System for a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network

Information

  • Patent Grant
  • 10693852
  • Patent Number
    10,693,852
  • Date Filed
    Wednesday, August 1, 2018
    6 years ago
  • Date Issued
    Tuesday, June 23, 2020
    4 years ago
Abstract
A router between a content consuming device and a content storage device obtains an interest corresponding to a content object. The interest includes a name identifying the content storage device, signaling information, an authentication token, and an inner interest identifying an actual content object stored at the content storage device. The inner interest is encrypted with an encryption key shared between the content storage device and the content consuming device, but not shared with the router. The router authenticates the interest by verifying the authentication token using an authentication key shared with the content consuming device. The router then provides the interest to the content storage device. The router obtains the content object, which includes at least a portion of the actual content object encrypted with the encryption key, from the content storage device. The router provides the content object to the content consuming device.
Description
BACKGROUND
Field

This disclosure is generally related to distribution of digital content. More specifically, this disclosure is related to a system for a secure encryption performance enhancing proxy in a content centric network.


Related Art

The proliferation of the Internet and e-commerce continues to create a vast amount of digital content. Content centric network (CCN) architectures have been designed to facilitate accessing and processing such digital content. A CCN includes entities, or nodes, such as network clients, forwarders (e.g., routers), and content producers, which communicate with each other by sending interest packets for various content items and receiving content object packets in return. CCN interests and content objects are identified by their unique names, which are typically hierarchically structured variable length identifiers (HSVLI). An HSVLI can include contiguous name components ordered from a most general level to a most specific level.


Digital content may be carried over wireless links based on a transport control protocol (TCP). However, because the digital content can travel over both a radio link and a wireline link, TCP may result in poor performance due to the different channel responses for a transport protocol for a radio link and for a wireline link. One solution is to split or proxy the topology by inserting a middle box (e.g., a performance enhancing proxy, or a PEP) which terminates the radio transport loop and establishes a second transport loop to the wireline system. This allows the transport protocols to optimize performance on each side of the proxy and keep the air interface full with a minimum of duplicate data due to TCP retransmission requests. However, today's network traffic uses an increased amount of encryption, which prevents middle boxes (such as PEPs), from intercepting encrypted sessions. As a result, the PEPs cannot proxy the encrypted traffic. The encrypted traffic loses the benefit of the proxy over the wireless link, and the PEPs are unable to do much more than packet shaping to adjust data rates.


While a CCN brings many desired features to a network, some issues remain unsolved for implementing a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network.


SUMMARY

One embodiment provides a system that facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network. During operation, the system receives, by an intermediate router from a content-consuming computing device, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on a signaling key, and an inner interest encrypted based on an encryption key. The inner interest includes a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data. The intermediate router does not possess the encryption key. The system generates one or more interests for the data represented by the manifest, wherein a generated interest has a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest. The system transmits to the content-consuming computing device a content object received in response to a generated interest, wherein the intermediate router transmits the responsive content object without receiving a corresponding interest from the content-consuming computing device, thereby facilitating reduced network between the content-consuming computing device and the intermediate router.


In some embodiments, the intermediate router acts as an encryption performance enhancing proxy between the content-consuming computing device and a replica device. The content-consuming computing device and the intermediate router communicate over an air interface, and the intermediate router and the replica device communicate over a wired link.


In some embodiments, the first interest further includes an authentication token which is based on an authentication key, the encrypted signaling information, the encrypted inner interest, and data associated with the encrypted inner interest and the first interest. The system authenticates the first interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key and the associated data. The system decrypts the signaling information included in the first interest based on the signaling key.


In some embodiments, in response to transmitting the first interest to a replica device, the system receives a first content object with signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates an end chunk number, wherein generating the one or more interests further involves generating a number of interests equal to the end chunk number.


In some embodiments, in response to transmitting a generated interest to a replica device, the system receives a responsive content object with a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest. A numbered chunk corresponds to: a chunk created by a content producing device based on a division of a concatenation of the data represented by the manifest; or data for a leaf or a content object indicated in the manifest.


In some embodiments, in response to receiving one or more interests from the content-consuming computing device, the system forwards the received interests, wherein a received interest indicates a name for a branch of the manifest. The system transmits to the content-consuming computing device a content object received in response to a forwarded interest.


In some embodiments, the system receives a second interest that includes the first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates the manifest name, data encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key. The system authenticates the second interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key. A generated interest of the one or more interests includes signaling information that indicates a request for a leaf of the manifest, and the content object received in response to the generated interest includes data corresponding to the requested manifest leaf.


In some embodiments, the system obtains the signaling key and the authentication key based on a key exchange protocol which is based on one or more of: a content centric network, wherein the intermediate router is known to the content-consuming computing device; and a dynamic proxy discovery, wherein the intermediate router is not known to the content-consuming computing device. The system updates an interest received during a second round of communication in the key exchange protocol based on the content centric network by adding a key share of the intermediate router to the interest, and transmits the updated interest to a replica device, which allows the replica device to return to the content-consuming computing device a responsive content object that includes the key share of the replica device and the key share of the intermediate router.


In some embodiments, a name is a hierarchically structured variable length identifier that includes contiguous name components ordered from a most general level to a most specific level. The name further includes one or more of: a routable name prefix for a replica device that hosts content; a session identifier; a transaction identifier; and a chunk number.


In some embodiments, the system receives a generates a first alert message which is one or more of: a close message that indicates a shutdown of a transaction associated with the transaction identifier or a shutdown of a session associated with the session identifier; and an error message that indicates an error. The system receives a second alert message which is one or more of: a rekey message that indicates a request from the content-consuming computing device or a replica device to establish a new set of session keys; and a keepalive message from the content-consuming computing device or the replica device that allows a receiving entity to return a message to a sending entity outside of the generated interests or a received content object.


Another embodiment provides a system that facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network. During operation, the system generates, by a content-consuming computing device, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on a signaling key, and an inner interest encrypted based on an encryption key. The inner interest includes a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data. In response to transmitting the first interest to an intermediate router, the system receives one or more content object. A received content object includes a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest, and the content-consuming computing device is not required to transmit one or more corresponding interests for the one or more content objects, thereby facilitating reduced network traffic between the content-consuming computing device and the intermediate router.


In some embodiments, a received content object includes an authentication token which is based on an authentication key, the encrypted signaling information, the encrypted inner interest, and data associated with the encrypted inner interest and the first interest. The system authenticates a received content object by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key and the associated data. The system decrypts the signaling information included in the received content object based on the signaling key, and the system decrypts encrypted data or the inner interest that is included in the received content object based on the encryption key.


In some embodiments, the system generates one or more interests, wherein a name for a generated interest indicates a name for a branch of the manifest. The system receives a content object in response to a generated interest.


In some embodiments, the system generates a second interest that includes the first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates the manifest name, data encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key. In response to transmitting the second interest to the intermediate router, the system receives one or more transport content objects. A received transport content object includes signaling information that indicates a request for a leaf of the manifest, and data corresponding to the requested manifest leaf.


In some embodiments, the system obtains the encryption key, the signaling key, and the authentication key based on a key exchange protocol which is based on one or more of: a content centric network, wherein the intermediate router is known to the content-consuming computing device; and a dynamic proxy discovery, wherein the intermediate router is not known to the content-consuming computing device. The system receives a responsive content object that includes the key share of a replica device and the key share of the intermediate router.


