Patent Application
20100296496
The present invention relates generally to wireless networking. More particularly, the present invention relates to systems and methods for concurrent wireless local area network (WLAN) access and sensing, such as, for example combining functionality of wireless access points (APs) and wireless intrusion prevention/detection in a single device.
Wireless technology is growing in popularity. Businesses are not only migrating to wireless networking, they are steadily integrating wireless technology and associated components into their wired infrastructure. The demand for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) is fueled by the growth of mobile computing devices, such as laptops and personal digital assistants and a desire by users for continual connections to the network without having to “plug in.” WLAN networks are defined by various IEEE specifications, such as IEEE 802.11 protocols. Because WLAN networks are open through radio frequency (RF) transmission, there is a recognized need for wireless security and for an associated system to provide security, such as a Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIPS), a Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS), and the like.
Traditionally, dedicated wireless security systems (e.g., WIPS, WIDS, etc.) have been overlaid on top of a WLAN infrastructure to provide security monitoring, policy enforcement, and remote troubleshooting capabilities. By overlaid, the wireless security system is separate from the WLAN infrastructure. A dedicated wireless security system typically includes distributed wireless sensors that scan channels passively and report their events and statistics to a central server. The server analyzes information from the sensors and generates alarms in response to attacks, events, and policy violations. The server also provides a centralized mechanism to administer and configure the remote sensors as well as provide a central repository for historical wireless data.
The advantage of an overlaid wireless security system that it provides superior visibility across the RF band as well as enhanced security due to the fact that it is scanning for and responding to threats on a 24×7 basis. Further, decoupling the WIPS from the WLAN infrastructure allows for a WLAN vendor agnostic monitoring solution. Relying on infrastructure Access Points (AP) for wireless sensor data typically results in reduced visibility on channels that the AP is not operating on. Security performance degrades as the load on the AP is increased. However, the disadvantage of the overlaid model is a higher cost associated with deploying and managing two separate systems—the WLAN infrastructure and an overlaid security system. It would be advantageous to combine wireless security functionality with WLAN infrastructure while avoiding the performance issues and limitations with the integrated solution.
In various exemplary embodiments, the present invention relates to systems and methods for concurrent wireless local area network (WLAN) access and sensing, such as, for example combining functionality of wireless access points (APs) and wireless intrusion prevention/detection in a single device. The present invention combines WLAN infrastructure and wireless security without sacrificing the 24×7 dedicated security and performance monitoring available from the overlaid systems while reducing the deployment cost by sharing common hardware platforms for APs and sensors. The present invention includes a common radio platform equipped with more than one WLAN radio and a unified management system.
The present invention is illustrated and described herein with reference to the various drawings, in which like reference numbers denote like method steps and/or system components, respectively, and in which:
In various exemplary embodiments, the present invention relates to systems and methods for concurrent wireless local area network (WLAN) access and sensing, such as, for example combining functionality of wireless access points (APs) and wireless intrusion prevention/detection in a single device. The present invention combines WLAN infrastructure and wireless security without sacrificing the 24×7 dedicated security and performance monitoring available from the overlaid systems while reducing the deployment cost by sharing common hardware platforms for APs and sensors. The present invention includes a common radio platform equipped with more than one WLAN radio and a unified management system.
Referring to
Wireless networks 140a, 140b operate over the airspace which is an uncontrolled and shared medium lacking the equivalent physical control and accessibility of its wired counterpart. As such, wireless hackers 145a, 145b can enter the local network 100 through the access points 130a, 130b even if the access points 130a, 130b are located behind the firewall 122. Therefore, wireless networks 140a, 140b (in conjunction with access points 130a, 130b) can provide opportunities for unauthorized users to attack the network 100, which can include in various examples: a local area network, a wide area network, a metropolitan area network, a corporate intranet, among many others. Also, a wireless AP 130c can be installed unbeknownst to an enterprise (e.g., rogue AP) or it can be installed and misconfigured (e.g. misconfigured AP without proper security settings). As such, the AP 130c can also provide opportunities for unauthorized users to access the network 100. Due to the low cost of APs 130c, anyone with access to an enterprise can install a rogue AP 130c and connect it to the Ethernet 108 network providing complete wireless access to the enterprise. A misconfigured AP 130c can have the wrong encryption settings allowing any user to gain access to the enterprise.
Also, municipal wireless networks 150 are proliferating such as local governments providing free or reduced cost IEEE 802.11 access. These networks 150 can be used by the wireless hacker 145a to gain access to a device on the enterprise's wireless network 140a which is set to allow inbound connections effectively bypassing the enterprise firewall and content filtering. Additionally, mobile users 160 face threats from evil twin APs 130e which gain access to the user's 160 login credentials by posing as a legitimate AP 130d. Such a threat can allow the evil twin AP 130e to relay the credentials to a hacker for access to the enterprise's wireless network 140a, 140b. In addition to IEEE 802.11 access, other wireless protocols 170 such as Bluetooth, WiMax, and cellular data are emerging and proliferating. Bluetooth is deployed within the enterprise with PDA, cellular phones, and the like. WiMax is a wireless standard for the delivery of last mile wireless broadband access as an alternative to cable and DSL.
