perform the sensitive. In some instances, an operator may provide an input to system 104 through a GUI to generate the message to communicate to computing device 102. For example, the operator may be presented with a GUI interface configured to take a user's phone number as input to send the computing device 102 a text message. The phone number may be communicated to the operator via the voice communication channel. In other instances, the system 104 may generate the message automatically. For example, the system 104 may include voice-to-text instructions to convert the user's words to text. The text may be analyzed to determine that the user does not have the application installed on their computing device 102. In some instances, the information may be communicated to the system 104 through a chat or text-based interface and the system 104 may analyze the text to determine the user does not have the application installed on their computing device 102.


The system 104 may generate the message including an embedded link, that when selected or activated, causes the computing device 102 to redirect to a location to download the application. For example, the link may cause the operating system 212 to launch an application store to download the application. In some instances, the application store may execute and open to the specific location to perform the download, and the download may occur automatically without human intervention. In another example, the embedded link may direct the operating system 212 to open a website in a web browser to a web-based location to download the application.


At line 304, the system 104 may communicate the message to the computing device 102. As mentioned, the message may be communicated via a text message service in accordance with a text message protocol based. The text message may include the embedded link which, as discussed, may be an address or link to a location, a QR code, or the like, that includes information to cause the operating system 212 to start downloading the application. In some instances, the message may be communicated to a device other than computing device 102, such as a personal computer, and then the computing device 102 may receive the message by performing a scanning operation utilizing a camera to read a QR code or the like. The message may be displayed in a web browser or other application on the other computing device and the user may use the camera of the computing device 102 to scan or take a picture of the message. Other options may include communicating the message to computing device 102 or another computing device using electronic mail or other message services, such as Teams® or Slack®.


At line 306, the computing device 102 may process the message, including the embedded link. For example, the user may select or interact with the embedded link, and the operating system 212 may process the selection and launch an application store or web browser to download the application. The operating system 212 may further download the application through the store or browser and install the application to execute on the computing device 102. In some instances, once the application is installed, the application may communicate back to system 104 an indication that it's installed. The indication may be communicated through an API and include information to specifically identify computing device 102, e.g., a phone number, device identifier, etc. In other instances, the user may verbally or through text-based chat communicate to the operator of system 104 that the application is successfully installed.


At line 308, the system 104 may determine a task identifier to identify an authentication task or operation to be performed by the application. In one example, the system 104 may perform a lookup in a database to determine the task identifier to identify the authentication operation to the application. The task identifier may be a combination of alphanumeric values that uniquely identifies the authentication operation. In some instances, the task identifier may be a programmed variable for a function of the application. The function may be invoked, and the task identifier may be passed to the function as an element. The function may process the task identifier and perform the authentication operation.


At line 310, the system 104 may communicate the task identifier to the computing device 102. In one example, the system 104 may generate a second text message or QR code with an embedded link. The embedded link includes a link to launch the mobile application on the computing device 102 and the task identifier. The task identifier is passed to the application when the application is launched. As similarly discussed above, the user may select the embedded link to cause the application to launch. In other instances, the application may automatically launch when the text message is received.


In some instances, the task identifier may be passed directly to the application on the computing device 102. For example, the application may execute on the computing device 102 and determine that the user is not authenticated to perform operations with the application. The application may communicate to the system 104 through an API, an indication that the authentication operation needs to occur. The system 104 may communicate the task identifier to the computing device 102 through another API call.


At line 312, the computing device 102 may process the task identifier and perform the operation associated with the task identifier. Specifically, the application will initiate the operation (e.g., authentication operation) based on the task identifier on the computing device 102. The authentication operation includes the user providing a token or identifying information to the computing device 102. The computing device 102, including the application, will perform the authentication by communicating the information to system 104 or another authentication server to compare the information to trusted information. In one example, the user can provide a token on their contactless card 700 to the computing device 102, which may be forwarded to system 104 or another server to authenticate. The method 1100 of FIG. 11 illustrates one possible processing flow that may be performed by the contactless card 700 to generate a cryptogram including the token. FIG. 9 illustrates a sequence flow 900 where the cryptogram is communicated from the contactless card 700 to the computing device 102. In another example, the user may take a picture of a trusted identification (e.g., driver's license), and the picture may be authenticated. Other authentication methods may include authenticating a biometric sample, a trusted certificate, etc.


In the illustrated example, the computing device 102 may communicate authentication information to the system 104 at line 314 to perform as part of the authentication operation. As mentioned, the authentication information may include a cryptogram from a contactless card 700, a picture of a trusted identification, or other trusted information (biometric sample). The authentication information may be communicated to the system 104 via the application and through an API. The API may provide a secure and encrypted channel to communicate the data to the system 104.


At line 316, the system 104 performs authentication on the information from the computing device 102. For example, the system 104 may verify that the authentication information is accurate or correct based on a comparison with stored trusted information. If the authentication information matches the trusted information, the user is authenticated. If the authentication information does not match the trusted information, the user is not authenticated. FIG. 12 describes one possible method 1200 that may be performed to authenticate a user utilize a contactless card 700 and a server, e.g., system 104.


At line 318, the system 104 communicates a result of the authentication to the computing device 102. The result includes an indication as to whether the user is successfully authenticated or not authenticated. At line 320, the system 104 may enable or prevent the user from performing the sensitive task. For example, the system 104 may set a flag or an indication for the application of the computing device 102 to permit or deny the user to perform the sensitive task. The indication may be an API call or communication to the application.



FIG. 4 illustrates an example routine 400 that may be performed by a system, such as 104, to authenticate a user to perform sensitive actions. The operations discussed herein may be performed by software, hardware, or combination thereof.


In block 402, the routine 400 includes communicating the first communication to a mobile device. The first communication includes first data to cause the mobile device to download a mobile application. In embodiments, the first communication may be a text message or a QR code and the first data may be an embedded link, such as a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or HTTP secure (HTTPS) link that, when activated, causes the mobile device to go to a location to download a mobile application.


In block 404, the routine 400 includes communicating a second communication to the mobile device. The second communication includes second data comprising a task identifier, and the second data to cause the mobile application to perform an authentication task associated with the task identifier. In embodiments, the second communication may also be a text message or QR code, and the second data may be an embedded link to launch the downloaded mobile application. The task identifier may be processed by the mobile application to execute an authentication task to authenticate a user of the mobile device.


In block 406, the routine 400 includes determining the user is authenticated by the authentication task. In embodiments, the mobile device, an authentication server, the system 104, or a combination thereof may perform the authentication task. One or more of the mobile device, the authentication server, and the system 104 may provide an indication of the result of the authentication task (e.g., authenticated or unauthenticated).


In block 408, the routine 400 includes enabling the user to perform sensitive actions via the mobile device. For example, the system may set a flag or setting to permit or deny the user from performing the sensitive actions. If the user is authenticated, the system may set a setting to permit the user to perform the sensitive actions, or vice versa.



FIG. 5 illustrates an example routine 500 that may be performed by a mobile device, such as computing device 102, to authenticate a user to perform sensitive actions. The operations discussed herein may be performed by software, hardware, or combination thereof.


In block 502, the routine 500 includes receiving a first communication from a system to authenticate a user. In embodiments, the first communication may be generated and communicated by the system based on a determination the mobile device does not have the mobile application to perform the authentication task. The mobile application may be a trusted application provided by the service provider associated with and controlling the system. In embodiments, the first communication includes the first data to install the mobile application. As previously discussed, the first communication may be a text message or a QR code, and the first data may be an embedded link, that when activated, downloads and installs the application on the mobile device.


In block 504, the routine 500 includes installing the mobile application based on the invocation of the first data. For example, a user of the mobile device may select the link via an interface, such as a touchscreen, and the operating system may be redirected to execute and open the application store to download the application. The link may cause the store to open to the location to directly download the application. In some instances, the first communication, including the first data may cause the operating system to redirect to the application store and install the application automatically when the communication is received. For example, the operating system may automatically process the link upon reception without the user selecting.


In block 506, the routine 500 includes receiving a second communication from the system. In embodiments, the second communication includes the second data comprising a task identifier, and the second data may cause the mobile application to perform an authentication task associated with the task identifier. The second communication may also be a text message or QR code, and the second data may also be an embedded link. However, this embedded link may include data to cause the newly downloaded application to execute when it is selected or invoked. Again, this link may also execute based on a user selection or automatically upon reception of the message. The link may also include a task identifier to identify the authentication task that is required to be performed by the application. The identifier may be passed to the application when the link is selected or invoked. The application may initiate and process the task identifier.


In block 508, the routine 500 includes initiating the authentication task based on the invocation of the second data to determine the user is authenticated. For example, the mobile application utilizes the task identifier to identify instructions to perform the authentication task. The instructions may execute by the mobile device, which may cause the mobile device to perform authentication with one or more of an authentication server or system 104.


In block 510, the routine 500 includes receiving an indication that the user is authenticated based on the performance of the authentication task. For example, the mobile device may receive an indication from an authentication server or system 104 indicating that information sent to the server or system is authenticated and the user is authenticated. In embodiments, the indication may also indicate that the user capable of performing sensitive actions with the mobile application. The user may now perform the action they desired to perform with the mobile application.



FIG. 6A illustrates an example sequence flow 600 that may occur between a user and a customer service operator to authenticate a user such that they can perform sensitive in accordance with embodiments discussed herein. The items discussed in this sequence flow 600 may be performed by systems and devices discussed herein, including computing device 102 (e.g., mobile device) and system 104 (e.g., a banking system).


In the illustrated example, the customer may make a telephone to a service provider, such as a bank. The customer may want to perform a high-risk task using the service provider, but the customer is not authenticated with the service provider, e.g., the customer is not enrolled with a single sign-on username and password. At 602, the customer may be notified that they are not authenticated to perform the high-risk task but can easily and quickly perform an authentication operation using a mobile application on a mobile device. At 604, the agent or operator communicates with the customer to obtain a phone number associated with the customer's phone to send a text message. The customer may verbally provide the number to the agent.


At 606, the agent may provide the phone number to a system (e.g., through a GUI) to send the text message to download the application to the customer's mobile phone. The system may generate a text message. The text message includes an embedded link (e.g., https://appstore/app). to download the application. At 608, the text message is communicated to the mobile device associated with the phone number. And at 610, the customer receives the text message on their mobile device. At 612, the customer may invoke or select the link in the message, and the message redirects the mobile device to download the application. At 612, the mobile application is downloaded on the mobile device.


At 614, the customer may communicate an indication that the mobile application is installed on the mobile device and is open. Further and at 616, the agent may confirm with the customer that the mobile application is installed on the mobile device and notify the customer that they are going to send another message. At 618, the agent may interact with a GUI interface to generate another message to communicate to the customer's mobile device. The system may create a task to perform on the mobile device. At 620, the system may determine a task identifier associated with the task. The task identifier may identify the task to the application and the system. The task identifier and link may be embedded in a message and sent to the mobile device at 622. And at block 624, the mobile device may receive the message from the system, including a link to cause the mobile application to execute or initiate with the task identifier.


In FIG. 6B, the sequence flow 600 continues; and at 626, the mobile application may initiate and execute on the customer's mobile device. In some instances, the customer may select the link to cause the mobile application to execute. In other instances, the mobile application may execute upon reception of the text message. The mobile application may open on the mobile device and present a GUI for the customer to interact with the application.


At 628, the mobile application evaluates the task identifier embedded in the link and/or provided in the text message. The mobile application may determine the task associated with the task identifier (e.g., perform the authentication operation). At 630, the mobile application may process the task identifier. For example, the mobile application may execute a function with the task identifier to cause the instructions associated with performing the authentication to execute on the mobile device.