In some embodiments, the system receives or generates an alert message which is one or more of: a close message that indicates a shutdown of a transaction associated with the transaction identifier or a shutdown of a session associated with the session identifier; an error message that indicates an error; a rekey message that indicates a request from the content-consuming computing device or a replica device to establish a new set of session keys; and a keepalive message from the content-consuming computing device or the replica device that allows a receiving entity to return a message to a sending entity outside of the generated interests or a received content object.


Another embodiment provides a system that facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network. During operation, the system receives, by a replica device, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on a signaling key, an inner interest encrypted based on an encryption key, and an authentication token based on an authentication key. The inner interest includes a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data. The system authenticates the first interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key. The system generates a first content object that includes signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates an end chunk number that corresponds to a number of chunks comprising the data represented by the manifest. The first content object further includes data represented by the manifest and that is encrypted based on the encryption key.


In some embodiments, in response to receiving a subsequent interest with a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest, the system generates a subsequent content object with data that corresponds to the numbered chunk.


In some embodiments, the system receives a second interest that includes the first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates the manifest name, data encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key. The system authenticates the second interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key. A received subsequent interest includes signaling information that indicates a request for data represented by the manifest, and a generated subsequent content object includes signaling information that indicates the data represented by the manifest.





BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS


FIG. 1A illustrates an exemplary environment in the prior art for a proxy between a radio link and a wire line.



FIG. 1B illustrates an exemplary environment which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 1C illustrates an exemplary table with a key distribution which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 1D illustrates exemplary channels created corresponding to the key distribution of FIG. 1C, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2A illustrates an exemplary communication which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2B illustrates an exemplary interest packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2C illustrates an exemplary content object packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2D illustrates an exemplary interest packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2E illustrates an exemplary content object packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2F illustrates an exemplary communication which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, where the consumer requests the manifest and the manifest data separately, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2G illustrates an exemplary communication which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, where the consumer requests a transport manifest over the signaling channel, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2H illustrates an exemplary interest packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2I illustrates an exemplary content object packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2J illustrates an exemplary interest packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 2K illustrates an exemplary content object packet corresponding to a communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 3A presents a flow chart illustrating a method by an intermediate router for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 3B presents a flow chart illustrating a method by an intermediate router for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 3C presents a flow chart illustrating a method for handling an error in a system which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 4A presents a flow chart illustrating a method by a content-consuming computing device for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 4B presents a flow chart illustrating a method by a content-consuming computing device for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 5A presents a flow chart illustrating a method by a replica device for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.



FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary computer system which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.





In the figures, like reference numerals refer to the same figure elements.


DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The following description is presented to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the embodiments, and is provided in the context of a particular application and its requirements. Various modifications to the disclosed embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments and applications without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure. Thus, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and features disclosed herein.


Overview


Embodiments of the present invention provide a system that solves the problem of relying on a PEP for encrypted traffic by providing an encryption performance enhancing proxy (ePEP) that can process encrypted traffic, where the system does not disclose any confidential information about the traffic to the ePEP. Current cellular network traffic carried over wireless links can be based on TCP, where digital content can travel over a radio link and over a wireline link.


However, because the radio link and the wireline link have different channel responses for a transport protocol, and because TCP cannot distinguish between the radio link and the wireline link, TCP may underestimate the end-to-end capacity. One solution is to split or proxy the topology by inserting a middle box (e.g., a performance enhancing proxy, or a PEP) which terminates the radio link transport loop and establishes a second transport loop to the wire-line system. This allows the transport protocols to optimize performance on each side of the proxy and keep the air interface full with a minimum of duplicate date due to TCP retransmission requests. However, today's network traffic uses an increased amount of encryption, which prevents a middle box (such as an PEP), from intercepting encrypted sessions. As a result, the PEP cannot proxy the encrypted traffic, as described below in relation to FIG. 1A. The encrypted traffic loses the benefit of the proxy over the wireless link, and the PEP is unable to do much more than packet shaping to adjust data rates.


Embodiments of the present invention provide an encryption performance enhancing proxy (ePEP), which can be an intermediate router that sits between a content-consuming computing device (e.g., a consumer) and a replica or a content producing device (e.g., a producer). The producer can provide all of its data to the replica. The system decouples the keys used to encrypt the underlying data from the keys used to encrypt or authenticate the data used for transporting the underlying data. For example, only the endpoints (e.g., the consumer and the producer) share the encryption key (“KE”) which is used to encrypt the underlying data, while the endpoints and the ePEP exchange both the signaling key (“KS”) which is used to encrypt signaling or transport information as well as the authentication key (“KA”) which is used to authenticate the underlying data in a packet. This allows the ePEP to participate in end-to-end signaling while it runs two different transport loops, and further allows the ePEP to process encrypted traffic, as described below in relation to FIG. 1B. An exemplary communication between a consumer, an ePEP, and a replica is described below in relation to FIG. 2A.


Thus, by decoupling the key distribution, the system can maintain end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, and authentication while benefiting from the performance improvements that a PEP can offer a mobile handset. Embodiments of the present invention result in increased efficiency in a network, specifically, in the communications or exchange of data between a content-consuming computing device (e.g., a mobile handset) and an ePEP over an air interface, and between the ePEP and a content hosting device (e.g., a replica) over a wireline link. The system of the present invention allows the ePEP to act as a semi-trusted middle box in a content centric network.


In CCN, each piece of content is individually named, and each piece of data is bound to a unique name that distinguishes the data from any other piece of data, such as other versions of the same data or data from other sources. This unique name allows a network device to request the data by disseminating a request or an interest that indicates the unique name, and can obtain the data independent from the data's storage location, network location, application, and means of transportation. The following terms are used to describe the CCN architecture:


Content Object (or “content object”): A single piece of named data, which is bound to a unique name. Content Objects are “persistent,” which means that a Content Object can move around within a computing device, or across different computing devices, but does not change. If any component of the Content Object changes, the entity that made the change creates a new Content Object that includes the updated content, and binds the new Content Object to a new unique name.


Unique Names: A name in a CCN is typically location independent and uniquely identifies a Content Object. A data-forwarding device can use the name or name prefix to forward a packet toward a network node that generates or stores the Content Object, regardless of a network address or physical location for the Content Object. In some embodiments, the name may be a hierarchically structured variable-length identifier (HSVLI). The HSVLI can be divided into several hierarchical components, which can be structured in various ways. For example, the individual name components pare, home, ccn, and test.txt can be structured in a left-oriented prefix-major fashion to form the name “/parc/home/ccn/test.txt.” Thus, the name “/parc/home/ccn” can be a “parent” or “prefix” of “/parc/home/ccn/test.txt.” Additional components can be used to distinguish between different versions of the content item, such as a collaborative document. The HSVLI can also include contiguous name components ordered from a most general level to a most specific level.


In some embodiments, the name can include an identifier, such as a hash value that is derived from the Content Object's data (e.g., a checksum value) and/or from elements of the Content Object's name. A description of a hash-based name is described in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/847,814, which is herein incorporated by reference. A name can also be a flat label. Hereinafter, “name” is used to refer to any name for a piece of data in a name-data network, such as a hierarchical name or name prefix, a flat name, a fixed-length name, an arbitrary-length name, or a label (e.g., a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) label).


