The present disclosure relates to data communication, and more specifically, to secure communication at the physical layer.
Conventional methods of providing secure communication over a channel use cryptography. Cryptography relies on the existence of codes that are “hard to break”: that is, one-way functions that are believed to be computationally infeasible to invert. Cryptography has become increasingly more vulnerable to an increase in computing power and to the development of more efficient attacks. Furthermore, the assumptions about the hardness of certain one-way functions have not been proven mathematically, so cryptography is vulnerable if these assumptions are incorrect.
Another weakness of cryptography is the lack of no precise metrics or absolute comparisons between various cryptographic algorithms, showing the tradeoff between reliability and security as a function of the block length of plaintext and ciphertext messages. Instead, a particular cryptographic algorithm is considered “secure” if it survives a defined set of attacks, or “insecure” if it does not.
Cryptography as applied to some media (e.g., wireless networks) also requires a trusted third party as well as complex protocols and system architectures. Therefore, a need exists for these and other problems to be addressed.
Many aspects of the disclosure can be better understood with reference to the following drawings. The components in the drawings are not necessarily to scale, emphasis instead being placed upon clearly illustrating the principles of the present disclosure.
Disclosed herein are inventive techniques for securing user data against eavesdropping at the physical layer of a communication system. A transmitter provides security at the physical layer (referred to herein as “physical layer security”) by transforming user data in a manner that produces a bit error rate of about one-half at an eavesdropper receiving the secure bit stream. The transform used by a secure physical layer exploits characteristics of the communication channel in a manner that prevents unintended receivers (referred to herein as “eavesdroppers”) from obtaining partial or complete information about the transmitted user data. Security is guaranteed because a one-half bit error rate means a bit decoded by the eavesdropper is as likely to be incorrect as correct. A “friendly” or “intended” receiver recovers the transmitted user data by reversing the specific transformation process used in the transmitter. Notably, some embodiments of the secure physical layer disclosed herein are keyless, where conventional security mechanisms at a higher layer typically use keys.
The embodiments disclosed herein can be used with secure error correction codes, which are known to a person of ordinary skill in the art to provide physical layer security. One non-limiting example of a secure error correction code is a punctured error correction code. Another non-limiting example of a secure error correction code is a low density parity check (LDPC) codes. One class of LPDC codes is disclosed in “Secure Communication Using Error Correction Codes”, U.S. 20100275093, which is hereby incorporated herein by reference. Another non-limiting example of a secure error correction code is a non-systematic error correction code. One class of non-systematic error correcting codes is disclosed in “Secure Communication Using Non-Systematic Error Control Codes”, U.S. 20110246854, which is hereby incorporated herein by reference.
The embodiments disclosed herein can be also be used with any physical layer pre-processing that provides physical layer security. One example of a physical layer security pre-processor is an arrangement of rate-1 non-recursive convolutional encoders in series with permuters as disclosed in co-pending application “System for Providing Physical Layer Security”, U.S. Ser. No. 13/908,000, filed concurrently with this application.
System 100 accounts for another device 130 (an “eavesdropper”) which may listen to (eavesdrop on) transmissions on main channel 110, over an eavesdropper channel 140. Eavesdropper 130 is passive with respect to main channel 110, i.e., eavesdropper 130 does not jam main channel 110, insert bits on main channel 110, etc. In some embodiments, main channel 110 and eavesdropper channel 140 are wireless. In one of these embodiments, transmitter 120T and receiver 120R are implemented using radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. In other embodiments, main channel 110 and eavesdropper channel 140 are wired (wireline) channels.
Main channel 110 is subject to a noise input 150. As a result, communication from transmitter 120T to receiver 120R over main channel 110 is not error-free. The performance of main channel 110 can be described in terms of a bit error rate (BER) at receiver 120R, which can also be understood as a probability of error (pM) at receiver 120R. Considering a single bit, the probability of receiver 120R seeing a 1 when transmitter 120T actually sent a 0, or seeing a 0 when transmitter 120T actually sent a 1, is pMAIN. Conversely, the probability of receiver 120R seeing a 1 when transmitter 120T actually sent a 1, or seeing a 0 when transmitter 120T actually sent a 0, is 1-pMAIN.
A secure physical layer 160 residing in transmitter 120T conveys information across main channel 110, where it is recovered by a secure physical layer 160 residing in receiver 120R. Though not discussed in detail herein, communication device 120 may implement other layers above secure physical layer 160, for example a Media Access Control (MAC) layer, a network layer, a transport layer, a session layer, etc. Such layers are depicted in
As a physical layer, secure physical layer 160 uses techniques known to a person of skill in the art, such as bit mapping, modulation, line coding, etc., to process data into a format that is suitable for the physical characteristics of main channel 110, and to transmit the processed data on main channel 110. Secure physical layer 160 may also use techniques such as channel coding and/or error correction to convey information in a manner which takes into account noise input 150, thus reducing pMAIN as compared to performance without such techniques.
