Software theft has been, and continues to be, pervasive. Individuals and companies typically try various techniques to combat software theft, including requiring a unique software key to install software, requiring online activation of software, requiring an active online connection to use software, encryption of software, and the like. Although these techniques typically prevent casual users from installing unauthorized copies, the techniques can typically be overcome by sophisticated users.
Another way to combat software theft is to try to identify the source of the stolen software using watermarks. This involves applying unique watermarks to each copy of the software so that when a stolen piece of software is found, the watermark in the stolen software will corresponding to one of the unique watermarks in the authorized software. This requires modification of the computer code, which is undesirable. Further, this technique can be overcome by removing the watermark from the stolen software or removing the watermark from the authorized software so that all further copies do not contain the unique watermark.
In addition to the issues identified above with the known techniques for combating software theft, these techniques focus on the software as a whole, and thus cannot identify when only portions of the underlying code are stolen. For example, if a watermark is applied to the software, the watermark would not appear in the stolen software if less than the entire code were used. Similarly, if software theft were identified by comparing hash values generated from the authorized and stolen software, the hash values would not match when less than the entire underlying code is present in the stolen software. Thus, a thief could simply modify some portion of the code to defeat these techniques. Further, it is often the case that only a portion of the underlying code is truly unique and provides the overall value to the software, and accordingly a thief may only want to use this unique portion in different software.
Exemplary embodiments of the present invention are directed to techniques for combating software theft by identifying whether at least a portion of one piece of software appears in another piece of software. Thus, the present invention allows the identification of whether portions of one piece of software appear in a different piece of software, even when the overall operation of the two pieces of software is different. The inventive technique is particularly useful because it operates using compiled computer binaries, and thus does not require access to the underlying source code.
In accordance with exemplary embodiments of the present invention, fingerprints are generated using compiled computer binaries and the fingerprints are compared to determine whether there are sufficient similarities so as to indicate theft of at least a portion of one of the compiled computer binaries in the other compiled computer binary.
The fingerprints are generated by disassembling the compiled computer binaries and generating a control flow graph and function call graphs for each function in the control flow graph. Each function is then processed to identify unique spectra. These unique spectra are used to identify similarities between the different compiled computer binaries.
Returning to
Turning now to the path on the right-hand side of
Processor 205 then calculates count block size, in-degree, and out-degree along the Markov chain (step 350). These three spectra are relatively unique among and within compiled computer binaries. An example of the count block size, in-degree, and out-degree will now be described in connection with
After the processing of the two parallel paths is complete, processor 205 determines whether there are any further functions to process (step 355). If there are (“Yes” path out of decision step 355), then the next function is selected (step 360) and the parallel processing is repeated. If not (“No” path out of decision step 355), then processor 205 generates the fingerprint of the binary using the calculated information (step 365).
Next, processor 205 computes distances between each pair of possible functions of the two fingerprints using the function coordinates 620 of the respective fingerprints (step 720). Processor 205 then sorts the distances sorted (step 720) and discards function pairs having distances greater than a threshold distance (step 725). This step reduces the processing load because only the most-likely related functions will have distances below the threshold. Thus, the particular threshold value can be selected depending upon the available processing power of the computer and the desired run-time of the fingerprint comparison process. Furthermore, those skilled in the art will recognize that above a certain distance it is highly unlikely that functions will be related, and thus at least some thresholding should be performed to reduce unnecessary processing.
Processor 205 then generates a list using the remaining function pairs (step 730), and one of the function pairs from the reduced list is selected for further processing of the unique spectra 630 (step 735). Specifically, processor 205 calculates a cross-correlation for the block-size spectra (step 740), the in-degree spectra (step 745), and the out-degree spectra (step 750). It will be recognized that the cross-correlation is a measure of how closely the spectra of the two fingerprints are related. Next processor 205 determines whether any function pairs remain to be processed (step 755). If so (“Yes path out of decision step 755), then the next function pair is selected from the reduced list (step 735) and the cross-correlation of the unique spectra are calculated (steps 740-750). The cross-correlation can produce a correlation coefficient indicating the degree of similarity or correlation. For example, a coefficient of −1 indicates complete anti-correlation and 1 indicates complete correlation (i.e., the two fingerprints have the same control flow graph).
If there are no remaining function pairs to process (“No” path out of decision step 755), then processor 205 calculates a block-size, in-degree and out-degree spectra ratios (step 760-770). These ratios are calculated by dividing a total number of respective correlation coefficients above a threshold by a total number of correlation coefficients. The threshold used for the calculation of the three ratios can be the same or different. Processor 205 then selects the maximum ratio of the unique spectra ratios (step 775) and generates a comparison score based on the selected maximum ratio (step 780). The generated comparison score is then used by processor 205 to identify infringement of one of the compiled computer binaries (step 785). The comparison score is generated by comparing the selected maximum ratio of the unique spectra ratios to a threshold, and accordingly infringement is identified when the selected maximum ratio is above the threshold. The threshold can be set, for example, by training the system using known data and a particular compiled computer binary for which it is to be determined whether there are other compiled computer binaries infringing the particular compiled computer binary. This training identifies commonalities between the known data and the particular compiled computer binary so that the threshold can be set to avoid false positives indicating infringement due to code commonly used across different pieces of software that would not be an indicator of infringement.
When, based on the generated comparison score, there is sufficient similarity between the compiled computer binaries or portions of the compiled computer binaries, processor 205 can notify the owner of one of the compiled computer binaries of the potential infringement via output 220 (step 790). The notification can include details of the regions of the allegedly infringing computer binary that is most likely involved in the infringement.
The collection of compiled computer binaries, fingerprint generation, and fingerprint matching can be automated and scheduled to execute using any type of task scheduling technique. Thus, the present invention provides a particularly cost- and time-effective way to discover, remediate, and enforce intellectual property rights, and accordingly acts as a deterrence against the theft of software code. Further, by identifying infringement based on the functions contained within compiled computer binaries, the present invention can identify an entirely copied compiled computer binary, as well as copied portions of a compiled computer binary.
Although exemplary embodiments have been described above as generating fingerprints using compiled computer binaries, the present invention is equally applicable to computer source code, byte code, and the like.
The foregoing disclosure has been set forth merely to illustrate the invention and is not intended to be limiting. Since modifications of the disclosed embodiments incorporating the spirit and substance of the invention may occur to persons skilled in the art, the invention should be construed to include everything within the scope of the appended claims and equivalents thereof.
This application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. §120 to application Ser. No. 14/314,407, filed Jun. 25, 2014, and under 35 U.S.C. §119 to Provisional Application No. 61/973,125, filed Mar. 31, 2014, the entire disclosures of which are herein expressly incorporated by reference.
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Parent | 14314407 | Jun 2014 | US |
Child | 14621554 | US |