Interest (or “interest”): A packet that indicates a request for a piece of data, and includes a name (or a name prefix) for the piece of data. A data consumer can disseminate a request or Interest across an information-centric network, which CCN/NDN routers can propagate toward a storage device (e.g., a cache server) or a data producer that can provide the requested data to satisfy the request or Interest.


The methods disclosed herein are not limited to CCN networks and are applicable to other architectures as well. A description of a CCN architecture is described in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/338,175, which is herein incorporated by reference.


Exemplary Network (Prior Art)



FIG. 1A illustrates an exemplary environment in the prior art for a proxy between a radio link and a wireline. A content-consuming computing device 102 (such as a mobile handset or other consumer) can communicate with a base station 104 over a link 130 based on a user equipment (UE) protocol 120. Base station 104 can communication with a performance enhancing proxy (PEP) 106 over a link 132 based on a radio protocol 122. Proxy 106 can communicate with a replica device 108 over a link 134 based on a wireline protocol 124. Replica device 108 can communicate with a content producing device 110 (such as a producer) over a link 136 based on wireline protocol 124. Proxy 106 can terminate radio protocol 122 and establish a second transport loop based on wireline protocol 124. In other words, proxy 106 can run two TCP loops 126, one on each side of proxy 106. This allows for an optimization of performance on each side of proxy 106, and further keeps the air interface full with a minimum of duplicate data due to TCP retransmission requests. However, proxy 106 cannot process or intercept an encrypted session. This leads to unencrypted traffic traveling over links 130, 132, 134, and 136, while encrypted traffic from replica device 108 bypasses proxy 106, traveling instead via a link 138. This results in TCP underutilizing the wireless link. Current schemes like HTTPS and TLS prevent a PEP like proxy 106 from doing much more than packet shaping to adjust data rates.


Exemplary Network and Communication; Exemplary Keys



FIG. 1B illustrates an exemplary environment which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 1B illustrates the same entities 102, 104, 108, and 110 as described above in relation to FIG. 1A. However, in place of proxy 106, FIG. 1B includes an ePEP 107, which operates in a CCN environment. The system depicted in FIG. 1B shares a set of keys (e.g., KA, KS, and KE) between consumer 102 and replica 108, and a subset of those keys (e.g., KS and KA) with ePEP 107. The system can run a radio adaptive link 140 on the air interface side between consumer 102 and ePEP 107, and can further run an end-to-end link 142 between ePEP 107 and replica 108 (or producer 110). This configuration allows a radio-aware transport protocol to execute on the radio side, and an Internet end-to-end transport protocol to operate on the wireline side. Furthermore, ePEP 107 can process all traffic, including both encrypted and unencrypted traffic (e.g., over links 150, 152, 154, and 156).



FIG. 1C illustrates an exemplary table 160 with a key distribution which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Table 160 includes entities 101, which correspond to consumer device 102, ePEP 107, replica 108, and producer 110 of FIG. 1B. Table 160 also includes keys 161, which include a public/private key pair 162 (e.g., a data certificate, or “DC”), an encryption key (KE) 164, an authentication key (KA) 166, and a signaling key (KS) 168. Consumer 102 and producer 110 can exchange a public/private key pair (such as DC), where producer 110 signs a manifest that represents a collection of data. Secure manifests in a CCN are described in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/231,515. Consumer 102 and replica 108 can establish an encryption key (KE), which is used to encrypt the underlying data. Consumer 102, replica 108, and ePEP 107 can establish a signaling key (KS), which is used to encrypt information in a signaling channel, and an authentication key (KA), which is used to verify or authenticate the underlying data in a packet. These keys can be established based on a key exchange protocol, as described below.


Logical Channels and Exemplary Formats for Packet Names


The keys KE, KA, and KS are used to secure and authenticate a logical data channel and a logical signaling (control) channel. FIG. 1D illustrates exemplary channels 180 created corresponding to the key distribution of FIG. 1C, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Channels 180 can include: an end-to-end channel 182 between consumer 102 and producer 110, which is protected based on DC; a data channel 184 between consumer 102 and replica 108, which is protected based on KE and KA; and signaling channels 186 between consumer 102 and ePEP 107, and between ePEP 107 and replica 108, which are protected based on KA and KS. The system uses two logical channels per encryption context (e.g., a set of keys). Each encryption context is identified by a Session ID (SID). With a SID, the system multiplexes flows within logical transactions. The transactions are similar to HTTP/2 frames. Each transaction has a signaling channel and a data channel. In other words, an interest or content object packet involved in a transaction can carry both signaling information (to be carried via the signaling channel, encrypted based on KS) and data (to be carried via the data channel, encrypted based on KE).


The system can encapsulate in an outer interest, an encrypted inner interest (which includes an inner interest name), where the inner interest is encrypted based on KE. The outer interest name can represent the encryption context. For example, one format for the outer interest name can be:

/replica-prefix/SID=sid/chunk=m  (1)


The name component “/replica=prefix” can be a routable name prefix of the replica; “SID=sid” can indicate the session identifier; and “chunk=m” can identify the specific chunk number. Format (1) corresponds to the SID-level control channel. With this naming context, a consumer, ePEP, or replica can exchange signaling information, e.g., to shut down an encryption context.


A second format for the outer interest name can be:

/replica-prefix/SID=sid/XID=xid/chunk=n  (2)


The name component “XID=xid” can identify a specific transaction, and “chunk=n” can identify the specific chunk number. Format (2) corresponds to the XID-level control channel. With this naming context, the participating entities can exchange signaling information and data relevant to a particular consumer transaction.


Encrypting and Authenticating Data


In general, a consumer or replica can: 1) encrypt underlying data using KE (“EKE{data”}); 2) encrypt signaling information using KS (e.g., “EKS{signaling}”); and 3) sign the concatenation of these two encrypted field using KA. Assume that the notation Ek{x} indicates to encrypt (and authenticate or decrypt) the element “x” under key “k,” and the notation Sk{x} means to only authenticate x under key k. For example, based on an AEAD scheme such as AES-GCM, the consumer can compute a hash over 1), 2), and additional data using KA, to produce an authentication token, which can be included in a packet. The additional data can be plaintext information associated with the encrypted data of 1) and 2) (e.g., associated data or “AD”). This can be written as:

SKA{AD∥EKA{Signaling}∥EKE{Data}}  (3)


An alternate method that drops the authentication key but co-signs the hash is:

EKS{Signaling,EDH∥EKE{Data}  (4)
EDH=Hash{EKE{Data}}  (5)


Thus, a consumer can generate and sign an interest packet using the above method (e.g., encrypting the data using KE, encrypting the signaling information using KS, and signing the encrypted information using KS). An ePEP can receive the packet and authenticate the packet by verifying that a computation of a comparison authentication token (e.g., performing equation (3)) matches the authentication token included in the received packet. The ePEP can also decrypt and process the signaling information based on KS, and subsequently forward the interest on to a replica. The replica can receive the packet and similarly authenticate the packet based on KA. The replica can also decrypt and process both the signaling information based on KS and the data based on KE. These communications are described below in relation to FIG. 2A.