At 634, the mobile application may execute and perform the task (e.g., the authentication operation). In the illustrated example, the customer has a contactless card associated with the service provider and can be authenticated based on the information on the contactless card. To perform authentication via the contactless card, the mobile device may retrieve the information from the card and send the information to a system to perform authentication with the contactless card information. At 632, the customer may be instructed to bring the card within a communication range of the mobile device. In one example, the customer may receive instructions, via a GUI display, to tap the contactless card on the mobile device, ensuring that the card is within a short-range communication range of the mobile device. At 634, the mobile device may process the contactless card information by sending the information to the server to perform the authentication and receiving a result of the authentication performed. At 636, the mobile device may confirm that the authentication was successful.


At 638, a use case policy analysis may be performed and applied to the task to determine a type of authentication that is available for the user. This process may be performed by the mobile application prior to the authentication operation. In one example, the use case policy may be applied to information of the user and determine that the user has a contactless card for authentication. In another example, the use case policy may determine that the customer does not have a contactless card and an alternative method needs to be used to authenticate the user. In some instances, the user may have more than one authentication method available to use for authentication (e.g., contactless card, biometric, identification), and the use case policy may assign different authenticate methods based on the risk level of the task to be performed by the user. For example, higher-risk tasks may require a stronger authentication method than lower-risk tasks. The authentication methods may be ranked from strongest to weakest, for example.


In embodiments, the authentication operation may be performed and provide a result to the customer and the mobile device. At 640, the customer may communicate to the agent that the authentication operation is successful. In some instances, at 646, the agent may receive an indication from the mobile application and mobile device confirming that the authentication is successful. The status may be provided in a GUI display at 644, and the agent my confirm to the customer that they are authenticated at 642.



FIG. 7 illustrates an example configuration of a contactless card 700, which may include a contactless card, a payment card, such as a credit card, debit card, or gift card, issued by a service provider as displayed as service provider indicia 702 on the front or back of the contactless card 700. In some examples, the contactless card 700 is not related to a payment card and may include, without limitation, an identification card. In some examples, the transaction card may include a dual interface contactless payment card, a rewards card, and so forth. The contactless card 700 may include a substrate 708, which may include a single layer or one or more laminated layers composed of plastics, metals, and other materials. Exemplary substrate materials include polyvinyl chloride, polyvinyl chloride acetate, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, polycarbonate, polyesters, anodized titanium, palladium, gold, carbon, paper, and biodegradable materials. In some examples, the contactless card 700 may have physical characteristics compliant with the ID-1 format of the ISO/IEC 7816 standard, and the transaction card may otherwise be compliant with the ISO/IEC 14443 standard. However, it is understood that the contactless card 700, according to the present disclosure, may have different characteristics, and the present disclosure does not require a transaction card to be implemented in a payment card.


The contactless card 700 may also include identification information 706 displayed on the front and/or back of the card, and a contact pad 704. The contact pad 704 may include one or more pads and be configured to establish contact with another client device, such as an ATM, a user device, smartphone, laptop, desktop, or tablet computer via transaction cards. The contact pad may be designed in accordance with one or more standards, such as ISO/IEC 7816 standard, and enable communication in accordance with the EMV protocol. The contactless card 700 may also include processing circuitry, antenna and other components as will be further discussed in FIG. 8. These components may be located behind the contact pad 704 or elsewhere on the substrate 708, e.g. within a different layer of the substrate 708, and may electrically and physically coupled with the contact pad 704. The contactless card 700 may also include a magnetic strip or tape, which may be located on the back of the card (not shown in FIG. 7). The contactless card 700 may also include a Near-Field Communication (NFC) device coupled with an antenna capable of communicating via the NFC protocol. Embodiments are not limited in this manner.


As illustrated in FIG. 7, the contact pad 704 of contactless card 700 may include processing circuitry 816 for storing, processing, and communicating information, including a processor 802, a memory 804, and one or more interface(s) 806. It is understood that the processing circuitry 816 may contain additional components, including processors, memories, error and parity/CRC checkers, data encoders, anticollision algorithms, controllers, command decoders, security primitives and tamper-proofing hardware, as necessary to perform the functions described herein.


The memory 804 may be a read-only memory, write-once read-multiple memory or read/write memory, e.g., RAM, ROM, and EEPROM, and the contactless card 700 may include one or more of these memories. A read-only memory may be factory programmable as read-only or one-time programmable. One-time programmability provides the opportunity to write once then read many times. A write-once/read-multiple memory may be programmed at a point in time after the memory chip has left the factory. Once the memory is programmed, it may not be rewritten, but it may be read many times. A read/write memory may be programmed and re-programed many times after leaving the factory. A read/write memory may also be read many times after leaving the factory. In some instances, the memory 804 may be encrypted memory utilizing an encryption algorithm executed by the processor 802 to encrypted data.


The memory 804 may be configured to store one or more applet(s) 808, one or more counter(s) 810, a customer identifier 814, and the account number(s) 812, which may be virtual account numbers. The one or more applet(s) 808 may comprise one or more software applications configured to execute on one or more contactless cards, such as a Java® Card applet. However, it is understood that applet(s) 808 are not limited to Java Card applets and instead may be any software application operable on contactless cards or other devices having limited memory. The one or more counter(s) 810 may comprise a numeric counter sufficient to store an integer. The customer identifier 814 may comprise a unique alphanumeric identifier assigned to a user of the contactless card 700, and the identifier may distinguish the user of the contactless card from other contactless card users. In some examples, the customer identifier 814 may identify both a customer and an account assigned to that customer and may further identify the contactless card 700 associated with the customer's account. As stated, the account number(s) 812 may include thousands of one-time use virtual account numbers associated with the contactless card 700. An applet(s) 808 of the contactless card 700 may be configured to manage the account number(s) 812 (e.g., to select an account number(s) 812, mark the selected account number(s) 812 as used, and transmit the account number(s) 812 to a mobile device for auto filling by an auto filling service.


The processor 802 and memory elements of the foregoing exemplary embodiments are described with reference to the contact pad 704, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto. It is understood that these elements may be implemented outside of the contact pad 704 or entirely separate from it or as further elements in addition to processor 802 and memory 804 elements located within the contact pad 704.


In some examples, the contactless card 700 may comprise one or more antenna(s) 818. The one or more antenna(s) 818 may be placed within the contactless card 700 and around the processing circuitry 816 of the contact pad 704. For example, the one or more antenna(s) 818 may be integral with the processing circuitry 816 and one or more antenna(s) 818 may be used with an external booster coil. As another example, one or more antenna(s) 818 may be external to the contact pad 704 and the processing circuitry 816.


In an embodiment, the coil of contactless card 700 may act as the secondary of an air-core transformer. The terminal may communicate with the contactless card 700 by cutting power or amplitude modulation. The contactless card 101 may infer the data transmitted from the terminal using the gaps in the contactless card's power connection, which may be functionally maintained through one or more capacitors. The contactless card 700 may communicate back by switching a load on the contactless card's coil or load modulation. Load modulation may be detected in the terminal's coil through interference. More generally, using the antenna(s) 818, processor 802, and/or the memory 804, the contactless card 101 provides a communications interface to communicate via NFC, Bluetooth, and/or Wi-Fi communications.


As explained above, contactless card 700 may be built on a software platform operable on smart cards or other devices having limited memory, such as JavaCard, and one or more or more applications or applets may be securely executed. Applet(s) 808 may be added to contactless cards to provide a one-time password (OTP) for multifactor authentication (MFA) in various mobile application-based use cases. Applet(s) 808 may be configured to respond to one or more requests, such as near field data exchange requests, from a reader, such as a mobile NFC reader (e.g., of a mobile device or point-of-sale terminal), and produce an NDEF message that comprises a cryptographically secure OTP encoded as an NDEF text tag.


One example of an NDEF OTP is an NDEF short-record layout (SR=1). In such an example, one or more applet(s) 808 may be configured to encode the OTP as an NDEF type 4 well-known type text tag. In some examples, NDEF messages may comprise one or more records. The applet(s) 808 may be configured to add one or more static tag records in addition to the OTP record.


In some examples, one or more applet(s) 808 may be configured to emulate an RFID tag. The RFID tag may include one or more polymorphic tags. In some examples, each time the tag is read, different cryptographic data is presented that may indicate the authenticity of the contactless card. Based on the one or more applet(s) 808, an NFC read of the tag may be processed, the data may be transmitted to a server, such as a server of a banking system, and the data may be validated at the server.


In some examples, the contactless card 700 and server may include certain data such that the card may be properly identified. The contactless card 700 may include one or more unique identifiers (not pictured). Each time a read operation takes place, the counter(s) 810 may be configured to increment. In some examples, each time data from the contactless card 700 is read (e.g., by a mobile device), the counter(s) 810 is transmitted to the server for validation and determines whether the counter(s) 810 are equal (as part of the validation) to a counter of the server.


One or more counter(s) 810 may be configured to prevent a replay attack. For example, if a cryptogram has been obtained and replayed, that cryptogram is immediately rejected if the counter(s) 810 has been read or used or otherwise passed over. If the counter(s) 810 has not been used, it may be replayed. In some examples, the counter that is incremented on the card is different from the counter that is incremented for transactions. The contactless card 101 is unable to determine the application transaction counter(s) 810 since there is no communication between applet(s) 808 on the contactless card 700.


In some examples, the counter(s) 810 may get out of sync. In some examples, to account for accidental reads that initiate transactions, such as reading at an angle, the counter(s) 810 may increment, but the application does not process the counter(s) 810. In some examples, when the mobile device is woken up, NFC may be enabled, and the device 110 may be configured to read available tags, but no action is taken responsive to the reads.


To keep the counter(s) 810 in sync, an application, such as a background application, may be executed that would be configured to detect when the mobile device 110 wakes up and synchronize with the server of a banking system indicating that a read that occurred due to detection to then move the counter(s) 810 forward. In other examples, Hashed One Time Password may be utilized such that a window of mis-synchronization may be accepted. For example, if within a threshold of 10, the counter(s) 810 may be configured to move forward. But if within a different threshold number, a request for performing re-synchronization may be processed which requests via one or more applications that the user tap, gesture, or otherwise indicate one or more times via the user's device. If the counter(s) 810 increases in the appropriate sequence, then it possible to know that the user has done so.


The key diversification technique described herein with reference to the counter(s) 810, master key, and diversified key is one example of encryption and/or decryption a key diversification technique. This example key diversification technique should not be considered limiting of the disclosure, as the disclosure is equally applicable to other types of key diversification techniques.


During the creation process of the contactless card 700, two cryptographic keys may be assigned uniquely per card. The cryptographic keys may comprise symmetric keys which may be used in both encryption and decryption of data. Triple DES (3DES) algorithm may be used by EMV and it is implemented by hardware in the contactless card 700. By using the key diversification process, one or more keys may be derived from a master key based upon uniquely identifiable information for each entity that requires a key.


In some examples, to overcome deficiencies of 3DES algorithms, which may be susceptible to vulnerabilities, a session key may be derived (such as a unique key per session) but rather than using the master key, the unique card-derived keys and the counter may be used as diversification data. For example, each time the contactless card 101 is used in operation, a different key may be used for creating the message authentication code (MAC) and for performing the encryption. This results in a triple layer of cryptography. The session keys may be generated by the one or more applets and derived by using the application transaction counter with one or more algorithms (as defined in EMV 4.3 Book 2 A1.3.1 Common Session Key Derivation).


Further, the increment for each card may be unique and assigned either by personalization or algorithmically assigned by some identifying information. For example, odd-numbered cards may increment by 2, and even-numbered cards may increment by 5. In some examples, the increment may also vary in sequential reads, such that one card may increment in sequence by 1, 3, 5, 2, 2, . . . repeating. The specific sequence or algorithmic sequence may be defined at personalization time or from one or more processes derived from unique identifiers. This can make it harder for a replay attacker to generalize from a small number of card instances.


The authentication message may be delivered as the content of a text NDEF record in hexadecimal ASCII format. In another example, the NDEF record may be encoded in hexadecimal format.