As noted earlier, eavesdropper 130 uses eavesdropper channel 140 to intercept communications between transmitter 120T and receiver 120R. Eavesdropper 130 then decodes intercepted data in an attempt to recover user data conveyed from transmitter 120T and receiver 120R. However, eavesdropper channel 140 is subject to a noise input 180 with characteristics different from noise input 150. The probability of error at eavesdropper 130 is referred to herein as pEVE. Security is achieved by secure physical layer 160 whenever pEVE is about one-half, since in this scenario it is just as likely that decoding a bit received by eavesdropper 130 produces an incorrect value as it is that the decode produces the correct value. As used herein, the term “about” can include traditional rounding according to significant figures of numerical values.
Secure physical layer 160 in transmitter 120T achieves the one-half value for pEVE by transforming user data to exploit characteristics that are specific to main channel 110. For example, a secure physical layer 160 may exploit one set of characteristics for a wired or wireline channel and another set for a wireless channel. As another example, a secure physical layer 160 may exploit one set of characteristics for a near-field wireless channel, another set for a short-range wireless channel such as WiFi, and yet another set for a long-range wireless channel such as WiMAX. Secure physical layer 160 in receiver 120R recovers the originally transmitted user data from the received transformed data by performing the inverse or complement of the particular transform used by transmitter 120T.
The embodiments of
In
In
Secure physical layer 160 can also be combined with cryptography to provide an additional level of security.
Various techniques for configuring physical layer security module 210 will now be described. The parameters utilized in physical layer security module 210 to exploit the physical channel characteristics are specified by configuration information. A particular instance of physical layer security module 210 can thus be constructed or initialized based on configuration data. The particular set of parameters specified in the configuration of a physical layer security module 210 varies according to the type of code or transform used. For example, the configuration data for embodiments which utilize an arrangement of rate-1 non-recursive convolutional encoders in series with permuters may specify the number of encoders and permuters, the input-to-output bit mapping used by each permuter, and the shift register depth, number of adders, and tap locations in each encoder. As another example, the configuration data for a secure error correcting encoder may specify a generator matrix. As yet another example, the configuration data for an LPDC encoder may specify a parity matrix. As another example, the configuration data for a convolutional encoder may specify a generator matrix or a transfer function.
In some embodiments, physical layer security configuration data takes the form of a bit vector. However, many other ways of specifying a configuration are contemplated, including (but not limited to) text, a markup language such as eXtensible Markup Language (XML), and serialized XML.
Transmitter 120T then transmits (arrow 430) the transmitter security configuration to receiver 120R in a secure manner. Mechanisms for securely providing the transmitter security configuration to receiver 120R will be discussed in further detail below. After receiving this information about the configuration of physical layer security module 210 in transmitter 120T, receiver 120R uses this information at block 420R to dynamically generate a receiver security configuration that is the inverse or complement of the transmitter security configuration. At block 440, receiver 120R configures physical layer security module 210R with the receiver security configuration. Once provided with this inverse configuration, physical layer security module 210R is able to recover any data secured by physical layer security module 210T.
Asynchronously, at block 440T, transmitter 120T configures physical layer security module 210T with the transmitter security configuration and waits for acknowledgement from receiver 120R before transmitting user data to receiver 120R. At some later point in time, receiver 120R sends an indication (arrow 450), acknowledging that physical layer security module 210R has been configured (at block 440T). Now that both sides of the channel have been configured, transmission can begin.
To this end, at block 460, transmitter 120T processes user data with physical layer security module 210T, and sends (arrow 470) the resulting secured data to receiver 120R. At block 480, receiver 120R processes the received secured data with physical layer security module 210R, thus recovering the user data sent from transmitter 120T.
At block 510, transmitter 120T generates a transaction identifier. The transaction identifier is pseudo-random, and may be unique to a data session. Transmitter 120T then transmits (arrow 520) the transaction identifier to receiver 120R in a secure manner. Mechanisms for securely providing the transmitter security configuration to receiver 120R will be discussed in further detail below.
After receiving the dynamically generated transaction identifier, receiver 120R uses this identifier, at block 530R, to dynamically generate a receiver security configuration that is the inverse or complement of the transmitter security configuration. This inverse configuration allows physical layer security module 210T to recover the data transformed by physical layer security module 210R.