Exemplary Communication with an ePEP, and Exemplary Packets



FIG. 2A illustrates an exemplary communication 200 which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Communication 200 can occur between consumer 102, ePEP 107, and replica 108. Assume that the consumer knows the identity of the proxy. This may occur via on-line discovery, such as in multi-context Transport Layer Security (mcTLS), or via configuration, such as when a mobile node associates with a base station. mcTLS is described in Naylor et al., “Multi-context TLS (mcTLS): Enabling Secure In-Network Functionality in TLS,” SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 45(4):199-212, August 2015. Packets from the consumer are addressed to the replica (e.g., an interest name can include a routable name prefix for the replica, as in Formats (1) and (2)), not to the proxy, so the operating network uses a method to put the proxy on-path. In addition, assume that the consumer knows the identity of the replica. This may occur via the application, a name resolution service, or user actions. For example, a Foo application may ask ccnx:/foo for a set of replicas and be given the replica name. In another example, a mobile node may be configured with the local cache replica of the mobile operator.


During operation, consumer 102 can generate an interest 210, which initializes state for a new transaction identifier XID of “1.” FIG. 2B illustrates exemplary interest packet 210 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Interest 210 includes a name 230 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=1/chunk=0,” an authentication token 232, encrypted signaling information 234, and an encrypted inner interest 236 with an inner interest name 238 of “/data/manifest” and a payload 240 of “<inner interest data>.” Returning to FIG. 2A, upon receiving interest 210, ePEP 107 can process the packet (function 212) by decrypting signaling information 234 based on the signaling key and authenticating the packet by verifying authentication token 232. For example, ePEP 107 can determine that there is no relevant signaling information in interest 210. ePEP 107 can also compute a comparison authentication token based on the authentication key KA, encrypted signaling information 234, encrypted inner interest 236, and data associated with the encrypted inner interest (e.g., as shown in Equation (3)). If the computed token does not match authentication token 232, ePEP 107 can generate an error message, as described below in relation to FIG. 3C. If it does match, ePEP 107 can successfully verify interest 210 and forward interest 210 to replica 108.


Replica 108 can similarly process the packet (function 214), by decrypting signaling information 234 and authenticating the packet by verifying authentication token 232. Replica 108 can further decrypt encrypted inner interest 236 based on the encryption key KE and obtain inner interest name 238 (and, if included, payload 240). Replica 108 can generate a responsive content object 216, which includes an encrypted inner content object corresponding to inner interest name 238. FIG. 2C illustrates exemplary content object packet 216 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Content object 216 includes a name 242 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=1/chunk=0,” an authentication token 244, encrypted signaling information 246, and an encrypted inner content object 248 with an inner content object name 250 of “/data/manifest” and a payload 252 of “<inner content object data>.” Returning to FIG. 2A, upon receiving content object 216, ePEP 107 can process the packet (function 218), similar to function 212, by decrypting signaling information 246 based on the signaling key and authenticating the packet by verifying authentication token 244. For example, ePEP 107 can determine that signaling information 246 indicates that the end chunk number is equal to “z,” and also authenticate the packet by verifying authentication token 244. ePEP 107 may also forward content object 216 to consumer 102. Consumer 102 may use the end chunk number to track the number of subsequently received content objects (e.g., 222.1-222.z, below).


ePEP 107 may now begin pipelining interests 220.1-220.z and receiving responsive content objects 222.1-222.z to retrieve the data represented by the manifest. FIG. 2D illustrates exemplary interest packet 220.1 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Interest 220.1 includes a name 254 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=1/chunk=1,” an authentication token 256, encrypted signaling information 258, and an encrypted inner interest 260 with an inner interest name 262 of “/data/manifest” and a payload 264 of “<inner interest data>.” Returning to FIG. 2A, upon generating interest 220.1, ePEP 107 can forward interest 220.1 to replica 108.


Replica 108 can process the packet (similar to function 214), and can further decrypt encrypted inner interest 260 based on the encryption key KE and obtain inner interest name 262 (and, if included, payload 264). Replica 108 can generate a responsive content object 222.1, which includes an encrypted inner content object corresponding to inner interest name 262. FIG. 2E illustrates exemplary content object packet 222.1 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2A, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Content object 222.1 includes a name 268 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=1/chunk=1,” an authentication token 270, encrypted signaling information 272, and an encrypted inner content object 274 with an inner content object name 276 of “/data/manifest” and a payload 278 of “<inner content object data>.” Returning to FIG. 2A, upon receiving content object 222.1 (and content objects 222.2-222.z), ePEP 107 can process the packet (similar to function 218) by decrypting signaling information 272 based on the signaling key and authenticating the packet by verifying authentication token 270. ePEP 107 can forward content object 222.1 to consumer 102.


Consumer 102 can subsequently receive content object 222.1 (and content objects 222.2-222.z) and reassemble the manifest based on the received content objects. Note that all entities that receive a packet will process the packet, although the process packet functions 212, 214, and 218 are only shown in relation to the first full data exchange. For example, a process packet function can also occur: by replica 108 upon receiving interest 220.1; by ePEP 107 upon receiving content object 222.1; and by consumer 102 upon receiving content object 222.1.


Thus, consumer 102 can generate a single interest 210 for the manifest, and ePEP 107 can retrieve and forward the data represented by the manifest on behalf of consumer 102, which reduces traffic over the air interface between the consumer and the proxy by limiting the number of transmitted (and, correspondingly, re-transmitted) interests. This results in a more efficient system and use of the encryption performance enhancing proxy, and further allows ePEP 107 to process both unencrypted and encrypted traffic.


Exemplary Communication: Consumer Requests Manifest and Data Separately



FIG. 2F illustrates an exemplary communication 280 which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, where the consumer requests the manifest and the manifest data separately, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. In communication 280, the first data exchange between consumer 102, ePEP 107, and replica 108 is the same (e.g., interest 210, functions 212 and 214, content object 216, and function 218). However, in communication 280, instead of ePEP 107 acting on behalf of consumer 102 to retrieve the manifest data (e.g., by pipelining interests 220.1-220.z), consumer 102 requests the manifest (all at once) separately from the data (e.g., the manifest branches). For example, upon receiving the manifest in content object 216, consumer 102 can generate an interest 217 for a manifest branch, with a name of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/xid=1/chunk=1” and an encrypted inner interest name of “/data/manifestbranch.” Replica 108 can return a responsive content object 219 with an inner content object that has data corresponding to the requested manifest branch. Consumer 102 can request the manifest branches as all in one streams, which still results in a substantial reduction of upstream traffic (i.e., by limiting the number of transmitted and re-transmitted interests sent over the air interface between consumer 102 and ePEP 107.


Exemplary Communication: Consumer Requests Transport Manifest in Signaling Channel, and Exemplary Packets



FIG. 2G illustrates exemplary communication 290 which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, where the consumer requests a transport manifest over the signaling channel, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. In communication 290, consumer 102 can request a transport manifest in the signaling channel, and ePEP 107 can begin retrieving the data based on the transport manifest. The data still remains in the data channel. The transport manifest is padded and encrypted with KE and authenticated with KA to prevent information leakage.