The network 100 can be configured with wireless sensors 180a, 180b and a server 190 for monitoring, detecting, and preventing wireless intrusions on the wireless networks 140a, 140b. The sensors 180a, 180b can connect to the Ethernet 108 network or over the wireless networks 140a, 140b for wireless backhaul, and each sensor 180a, 180b is located to monitor, detect, and prevent intrusions over a pre-defined area for wireless activity. The sensors 180a, 180b are configured to monitor data transmitted on the wireless networks 140a, 140b and to communicate relevant data, events, and statistics to the server 190. The sensors 180a, 180b can be configured to monitor one or more wireless channels such as IEEE 802.11 standard channels and non-standard user-defined channels. The sensors 180a, 180b can monitor more than one channel simultaneously if the sensors 180a, 180b are configured with multiple wireless radios. The sensors 180a, 180b can include a local processor to perform data analysis on wireless events to minimize communications to the server 190.
The server 190 connects to the Ethernet 108 or optionally through the network 120 (not shown) and the server 190 is configured to receive and correlate data, events, and statistics from the sensors 180a, 180b. Further, multiple servers 190 can operate to provide redundancy and load-balancing. Additionally in some examples, access points 130 and/or local clients 106 can occasionally operate as sensors 180a, 180b to communicate data, events, and statistics to the server 190. Also, local clients 106 equipped with WLAN cards can be configured with software agents, allowing the local clients 106 to periodically monitor the wireless networks 140a, 140b and to communicate data, events, and statistics from monitoring the wireless networks 140a, 140b to the server 190.
The server 190 can be configured to detect attacks and events, network performance degradation, network policy compliance on the wireless networks 140a, 140b, and the like. Further, the server 190 can be configured to direct the sensors 180a, 180b to terminate a rogue wireless client (e.g. an unauthorized user) such as wireless hackers 145a, 145b through various mechanisms, such as 1) transmitting a signal via a wireless transmitter to jam communications targeted at the potentially compromised AP 130; 2) transmitting a signal via the wireless transmitter to corrupt communications targeted at the potentially compromised AP 130 by introducing CRC errors; 3) transmitting a signal via the wireless transmitter to increase difficulty associated with breaking of encryption associated with the wireless networks 140a, 140b and the potentially compromised AP 130, wherein the signal includes packets emulating legitimate traffic but with randomized payloads; or 4) transmitting a channel change request communication via the wireless transmitter to the potentially compromised AP 130. Also, the server 190 can include a data store to log history and trends relating to monitoring of the wireless network 140a, 140b. The combination of the server 190 and sensors 180a, 180b is known as a wireless intrusion prevention system (WIPS) or a wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS).
Referring to
The wireless security system 200 can include WLAN clients 208 that are generally wireless devices configured with a software agent that enables the wireless device to passively monitor the wireless network periodically, such as when the wireless device is idle. For example, the WLAN clients 208 can include computers with WLAN cards or the like. Here, the computer can provide monitoring while idle and forward the monitored data to the server 202. Typically, wireless devices significantly outnumber the quantity of sensors 204 and APs 210 by several orders of magnitude. Advantageously, the sheer quantity of the WLAN clients 208 can provide significant monitoring coverage of the wireless network without requiring additional hardware since the WLAN client 208 is a software agent that can be installed on an enterprise's computers.
The wireless network includes the APs 208 to allow wireless communication devices to connect to a wireless network using Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11), Bluetooth or related standards. The APs 208 can connect to the network 204 through a wired or a wireless connection. Typically, the APs 208 include one or more radios operating on one or more wireless channels to provide wireless access. Existing APs 208 can provide dual access and sensing functionality on a periodic basis, such as monitoring off channels with an extra radio or monitoring while not providing access to the wireless network. However, the sensing functionality of the APs 208 is not 24×7 and also suffers desensitization from the access radio. Also, typical APs 208 include band locked radios.
In various exemplary embodiments, the present invention provides a combined AP/sensor 212 device to provide both access and monitoring of the wireless network. This AP/sensor 212 includes multiple radios configured to provide both access and sensing functionality with corresponding connections to the server 202 and to the network 204. The AP/sensor 212 provides all the benefits of WLAN infrastructure, without sacrificing the 24×7 dedicated security monitoring and performance troubleshooting available from an overlaid security system, while reducing the deployment cost and management complexity, by sharing a common hardware platform for the WLAN Access Point (AP) and sensor and leveraging an integrated management system.