FIG. 9 is a timing diagram illustrating an example sequence for providing authenticated access according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. Sequence flow 900 may include contactless card 700 and computing device 102, which may include an application(s) 210 and processor(s) 202.


At line 904, the application(s) 210 communicates with the contactless card 700 (e.g., after being brought near the contactless card 700). Communication between the application(s) 210 and the contactless card 700 may involve the contactless card 700 being sufficiently close to a card reader (not shown) of the computing device 102 to enable NFC data transfer between the application(s) 210 and the contactless card 700.


At line 902, after communication has been established between computing device 102 and contactless card 700, contactless card 700 generates a message authentication code (MAC) cryptogram. In some examples, this may occur when the contactless card 700 is read by the application(s) 210. In particular, this may occur upon a read, such as an NFC read, of a near field data exchange (NDEF) tag, which may be created in accordance with the NFC Data Exchange Format. For example, a reader application, such as application(s) 210, may transmit a message, such as an applet select message, with the applet ID of an NDEF producing applet. Upon confirmation of the selection, a sequence of select file messages followed by read file messages may be transmitted. For example, the sequence may include “Select Capabilities file”, “Read Capabilities file”, and “Select NDEF file”. At this point, a counter value maintained by the contactless card 700 may be updated or incremented, which may be followed by “Read NDEF file.” At this point, the message may be generated which may include a header and a shared secret. Session keys may then be generated. The MAC cryptogram may be created from the message, which may include the header and the shared secret. The MAC cryptogram may then be concatenated with one or more blocks of random data, and the MAC cryptogram and a random number (RND) may be encrypted with the session key. Thereafter, the cryptogram and the header may be concatenated, and encoded as ASCII hex and returned in NDEF message format (responsive to the “Read NDEF file” message).


In some examples, the MAC cryptogram may be transmitted as an NDEF tag, and in other examples, the MAC cryptogram may be included with a uniform resource indicator (e.g., as a formatted string). In some examples, application(s) 210 may be configured to transmit a request to contactless card 700, the request comprising an instruction to generate a MAC cryptogram.


At line 906, the contactless card 700 sends the MAC cryptogram to the application(s) 210. In some examples, the transmission of the MAC cryptogram occurs via NFC; however, the present disclosure is not limited thereto. In other examples, this communication may occur via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or other means of wireless data communication. At line 908, the application(s) 210 communicates the MAC cryptogram to the processor(s) 202.


At line 910, the processor(s) 202 verifies the MAC cryptogram pursuant to an instruction from the application 122. For example, the MAC cryptogram may be verified, as explained below. In some examples, verifying the MAC cryptogram may be performed by a device other than computing device 102, such as a server of a banking system in data communication with the computing device 102. For example, processor(s) 202 may output the MAC cryptogram for transmission to the server of the banking system, which may verify the MAC cryptogram. In some examples, the MAC cryptogram may function as a digital signature for purposes of verification and authentication. Other digital signature algorithms, such as public key asymmetric algorithms, e.g., the Digital Signature Algorithm and the RSA algorithm, or zero knowledge protocols, may be used to perform this verification.



FIG. 10 illustrates a diagram of a system 1000 configured to implement one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. As explained below, during the contactless card creation process, two cryptographic keys may be assigned uniquely for each card. The cryptographic keys may comprise symmetric keys which may be used in both encryption and decryption of data. Triple DES (3DES) algorithm may be used by EMV and it is implemented by hardware in the contactless card. By using a key diversification process, one or more keys may be derived from a master key based upon uniquely identifiable information for each entity that requires a key.


Regarding master key management, two issuer master keys 1002, 1026 may be required for each part of the portfolio on which the one or more applets is issued. For example, the first master key 1002 may comprise an Issuer Cryptogram Generation/Authentication Key (Iss-Key-Auth) and the second master key 1026 may comprise an Issuer Data Encryption Key (Iss-Key-DEK). As further explained herein, two issuer master keys 1002, 1026 are diversified into card master keys 1008, 1020, which are unique for each card. In some examples, a network profile record ID (pNPR) 522 and derivation key index (pDKI) 1024, as back office data, may be used to identify which Issuer Master Keys 1002, 1026 to use in the cryptographic processes for authentication. The system performing the authentication may be configured to retrieve values of pNPR 1022 and pDKI 1024 for a contactless card at the time of authentication.


In some examples, to increase the security of the solution, a session key may be derived (such as a unique key per session) but rather than using the master key, the unique card-derived keys and the counter may be used as diversification data, as explained above. For example, each time the card is used in operation, a different key may be used for creating the message authentication code (MAC) and for performing the encryption. Regarding session key generation, the keys used to generate the cryptogram and encipher the data in the one or more applets may comprise session keys based on the card unique keys (Card-Key-Auth 1008 and Card-Key-Dek 1020). The session keys (Aut-Session-Key 1032 and DEK-Session-Key 1010) may be generated by the one or more applets and derived by using the application transaction counter (pATC) 1004 with one or more algorithms. To fit data into the one or more algorithms, only the 2 low order bytes of the 4-byte pATC 1004 is used. In some examples, the four byte session key derivation method may comprise: F1:=PATC(lower 2 bytes)∥‘F0’∥‘00’∥PATC (four bytes) F1:=PATC(lower 2 bytes)∥‘0F’∥‘00’∥PATC (four bytes) SK:={(ALG (MK) [F1])∥ALG (MK) [F2]}, where ALG may include 3DES ECB and MK may include the card unique derived master key.


As described herein, one or more MAC session keys may be derived using the lower two bytes of pATC 1004 counter. At each tap of the contactless card, pATC 1004 is configured to be updated, and the card master keys Card-Key-AUTH 808 and Card-Key-DEK 1020 are further diversified into the session keys Aut-Session-Key 1032 and DEK-Session-KEY 1010. pATC 1004 may be initialized to zero at personalization or applet initialization time. In some examples, the pATC counter may be initialized at or before personalization, and may be configured to increment by one at each NDEF read.


Further, the update for each card may be unique, and assigned either by personalization, or algorithmically assigned by pUID or other identifying information. For example, odd numbered cards may increment or decrement by 2 and even numbered cards may increment or decrement by 5. In some examples, the update may also vary in sequential reads, such that one card may increment in sequence by 1, 3, 5, 2, 2, . . . repeating. The specific sequence or algorithmic sequence may be defined at personalization time, or from one or more processes derived from unique identifiers. This can make it harder for a replay attacker to generalize from a small number of card instances.


The authentication message may be delivered as the content of a text NDEF record in hexadecimal ASCII format. In some examples, only the authentication data and an 8-byte random number followed by MAC of the authentication data may be included. In some examples, the random number may precede cryptogram A and may be one block long. In other examples, there may be no restriction on the length of the random number. In further examples, the total data (i.e., the random number plus the cryptogram) may be a multiple of the block size. In these examples, an additional 8-byte block may be added to match the block produced by the MAC algorithm. As another example, if the algorithms employed used 16-byte blocks, even multiples of that block size may be used, or the output may be automatically, or manually, padded to a multiple of that block size.


The MAC may be performed by a function key (AUT-Session-Key) 1032. The data specified in cryptogram may be processed with javacard.signature method: ALG_DES_MAC8_IS09797_1_M2_ALG3 to correlate to EMV ARQC verification methods.


The key used for this computation may comprise a session key AUT-Session-Key 1032, as explained above. As explained above, the low order two bytes of the counter may be used to diversify for the one or more MAC session keys. As explained below, AUT-Session-Key 1032 may be used to MAC data 1006, and the resulting data or cryptogram A 1014 and random number RND may be encrypted using DEK-Session-Key 1010 to create cryptogram B or output 1018 sent in the message.


In some examples, one or more HSM commands may be processed for decrypting such that the final 16 (binary, 32 hex) bytes may comprise a 3DES symmetric encrypting using CBC mode with a zero IV of the random number followed by MAC authentication data. The key used for this encryption may comprise a session key DEK-Session-Key 1010 derived from the Card-Key-DEK 1020. In this case, the ATC value for the session key derivation is the least significant byte of the counter pATC 1004.


The format below represents a binary version example embodiment. Further, in some examples, the first byte may be set to ASCII ‘A’.


















Message Format






1
2
4
8
8


0 × 43 (Message
Version
pATC
RND
Cryptogram A


Type ‘A’)



(MAC)


Cryptogram A
8 bytes





(MAC)






MAC of






2
8
4
4
18 bytes input data


Version
pUID
pATC
Shared Secret

























Message Format






1
2
4
16



0 × 43 (Message
Version
pATC
Cryptogram B



Type ‘A’)






Cryptogram A
8 bytes





(MAC)






MAC of






2
8
4
4
18 bytes input data


Version
pUID
pATC
Shared Secret



Cryptogram B
16





Sym Encryption






of






8
8





RND
Cryptogram






A









Another exemplary format is shown below. In this example, the tag may be encoded in hexadecimal format.


















Message Format






2
8
4
8
8


Version
pUID
pATC
RND
Cryptogram A






(MAC)


8 bytes






8
8
4
4
18 bytes input data


pUID
pUID
pATC
Shared Secret
























Message Format





2
8
4
16


Version
pUID
pATC
Cryptogram B


8 bytes














8

4
4
18 bytes input data


pUID
pUID
pATC
Shared Secret











Cryptogram B
16




Sym Encryption





of





8
8




RND
Cryptogram





A









The UID field of the received message may be extracted to derive, from master keys Iss-Key-AUTH 802 and Iss-Key-DEK 1026, the card master keys (Card-Key-Auth 1008 and Card-Key-DEK 1020) for that particular card. Using the card master keys (Card-Key-Auth 808 and Card-Key-DEK 1020), the counter (pATC) field of the received message may be used to derive the session keys (Aut-Session-Key 1032 and DEK-Session-Key 1010) for that particular card. Cryptogram B 1018 may be decrypted using the DEK-Session-KEY, which yields cryptogram A 1014 and RND, and RND may be discarded. The UID field may be used to look up the shared secret of the contactless card which, along with the Ver, UID, and pATC fields of the message, may be processed through the cryptographic MAC using the re-created Aut-Session-Key to create a MAC output, such as MAC′. If MAC′ is the same as cryptogram A 1014, then this indicates that the message decryption and MAC checking have all passed. Then the pATC may be read to determine if it is valid.


During an authentication session, one or more cryptograms may be generated by the one or more applications by the contactless card 700. For example, the one or more cryptograms may be generated as a 3DES MAC using ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 3 with Method 2 padding via one or more session keys, such as Aut-Session-Key 1032. The input data 1006 may take the following form: Version (2), pUID (8), pATC (4), Shared Secret (4). In some examples, the numbers in the brackets may comprise length in bytes. In some examples, the shared secret may be generated by one or more random number generators which may be configured to ensure, through one or more secure processes, that the random number is unpredictable. In some examples, the shared secret may comprise a random 4-byte binary number injected into the card at personalization time that is known by the authentication service. During an authentication session, the shared secret may not be provided from the one or more applets to the mobile application. Method 2 padding may include adding a mandatory 0x′80′ byte to the end of input data and 0x′ 00′ bytes that may be added to the end of the resulting data up to the 8-byte boundary. The resulting cryptogram may comprise 8 bytes in length.


In some examples, one benefit of encrypting an unshared random number as the first block with the MAC cryptogram, is that it acts as an initialization vector while using CBC (Block chaining) mode of the symmetric encryption algorithm. This allows the “scrambling” from block to block without having to pre-establish either a fixed or dynamic IV.