During operation, consumer 102 can generate an interest 211, which initializes state for a new transaction identifier XID of “2.” FIG. 2H illustrates exemplary interest packet 211 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Interest 211 includes a name 231 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=2/chunk=0,” an authentication token 233, encrypted signaling information 235 which includes an interest 291 with a name 292 of “klata/manifest/chunk=0,” and encrypted data 237. Returning to FIG. 2G, upon receiving interest 211, ePEP 107 can process the packet (function 212, as described above). For example, ePEP 107 can decrypt encrypted signaling information 235 to obtain name 292, and can successfully verify interest 211 and forward interest 211 to replica 108.


Replica 108 can process the packet (function 214, as described above), by decrypting signaling information 235 to obtain encrypted interest 291 and name 292, and authenticating the packet by verifying authentication token 233. Replica 108 can generate a responsive content object 217, which includes an encrypted inner content object corresponding to name 292. FIG. 21 illustrates exemplary content object packet 217 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Content object 217 includes a name 243 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=2/chunk=0,” an authentication token 245, encrypted signaling information 247, and encrypted data 249. Encrypted signaling information 237 can include an end chunk number with a value equal to “z,” and an encrypted inner content object 293 with an inner content object name 294 of “/data/manifest/chunk=0,” and a payload 295 of “<data>.”


Returning to FIG. 2G, upon receiving content object 217, ePEP 107 can process the packet (function 218, as described above) by decrypting signaling information 247 based on the signaling key and authenticating the packet by verifying authentication token 245. For example, ePEP 107 can determine that signaling information 246 indicates that the end chunk number is equal to “z.” ePEP 107 can further obtain content object 293, which includes the manifest. ePEP 107 may also forward content object 216 to consumer 102. Consumer 102 may use the end chunk number to track the number of subsequently received content objects (e.g., 223.1-223.z, below).


ePEP 107 may now begin pipelining interests 221.1-221.z and receiving responsive content objects 223.1-223.z to retrieve the data represented by the manifest. ePEP 107 can use the signaling channel to request the manifest leaves. The responsive content objects received from replica 108 may still be carried in the data channel, thereby maintaining the protection of the underlying data based on the encryption key KE, which is only known to consumer 102 and replica 108, and not known to ePEP 107. FIG. 2J illustrates exemplary interest packet 221.1 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Interest 221.1 includes a name 255 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=2/chunk=1,” an authentication token 257, encrypted signaling information 259, and encrypted data 261. Encrypted signaling information 259 can indicate a request 296 and a name 297 of “/manifestleaf.” Returning to FIG. 2G, upon generating interest 221.1, ePEP 107 can forward interest 221.1 to replica 108.


Replica 108 can process the packet (similar to function 214, as described above), and can decrypt encrypted signaling information 259 based on the signaling key KS and obtain inner interest name 297. Replica can also decrypt encrypted data 261 based on encryption key KE. Replica 108 can generate a responsive content object 223.1, which includes an encrypted inner content object corresponding to inner interest name 297. FIG. 2K illustrates exemplary content object packet 223.1 corresponding to the communication of FIG. 2G, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Content object 223.1 includes a name 269 of “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/XID=2/chunk=1,” an authentication token 271, encrypted signaling information 273, and an encrypted inner content object 275 with an inner content object name 277 of “/manifestleaf’ and a payload 279 of “<inner content object data>.” Encrypted signaling information 273 can indicate a response 298 and a name 299 of “/manifestleaf.” Returning to FIG. 2G, upon receiving content object 223.1 (and content objects 223.2-223.z), ePEP 107 can process the packet (similar to function 218) by decrypting signaling information 273 based on the signaling key KS and authenticating the packet by verifying authentication token 271. ePEP 107 can forward content object 222.1 to consumer 102.


Consumer 102 can subsequently receive content object 223.1 (and content objects 223.2-223.z) and reassemble the manifest based on the received content objects (i.e., the manifest leaves). Thus, consumer 102 can generate a single interest 211 for a transport manifest in the signaling channel, and ePEP 107 can retrieve and forward the data represented by the manifest on behalf of consumer 102, which reduces traffic over the air interface between the consumer and the proxy by limiting the number of transmitted (and, correspondingly, re-transmitted) interests. This results in a more efficient system and use of the ePEP, and further allows ePEP 107 to process both unencrypted and encrypted traffic.


In some embodiments, the consumer can drive all interest traffic with consumer-to-replica interests in the data channel, and the proxy can shape the interests within the XID to achieve the proper wireline downlink capacity to keep the radio link saturated. In this case, the only messages in the signaling channel are CLOSE messages.


Alert Messages


The system can send different types of alert messages, based on various conditions. The alert messages can include: REKEY, CLOSE, ERROR, and KEEPALIVE. An ERROR message implies a CLOSE. If a message or packet fails authentication, the consumer, ePEP, or replica may send a CLOSE message for the corresponding transaction identifier, which indicates a shutdown of the transaction associated with that XID. A CLOSE message may also be sent for a corresponding session identifier, which indicates a shutdown of the session associated with the SID. When the consumer is done reading from a transaction, the consumer sends a CLOSE message. The ePEP will forward the CLOSE message to the replica, and the replica responds with its own CLOSE message in the downstream signaling channel. If the consumer does not receive this downstream CLOSE message, the CLOSE message may time out, and the replica may re-send the CLOSE message or may shut down the XID. If the consumer receives a CLOSE response on a SID for a non-existent XID, the consumer can send an ERROR in the SID control channel to the replica, which will cause the replica to destroy the XID.


In addition, a replica may shutdown an XID at any time. For example, the replica may place a CLOSE or ERROR message in the response to any outer pending interest from the consumer. The replica does not put any data in the data channel. This may cause an imbalance between pending interests and returning content objects in the data channel. However, because the replica indicated a CLOSE or ERROR message, the replica will have flushed any remaining data, rending this issue irrelevant.


A consumer or a producer may request a REKEY at any time. The REKEY message can be carried in the first outer namespace (as shown in Format (1)): “/replica_prefix/SID=sid/Chunk=m.” A REKEY message causes all parties to negotiate new session keys (e.g., via a key exchange protocol such as the one described in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/927,034, also known as CCN×KE). A REKEY message results in a new SID. Any existing open XIDs carry over to the new SID. Once the new SID is in operation, the consumer and the producer terminate the old SID with CLOSE messages, but keep the XIDs open. Carrying over an XID allows the chunk number of the XID to remain intact.


The communication described for embodiments of the present invention is always initiated by the consumer to the replica, based on a routable prefix of the replica. The replica has no way on its own to obtain a name for the consumer or to send a packet directly to the consumer outside of the responsive content objects to the received interests from the consumer. Thus, the asymmetric nature of the protocol does not allow the replica to send a message to the consumer unless it is in response to an interest sent by and received from the consumer. Furthermore, because the channel is simplex, the consumer must give the replica a chance to send the consumer control messages on the channel. The consumer can thus send KEEPALIVE messages to the producer at a negotiated rate or interval (e.g., every 30 seconds). The producer can then respond with its own KEEPALIVE or a REKEY or a CLOSE message. This maintains the interest/content object flow balance in this control channel.


Methods for Key Exchange in Facilitating a Secure Encryption Proxy


When the consumer has prior knowledge of the proxy, the consumer can establish session keys (e.g., KE, KA, and KS) with the replica (e.g., via CCN×KE). The consumer can also establish a key control channel with the proxy (e.g., via CCN×KE) for the express purpose of providing KA and KS to the proxy.