The server 202 includes a core 220 and a data store 222. The core 220 generally includes a processing element and interfaces to the network 204. The core 220 is configured to receive data from the sensors 206, the WLAN clients 208, the APs 210, and the AP/Sensors 212, to analyze the data, and to store the data in the data store 222. In an exemplary embodiment, the core 220 can apply multiple intrusion detection tests to received data to detect possible intrusions or violations as described in
The server 202 can be accessed through a user interface 230 locally or remotely through a remote browser interface 240. Specifically, the server 202 can include a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to display network topology, alarms and warnings, network performance, and the like. The GUI can also be utilized to configure the server 202 and the sensors 206, the WLAN clients 208, the APs 210, and the AP/Sensors 212. In the present invention, the UI 230 and interface 240 can provide a single point of control for both WLAN infrastructure management and wireless security management.
Referring to
Initially, configuration information is received in step 305, typically including network default data and risk criteria. This information can be retrieved from a file (e.g., from the data store 222, derived or obtained from monitoring the network and/or entered interactively at the outset of the IDS process 300. The system reads or receives frames from the wireless network in step 310. The received frames are interrogated as follows. The information within the frame is interrogated to determine if a known attack signature has been identified in step 325. Signatures encode datalink layer attack patters as combinations of packet sequences and state. For example, active probing emits a pattern or sequence of network requests. This sequence can be recognized by its packet sequence signature. If the attack signature is identified, the intrusion detection system signals an alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step 345.
If no attack signature is identified, the frame information is passed through a protocol violation engine to determine if the protocol used in the frame is authorized in step 330. Protocol analysis examines whether or not protocol usage is legitimate. For example, emitting a large number of association or disassociation requests in a short interval is not a legitimate use of the protocol. Other protocol violations are also contemplated. The protocol violations can be defined by a network administrator, determined by the IDS based upon historical statistics for the given network, and the like. If the protocol used in the frame is outside of the authorized protocol set, the intrusion detection system signals an alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step 345.
If the protocol test passes, in step 335, the IDS checks the frame data for statistical anomalies against the data store 222, or a statistics database maintained therein. Anomaly based detection computes such values as the mean, non-zero mean, standard deviation, autocorrelation and peak for each time slice throughout the day. This can be used to create a normalized statistics database for each time slice and user. Current activity is then monitored and compared with the recorded statistics vector. If the difference is larger than a configurable threshold, an alert is generated. Instead of, or in addition to, this approach, a Bayes test can be applied to deduce the probability that the current statistics vector is an attack as opposed to a legitimate sequence. If an anomaly exists, the intrusion detection system signals an alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step 345.
If no anomaly is detected, the system interrogates the frame to determine if a pre-defined policy has been violated in step 340. Policy testing compares the observed activity with a configurable set of activity rules stored in the data store 222. For example, a rule can declare that only specific hosts with specific addresses and specific network cards can access the network. Another rule can declare that wireless activity is only allowed at specific times. Alternatively, another rule can require a specific encryption setting or the like. Generally, the policy rules can include any configurable setting or use associated with the wireless network. If a pre-defined policy has been violated, the intrusion detection system signals an alarm manager to deliver an alert to the administrator in step 345.
The tests outlined above and depicted in
Referring to
In step 430, a wireless packet frame is received from each input device (e.g., the wireless sensors 206, WLAN clients 208, APs 210, and combined APs/sensors 212). Frames are read so that the frame content can be interrogated. Each read frame is interrogated by a multi-dimensional intrusion detection system (IDS) such as detailed above with respect to
In step 440, in the case where only a statistical anomaly is detected, it is flagged as a lower level performance alert. In the case where, in addition to the statistical anomaly, one of the other violations has been detected, the alarm is elevated to an intrusion alarm and an alarm manger is alerted in step 444. Other embodiments do not rely on aggregate test outcome but determine alarm status on single test outcomes. Further, some embodiments can use other test types and outcome combinations to determine type and severity of alarms generated.
If an alarm is not detected in step 440, a test to see if a predetermined interval for gathering statistics has been reached occurs in step 460. If the end of the pre-configured statistics gathering interval has occurred, the data store 222 is updated in step 470 to reflect the statistics gathered from the received frames over the interval. Statistics are gathered by monitoring traffic between network nodes, minute-by-minute statistics about BSS frame types and traffic volumes, summaries of transmission statistics for all stations associated with access points, current-minute transmission statistics for all Stations, and detailed minute-by-minute transmission statistics for any individual station in the wireless computer network.
Data fusion occurs on a batch basis by aggregating data from multiple databases. This process begins at step 414. The process integrates statistical data from multiple databases that is generated through frame monitoring and intrusion detection engines. This approach provides a methodology for managing data received from input devices such as the wireless sensors 206, WLAN clients 208, APs 210, and combined APs/sensors 212 deployed at multiple sites and for aggregating enterprise data at a single central system such as the server 202. The Attack and Station Profile database is read at step 418 to begin a processing loop to integrate databases from separate sources. Correlation and pattern recognition is performed at step 420 to update the attack and station profiles in step 424. The processing loop then sleeps at step 428 until the next processing loop interval is to take place based on the pre-configured time interval or trigger.