By including the application transaction counter (pATC) as part of the data included in the MAC cryptogram, the authentication service may be configured to determine if the value conveyed in the clear data has been tampered with. Moreover, by including the version in the one or more cryptograms, it is difficult for an attacker to purposefully misrepresent the application version in an attempt to downgrade the strength of the cryptographic solution. In some examples, the pATC may start at zero and be updated by 1 each time the one or more applications generates authentication data. The authentication service may be configured to track the pATCs used during authentication sessions. In some examples, when the authentication data uses a pATC equal to or lower than the previous value received by the authentication service, this may be interpreted as an attempt to replay an old message, and the authenticated may be rejected. In some examples, where the pATC is greater than the previous value received, this may be evaluated to determine if it is within an acceptable range or threshold, and if it exceeds or is outside the range or threshold, verification may be deemed to have failed or be unreliable. In the MAC operation 1012, data 1006 is processed through the MAC using Aut-Session-Key 1032 to produce MAC output (cryptogram A) 1014, which is encrypted.


In order to provide additional protection against brute force attacks exposing the keys on the card, it is desirable that the MAC cryptogram 1014 be enciphered. In some examples, data or cryptogram A 1014 to be included in the ciphertext may comprise: Random number (8), cryptogram (8). In some examples, the numbers in the brackets may comprise length in bytes. In some examples, the random number may be generated by one or more random number generators which may be configured to ensure, through one or more secure processes, that the random number is unpredictable. The key used to encipher this data may comprise a session key. For example, the session key may comprise DEK-Session-Key 1010. In the encryption operation 1016, data or cryptogram A 1014 and RND are processed using DEK-Session-Key 810 to produce encrypted data, cryptogram B 1018. The data 1014 may be enciphered using 3DES in cipher block chaining mode to ensure that an attacker must run any attacks over all of the ciphertext. As a non-limiting example, other algorithms, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), may be used. In some examples, an initialization vector of 0x′0000000000000000′ may be used. Any attacker seeking to brute force the key used for enciphering this data will be unable to determine when the correct key has been used, as correctly decrypted data will be indistinguishable from incorrectly decrypted data due to its random appearance.


In order for the authentication service to validate the one or more cryptograms provided by the one or more applets, the following data must be conveyed from the one or more applets to the mobile device in the clear during an authentication session: version number to determine the cryptographic approach used and message format for validation of the cryptogram, which enables the approach to change in the future; pUID to retrieve cryptographic assets, and derive the card keys; and pATC to derive the session key used for the cryptogram.



FIG. 11 illustrates a method 1100 for generating a cryptogram that may be performed by a contactless card 700. For example, at block 1102, a network profile record ID (pNPR) and derivation key index (pDKI) may be used to identify which Issuer Master Keys to use in the cryptographic processes for authentication. In some examples, the method may include performing the authentication to retrieve values of pNPR and pDKI for a contactless card at the time of authentication.


At block 1104, Issuer Master Keys may be diversified by combining them with the card's unique ID number (pUID) and the PAN sequence number (PSN) of one or more applets, for example, a payment applet.


At block 1106, Card-Key-Auth and Card-Key-DEK (unique card keys) may be created by diversifying the Issuer Master Keys to generate session keys which may be used to generate a MAC cryptogram.


At block 1108, the keys used to generate the cryptogram and encipher the data in the one or more applets may comprise the session keys based on the card unique keys (Card-Key-Auth and Card-Key-DEK). In some examples, these session keys may be generated by the one or more applets and derived by using pATC, resulting in session keys Aut-Session-Key and DEK-Session-Key.



FIG. 12 depicts an exemplary process 1200 illustrating key diversification according to one example. Initially, a sender and the recipient may be provisioned with two different master keys. For example, a first master key may comprise the data encryption master key, and a second master key may comprise the data integrity master key. The sender has a counter value, which may be updated at block 1202, and other data, such as data to be protected, which it may secure share with the recipient.


At block 1204, the counter value may be encrypted by the sender using the data encryption master key to produce the data encryption derived session key, and the counter value may also be encrypted by the sender using the data integrity master key to produce the data integrity derived session key. In some examples, a whole counter value or a portion of the counter value may be used during both encryptions.


In some examples, the counter value may not be encrypted. In these examples, the counter may be transmitted between the sender and the recipient in the clear, i.e., without encryption.


At block 1206, the data to be protected is processed with a cryptographic MAC operation by the sender using the data integrity session key and a cryptographic MAC algorithm. The protected data, including plaintext and shared secret, may be used to produce a MAC using one of the session keys (AUT-Session-Key).


At block 1208, the data to be protected may be encrypted by the sender using the data encryption derived session key in conjunction with a symmetric encryption algorithm. In some examples, the MAC is combined with an equal amount of random data, for example each 8 bytes long, and then encrypted using the second session key (DEK-Session-Key).


At block 1210, the encrypted MAC is transmitted, from the sender (contactless card 700) to the recipient (system 104 via computing device 102), with sufficient information to identify additional secret information (such as shared secret, master keys, etc.), for verification of the cryptogram.


At block 1212, the recipient uses the received counter value to independently derive the two derived session keys from the two master keys as explained above.


At block 1214, the data encryption derived session key is used in conjunction with the symmetric decryption operation to decrypt the protected data. Additional processing on the exchanged data will then occur. In some examples, after the MAC is extracted, it is desirable to reproduce and match the MAC. For example, when verifying the cryptogram, it may be decrypted using appropriately generated session keys. The protected data may be reconstructed for verification. A MAC operation may be performed using an appropriately generated session key to determine if it matches the decrypted MAC. As the MAC operation is an irreversible process, the only way to verify is to attempt to recreate it from source data.


At block 1216, the data integrity derived session key is used in conjunction with the cryptographic MAC operation to verify that the protected data has not been modified.


Some examples of the methods described herein may advantageously confirm when a successful authentication is determined when the following conditions are met. First, the ability to verify the MAC shows that the derived session key was proper. The MAC may only be correct if the decryption was successful and yielded the proper MAC value. The successful decryption may show that the correctly derived encryption key was used to decrypt the encrypted MAC. Since the derived session keys are created using the master keys known only to the sender (e.g., the transmitting device) and recipient (e.g., the receiving device), it may be trusted that the contactless card which originally created the MAC and encrypted the MAC is indeed authentic. Moreover, the counter value used to derive the first and second session keys may be shown to be valid and may be used to perform authentication operations.


Thereafter, the two derived session keys may be discarded, and the next iteration of data exchange will update the counter value (returning to block 1202) and a new set of session keys may be created (at block 1210). In some examples, the combined random data may be discarded.



FIG. 13 illustrates an embodiment of an exemplary computer architecture 1300 suitable for implementing various embodiments as previously described. In one embodiment, the computer architecture 1300 may include or be implemented as part of one or more systems or devices discussed herein.


As used in this application, the terms “system” and “component” are intended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, a combination of hardware and software, software, or software in execution, examples of which are provided by the exemplary computing computer architecture 1300. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to being, a process running on a processor, a processor, a hard disk drive, multiple storage drives (of optical and/or magnetic storage medium), an object, an executable, a thread of execution, a program, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, both an application running on a server and the server can be a component. One or more components can reside within a process and/or thread of execution, and a component can be localized on one computer and/or distributed between two or more computers. Further, components may be communicatively coupled to each other by various types of communications media to coordinate operations. The coordination may involve the uni-directional or bi-directional exchange of information. For instance, the components may communicate information in the form of signals communicated over the communications media. The information can be implemented as signals allocated to various signal lines. In such allocations, each message is a signal. Further embodiments, however, may alternatively employ data messages. Such data messages may be sent across various connections. Exemplary connections include parallel interfaces, serial interfaces, and bus interfaces.


The computer architecture 1300 includes various common computing elements, such as one or more processors, multi-core processors, co-processors, memory units, chipsets, controllers, peripherals, interfaces, oscillators, timing devices, video cards, audio cards, multimedia input/output (I/O) components, power supplies, and so forth. The embodiments, however, are not limited to implementation by the computer architecture 1300.


As shown in FIG. 13, the computer architecture 1300 includes a processor 1312, a system memory 1304 and a system bus 1306. The processor 1312 can be any of various commercially available processors.


The system bus 1306 provides an interface for system components including, but not limited to, the system memory 1304 to the processor 1312. The system bus 1306 can be any of several types of bus structure that may further interconnect to a memory bus (with or without a memory controller), a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of commercially available bus architectures. Interface adapters may connect to the system bus 902 via slot architecture. Example slot architectures may include without limitation Accelerated Graphics Port (AGP), Card Bus, (Extended) Industry Standard Architecture ((E)ISA), Micro Channel Architecture (MCA), NuBus, Peripheral Component Interconnect (Extended) (PCI(X)), PCI Express, Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA), and the like.


The computer architecture 1300 may include or implement various articles of manufacture. An article of manufacture may include a computer-readable storage medium to store logic. Examples of a computer-readable storage medium may include any tangible media capable of storing electronic data, including volatile memory or non-volatile memory, removable or non-removable memory, erasable or non-erasable memory, writeable or re-writeable memory, and so forth. Examples of logic may include executable computer program instructions implemented using any suitable type of code, such as source code, compiled code, interpreted code, executable code, static code, dynamic code, object-oriented code, visual code, and the like. Embodiments may also be at least partly implemented as instructions contained in or on a non-transitory computer-readable medium, which may be read and executed by one or more processors to enable the performance of the operations described herein.


The system memory 1304 may include various types of computer-readable storage media in the form of one or more higher speed memory units, such as read-only memory (ROM), random-access memory (RAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), Double-Data-Rate DRAM (DDRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), static RAM (SRAM), programmable ROM (PROM), erasable programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory, polymer memory such as ferroelectric polymer memory, ovonic memory, phase change or ferroelectric memory, silicon-oxide-nitride-oxide-silicon (SONOS) memory, magnetic or optical cards, an array of devices such as Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) drives, solid-state memory devices (e.g., USB memory, solid-state drives (SSD) and any other type of storage media suitable for storing information. In the illustrated embodiment shown in FIG. 13, the system memory 1304 can include non-volatile 1308 and/or volatile 1310. A basic input/output system (BIOS) can be stored in the non-volatile 1308.


The computer 1302 may include various types of computer-readable storage media in the form of one or more lower speed memory units, including an internal (or external) hard disk drive 1330, a magnetic disk drive 1316 to read from or write to a removable magnetic disk 1320, and an optical disk drive 1328 to read from or write to a removable optical disk 1332 (e.g., a CD-ROM or DVD). The hard disk drive 1330, magnetic disk drive 1316 and optical disk drive 1328 can be connected to system bus 1306 by an HDD interface 1314, and FDD interface 1318 and an optical disk drive interface 1334, respectively. The HDD interface 1314 for external drive implementations can include at least one or both of Universal Serial Bus (USB) and IEEE 1394 interface technologies.


The drives and associated computer-readable media provide volatile and/or nonvolatile storage of data, data structures, computer-executable instructions, and so forth. For example, a number of program modules can be stored in the drives and non-volatile 1308, and volatile 1310, including an operating system 1322, one or more applications 1342, other program modules 1324, and program data 1326. In one embodiment, the one or more applications 1342, other program modules 1324, and program data 1326 can include, for example, the various applications and/or components of the systems discussed herein.


A user can enter commands and information into the computer 1302 through one or more wired/wireless input devices, for example, a keyboard 1350 and a pointing device, such as a mouse 1352. Other input devices may include microphones, infra-red (IR) remote controls, radio-frequency (RF) remote controls, game pads, stylus pens, card readers, dongles, fingerprint readers, gloves, graphics tablets, joysticks, keyboards, retina readers, touch screens (e.g., capacitive, resistive, etc.), trackballs, track pads, sensors, styluses, and the like. These and other input devices are often connected to the processor 1312 through an input device interface 1336 that is coupled to the system bus 1306 but can be connected by other interfaces such as a parallel port, IEEE 1394 serial port, a game port, a USB port, an IR interface, and so forth.


A monitor 1344 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 1306 via an interface, such as a video adapter 1346. The monitor 1344 may be internal or external to the computer 1302. In addition to the monitor 1344, a computer typically includes other peripheral output devices, such as speakers, printers, and so forth.