When the consumer does not have prior knowledge of the proxy, the protocol can use a method similar to the one used in mcTLS for deriving the keys. The consumer and the replica can establish the session keys KE, KA, and KS (via CCN×KE) by exchanging messages in a series of rounds, as described in relation to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/927,034. The proxy may terminate a second round of communication from the consumer to the replica, where the second round interest includes the secret key share of the consumer. The proxy can add the proxy's own secret key share to the second round interest, and forward the modified interest on to the replica. The replica can verify both the key share of the consumer and the key share of the proxy, and return a second round content object that includes the replica's secret key share. Thus, the consumer receives both the key share of the replica and the proxy, which allows the consumer to immediately establish a session, thereby avoiding an additional round trip.


Assume that the consumer communicates with the replica or the producer through the proxy, and further assume that the consumer trusts the replica or producer (e.g., through server validation). For n>1 proxies, there are n different security contexts derived using mcTLS. Each context is set to the name of the entity or proxy and its KeyID with the appropriate string, e.g., “ka,” where three keys strings “ka,” “ke,” and “ks” are supported. An example of a context is shown below:

context=“proxyA”∥“0x1abc2901. . . ”∥“ka”  (6)


Each party can establish a pair-wise shared key via CCN×KE. For example, pair-wise keys are created for the consumer and the proxy, the proxy and the replica, and the consumer and the replica. After this step, the context keys KE, KA, and KS are created based on the per-context derivation technique described in mcTLS. Specifically, the consumer and the replica generate per-context keys using the following technique:

KiC=PRFSc-r(<context>∥randC)|  (7)


KiC is a context key derived at the consumer, Sc-r is the traffic secret derived between the consumer and the replica via CCN×KE, <context> is the context string defined above in Equation (6) (for the appropriate key), and randy is fresh randomness generated by the consumer and given to the replica or producer in the CCN×KE exchange. After these keys are created, the consumer and the replica share them with the middlebox(es) (e.g., the proxy or proxies) as needed by encrypting them with the appropriate pair-wise keys. For example, because the proxy needs to obtain both KS and KA, the keys KSC, KSR, KaC, and KaR are shared with the proxy. The final computation to derive KA and KS from these values is as follows:

Ka<−PRFKaC|KaR(<′ka′∥randC∥randR)|  (8)


The entire exchange requires two “protocol executions”: a first round of CCN×KE to establish shared keys between each party; and a second round to establish and share per-context (per-proxy transport keys) with each party and each allocated middlebox.


mcTLS Support


The ePEP design can be emulated with mcTLS on top of IP. Within a single mcTLS session with at least one proxy, define two contexts for a single transaction: one for signaling information and for data information. The consumer and replica should not share the reader or write keys for the data context with the proxy. The proxy should only receive the signaling context keys. Afterwards, the consumer and replica should use the data context to transport application data and the signaling context to share transport-related information with all parties, including the proxy. The use of these channels follows as described herein. If more than one transaction is needed in a session, then more than one pair of context channels (signaling and data) should be created and shared appropriately. There is no restriction on the amount of channels that can be created.


Intermediate Router (or ePEP) Facilitates a Secure Encryption Proxy



FIG. 3A presents a flow chart 300 illustrating a method by an intermediate router for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. During operation, the system obtains, by the intermediate router, an authentication key KA and a signaling key KS which are both associated with a session or a logical channel (operation 302). The intermediate router can be an ePEP which cannot obtain the encryption key KE. Exemplary key exchange protocols are described above. The system receives, from a content-consuming computing device, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key, an inner interest encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key (operation 304). The inner interest includes a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data. The system processes the first interest (operation 306). The system decrypts the signaling information based on the signaling key (operation 308). The system authenticates the first interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key (operation 310) (as described in relation to Equations (3), (4), and (5)). If the authentication token is not successfully verified (decision 312), the operation continues as described at Label B of FIG. 3C. If the authentication token is successfully verified (decision 312), in response to transmitting the first interest to a replica device, the system receives a first content object with signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates an end chunk number (operation 314), and the operation continues as described at Label A of FIG. 3B. The end chunk number can correspond to a number of chunks, where a numbered chunk can correspond to: a chunk created by a content producing device based on a division of a concatenation of the data represented by the manifest (e.g., by slicing up a .tar file); or data for a leaf or a content object indicated in the manifest.



FIG. 3B presents a flow chart 320 illustrating a method by an intermediate router for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. During operation, the system processes the first content object (operation 322). The system decrypts the signaling information based on the signaling key (operation 324). The system authenticates the first content object by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key (operation 326). If the authentication token is not successfully verified (decision 328), the operation continues as described at Label B of FIG. 3C. If the authentication token is successfully verified (decision 328), the system generates one or more interests for the data represented by the manifest, wherein a generated interest has a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest (operation 330). In response to transmitting the one or more generated interests to the replica device, the system receives one or more content objects, wherein a received content object has a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest (operation 332). For each received content object, the system processes the received content object (by decrypting the signaling information and verifying the authentication token) (operation 334).


If the authentication token is not successfully verified (decision 336), the operation continues as described at Label B of FIG. 3C. If the authentication token is successfully verified (decision 336), the operation returns.


Method for Handling an Error Message



FIG. 3C presents a flow chart 350 illustrating a method for handling an error in a system which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. During operation, a device (such as a content-consuming computing device, an ePEP, a replica device, or a content producing device) generates an alert message that is an error message which indicates an authentication failure or other error (operation 352). The system transmits the alert message (operation 354). For example: the ePEP can transmit the alert message to the content-consuming computing device and the replica device; the content-consuming computing device can transmit the alert message to the ePEP and the replica; or the replica device can transmit the alert message to the content-consuming computing device and the ePEP. Other types of alert messages are described above (e.g., CLOSE, ERROR, REKEY, and KEEPALIVE). The system shuts down the transaction associated with the transaction identifier indicated in the first name of the first interest (operation 356).


Content-Consuming Computing Device Facilitates a Secure Encryption Proxy



FIG. 4A presents a flow chart 400 illustrating a method by a content-consuming computing device for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. During operation, the system obtains, by the content-consuming computing device, an encryption key KE, an authentication key KA, and a signaling key KS, which are each associated with a session or a logical channel (operation 402). Exemplary key exchange protocols are described above. The system generates a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key, an inner interest encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key (operation 404). The inner interest can include a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data.


In response to transmitting the first interest, the system receives a first content object with signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates an end chunk number (operation 406). The system processes the first content object (operation 408). The system decrypts the signaling information based on the signaling key (operation 410). The system decrypts the data (e.g., the inner content object) based on the encryption key (operation 412). The system authenticates the first interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key (operation 414). If the authentication token is not successfully verified (decision 416), the operation continues as described at Label B of FIG. 3C. If the authentication token is successfully verified (decision 416), the operation continues as depicted as Label C of FIG. 4B. Note that operations 406-416 are depicted with dashed lines because they do not need to occur in order for the operations depicted at Label C to occur.