After the alarm manager is signaled in step 444, the attack and station profile database is read in step 448; in this step, existing attacks are queried and existing station security state is queried. In step 450, this data is compared to the newly generated alarm. If it is sufficiently similar, no new external notification occurs in step 454. If it is not, a new notification message is generated in step 454 and console display and/or external messaging of the alarm occurs in step 458.
Referring to
A wireless packet frame is then read from the wireless network, step 520. Frames are read so that the frame content can be interrogated in down-stream processes. This is also the entry point 515 in the process for retrieving the next frame after interrogation of the present frame. The packet frame read off the wireless network is interrogated to determine if the frame is of a redundant type such as management or control frames, step 525. If the frame is of a redundant type, processing continues at entry point 530 in
If the frame is not of a redundant type, processing continues at step 535 where the header data is stripped from the wireless packet frame. The header data is used to get origin/destination data as well as for maintaining state. In step 540, a data structure is populated with pertinent information concerning wireless station state and protocol activity as well as origin and destination information for later down-line processing by a backend analysis server, by a peer or a local processor. Once data is accumulated and preprocessed by the remote sensor, the resulting data structures are passed back to the central server or a peer over IP or locally processed for intrusion detection analysis (step 550). The process continues at entry point 515 with the retrieval of the next frame.
The embodiment of a combination hardware sensor and access point, one 802.11 radio operates as a normal 802.11 access point operating in infrastructure mode that allows wireless stations to associate and pass data through to the wired network. The additional 802.11 radio operates in promiscuous mode just as a stand-alone hardware sensor operates. This gives the device the ability to send and receive data as a normal 802.11 access point while utilizing the additional radio to monitor the airwaves against intrusions and monitor the wireless network for performance and health monitoring.
Referring to
The overlaid wireless security system can include a WIDS and/or WIPS system with distributed sensors 610 deployed in proximity of the distributed access points 602. The sensors 610 communicate with a WIPS/WIDS server 612 using the network 604 similar to the APs 602 communicating with wireless switches, controllers and the WLAN management system 608. Note that there is no requirement for common hardware between the AP 602 and the sensor 610 in this overlaid architecture. As long as the sensors 610 and APs 602 are IEEE 802.11 standards-based, the system is interoperable. The sensors 610 are configured to monitor, detect, and prevent a rogue wireless device 614 from accessing the wireless network.
Referring to
The present invention includes a single management platform 702 configured to provide the functionality of the WLAN management system 608 and the WIPS/WIDS server 612. The AP/sensor devices 700 are configured and controlled by the single management platform 702. The single management platform 702 (illustrated in detail in
Based on data and security sensing requirements, a subset of the AP/sensor units can enable sensing function on their radios. Accordingly, the AP and sensor portions of the AP/sensor devices 700 cooperate to improve performance. Specifically, the AP/sensor devices 700 include a cooperation algorithm that enables combined access and sensing functionality in collocated radios thereby avoiding performance issues associated with collocated radio units. In one exemplary aspect of the cooperation algorithm, each AP/sensor device 700 can be configured with an allocation of AP functionality and sensing functionality that is either fixed, on-demand, or adaptive. For example, more of the AP/sensor devices 700 can be dedicated to the access function during periods of high usage or load and more AP/sensor devices 700 can be dedicated to security when the data usage or load is low (e.g., off hours) when security monitoring is more important.
In another exemplary aspect of the cooperation algorithm, radios in the AP/sensor device 700 associated with the sensor and AP functions are coordinated to minimize the impact of mutual radio desensitization when one radio is transmitting and the other is receiving a frame on a channel that is in close frequency proximity. APs typically transmit much more frequently than sensors. When the AP is transmitting on a given channel, the sensor radio can be desensitized by the high powered transit signal emanating in close proximity to the sensors radio. The desensitization progressively reduces as the frequency separation between the two radios is increased. By adaptively adjusting the frequency scanning pattern to avoid AP channel proximity, while the AP is transmitting, the sensor can minimize the loss of frame reception. Similarly, when the sensor is transmitting (e.g., during a wireless termination), the AP may attempt to synchronize its transmissions at the same time as the sensor to avoid transmit-receive desensitization.
Referring to
The AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 include two or more wireless radios 810 configured as access points or sensors. For example, the antennas on the wireless radios 810 are configured to receive and transmit wireless signals according to a predetermined protocol such as a variant of IEEE 802.11. The radios 810 can be configured as APs or as sensors. When configured as APs, the wireless radios 810 operate to transmit and receive wireless traffic as a wireless AP, and other wireless devices can connect to the wireless radios 810 and communicate through either an Ethernet 812 or wireless 814 backhaul connection to the wired network 806 or to a wireless network 808. Note, the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 can utilize either type of backhaul connection 812, 814. When configured as a sensor, the wireless radios 810 monitor the wireless network only acting as a sensor device. The wireless radios 810 can be operated as APs in promiscuous mode in order to be undetectable from the airwaves and still read all IEEE 802.11 network traffic.
The AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 also include a processor 816 coupled to memory 818, the wireless radios 810, and the backhaul connection 812, 814. The processor 816 supports management, security collection, and security analysis functionality associated with the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804. The processor 816 can be any custom made or commercially available processor, a central processing unit (CPU), an auxiliary processor among several processors, a semiconductor-based microprocessor (in the form of a microchip or chip set), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or generally any device for executing software instructions. When the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 are in operation, the processor 816 is configured to execute software stored within the memory 818, to communicate data to and from the memory 818, and to generally control operations of the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 pursuant to the software instructions. The processor 816 is configured to perform functionality related to both access and sensing.
The memory 818 is used to store data, such as configuration data, monitored data from the wireless radios 810, and the like. The memory 818 can include any of volatile memory elements (e.g., random access memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, etc.)), nonvolatile memory elements (e.g., ROM, hard drive, tape, CDROM, etc.), and combinations thereof. Moreover, the memory 818 can incorporate electronic, magnetic, optical, and/or other types of storage media. Note that the memory 818 can have a distributed architecture, where various components are situated remotely from one another, but can be accessed by the processor 816.
The backhaul connections 812, 814 are used to enable the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 to communicate on a network, such as the wired network 806 or the wireless network 808. The backhaul connections 812, 814 can include, for example, an Ethernet card (e.g., 10BaseT, Fast Ethernet, Gigabit Ethernet) or a wireless local area network (WLAN) card (e.g., 802.11a/b/g/n or proprietary wireless protocol based mesh network) or a cellular data network (e.g., 3G or EvDO) access card. The backhaul connections 812, 814 can include address, control, and/or data connections to enable appropriate communications on the network. The backhaul connections 812, 814 are configured to perform functionality related to both access and sensing, i.e. communication to/from clients accessing the AP radios and communication to/from the management server for sensing. For the wireless backhaul connection 814, the AP/sensor devices 802 can be part of a wireless mesh network. Wireless backhaul connectivity can be provided through a separate radio, i.e. the wireless backhaul connection 812, which can leverage 802.11, 802.16, or other longer range wireless access protocols (e.g., cellular or point to point wireless links). In some instances, the AP radio itself may be multiplexed for wireless backhaul.
Additionally, the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 include a connection to a power source such as an alternating current (AC) interface, direct current (DC) interface, power over Ethernet (PoE) compatible interface, or a repository for one or more disposable and/or rechargeable batteries. The various components in the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 are housed in a single mechanical enclosure sharing the same power connection and backhaul connections 812, 814.
The AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 include software and/or firmware for operating as both an AP and a sensor. The sensor software embedded on the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 is configured to read IEEE 802.11 frames from the wireless network and interrogate them to strip the management and control frames from the data frames, collect the data, store it in the memory 818, process the data frames, and communicate with a management server. The processor 816 can be configured to perform data processing on collected data prior to sending it to the management server to minimize network communications by performing distributed data analysis. The AP software embedded on the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 is configured to operate the wireless radios 810 to provide access to wireless clients.
The AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 also include software embedded on the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804 for operating the cooperation algorithm between the AP and sensor wireless radios 810. This cooperation algorithm provides intelligent scanning between the wireless radios minimizing interference and the like. For example, the wireless radios 810 are not locked to any band, i.e. each can individually and concurrently operate on any channel in the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz frequency band. The cooperation algorithm enables combined access and sensing functionality in the collocated wireless radios 810 by monitoring channel usage, adjusting transmission power, sensor radio frequency scanning patterns and the like based on the operating characteristics and scanning requirements of each of the wireless radios 810.
The AP/sensor device 804 of
When in operation as a sensor, the wireless radios 810 can perform a variety of functions in addition to monitoring transmitted frames. For example, the sensor can request an in-service AP to send wireless termination packets to a rogue device that is operating on the same channel as the AP. This allows the sensor to continue scanning across frequencies to search for other threats and issues. Alternatively, the sensor can request that the AP block the wired network access of a suspicious device connected to the AP. Further, the sensor can transmit the wireless termination packets itself.
Additionally, the sensor can provide remote testing capability of remote APs. For example, remote testing of APs is described in commonly assigned U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/410,967 filed Mar. 25, 2009 and entitled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR REMOTE TESTING OF WIRELESS LAN ACCESS POINTS,” the contents of which are incorporated by reference herein. Specifically, the remote testing can include a distributed network of WLAN sensors that typically operate to monitor the WLAN, and as needed, the WLAN sensors are converted to WLAN clients capable to connecting and remotely testing one or more WLAN APs. For example, the testing can include layer two and layer three related connectivity tests.