The computer 1302 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections via wire and/or wireless communications to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computer(s) 1348. The remote computer(s) 1348 can be a workstation, a server computer, a router, a personal computer, portable computer, microprocessor-based entertainment appliance, a peer device or other common network node, and typically includes many or all the elements described relative to the computer 1302, although, for purposes of brevity, only a memory and/or storage device 1358 is illustrated. The logical connections depicted include wire/wireless connectivity to a local area network 1356 and/or larger networks, for example, a wide area network 1354. Such LAN and WAN networking environments are commonplace in offices and companies, and facilitate enterprise-wide computer networks, such as intranets, all of which may connect to a global communications network, for example, the Internet.


When used in a local area network 1356 networking environment, the computer 1302 is connected to the local area network 1356 through a wired and/or wireless communication network interface or network adapter 1338. The network adapter 1338 can facilitate wire and/or wireless communications to the local area network 1356, which may also include a wireless access point disposed thereon for communicating with the wireless functionality of the network adapter 1338.


When used in a wide area network 1354 networking environment, the computer 1302 can include a modem 1340, or is connected to a communications server on the wide area network 1354 or has other means for establishing communications over the wide area network 1354, such as by way of the Internet. The modem 1340, which can be internal or external and a wire and/or wireless device, connects to the system bus 1306 via the input device interface 1336. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to the computer 1302, or portions thereof, can be stored in the remote memory and/or storage device 1358. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers can be used.


The computer 1302 is operable to communicate with wire and wireless devices or entities using the IEEE 802 family of standards, such as wireless devices operatively disposed in wireless communication (e.g., IEEE 802.11 over-the-air modulation techniques). This includes at least Wi-Fi (or Wireless Fidelity), WiMax, and Bluetooth™ wireless technologies, among others. Thus, the communication can be a predefined structure as with a conventional network or simply an ad hoc communication between at least two devices. Wi-Fi networks use radio technologies called IEEE 802.11 (a, b, g, n, etc.) to provide secure, reliable, fast wireless connectivity. A Wi-Fi network can be used to connect computers to each other, to the Internet, and to wire networks (which use IEEE 802.3-related media and functions).


The various elements of the devices as previously described herein may include various hardware elements, software elements, or a combination of both. Examples of hardware elements may include devices, logic devices, components, processors, microprocessors, circuits, processors, circuit elements (e.g., transistors, resistors, capacitors, inductors, and so forth), integrated circuits, application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), programmable logic devices (PLD), digital signal processors (DSP), field-programmable gate array (FPGA), memory units, logic gates, registers, semiconductor device, chips, microchips, chip sets, and so forth. Examples of software elements may include software components, programs, applications, computer programs, application programs, system programs, software development programs, machine programs, operating system software, middleware, firmware, software modules, routines, subroutines, functions, methods, procedures, software interfaces, application program interfaces (API), instruction sets, computing code, computer code, code segments, computer code segments, words, values, symbols, or any combination thereof. However, determining whether an embodiment is implemented using hardware elements and/or software elements may vary in accordance with any number of factors, such as desired computational rate, power levels, heat tolerances, processing cycle budget, input data rates, output data rates, memory resources, data bus speeds and other design or performance constraints, as desired for a given implementation.


The components and features of the devices described above may be implemented using any combination of discrete circuitry, application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), logic gates and/or single chip architectures. Further, the features of the devices may be implemented using microcontrollers, programmable logic arrays and/or microprocessors or any combination of the foregoing where suitably appropriate. It is noted that hardware, firmware and/or software elements may be collectively or individually referred to herein as “logic” or “circuit.”