FIG. 4B presents a flow chart 420 illustrating a method by a content-consuming computing device for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. During operation, in response to transmitting the first interest, the system receives one or more content objects, wherein a received content object has a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest indicated in the inner interest name (operation 422). For each received content object, the system processes the received content object (by decrypting signaling information, decrypting the inner content object, and verifying the authentication token) (operation 424). The received content object includes an authentication token based on the authentication key. This allows the content-consuming computing device to perform authentication by verifying the authentication (not shown), and to send an error message as shown at Label B. In addition, the received content object can include encrypted signaling information and encrypted data (e.g., an inner content object). If the authentication token is not successfully verified (decision 426), the operation continues as described at Label B of FIG. 3C. If the authentication token is successfully verified (decision 426), the operation returns.


Replica Device Facilitates a Secure Encryption Proxy



FIG. 5A presents a flow chart 500 illustrating a method by a replica device for facilitating a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. During operation, the system obtains, by a replica device, an encryption key KE, an authentication key KA, and a signaling key KS, which are each associated with a session or a logical channel (operation 502). The system receives, from an intermediate router, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key, an inner interest encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key (operation 504).


The system processes the first interest (operation 506). The system decrypts the signaling information based on the signaling key (operation 508). The system decrypts the data (e.g., the inner interest) based on the encryption key (operation 510). The system authenticates the first interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key (operation 512). If the authentication token is not successfully verified (decision 514), the operation continues as described at Label B of FIG. 3C. If the authentication token is successfully verified (decision 514), the system generates a first content object with signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates an end chunk number (operation 516). In response to an interest with a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk, the system processes the interest and generates a responsive content object (operation 518). The responsive content object includes encrypted signaling information based on KS, encrypted data based on KE, and an authentication token based on KA.


Exemplary Computer System



FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary computer system which facilitates a secure encryption proxy in a content centric network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Computer system 602 includes a processor 604, a memory 606, and a storage device 608. Memory 606 can include a volatile memory (e.g., RAM) that serves as a managed memory, and can be used to store one or more memory pools. Furthermore, computer system 602 can be coupled to a display device 610, a keyboard 612, and a pointing device 614. Storage device 608 can store an operating system 616, a content-processing system 618, and data 632.


Content-processing system 618 can include instructions, which when executed by computer system 602, can cause computer system 602 to perform methods and/or processes described in this disclosure. Specifically, content-processing system 618 may include instructions for sending and/or receiving data packets to/from other network nodes across a computer network, such as a content centric network (communication module 620). A data packet can include an interest packet or a content object packet with a name which is an HSVLI that includes contiguous name components ordered from a most general level to a most specific level.


Furthermore, content-processing system 618 can include instructions for receiving, by an intermediate router from a content-consuming computing device, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on a signaling key, and an inner interest encrypted based on an encryption key, wherein the inner interest includes a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for generating one or more interests for the data represented by the manifest (packet-generating module 622). Content-processing system 618 can also include instructions for transmitting to the content-consuming computing device a content object received in response to a generated interest (communication module 620).


Content-processing system 618 can additionally include instructions for authenticating the first interest by verifying an authentication token based on the authentication key and associated data (packet-authenticating module 624). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for decrypting the signaling information included in the first interest based on the signaling key (decrypting module 626). Content-processing system 618 can also include instructions for, in response to transmitting the first interest to a replica device, receiving a first content object with signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates an end chunk number (communication module 620), wherein generating the one or more interests further involves generating a number of interests equal to the end chunk number (packet-generating module 622). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for, in response to transmitting a generated interest to a replica device, receiving a responsive content object with a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest (communication module 620).


Content-processing system 618 can further include instructions for, in response to receiving one or more interests from the content-consuming computing device, forwarding the received interests, wherein a received interest indicates a name for a branch of the manifest (communication module 620), and transmitting to the content-consuming computing device a content object received in response to a forwarded interest (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can also include instructions for receiving a second interest that includes the first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates the manifest name, data encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for authenticating the second interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key (packet-authenticating module 624). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for obtaining the signaling key and the authentication key based on a key exchange protocol (key-obtaining module 628). Content-processing system 618 can further include instructions for updating an interest received during a second round of communication in the key exchange protocol based on the content centric network by adding a key share of the intermediate router to the interest (key-obtaining module 628) and transmitting the updated interest to a replica device (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for receiving or generating an alert message (alert-processing module 630).


Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for generating, by a content-consuming computing device, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on a signaling key, and an inner interest encrypted based on an encryption key, wherein the inner interest includes a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data (packet-generating module 622). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for. in response to transmitting the first interest to an intermediate router, receiving one or more content objects (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can further include instructions for authenticating a received content object by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key and the associated data (packet-authenticating module 624). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for decrypting the signaling information included in the received content object based on the signaling key, and for decrypting encrypted data or the inner interest that is included in the received content object based on the encryption key (decrypting module 626). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for generating one or more interests, wherein a name for a generated interest indicates a name for a branch of the manifest (packet-generating module 622), and receiving a content object in response to a generated interest (communication module 620).


Content-processing system 618 can also include instructions for generating a second interest that includes the first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates the manifest name, data encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key (packet-generating module 620). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for, in response to transmitting the second interest to the intermediate router, receiving one or more transport content objects, wherein a received transport content object includes signaling information that indicates a request for a leaf of the manifest, and data corresponding to the requested manifest leaf (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for obtaining the encryption key, the signaling key, and the authentication key based on a key exchange protocol (key-obtaining module 628). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for receiving, by the content-consuming computing device, the responsive content object that includes the key share of the replica device and the key share of the intermediate router (communication module 620).


Content-processing system 618 can additionally include instructions for receiving, by a replica device, a first interest that includes a first name, signaling information encrypted based on a signaling key, an inner interest encrypted based on an encryption key, and an authentication token based on an authentication key, wherein the inner interest includes a name for a manifest that represents a collection of data (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for authenticating the first interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key (packet-authenticating module 624). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for generating a first content object that includes signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates an end chunk number that corresponds to a number of chunks comprising the data represented by the manifest (packet-generating module 622). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for, in response to receiving a subsequent interest with a name that corresponds to a numbered chunk of the data represented by the manifest, generating a subsequent content object with data that corresponds to the numbered chunk (packet-generating module 622).


Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for receiving a second interest that includes the first name, signaling information encrypted based on the signaling key and that indicates the manifest name, data encrypted based on the encryption key, and an authentication token based on the authentication key (communication module 620). Content-processing system 618 can include instructions for authenticating the second interest by verifying the authentication token based on the authentication key (packet-authenticating module 624).


Data 632 can include any data that is required as input or that is generated as output by the methods and/or processes described in this disclosure. Specifically, data 632 can store at least: an interest; an inner or encapsulated interest; a content object; an inner or encapsulated content object; a name; a name that is an HSVLI; signaling information; data; encrypted signaling information; encrypted data; an authentication key; a signaling key; an encryption key; a public private key pair or a data certificate; an authentication token; a manifest name; a manifest branch; a manifest leaf; a collection of data represented by the manifest; data associated with encrypted data and an interest; an end chunk number; a chunk number; a chunk; a key exchange protocol; a key exchange protocol based on a CCN; a key exchange protocol based on a dynamic proxy discovery; a key share; a routable name prefix; a session identifier; a transaction identifier; an alert message; a close message; an error message; a rekey message; and a keepalive message


The data structures and code described in this detailed description are typically stored on a computer-readable storage medium, which may be any device or medium that can store code and/or data for use by a computer system. The computer-readable storage medium includes, but is not limited to, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, magnetic and optical storage devices such as disk drives, magnetic tape, CDs (compact discs), DVDs (digital versatile discs or digital video discs), or other media capable of storing computer-readable media now known or later developed.