Referring to
The switch 1102 includes a sensor module 1108, a wireless access module 1110, a management interface 1112, and a wired or wireless backhaul interface 1114. Collectively, these components 1108, 1110, 1112, 1114 provide similar functionality as described herein with respect to the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804. The Ethernet interface 1106 includes multiple Ethernet ports, i.e. at least enough ports to support all of the plurality of thin AP/sensors 1100. These ports can include 10BaseT, Fast Ethernet, Gigabit Ethernet, and the like. The Ethernet interface 1106 is connected to the sensor module 1108 and the wireless access module 1110 to provide frames from the plurality of thin AP/sensor devices to these modules 1108, 1110 for processing of the frames. The wireless access module 1110 is configured to process frames for the Ethernet interface 1106 and to communicate the frames with the management interface 1112 and the backhaul 1114. This processing by the wireless access module 1110 relates to the access point functionality.
The sensor module 1108 is configured to process frames for the Ethernet interface 1106 and to communicate processed data with the management interface 1112 and the backhaul 1114. This processing by the sensor module 1108 relates to the WIDS/WIPS functionality. The management interface 1112 provides overall control of the wireless switch 1102 and communication to/from the sensor module 1108 and the wireless access module 1110. The management interface 1112 further communicates with the wired or wireless backhaul 1114. The backhaul 1114 provides similar functionality as the backhaul connections 812, 814.
In this model of thin AP/sensor devices 1100, the AP and sensor software is resident on the wireless switch 1102. The sensor module 1108 gets a “feed” from the wireless access module 1110, i.e. the feed includes a stream of data of some or all of the data from the Ethernet interface 1106 to the wireless access module 1110. For example, the wireless access module 1110 can provide a copy of every frame it receives to the sensor module 1108. Alternatively, the two modules 1108, 1110 can have an interface to exchange frame summary information and statistics. Here, the wireless access module 1110 can perform some processing on the frames to determine relevancy related to WIDS/WIPS, and if so, transmit them to the sensor module 1108. The sensor module 1108 interacts with the wireless access module 1110 to initiate sensor wireless transmission (e.g. during wireless termination through various mechanisms known in the art). The sensor module 1108 also communicates to the management server via the management interface 1112 and the wired or wireless connection backhaul 1114 to the rest of the network. The sensor module 1108 can request an in-service AP to send wireless termination packets to a rogue device that is operating on the same channel as the AP.
Referring to
The processor 1210 is a hardware device for executing software instructions. The processor 1210 can be any custom made or commercially available processor, a central processing unit (CPU), an auxiliary processor among several processors associated with the server 1200, a semiconductor-based microprocessor (in the form of a microchip or chip set), or generally any device for executing software instructions. When the server 1200 is in operation, the processor 1210 is configured to execute software stored within the memory 1250, to communicate data to and from the memory 1250, and to generally control operations of the server 1200 pursuant to the software instructions.
The I/O interfaces 1220 can be used to receive user input from and/or for providing system output to one or more devices or components. User input can be provided via, for example, a keyboard and/or a mouse. System output can be provided via a display device and a printer (not shown). I/O interfaces 1220 can include, for example, a serial port, a parallel port, a small computer system interface (SCSI), an infrared (IR) interface, a radio frequency (RF) interface, and/or a universal serial bus (USB) interface. The network interfaces 1230 can be used to enable the server 1200 to communicate on a network. The network interfaces 1230 can include, for example, an Ethernet card (e.g., 10BaseT, Fast Ethernet, Gigabit Ethernet) or a wireless local area network (WLAN) card (e.g., 802.11a/b/g). The network interfaces 1230 can include address, control, and/or data connections to enable appropriate communications on the network. The network interfaces 1230 are utilized to communicate with the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804, the switch 1102, and the like.
The data store 1240 can be used to store alarms, events, data, state, and statistics that the server 1200 receives or analyzes from AP/sensor devices monitoring or managing a wireless network. The data store can include any of volatile memory elements (e.g., random access memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, etc.)), nonvolatile memory elements (e.g., ROM, hard drive, tape, CDROM, etc.), and combinations thereof. Moreover, the data store can incorporate electronic, magnetic, optical, and/or other types of storage media. In one example, the data store 1240 can be located internal to the server 1200 such as, for example, an internal hard drive connected to the local interface 1260 in the server 1200. Additionally in another embodiment, a data store 1270 can be located external to the server 1200 such as, for example, an external hard drive connected to the I/O interfaces 1220 (e.g., SCSI or USB connection). Finally in a third embodiment, a data store 1280 may be connected to the server 1200 through a network, such as, for example, a network attached file server or the like.
The memory 1250 can include any of volatile memory elements (e.g., random access memory (RAM, such as DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, etc.)), nonvolatile memory elements (e.g., ROM, hard drive, tape, CDROM, etc.), and combinations thereof. Moreover, the memory 1250 can incorporate electronic, magnetic, optical, and/or other types of storage media. Note that the memory 1250 can have a distributed architecture, where various components are situated remotely from one another, but can be accessed by the processor 1210.