Claims
  • 1. A system configured to authenticate unauthenticated users to perform sensitive actions, comprising: one or more processors;memory coupled with the one or more processors, the memory to store instructions that when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to: communicate a first communication to a mobile device, the first communication comprising first data to cause the mobile device to download a mobile application;generate a task identifier to identify and launch an authentication operation to perform a specific type of authentication in the mobile application to authenticate a user of the mobile device;communicate a second communication to the mobile device, the second communication comprising second data comprising the task identifier, the second data to cause the mobile application to launch and perform the authentication operation associated with the task identifier;determine the user is authenticated by the authentication operation; andenable the mobile device to perform sensitive actions.
  • 2. The system of claim 1, wherein the authentication operation comprises prompting a user to tap a contactless card on the mobile device, and the one or more processors to: receive encrypted data from the contactless card via the mobile device; andverify the user is authenticated with the encrypted data based on stored data.
  • 3. The system of claim 2, wherein the encrypted data comprises data stored on the contactless card and is received in response to the contactless card being within a near-field communication range of the mobile device.
  • 4. The system of claim 3, the one or more processors to compare the data of the contactless card to the stored data stored and verify the user if they match.
  • 5. The system of claim 1, wherein the authentication operation comprises prompting a user to provide a picture of an identification card, and the one or more processors to: receive the picture of the identification card; andverify the user is authenticated with the picture.
  • 6. The system of claim 1, wherein the first data comprises an embedded link to a location on the mobile device to download the mobile application.
  • 7. The system of claim 6, wherein the first communication is a short message service (SMS) message or a rich communication service (RCS) message, and the embedded link is embedded the SMS message or RCS message.
  • 8. The system of claim 1, wherein the task identifier is encoded in the second data, and the second data comprises an embedded link to launch the mobile application and initiate a function to perform the authentication operation based on the task identifier.
  • 9. The system of claim 8, wherein the second communication is a short message service (SMS) message or a rich communication service (RCS) message, and the embedded link is embedded the SMS message or RCS message.
  • 10. The system of claim 1, wherein the authentication operation is performed with the mobile application without the user providing any other authentication information.
  • 11. The system of claim 1, the one or more processors to determine a phone number associated with the mobile device, and the authentication operation further comprising verifying the phone number is associated with user.
  • 12. A computing device configured to authenticate unauthenticated users to perform sensitive actions, comprising: processing circuitry;memory coupled with the processing circuitry, the memory to store instructions that when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to: receive a first communication from a system to authenticate a user, the first communication comprising first data to install a mobile application;install the mobile application based on invocation of the first data;receive a second communication from the system, the second communication comprising second data comprising a task identifier to identify a specific type of authentication operation, the second data to cause the mobile application to perform the authentication operation associated with the task identifier;initiate the authentication operation of the specific type based on invocation of the second data to determine the user is authenticate; andreceive an indication that the user is authenticated based on performance of the authentication operation, and the user is enabled to perform sensitive actions.
  • 13. The computing device of claim 12, comprising a wireless interface, and the processing circuitry, to perform the authentication operation, to: prompt the user to tap a contactless card on a surface of the computing device, receive, via the wireless interface, encrypted data from the contactless card; andverify the user is authenticated with the encrypted data.
  • 14. The computing device of claim 13, and the processing circuitry, to verify the encrypted data, to communicate the encrypted data to the system.
  • 15. The computing device of claim 13, wherein the wireless interface comprises a near-field communication (NFC) interface, and the encrypted data is received from the contactless card as part of an NFC exchange.
  • 16. The computing device of claim 12, comprising a camera, and the processing circuitry, to perform the authentication, to: prompt the user to provide a picture of an identification card; andcommunicate the picture to the system.
  • 17. The computing device of claim 12, wherein the first data comprises an embedded link to a mobile application store to download the mobile application, and the processing circuitry to receive an input on the embedded link, execute the mobile application store to download the mobile application, and download the mobile application.
  • 18. The computing device of claim 12, wherein the task identifier is encoded in the second data, and the second data comprises an embedded link to launch the mobile application and initiate a function to perform the authentication operation based on the task identifier.
  • 19. The computing device of claim 12, wherein the authentication operation is performed with the mobile application without the user providing any other authentication information.
  • 20. The computing device of claim 12, the processing circuitry to provide a phone number associated with computing device to the system to perform the authentication operation.
US Referenced Citations (610)
Number Name Date Kind
4683553 Mollier Jul 1987 A
4827113 Rikuna May 1989 A
4910773 Hazard et al. Mar 1990 A
5036461 Elliott et al. Jul 1991 A
5363448 Koopman, Jr. et al. Nov 1994 A
5377270 Koopman, Jr. et al. Dec 1994 A
5533126 Hazard Jul 1996 A
5537314 Kanter Jul 1996 A
5592553 Guski et al. Jan 1997 A
5616901 Crandall Apr 1997 A
5666415 Kaufman Sep 1997 A
5763373 Robinson et al. Jun 1998 A
5764789 Pare, Jr. et al. Jun 1998 A
5768373 Lohstroh et al. Jun 1998 A
5778072 Samar Jul 1998 A
5796827 Coppersmith et al. Aug 1998 A
5832090 Raspotnik Nov 1998 A
5883810 Franklin et al. Mar 1999 A
5901874 Deters May 1999 A
5929413 Gardner Jul 1999 A
5960411 Hartman et al. Sep 1999 A
6021203 Douceur et al. Feb 2000 A
6049328 Vanderheiden Apr 2000 A
6058373 Blinn et al. May 2000 A
6061666 Do et al. May 2000 A
6105013 Curry et al. Aug 2000 A
6199114 White et al. Mar 2001 B1
6199762 Hohle Mar 2001 B1
6216227 Goldstein et al. Apr 2001 B1
6227447 Campisano May 2001 B1
6282522 Davis et al. Aug 2001 B1
6324271 Sawyer et al. Nov 2001 B1
6342844 Rozin Jan 2002 B1
6367011 Lee et al. Apr 2002 B1
6402028 Graham, Jr. et al. Jun 2002 B1
6438550 Doyle et al. Aug 2002 B1
6501847 Helot et al. Dec 2002 B2
6631197 Taenzer Oct 2003 B1
6641050 Kelley et al. Nov 2003 B2
6655585 Shinn Dec 2003 B2
6662020 Aaro et al. Dec 2003 B1
6721706 Strubbe et al. Apr 2004 B1
6731778 Oda et al. May 2004 B1
6779115 Naim Aug 2004 B1
6792533 Jablon Sep 2004 B2
6829711 Kwok et al. Dec 2004 B1
6834271 Hodgson et al. Dec 2004 B1
6834795 Rasmussen et al. Dec 2004 B1
6852031 Rowe Feb 2005 B1
6865547 Brake, Jr. et al. Mar 2005 B1
6873260 Lancos et al. Mar 2005 B2
6877656 Jaros et al. Apr 2005 B1
6889198 Kawan May 2005 B2
6905411 Nguyen et al. Jun 2005 B2
6910627 Simpson-Young et al. Jun 2005 B1
6971031 Haala Nov 2005 B2
6990588 Yasukura Jan 2006 B1
7006986 Sines et al. Feb 2006 B1
7085931 Smith et al. Aug 2006 B1
7127605 Montgomery et al. Oct 2006 B1
7128274 Kelley et al. Oct 2006 B2
7140550 Ramachandran Nov 2006 B2
7152045 Hoffman Dec 2006 B2
7165727 de Jong Jan 2007 B2
7175076 Block et al. Feb 2007 B1
7202773 Oba et al. Apr 2007 B1
7206806 Pineau Apr 2007 B2
7232073 de Jong Jun 2007 B1
7246752 Brown Jul 2007 B2
7254569 Goodman et al. Aug 2007 B2
7263507 Brake, Jr. et al. Aug 2007 B1
7270276 Vayssiere Sep 2007 B2
7278025 Saito et al. Oct 2007 B2
7287692 Patel et al. Oct 2007 B1
7290709 Tsai et al. Nov 2007 B2
7306143 Bonneau, Jr. et al. Dec 2007 B2
7319986 Praisner et al. Jan 2008 B2
7325132 Takayama et al. Jan 2008 B2
7373515 Owen et al. May 2008 B2
7374099 de Jong May 2008 B2
7375616 Rowse et al. May 2008 B2
7380710 Brown Jun 2008 B2
7424977 Smets et al. Sep 2008 B2
7453439 Kushler et al. Nov 2008 B1
7472829 Brown Jan 2009 B2
7487357 Smith et al. Feb 2009 B2
7568631 Gibbs et al. Aug 2009 B2
7584153 Brown et al. Sep 2009 B2
7597250 Finn Oct 2009 B2
7628322 Holtmanns et al. Dec 2009 B2
7652578 Braun et al. Jan 2010 B2
7689832 Talmor et al. Mar 2010 B2
7703142 Wilson et al. Apr 2010 B1
7748609 Sachdeva et al. Jul 2010 B2
7748617 Gray Jul 2010 B2
7748636 Finn Jul 2010 B2
7762457 Bonalle et al. Jul 2010 B2
7789302 Tame Sep 2010 B2
7793851 Mullen Sep 2010 B2
7796013 Murakami et al. Sep 2010 B2
7801799 Brake, Jr. et al. Sep 2010 B1
7801829 Gray et al. Sep 2010 B2
7805755 Brown et al. Sep 2010 B2
7809643 Phillips et al. Oct 2010 B2
7827115 Weller et al. Nov 2010 B2
7828214 Narendra et al. Nov 2010 B2
7848746 Juels Dec 2010 B2
7882553 Tuliani Feb 2011 B2
7900048 Andersson Mar 2011 B2
7908216 Davis et al. Mar 2011 B1
7922082 Muscato Apr 2011 B2
7933589 Mamdani et al. Apr 2011 B1
7949559 Freiberg May 2011 B2
7954716 Narendra et al. Jun 2011 B2
7954723 Charrat Jun 2011 B2
7962369 Rosenberg Jun 2011 B2
7993197 Kaminkow Aug 2011 B2
8005426 Huomo et al. Aug 2011 B2
8010405 Bortolin et al. Aug 2011 B1
RE42762 Shin et al. Sep 2011 E
8041954 Plesman Oct 2011 B2
8060012 Sklovsky et al. Nov 2011 B2
8074877 Mullen et al. Dec 2011 B2
8082450 Frey et al. Dec 2011 B2
8095113 Kean et al. Jan 2012 B2
8099332 Lemay et al. Jan 2012 B2
8103249 Markison Jan 2012 B2
8108687 Ellis et al. Jan 2012 B2
8127143 Abdallah et al. Feb 2012 B2
8135648 Oram et al. Mar 2012 B2
8140010 Symons et al. Mar 2012 B2
8141136 Lee et al. Mar 2012 B2
8150321 Winter et al. Apr 2012 B2
8150767 Wankmueller Apr 2012 B2
8186602 Itay et al. May 2012 B2
8196131 von Behren et al. Jun 2012 B1
8215563 Levy et al. Jul 2012 B2
8224753 Atef et al. Jul 2012 B2
8232879 Davis Jul 2012 B2
8233841 Griffin et al. Jul 2012 B2
8245292 Buer Aug 2012 B2
8249654 Zhu Aug 2012 B1
8266451 Leydier et al. Sep 2012 B2
8285329 Zhu Oct 2012 B1
8302872 Mullen Nov 2012 B2
8312519 Bailey et al. Nov 2012 B1
8316237 Felsher et al. Nov 2012 B1
8332272 Fisher Dec 2012 B2
8365988 Medina, III et al. Feb 2013 B1
8369960 Tran et al. Feb 2013 B2
8371501 Hopkins Feb 2013 B1
8381307 Cimino Feb 2013 B2
8391719 Alameh et al. Mar 2013 B2
8417231 Sanding et al. Apr 2013 B2
8439271 Smets et al. May 2013 B2
8475367 Yuen et al. Jul 2013 B1
8489112 Roeding et al. Jul 2013 B2
8511542 Pan Aug 2013 B2
8559872 Butler Oct 2013 B2
8566916 Bailey et al. Oct 2013 B1
8567670 Stanfield et al. Oct 2013 B2
8572386 Takekawa et al. Oct 2013 B2
8577810 Dalit et al. Nov 2013 B1
8583454 Beraja et al. Nov 2013 B2
8589335 Smith et al. Nov 2013 B2
8594730 Bona et al. Nov 2013 B2
8615468 Varadarajan Dec 2013 B2
8620218 Awad Dec 2013 B2
8667285 Coulier et al. Mar 2014 B2
8723941 Shirbabadi et al. May 2014 B1
8726405 Bailey et al. May 2014 B1
8740073 Vijayshankar et al. Jun 2014 B2
8750514 Gallo et al. Jun 2014 B2
8752189 de Jong Jun 2014 B2
8794509 Bishop et al. Aug 2014 B2
8799668 Cheng Aug 2014 B2
8806592 Ganesan Aug 2014 B2
8807440 von Behren et al. Aug 2014 B1
8811892 Khan et al. Aug 2014 B2
8814039 Bishop et al. Aug 2014 B2
8814052 Bona et al. Aug 2014 B2
8818867 Baldwin et al. Aug 2014 B2
8850538 Vernon et al. Sep 2014 B1
8861733 Benteo et al. Oct 2014 B2