The methods and processes described in the detailed description section can be embodied as code and/or data, which can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium as described above. When a computer system reads and executes the code and/or data stored on the computer-readable storage medium, the computer system performs the methods and processes embodied as data structures and code and stored within the computer-readable storage medium.


Furthermore, the methods and processes described above can be included in hardware modules. For example, the hardware modules can include, but are not limited to, application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chips, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), and other programmable-logic devices now known or later developed. When the hardware modules are activated, the hardware modules perform the methods and processes included within the hardware modules.


The foregoing descriptions of embodiments of the present invention have been presented for purposes of illustration and description only. They are not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the present invention to the forms disclosed. Accordingly, many modifications and variations will be apparent to practitioners skilled in the art. Additionally, the above disclosure is not intended to limit the present invention. The scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims.

Claims
  • 1. A method comprising: obtaining, at a router between a content consuming device and a content storage device, a first interest corresponding to a first content object, the first interest comprising a first name identifying the content storage device, signaling information, an authentication token, and an inner interest identifying an actual content object stored at the content storage device, wherein the inner interest is encrypted with an encryption key shared between the content storage device and the content consuming device and not shared with the router;authenticating the first interest by verifying the authentication token using an authentication key shared with the content consuming device;providing the first interest to the content storage device;obtaining the first content object from the content storage device, wherein the first content object includes at least a portion of the actual content object encrypted with the encryption key; andproviding the first content object to the content consuming device.
  • 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the router communicates with the content consuming device over an air interface to obtain the first interest and provide the first content object, and wherein the router communicates with the content storage device over a wired link to provide the first interest and obtain the first content object.
  • 3. The method of claim 1, further comprising decrypting the signaling information based on a signaling key shared with the content consuming device.
  • 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: from the first content object, determining a number of remaining chunks in the actual content object identified by the inner interest;generating one or more subsequent interests equal to the number of remaining chunks in the actual content object, wherein each subsequent interest includes a name identifying a numbered chunk of the actual content object; andproviding the one or more subsequent interests to the content storage device.
  • 5. The method of claim 4, further comprising obtaining one or more subsequent content objects corresponding to the one or more subsequent interests, wherein each subsequent content object corresponds to the numbered chunk of the actual content object corresponding to one of the subsequent interests.
  • 6. The method of claim 1, further comprising obtaining the authentication key via a key exchange with the content consuming device.
  • 7. The method of claim 1, further comprising: obtaining the authentication key via a key exchange based on a dynamic proxy discovery;updating the first interest during the key exchange by adding a key share of the router to the first interest; andproviding the updated first interest to the content storage device,wherein the first content object includes the key share of the router and a key share of the content storage device.
  • 8. An apparatus comprising: at least one network interface configured to communicate with computing devices; anda hardware memory; anda processor configured to: obtain from a content consuming device, via the network interface, a first interest corresponding to a first content object, the first interest comprising a first name identifying a content storage device, signaling information, an authentication token, and an inner interest identifying an actual content object stored at the content storage device, wherein the inner interest is encrypted with an encryption key shared between the content storage device and the content consuming device and not shared with the apparatus;authenticate the first interest by verifying the authentication token using an authentication key shared with the content consuming device;cause the network interface to provide the first interest to the content storage device;obtain the first content object from the content storage device via the network interface, wherein the first content object includes at least a portion of the actual content object encrypted with the encryption key; andcause the network interface to provide the first content object to the content consuming device.
  • 9. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the network interface includes an air interface to communicate with the content consuming device to obtain the first interest and provide the first content object, and wherein the network interface includes a wired interface to communicate with the content storage device over a wired link to provide the first interest and obtain the first content object.
  • 10. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to decrypt the signaling information based on a signaling key shared with the content consuming device.
  • 11. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to: from the first content object, determine a number of remaining chunks in the actual content object identified by the inner interest;generate one or more subsequent interests equal to the number of remaining chunks in the actual content object, wherein each subsequent interest includes a name identifying a numbered chunk of the actual content object; andcause the network interface to provide the one or more subsequent interests to the content storage device.
  • 12. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein the processor is further configured to obtain one or more subsequent content objects corresponding to the one or more subsequent interests, wherein each subsequent content object corresponds to the numbered chunk of the actual content object corresponding to one of the subsequent interests.
  • 13. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to obtain the authentication key via a key exchange with the content consuming device.
  • 14. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to: obtain the authentication key via a key exchange based on a dynamic proxy discovery;update the first interest during the key exchange by adding a key share of the apparatus to the first interest; andcause the network interface to provide the updated first interest to the content storage device,wherein the first content object includes the key share of the apparatus and a key share of the content storage device.
  • 15. One or more non-transitory computer readable storage media encoded with instructions that, when executed by a processor in a router between a content consuming device and a content storage device, cause the processor to: obtain from the content consuming device a first interest corresponding to a first content object, the first interest comprising a first name identifying the content storage device, signaling information, an authentication token, and an inner interest identifying an actual content object stored at the content storage device, wherein the inner interest is encrypted with an encryption key shared between the content storage device and the content consuming device and not shared with the router;authenticate the first interest by verifying the authentication token using an authentication key shared with the content consuming device;provide the first interest to the content storage device;obtain the first content object from the content storage device, wherein the first content object includes at least a portion of the actual content object encrypted with the encryption key; andprovide the first content object to the content consuming device.
  • 16. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15, further comprising instructions that cause the processor to communicate with the content consuming device over an air interface to obtain the first interest and provide the first content object, and cause the processor to communicate with the content storage device over a wired link to provide the first interest and obtain the first content object.
  • 17. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15, further comprising instructions that cause the processor to decrypt the signaling information based on a signaling key shared with the content consuming device.
  • 18. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15, further comprising instructions that cause the processor to: from the first content object, determine a number of remaining chunks in the actual content object identified by the inner interest;generate one or more subsequent interests equal to the number of remaining chunks in the actual content object, wherein each subsequent interest includes a name identifying a numbered chunk of the actual content object;provide the one or more subsequent interests to the content storage device; andobtain one or more subsequent content objects corresponding to the one or more subsequent interests, wherein each subsequent content object corresponds to the numbered chunk of the actual content object corresponding to one of the subsequent interests.
  • 19. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15, further comprising instructions that cause the processor to obtain the authentication key via a key exchange with the content consuming device.
  • 20. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 15, further comprising instructions that cause the processor to: obtain the authentication key via a key exchange based on a dynamic proxy discovery;update the first interest during the key exchange by adding a key share of the router to the first interest; andprovide the updated first interest to the content storage device,wherein the first content object includes the key share of the router and a key share of the content storage device.
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/154,825, filed May 13, 2016, now U.S. Pat. No. 10,084,764, the entirety of which is incorporated herein by reference.

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Related Publications (1)
Number Date Country
20180337902 A1 Nov 2018 US
Continuations (1)
Number Date Country
Parent 15154825 May 2016 US
Child 16051897 US