The software in memory 1250 can include one or more software programs, each of which includes an ordered listing of executable instructions for implementing logical functions. In the example of
The WLAN management component 1202 is configured to provide WLAN management of a plurality of APs, thin APs, sensors, AP/sensor devices, thin AP/sensor devices, and the like forming the WLAN infrastructure. Such management can include WLAN infrastructure configuration, wireless planning, visual network views, comprehensive reporting, alarming, performance monitoring, and the like. Additionally, the WLAN management component 1202 can enable setting of various configured properties or policies for the APs. The following table provides a summary of various AP properties displayable or configurable through the WLAN management component 1202.
The WLAN management component 1202 can display a station maintenance screen or menu WLAN management component 1202. An exemplary embodiment of such a screen or menu, automatically detects all stations within the footprint of the access point's Basic Service Set (BSS) and enters their MAC addresses in an Observed column. Such stations can be indicated as an authorized member of the BSS by selecting them in the Observed column and designating them as Valid. Designated stations are moved to a Valid column. (Stations can, in some embodiments, be designated as invalid by selecting and marking them in the Valid column.) Stations not auto-detected can be manually entered by specifying its MAC address in a Enter New Station input field and triggering an Add Station feature.
The WIPS/WIDS component 1204 is configured to provide wireless intrusion detection and/or prevention support. These functions can include gathering data related to wireless frame transmissions on the network, correlating the data, utilizing the correlated data to detect intrusion based on one or more intrusion detection tests (e.g., signature-based testing, protocol-based testing, anomaly-based testing, and policy deviation-based testing), preventing intrusions through one or more prevention mechanisms, and the like. These one or more prevention mechanisms can include: 1) transmitting a signal via the wireless transmitter to jam communications targeted at the potentially compromised access point; 2) transmitting a signal via the wireless transmitter to corrupt communications targeted at the potentially compromised access point by introducing CRC errors; 3) transmitting a signal via the wireless transmitter to increase difficulty associated with breaking of encryption associated with the wireless computer network and the potentially compromised access point, wherein the signal includes packets emulating legitimate traffic but with randomized payloads; 4) transmitting a channel change request communication via the wireless transmitter to the potentially compromised access point; or 5) blocking wired side access by suppressing a switch port or setting up an Access control List (ACL) for a rogue wireless device.
An additional aspect of the WIPS/WIDS component 1204 can include gathering and monitoring various statistics related to operation of the wireless network. These statistics can be utilized in the WIPS/WIDS process to detect anomalous behavior or rogue devices. For example, the WIPS/WIDS component 1204 can enable various thresholds associated with these statistics. These thresholds can be predetermined or user-settable through the server 1200. Exemplary thresholds associated with APs can include:
Exemplary thresholds associated with individual wireless clients or stations can include:
The foregoing thresholds are shown for illustration purposes. Those of ordinary skill in the art will recognize additional thresholds could be included based on any of the parameters that are monitored by the WIPS/WIDS component 1204. Advantageously, these thresholds enable the WIPS/WIDS component 1204 to detect not only rogue devices, but also authorized devices displaying anomalous behavior.
The WIPS/WIDS component 1204 performs vulnerability assessment by analyzing WLAN traffic, discovering access points and wireless clients. The WIPS/WIDS component 1204 determines how many bytes of data stations are sending and receiving, the mean signal strength for an entire day or the hi/low signal strength for each minute. It can distinguish between network traffic internal to the wireless network and traffic originating from or destined to the physical, wired-network and which stations are the largest senders and receivers of data. The WIPS/WIDS component 1204 produces broad summaries of data that report high, low, and mean values for a variety of traffic parameters, and detailed views that show minute-by-minute snapshots of your traffic. Traffic parameters include the breakdown of frame traffic (control, management, data, and error frames) and network routing information. The WIPS/WIDS component 1204 determines if any traffic has not been encrypted, users are authenticated, and all hardware is properly configured. The WIPS/WIDS component 1204 detects rogue deployments by identifying and locating unauthorized WLANs and ad hoc networks (peer-to-peer networks) that violate policy and jeopardize security. The WIPS/WIDS component 1204 identifies suspicious WLAN traffic across unauthorized channels and frequencies, which can be a common sign of intruders accessing your WLAN or employees abusing their network privileges.