8880027 Darringer Nov 2014 B1
8888002 Marshall Chesney et al. Nov 2014 B2
8898088 Springer et al. Nov 2014 B2
8934837 Zhu et al. Jan 2015 B2
8977569 Rao Mar 2015 B2
8994498 Agrafioti et al. Mar 2015 B2
9004365 Bona et al. Apr 2015 B2
9038894 Khalid May 2015 B2
9042814 Royston et al. May 2015 B2
9047531 Showering et al. Jun 2015 B2
9069976 Toole et al. Jun 2015 B2
9081948 Magne Jul 2015 B2
9104853 Venkataramani et al. Aug 2015 B2
9118663 Bailey et al. Aug 2015 B1
9122964 Krawczewicz Sep 2015 B2
9129280 Bona et al. Sep 2015 B2
9152832 Royston et al. Oct 2015 B2
9203800 Izu et al. Dec 2015 B2
9209867 Royston Dec 2015 B2
9251330 Boivie et al. Feb 2016 B2
9251518 Levin et al. Feb 2016 B2
9258715 Borghei Feb 2016 B2
9270337 Zhu et al. Feb 2016 B2
9306626 Hall et al. Apr 2016 B2
9306942 Bailey et al. Apr 2016 B1
9324066 Archer et al. Apr 2016 B2
9324067 Van Os et al. Apr 2016 B2
9332587 Salahshoor May 2016 B2
9338622 Bjontegard May 2016 B2
9373141 Shakkarwar Jun 2016 B1
9379841 Fine et al. Jun 2016 B2
9413430 Royston et al. Aug 2016 B2
9413768 Gregg et al. Aug 2016 B1
9420496 Indurkar Aug 2016 B1
9426132 Alikhani Aug 2016 B1
9432339 Bowness Aug 2016 B1
9455968 Machani et al. Sep 2016 B1
9473509 Arsanjani et al. Oct 2016 B2
9491626 Sharma et al. Nov 2016 B2
9553637 Yang et al. Jan 2017 B2
9619952 Zhao et al. Apr 2017 B1
9635000 Muftic Apr 2017 B1
9665858 Kumar May 2017 B1
9674705 Rose et al. Jun 2017 B2
9679286 Colnot et al. Jun 2017 B2
9680942 Dimmick Jun 2017 B2
9710804 Zhou et al. Jul 2017 B2
9740342 Paulsen et al. Aug 2017 B2
9740988 Levin et al. Aug 2017 B1
9763097 Robinson et al. Sep 2017 B2
9767329 Forster Sep 2017 B2
9769662 Queru Sep 2017 B1
9773151 Mil'shtein et al. Sep 2017 B2
9780953 Gaddam et al. Oct 2017 B2
9891823 Feng et al. Feb 2018 B2
9940571 Herrington Apr 2018 B1
9953323 Candelore et al. Apr 2018 B2
9961194 Wiechman et al. May 2018 B1
9965756 Davis et al. May 2018 B2
9965911 Wishne May 2018 B2
9978058 Wurmfeld et al. May 2018 B2
10043164 Dogin et al. Aug 2018 B2
10075437 Costigan et al. Sep 2018 B1
10129648 Hernandez et al. Nov 2018 B1
10133979 Eidam et al. Nov 2018 B1
10217105 Sangi et al. Feb 2019 B1
10581611 Osborn Mar 2020 B1
20010010723 Pinkas Aug 2001 A1
20010029485 Brody et al. Oct 2001 A1
20010034702 Mockett et al. Oct 2001 A1
20010054003 Chien et al. Dec 2001 A1
20020078345 Sandhu et al. Jun 2002 A1
20020093530 Krothapalli et al. Jul 2002 A1
20020100808 Norwood et al. Aug 2002 A1
20020120583 Keresman, III et al. Aug 2002 A1
20020152116 Yan et al. Oct 2002 A1
20020153424 Li Oct 2002 A1
20020165827 Gien et al. Nov 2002 A1
20030023554 Yap et al. Jan 2003 A1
20030034873 Chase et al. Feb 2003 A1
20030055727 Walker et al. Mar 2003 A1
20030078882 Sukeda et al. Apr 2003 A1
20030167350 Davis et al. Sep 2003 A1
20030208449 Diao Nov 2003 A1
20040015958 Veil et al. Jan 2004 A1
20040039919 Takayama et al. Feb 2004 A1
20040127256 Goldthwaite et al. Jul 2004 A1
20040215674 Odinak et al. Oct 2004 A1
20040230799 Davis Nov 2004 A1
20050044367 Gasparini et al. Feb 2005 A1
20050075985 Cartmell Apr 2005 A1
20050081038 Arditti Modiano et al. Apr 2005 A1
20050138387 Lam et al. Jun 2005 A1
20050156026 Ghosh et al. Jul 2005 A1
20050160049 Lundholm Jul 2005 A1
20050195975 Kawakita Sep 2005 A1
20050247797 Ramachandran Nov 2005 A1
20060006230 Bear et al. Jan 2006 A1
20060040726 Szrek et al. Feb 2006 A1
20060041402 Baker Feb 2006 A1
20060044153 Dawidowsky Mar 2006 A1
20060047954 Sachdeva et al. Mar 2006 A1
20060085848 Aissi et al. Apr 2006 A1
20060136334 Atkinson et al. Jun 2006 A1
20060173985 Moore Aug 2006 A1
20060174331 Schuetz Aug 2006 A1
20060242698 Inskeep et al. Oct 2006 A1
20060280338 Rabb Dec 2006 A1
20070033642 Ganesan et al. Feb 2007 A1
20070055630 Gauthier et al. Mar 2007 A1
20070061266 Moore et al. Mar 2007 A1
20070061487 Moore et al. Mar 2007 A1
20070116292 Kurita et al. May 2007 A1
20070118745 Buer May 2007 A1
20070197261 Humbel Aug 2007 A1
20070224969 Rao Sep 2007 A1
20070241182 Buer Oct 2007 A1
20070256134 Lehtonen et al. Nov 2007 A1
20070258594 Sandhu et al. Nov 2007 A1
20070278291 Rans et al. Dec 2007 A1
20080008315 Fontana et al. Jan 2008 A1
20080011831 Bonalle et al. Jan 2008 A1
20080014867 Finn Jan 2008 A1
20080035738 Mullen Feb 2008 A1
20080071681 Khalid Mar 2008 A1
20080072303 Syed Mar 2008 A1
20080086767 Kulkarni et al. Apr 2008 A1
20080103968 Bies et al. May 2008 A1
20080109309 Landau et al. May 2008 A1
20080110983 Ashfield May 2008 A1
20080120711 Dispensa May 2008 A1
20080156873 Wilhelm et al. Jul 2008 A1
20080162312 Sklovsky et al. Jul 2008 A1
20080164308 Aaron et al. Jul 2008 A1
20080207307 Cunningham, II et al. Aug 2008 A1
20080209543 Aaron Aug 2008 A1
20080223918 Williams et al. Sep 2008 A1
20080285746 Androck et al. Nov 2008 A1
20080308641 Finn Dec 2008 A1
20090037275 Pollio Feb 2009 A1
20090048026 French Feb 2009 A1
20090132417 Scipioni et al. May 2009 A1
20090143104 Loh et al. Jun 2009 A1
20090171682 Dixon et al. Jul 2009 A1
20090210308 Toomer et al. Aug 2009 A1
20090235339 Mennes et al. Sep 2009 A1
20090249077 Gargaro et al. Oct 2009 A1
20090282264 Ameil et al. Nov 2009 A1
20100023449 Skowronek et al. Jan 2010 A1
20100023455 Dispensa et al. Jan 2010 A1
20100029202 Jolivet et al. Feb 2010 A1
20100033310 Narendra et al. Feb 2010 A1
20100036769 Winters et al. Feb 2010 A1
20100078471 Lin et al. Apr 2010 A1
20100082491 Rosenblatt et al. Apr 2010 A1
20100094754 Bertran et al. Apr 2010 A1
20100095130 Bertran et al. Apr 2010 A1
20100100480 Altman et al. Apr 2010 A1
20100114731 Kingston et al. May 2010 A1
20100192230 Steeves et al. Jul 2010 A1
20100207742 Buhot et al. Aug 2010 A1
20100211797 Westerveld et al. Aug 2010 A1
20100240413 He et al. Sep 2010 A1
20100257357 McClain Oct 2010 A1
20100312634 Cervenka Dec 2010 A1
20100312635 Cervenka Dec 2010 A1
20110028160 Roeding et al. Feb 2011 A1
20110035604 Habraken Feb 2011 A1
20110060631 Grossman et al. Mar 2011 A1
20110068170 Lehman Mar 2011 A1
20110084132 Tofighbakhsh Apr 2011 A1
20110101093 Ehrensvard May 2011 A1
20110113245 Varadarajan May 2011 A1
20110125638 Davis et al. May 2011 A1
20110131415 Schneider Jun 2011 A1
20110153437 Archer et al. Jun 2011 A1
20110153496 Royyuru Jun 2011 A1
20110197267 Gravel Aug 2011 A1
20110208658 Makhotin Aug 2011 A1
20110208965 Machani Aug 2011 A1
20110211219 Bradley et al. Sep 2011 A1
20110218911 Spodak Sep 2011 A1
20110238564 Lim et al. Sep 2011 A1
20110246780 Yeap et al. Oct 2011 A1
20110258452 Coulier et al. Oct 2011 A1
20110280406 Ma et al. Nov 2011 A1
20110282785 Chin Nov 2011 A1
20110294418 Chen Dec 2011 A1
20110312271 Ma et al. Dec 2011 A1
20120024947 Naelon Feb 2012 A1
20120030047 Fuentes et al. Feb 2012 A1
20120030121 Grellier Feb 2012 A1
20120047071 Mullen et al. Feb 2012 A1
20120079281 Lowenstein et al. Mar 2012 A1
20120109735 Krawczewicz et al. May 2012 A1
20120109764 Martin et al. May 2012 A1
20120143754 Patel Jun 2012 A1
20120150737 Rottink et al. Jun 2012 A1
20120178366 Levy et al. Jul 2012 A1
20120196583 Kindo Aug 2012 A1
20120207305 Gallo et al. Aug 2012 A1
20120209773 Ranganathan Aug 2012 A1
20120238206 Singh et al. Sep 2012 A1
20120239560 Pourfallah et al. Sep 2012 A1
20120252350 Steinmetz et al. Oct 2012 A1
20120254394 Barras Oct 2012 A1
20120284194 Liu et al. Nov 2012 A1
20120290472 Mullen et al. Nov 2012 A1
20120296818 Nuzzi et al. Nov 2012 A1
20120316992 Oborne Dec 2012 A1
20120317035 Royyuru et al. Dec 2012 A1
20120317628 Yeager Dec 2012 A1
20130005245 Royston Jan 2013 A1
20130008956 Ashfield Jan 2013 A1
20130026229 Jarman et al. Jan 2013 A1
20130048713 Pan Feb 2013 A1
20130054474 Yeager Feb 2013 A1
20130065564 Conner et al. Mar 2013 A1
20130080228 Fisher Mar 2013 A1
20130080229 Fisher Mar 2013 A1
20130099587 Lou et al. Apr 2013 A1
20130104251 Moore et al. Apr 2013 A1
20130106576 Hinman et al. May 2013 A1
20130119130 Braams May 2013 A1
20130130614 Busch-Sorensen May 2013 A1
20130144793 Royston Jun 2013 A1
20130171929 Adams et al. Jul 2013 A1
20130179351 Wallner Jul 2013 A1
20130185772 Jaudon et al. Jul 2013 A1
20130191279 Calman et al. Jul 2013 A1
20130200999 Spodak et al. Aug 2013 A1
20130216108 Hwang et al. Aug 2013 A1
20130226791 Springer et al. Aug 2013 A1
20130226796 Jiang et al. Aug 2013 A1
20130232082 Krawczewicz et al. Sep 2013 A1
20130238894 Ferg et al. Sep 2013 A1
20130282360 Shimota et al. Oct 2013 A1
20130303085 Boucher et al. Nov 2013 A1
20130304651 Smith Nov 2013 A1
20130312082 Izu et al. Nov 2013 A1
20130314593 Reznik et al. Nov 2013 A1
20130344857 Berionne et al. Dec 2013 A1
20140002238 Taveau et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140019352 Shrivastava Jan 2014 A1
20140020068 Desai et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140027506 Heo et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140032409 Rosano Jan 2014 A1
20140032410 Georgiev et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140040120 Cho et al. Feb 2014 A1
20140040139 Brudnicki et al. Feb 2014 A1
20140040147 Varadarakan et al. Feb 2014 A1
20140047235 Lessiak et al. Feb 2014 A1
20140067690 Pitroda et al. Mar 2014 A1
20140074637 Hammad Mar 2014 A1
20140074655 Lim et al. Mar 2014 A1
20140081720 Wu Mar 2014 A1
20140138435 Khalid May 2014 A1
20140156396 deKozan et al. Jun 2014 A1
20140171034 Aleksin et al. Jun 2014 A1
20140171039 Bjontegard Jun 2014 A1
20140172700 Teuwen et al. Jun 2014 A1
20140180851 Fisher Jun 2014 A1
20140208112 McDonald et al. Jul 2014 A1
20140214674 Narula Jul 2014 A1
20140229375 Zaytzsev et al. Aug 2014 A1
20140245391 Adenuga Aug 2014 A1
20140256251 Caceres et al. Sep 2014 A1
20140258099 Rosano Sep 2014 A1
20140258113 Gauthier et al. Sep 2014 A1
20140258125 Gerber et al. Sep 2014 A1
20140274179 Zhu et al. Sep 2014 A1
20140279479 Maniar et al. Sep 2014 A1
20140337235 Van Heerden et al. Nov 2014 A1
20140339315 Ko Nov 2014 A1
20140346860 Aubry et al. Nov 2014 A1
20140365780 Movassaghi Dec 2014 A1
20140379361 Mahadkar et al. Dec 2014 A1
20150012444 Brown et al. Jan 2015 A1
20150032635 Guise Jan 2015 A1
20150071486 Rhoads et al. Mar 2015 A1
20150088757 Zhou et al. Mar 2015 A1
20150089586 Ballesteros Mar 2015 A1
20150134452 Williams May 2015 A1
20150140960 Powell et al. May 2015 A1
20150154595 Collinge et al. Jun 2015 A1
20150170138 Rao Jun 2015 A1
20150178724 Ngo et al. Jun 2015 A1
20150186871 Laracey Jul 2015 A1
20150205379 Mag et al. Jul 2015 A1
20150302409 Malek et al. Oct 2015 A1
20150317626 Ran et al. Nov 2015 A1
20150332266 Friedlander et al. Nov 2015 A1
20150339474 Paz et al. Nov 2015 A1
20150371234 Huang et al. Dec 2015 A1
20160012465 Sharp Jan 2016 A1
20160026997 Tsui et al. Jan 2016 A1
20160048913 Rausaria et al. Feb 2016 A1
20160055480 Shah Feb 2016 A1
20160057619 Lopez Feb 2016 A1
20160065370 Le Saint et al. Mar 2016 A1
20160087957 Shah et al. Mar 2016 A1
20160092696 Guglani et al. Mar 2016 A1
20160148193 Kelley et al. May 2016 A1
20160232523 Venot et al. Aug 2016 A1
20160239672 Khan et al. Aug 2016 A1
20160253651 Park et al. Sep 2016 A1
20160255072 Liu Sep 2016 A1
20160267486 Mitra et al. Sep 2016 A1
20160277383 Guyomarc'h et al. Sep 2016 A1
20160277388 Lowe et al. Sep 2016 A1
20160307187 Guo et al. Oct 2016 A1
20160307189 Zarakas et al. Oct 2016 A1
20160314472 Ashfield Oct 2016 A1
20160330027 Ebrahimi Nov 2016 A1
20160335531 Mullen et al. Nov 2016 A1
20160379217 Hammad Dec 2016 A1
20170004502 Quentin et al. Jan 2017 A1
20170011395 Pillai et al. Jan 2017 A1
20170011406 Tunnell et al. Jan 2017 A1
20170017957 Radu Jan 2017 A1
20170017964 Janefalkar et al. Jan 2017 A1
20170024716 Jiam et al. Jan 2017 A1
20170039566 Schipperheijn Feb 2017 A1
20170041759 Gantert et al. Feb 2017 A1
20170068950 Kwon Mar 2017 A1
20170103388 Pillai et al. Apr 2017 A1
20170104739 Ansler et al. Apr 2017 A1
20170109509 Baghdasaryan Apr 2017 A1
20170109730 Locke et al. Apr 2017 A1
20170116447 Cimino et al. Apr 2017 A1
20170124568 Moghadam May 2017 A1
20170140379 Deck May 2017 A1
20170154328 Zarakas et al. Jun 2017 A1
20170154333 Gleeson et al. Jun 2017 A1
20170180134 King Jun 2017 A1
20170230189 Toll et al. Aug 2017 A1
20170237301 Elad et al. Aug 2017 A1
20170289127 Hendrick Oct 2017 A1
20170295013 Claes Oct 2017 A1
20170316696 Bartel Nov 2017 A1
20170317834 Smith et al. Nov 2017 A1
20170330173 Woo et al. Nov 2017 A1
20170374070 Shah et al. Dec 2017 A1
20180034507 Wobak et al. Feb 2018 A1
20180039986 Essebag et al. Feb 2018 A1