Asynchronously, at block 530T, transmitter 120T dynamically generates a transmitter security configuration from the transaction identifier. Generating the transmitter security configuration was discussed above in connection with
Transmitter 120T waits for acknowledgement from receiver 120R before transmitting user data to receiver 120R. At some later point in time, receiver 120R sends an indication (arrow 550), acknowledging that physical layer security module 210T has been configured (at block 540T). Now that both sides of the channel have been configured, transmission can begin. To this end, at block 560, transmitter 120T processes user data with physical layer security module 210T, and sends (arrow 570) the resulting secured data to receiver 120R. At block 580, receiver 120R processes the received secured data with physical layer security module 210R, thus recovering the user data sent from transmitter 120T.
The configuration method discussed above in connection with
At block 610T, transmitter 120T retrieves from storage a predefined (static) initial configuration for the physical layer security module 210T, while at block 610R, receiver 120R retrieves from storage a corresponding predefined initial configuration for the physical layer security module 210R. At block 620T, transmitter 120T configures physical layer security module 210T with this initial configuration, while at block 620R, receiver 120R configures physical layer security module 210R with a corresponding (inverse) initial configuration.
Once physical layer security module 210 and physical layer security module 210 have been constructed in accordance with their corresponding initial configurations, transmitter 120T and receiver 120R can exchange data in a manner that is protected from eavesdropper 130. To this end, at block 630T, transmitter 120T processes the dynamic transmitter security configuration using the statically configured (at block 620T) physical layer security module 210T, and transmits (arrow 640) the secured configuration information to receiver 120R. This transmission may use lower power as comparing to transmitting user data.
At block 630R, receiver 120R processes the received data with the statically configured (at block 620T) physical layer security module 210R, thus recovering the transmitter security configuration that was dynamically generated by transmitter 120T (at block 420T of
Having discussed in detail two methods of configuring secure physical layer 160 using secure transmission of configuration information, a third method will now be discussed that relies on user action, rather than a secure transmission channel, to convey configuration information.
The process then continues in a manner analogous to that discussed earlier in connection with
At some later point in time, receiver 120R sends an indication (arrow 760), acknowledging that physical layer security module 210R has been configured. Now that both sides of the channel have been configured, transmission can begin. To this end, at block 770, transmitter 120T processes user data with physical layer security module 210T, and sends (arrow 780) the resulting transformed data to receiver 120R. At block 790, receiver 120R processes the received transformed data with physical layer security module 210R, thus recovering the user data sent from transmitter 120T.
Examples of non-volatile storage include, for example, a hard disk, flash RAM, flash ROM, EPROM, etc. Memory 830 contains physical layer security instructions 860 that program or enable processor 810 to implement the functions of physical layer security module 210. Memory 830 also contains configuration instructions 870 that program or enable processor 810 to construct or initialize physical layer security module 210, using dynamic configuration information 880 or static configuration information 890. Omitted from
Some embodiments of physical layer security module 210 and/or physical layer security module 210 are stored on a computer-readable medium, which in the context of this disclosure refers to any structure which can contain, store, or embody instructions executable by a processor. The computer readable medium can be, for example but not limited to, based on electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor technology. Specific examples of a computer-readable medium using electronic technology would include (but are not limited to) the following: a random access memory (RAM); a read-only memory (ROM); and an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory). A specific example using magnetic technology includes (but is not limited to) a disk drive; and a portable computer diskette. Specific examples using optical technology include (but are not limited to) a compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM) or a digital video disk read-only memory (DVD-ROM).
Other embodiments of physical layer security module 210 and/or physical layer security module 210 (not illustrated) are implemented in hardware logic, as security transformer logic and inverse security transformer logic. Technologies used to implement security transformer logic and inverse security transformer logic in specialized hardware may include, but are not limited to, a programmable logic device (PLD), a programmable gate array (PGA), field programmable gate array (FPGA), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a system on chip (SoC), and a system on packet (SoP). In yet another embodiment of communication device 120 (not illustrated), physical layer security module 210 and/or physical layer security module 210 are implemented by a combination of software (i.e., instructions executed on a processor) and hardware logic.
Any process descriptions or blocks in flowcharts would be understood as representing modules, segments, or portions of code which include one or more executable instructions for implementing specific functions or steps in the process. As would be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art of the software development, alternate implementations are also included within the scope of the disclosure. In these alternate implementations, functions may be executed out of order from that shown or discussed, including substantially concurrently or in reverse order, depending on the functionality involved.
The foregoing description has been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the disclosure to the precise forms disclosed. Obvious modifications or variations are possible in light of the above teachings. The implementations discussed, however, were chosen and described to illustrate the principles of the disclosure and its practical application to thereby enable one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the disclosure in various implementations and with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated. All such modifications and variation are within the scope of the disclosure as determined by the appended claims when interpreted in accordance with the breadth to which they are fairly and legally entitled.
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/654,341, filed Jun. 1, 2012, and of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/654,345, filed Jun. 1, 2012, each of which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.
Number | Date | Country | |
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61654341 | Jun 2012 | US | |
61654345 | Jun 2012 | US |