In another exemplary embodiment, the management server 1200 in conjunction with the AP/sensor devices 800, 802, 804, the switch 1102, and the like can be utilized to provide enhanced visibility of the WLAN infrastructure. For example, the accuracy of physical location tracking of wireless devices that rely on signal strength triangulation or fingerprinting can be improved by aggregating data from AP and sensor wireless radios 1110. This location tracking mechanism can use the sensor-based monitoring infrastructure in the wireless radios 1110 along with the AP WLAN infrastructure in the wireless radios 1110 to derive estimates of position based upon received signal characteristics. In pre-configured mode, a static list of device identifiers representing one or more objects to be tracked can be maintained within the system data store 1240. In adaptive mode, the list of devices can be dynamically developed from an empty list or from a pre-configured static list. In some embodiments including an adaptive mode, a pre-configured static list can be provided that cannot be altered in adaptive mode; while in others, the objects in a pre-configured static list can be removed and/or modified just as objects dynamically added to the list of objects to be tracked.
Referring to
A decision as to whether the particular condition to trigger a background scan has occurred is made at step 1320. In step 1325, the background scan occurs. A determination is then made in step 1330 as to whether an unauthorized device has been detected during the background scan. If not, processing continues at step 1315 with a primary network scan. If a device was detected, the scan pattern for the primary network is adapted in step 1335. This modified scan pattern is then used for scanning the wireless channels in step 1340. As above, background scans can occur after each such modified scan, or as depicted, can occur according to a trigger condition. In step 1345, a determination if fewer unauthorized devices were identified in the modified scan. If so, a determination is then made as to whether any unauthorized devices are still being detected in step 1365. If no unauthorized devices are still being detected, the scan pattern is reset to the predetermined original scan pattern at step 1370 and processing continues with a primary scan at step 1315. If some unauthorized devices are still being detected, the scan pattern is modified accordingly in step 1335 and processing continues with step 1140.
If fewer devices were not found in step 1345, a determination is made as to whether a background scan should occur in step 1350. If not, processing continues with a further modified scan at step 1340. If so, at step 1355, the background scan occurs. A determination is made in step 1360 as to whether a previously unidentified unauthorized device has been detected. If so, the scan pattern is modified accordingly in step 1335 and processing continues with step 1340. If not, the processing continues with step 1340. Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that the described process is exemplary and that the steps described need not occur in the exact order described but can proceed logically in other apparent orderings. For instance, the background scan determination loop in the modified scan portion of the flow could as readily occur before the fewer device determination step as after. Additional order alterations should be apparent and are contemplated within the scope of the present invention. Further, enhanced embodiments can utilize multi-channel receivers in which adaptive scanning can occur uniquely per receiver. This allows, for example, multiple channels or multiple frequency bands to be scanned and monitored in parallel.
In some embodiments, the scanning of air waves for network activity can be adaptive in nature. In a typical configuration, wireless network channels are scanned for activity according to a predefined pattern. According to an adaptive approach, the predefined pattern can serve as an initial and/or baseline pattern. This pattern can then be adapted based upon actual activity in the scanned channels. This mechanism allows the system to deterministically scan all wireless channels through time-based multiplexing while also allowing the system to adaptively adjust the time spent on a given channel based on current and past activity. A typical scenario would be to monitor a fixed set of channels and periodically perform a background scan of the remaining channels. If any activity is observed on a channel expected to be idle or unauthorized activity is discovered, the system adapts by adding this channel to its primary scanning pattern. If activity then diminishes, this channel will be removed from the primary scanning pattern and then scanned next during the background scanning mode. The system can utilize either pre-configured thresholds or user-entered thresholds to determine the trigger point at which to start or stop dynamic monitoring of the channel. Additionally, automated controls can be included that will lock onto the channel if a security violation has been detected per the underlying multi-dimensional analysis engine.
Referring to
The scanning pattern is adapted based on the other collocated radios as illustrated in step 1440. This adaptation ensures that sensor and AP functions are coordinated to minimize the impact of mutual radio desensitization when one radio is transmitting and the other is receiving a frame on a channel that is in close frequency proximity. APs typically transmit much more frequently than sensors. When the AP is transmitting on a given channel, the sensor radio can be desensitized by the high powered transit signal emanating in close proximity to the sensors radio. The desensitization progressively reduces as the frequency separation between the two radios is increased. By adaptively adjusting the frequency scanning pattern to avoid AP channel proximity, while the AP is transmitting, the sensor can minimize the loss of frame reception. Similarly, when the sensor is transmitting (e.g., during a wireless termination), the AP may attempt to synchronize its transmissions at the same time as the sensor to avoid transmit-receive desensitization. Alternatively, this adaptation can include changing the predetermined scanning pattern responsive to emerging risks and recent channel usage. The various radio types can be adjusted as needed as shown in step 1450. For example, more radios can be used as access points during high bandwidth periods and changed to sensors during low bandwidth periods. If the radios are changed, then a new designation is provided as shown in step 1420. If not, the radios continue to operate as shown in step 1460.
Although the present invention has been illustrated and described herein with reference to preferred embodiments and specific examples thereof, it will be readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that other embodiments and examples may perform similar functions and/or achieve like results. All such equivalent embodiments and examples are within the spirit and scope of the present invention and are intended to be covered by the following claims.