20180068316 Essebag et al. Mar 2018 A1
20180129945 Saxena et al. May 2018 A1
20180160255 Park Jun 2018 A1
20180191501 Lindemann Jul 2018 A1
20180205712 Versteeg et al. Jul 2018 A1
20180240106 Garrett et al. Aug 2018 A1
20180254909 Hancock Sep 2018 A1
20180268132 Buer et al. Sep 2018 A1
20180270214 Caterino et al. Sep 2018 A1
20180294959 Traynor et al. Oct 2018 A1
20180300716 Carlson Oct 2018 A1
20180302396 Camenisch et al. Oct 2018 A1
20180315050 Hammad Nov 2018 A1
20180316666 Koved et al. Nov 2018 A1
20180322486 Deliwala et al. Nov 2018 A1
20180359100 Gaddam et al. Dec 2018 A1
20190014107 George Jan 2019 A1
20190019375 Foley Jan 2019 A1
20190036678 Ahmed Jan 2019 A1
20190089699 Krishnamurthy Mar 2019 A1
20190180278 Park Jun 2019 A1
20190238517 D'Agostino et al. Aug 2019 A1
20200104474 Duane Apr 2020 A1
20200104826 Rule Apr 2020 A1
20200111095 Osborn Apr 2020 A1
20200184462 Rule Jun 2020 A1
20200226581 Rule Jul 2020 A1
20200242588 Rule Jul 2020 A1
20200250672 Rule Aug 2020 A1
20200302436 Ilincic Sep 2020 A1
20200304310 Rule Sep 2020 A1
20200304311 Rule Sep 2020 A1
20200380591 Rule Dec 2020 A1
20210004218 Ilincic Jan 2021 A1
20210004786 Mossler Jan 2021 A1
20210004803 Rule Jan 2021 A1
20210012401 Osborn Jan 2021 A1
20210019731 Rule Jan 2021 A1
20210019735 Hart Jan 2021 A1
20210019756 Rule Jan 2021 A1
20210168140 Canfield Jun 2021 A1
20210192494 Capurso Jun 2021 A1
20210192495 Cody Jun 2021 A1
20210192508 Edwards Jun 2021 A1
20210192518 Rule Jun 2021 A1
20210192519 McHugh Jun 2021 A1
20210201296 Rule Jul 2021 A1
20210203505 Mossler Jul 2021 A1
20210319427 Rule Oct 2021 A1
20210342809 Rule Nov 2021 A1
20210342816 Benkreira Nov 2021 A1
20210342817 Rule Nov 2021 A1
20210342840 Rule Nov 2021 A1
20220138726 Rule May 2022 A1
20220139511 Osborn May 2022 A1
20220215217 Hart Jul 2022 A1
20220247741 Moreton Aug 2022 A1
20220272083 Rule Aug 2022 A1
20220284178 Rule Sep 2022 A1
20220335412 Rule Oct 2022 A1
20220335432 Rule Oct 2022 A1
20220337581 Guo Oct 2022 A1
20220345309 Rule Oct 2022 A1
20220366410 Rule Nov 2022 A1
20220414648 Rule Dec 2022 A1
20220417024 Yee Dec 2022 A1
20230020843 Bowers Jan 2023 A1
20230065163 Vargas Mar 2023 A1
20230083785 Maiman Mar 2023 A1
20230162187 Rule May 2023 A1
20230169505 Rule Jun 2023 A1
20230169596 Rule Jun 2023 A1
20230188340 Osborn Jun 2023 A1
20230298417 Osborn Sep 2023 A1
20230325810 Barrett Oct 2023 A1
20230376936 Lutz Nov 2023 A1
20230401564 Barrett Dec 2023 A1
20230418923 Ogbennah Dec 2023 A1
20230419295 Rule Dec 2023 A1
20240021041 Chigurupati Jan 2024 A1
20240054493 Osborn Feb 2024 A1
Foreign Referenced Citations (39)
Number Date Country
3010336 Jul 2017 CA
101192295 Jun 2008 CN
103023643 Apr 2013 CN
103417202 Dec 2013 CN
1085424 Mar 2001 EP
1223565 Jul 2002 EP
1265186 Dec 2002 EP
1783919 May 2007 EP
2139196 Dec 2009 EP
1469419 Aug 2012 EP
2852070 Mar 2015 EP
2457221 Aug 2009 GB
2516861 Feb 2015 GB
2551907 Jan 2018 GB
101508320 Apr 2015 KR
0049586 Aug 2000 WO
2006070189 Jul 2006 WO
2008055170 May 2008 WO
2009025605 Feb 2009 WO
2010049252 May 2010 WO
2011112158 Sep 2011 WO
2012001624 Jan 2012 WO
2013039395 Mar 2013 WO
2013155562 Oct 2013 WO
2013192358 Dec 2013 WO
2014043278 Mar 2014 WO
2014170741 Oct 2014 WO
2015179649 Nov 2015 WO
2015183818 Dec 2015 WO
2016097718 Jun 2016 WO
2016160816 Oct 2016 WO
2016168394 Oct 2016 WO
2017042375 Mar 2017 WO
2017042400 Mar 2017 WO
2017157859 Sep 2017 WO
2017208063 Dec 2017 WO
2018063809 Apr 2018 WO
2018137888 Aug 2018 WO
2020190788 Sep 2020 WO
Non-Patent Literature Citations (42)
Entry
International Search Report and Written Opinion dated Sep. 28, 2022, for Application No. PCT/US2022/032762 (13 pages).
Batina, L. and Poll, E., “SmartCards and RFID”, Course PowerPoint Presentation for IPA Security Course, Digital Security at University of Nijmegen, Netherlands (date unknown) 75 pages.
Haykin, M. and Warnar, R., “Smart Card Technology: New Methods for Computer Access Control”, Computer Science and Technology NIST Special Publication 500-157:1-60 (1988).
Lehpamer, H., “Component of the RFID System”, RFID Design Principles, 2nd edition pp. 133-201 (2012).
Author Unknown, “CardrefresherSM from American Express®”, [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://merchant-channel.americanexpress.com/merchant/en_US/cardrefresher, 2 pages.
Author Unknown, “Add Account Updater to your recurring payment tool”, [online] 2018-19 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.authorize.net/our-features/account-updater/, 5 pages.
Author Unknown, “Visa® Account Updater for Merchants”, [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/visa-account-updater-product-information-fact-sheet-for-merchants.pdf, 2 pages.
Author Unknown, “Manage the cards that you use with Apple Pay”, Apple Support [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205583, 5 pages.
Author Unknown, “Contactless Specifications for Payment Systems”, EMV Book B—Entry Point Specification [online] 2016 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.emvco.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BookB_Entry_Point_Specification_v2_6_20160809023257319.pdf, 52 pages.
Author Unknown, “EMV Integrated Circuit Card Specifcations for Payment Systems, Book 2, Security and Key Management,” Version 3.4, [online] 2011 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.emvco.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/EMV_v4.3_Book_2_Security_and_Key_Management_20120607061923900.pdf, 174 pages.
Author Unknown, “NFC Guide: All You Need to Know About Near Field Communication”, Square Guide [online] 2018 [retrieved on Nov. 13, 2018]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://squareup.com/guides/nfc, 8 pages.
Profis, S., “Everything you need to know about NFC and mobile payments” CNET Directory [online], 2014 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from the Internet URL: https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-nfc-works-and-mobile-payments/, 6 pages.
Cozma, N., “Copy data from other devices in Android 5.0 Lollipop setup”, CNET Directory [online] 2014 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from the Internet URL: https://www.cnet.com/how-to/copy-data-from-other-devices-in-android-5-0-lollipop-setup/, 5 pages.
Kevin, Android Enthusiast, “How to copy text string from nfc tag”, StackExchange [online] 2013 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from the Internet URL: https://android.stackexchange.com/questions/55689/how-to-copy-text-string-from-nfc-tag, 11 pages.
Author Unknown, “Tap & Go Device Setup”, Samsung [online] date unknown [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from the Internet URL: https://www.samsung.com/us/switch-me/switch-to-the-galaxy-s-5/app/partial/setup-device/tap-go.html, 1 page.
Author Unknown, “Multiple encryption”, Wikipedia [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_encryption, 4 pages.
Krawczyk, et al., “HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication”, Network Working Group RFC:2104 memo [online] 1997 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104, 12 pages.
Song, et al., “ The AES-CMAC Algorithm”, Network Working Group RFC: 4493 memo [online] 2006 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493, 21 pages.
Katz, J. and Lindell, Y., “Aggregate Message Authentication Codes”, Topics in Cryptology [online] 2008 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.cs.umd.edu/˜jkatz/papers/aggregateMAC.pdf, 11 pages.
Adams, D., and Maier, A-K., “Goldbug Big Seven open source crypto-messengers to be compared—or: Comprehensive Confidentiality Review & Audit of GoldBug Encrypting E-Mail-Client & Secure Instant Messenger”, Big Seven Study 2016 [online] [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2018]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://sf.net/projects/goldbug/files/bigseven-crypto-audit.pdf, 309 pages.
Author Unknown, “Triple DES”, Wikipedia [online] 2018 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_DES, 2 pages.
Song F., and Yun, A.I., “Quantum Security of NMAC and Related Constructions—PRF domain extension against quantum attacks”, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive [online] 2017 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/509.pdf, 41 pages.
Saxena, N., “Lecture 10: NMAC, HMAC and Number Theory”, CS 6903 Modern Cryptography [online] 2008 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: http://isis.poly.edu/courses/cs6903/Lectures/lecture 10.pdf, 8 pages.
Berg, G., “Fundamentals of EMV”, Smart Card Alliance [online] date unknown [retrieved on Mar. 27, 2019]. Retrieveed from Internet URL: https://www.securetechalliance.org/resources/media/scap13_preconference/02.pdf, 37 pages.
Pierce, K., “Is the amazon echo nfc compatible?”, Amazon.com Customer Q&A [online] 2016 [retrieved on Mar. 26, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.amazon.com/ask/questions/Tx1RJXYSPE6XLJD?_ encodi . . . , 2 pages.
Author Unknown, “Multi-Factor Authentication”, idaptive [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.centrify.com/products/application-services/adaptive-multi-factor-authentication/risk-based-mfa/, 10 pages.
Author Unknown, “Adaptive Authentication”, SecureAuth [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019}. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.secureauth.com/products/access-management/adaptive-authentication, 7 pages.
Van den Breekel, J., et al., “EMV in a nutshell”, Technical Report, 2016 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.cs.ru.nl/E.Poll/papers/EMVtechreport.pdf, 37 pages.
Author Unknown, “Autofill”, Computer Hope [online] 2018 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/a/autofill.htm, 2 pages.
Author Unknown, “Fill out forms automatically”, Google Chrome Help [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/142893?co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&hl=en, 3 pages.
Author Unknown, “Autofill credit cards, contacts, and passwords in Safari on Mac”, Apple Safari User Guide [online] 2019 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/use-autofill-brw1103/mac, 3 pages.
Menghin, M.J., “Power Optimization Techniques for Near Field Communication Systems”, 2014 Dissertation at Technical University of Graz [online]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://diglib.tugraz.at/download.php?id=576a7b910d2d6&location=browse, 135 pages.
Mareli, M., et al., “Experimental evaluation of NFC reliability between an RFID tag and a smartphone”, Conference paper (2013) IEEE AFRICON At Mauritius [online] [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/54204839.pdf, 5 pages.
Davison, A., et al., “MonoSLAM: Real-Time Single Camera SLAM”, IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 29(6): 1052-1067 (2007).
Barba, R., “Sharing your location with your bank sounds creepy, but it's also useful”, Bankrate, LLC [online] 2017 [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.bankrate.com/banking/banking-app-location-sharing/, 6 pages.
Author Unknown: “onetappayment™”, [online] Jan. 24, 2019, [retrieved on Mar. 25, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.payubiz.in/onetap, 4 pages.
Vu, et al., “Distinguishing users with capacitive touch communication”, Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, 2012, MOBICOM. 10.1145/2348543.2348569.
Pourghomi, P., et al., “A Proposed NFC Payment Application,” International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 4(8):173-181 (2013).
Author unknown, “EMV Card Personalization Specification”, EMVCo., LLC., specification version 1.0, (2003) 81 pages.
Ullmann et al., “On-Card” User Authentication for Contactless Smart Cards based on Gesture Recognition, paper presentation LNI proceedings, (2012) 12 pages.
Faraj, S.T., et al., “Investigation of Java Smart Card Technology for Multi-Task Applications”, J of Al-Anbar University for Pure Science, 2(1):23 pages (2008).
Dhamdhere, P., “Key Benefits of a Unified Platform for Loyalty, Referral Marketing, and UGC” Annex Cloud [online] May 19, 2017 [retrieved on Jul. 3, 2019]. Retrieved from Internet URL: https://www.annexcloude.com/blog/benefits-unified-platform/, 13 pages.
Related Publications (1)
Number Date Country
20230020843 A1 Jan 2023 US