1. Field of the Inventions
The field of the invention relates generally to electronic transactions, and more particularly to authentication of such transactions using a token configured to work in conjunction with a standard input device.
2. Background Information
Internet based financial transactions, referred to generally as “E-Commerce”, are currently experiencing very rapid growth, due primarily to its convenience compared with telephonic or point-of-purchase transactions. In response to growing abuse, E-Commerce has developed various Web-specific methods in attempts to ensure security and prevent fraud. One aspect of E-Commerce that remains particularly vulnerable is in regard to identity verification. Identification in point-of-purchase transactions is inferred by physical possession of the payment card, and may also include a second-factor, i.e., some more direct type of identification, such as a picture ID in face-to-face transactions. Obviously, these identification measures are not possible with telephone and E-Commerce based transactions where all that is typically needed to carry out a transaction is the information anyone could have obtained by a quick visual inspection of a person's payment card. The fact that E-Commerce purchases can be carried out without an individual actually having a payment card physically in their possession, coupled with the inability to verify user identity creates a significant opportunity for fraud. Some E-Commerce merchants now require supplemental identification, usually a billing address, Personal Identification Number (PIN), or a similar item of card holder identification not found on the credit card per se. While this provides some added degree of verification, it falls far short of ensuring physical possession of the credit card by the purchaser.
The increasing use of payment cards by consumers, particularly in the E-Commerce environment, has stimulated intense interest in the development of cards with enhanced functionality and security. A key feature of these enhanced cards is their significantly increased data storage capacity compared with the standard magnetic stripe, which has less than one kilobyte of storage capacity. Most of these so-called “smartcards” rely on a silicon memory chip embedded in the card that provides several kilobytes of data storage and which may even include an onboard microprocessor. Smartcards may use one or more memory types, including ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM, or RAM. Each of these memory types enables certain functionalities and security features.
Payment cards with enhanced data storage capability in the form of optical storage, or other storage mechanisms, are also known. Such cards have the potential to provide, in addition to enhanced functionality, the ability for physical card verification in the form of a hardware key or token. A significant drawback to the general acceptance of all these cards for E-Commerce, however, is the requirement for a specialized single-purpose piece of hardware or “reader” that allows the user to interface the card with a mini-computer. Thus, there currently exists no convenient and portable means for direct physical payment card verification in the E-Commerce environment. For this reason, such cards, i.e., smartcards, have found minimal acceptance in the U.S. The result is a much higher rate of fraud in E-Commerce compared with direct face-to-face transactions, which inflicts a financial hardship on merchants and has a chilling effect on the acceptance of E-Commerce by consumers.
A specially configured payment card that functions as both a standard payment, e.g., bank credit, debit, or ATM card for use in point-of-purchase transactions and an optical storage device that can be read by any common CD or DVD drive for use in secure online E-Commerce transactions.
In one aspect, the card has the standard footprint dimensions, e.g., 3⅜″×2⅛,″ of common payment type cards, and includes a magnetic data stripe that is readable using common magnetic stripe readers. As such, it has the point-of-purchase functionality and convenience of a standard payment card. The payment card can additionally be configured with digital optical storage media and physical alignment features that make the optical data readable by a CD or DVD drive.
These and other features, aspects, and embodiments of the invention are described below in the section entitled “Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments.”
Features, aspects, and embodiments of the inventions are described in conjunction with the attached drawings, in which:
To help better understand the systems and methods described herein, some specific examples involving electronic commerce over the Internet, i.e., online transactions, are examined below. It should be remembered, however, that the examples provided are not intended to limit the systems and methods described to electronic commerce or Internet implementations. Rather, the systems and methods described can be implemented for any type of electronic transaction that requires authentication.
Network 108 can, for example, be the Internet, but it can also be some other type of network. Network 108 can, for example, be a wired, or wireless Wide Area Network (WAN), such as a telephone network, a wired, or wireless Metropolitan area Network (MAN), a wired, or wireless Local Area Network (LAN) or even a wired, or wireless Personal Area Network (PAN).
Accordingly, terminal 102 can be any type of terminal configured to communicate over any of the above networks. In one particular embodiment that is discussed in detail below, terminal 102 can be any terminal configured to communicate over the Internet, such as a personal computer, laptop computer, cable set-top box, Internet enabled phone, or handled computer, e.g., a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or handheld gaming console with communication capability.
Terminal 102 includes a standard input device 104 through which a token 106 can be interfaced with terminal 102. For purposes of this specification and the claims that follow, the term “standard input device” means a standard, or widely adopted device for inputting, or transferring information into a particular type of terminal 102. Thus, for example, if terminal 102 is a personal computer, then standard input device 104 can be a floppy drive, a Compact Disc (CD) drive, a CD Read/Write (R/W) drive, a Digital Video Disc (DVD) drive, or any other type of drive that is commonly included, or interfaced with a personal computer.
Token 106 is, therefore, a physical device, such as CD media, USB storage, or compact flash, etc., that can be interfaced with terminal 102 through standard input device 104. Some specific token embodiments are described in detail below. Token 106 is configured to allow authentication authority 110 to verify the presence of token 106, through network 108, once it is interfaced with terminal 102 through standard input device 104.
An input device, the only purpose of which is to allow a token, such as token 106, to be interfaced with a terminal, such as terminal 102, to enable an online transaction is expressly not included in the definition of the term “standard input device.” The point being that the systems and methods described herein do not require the cost, integration, or maintenance of specialized hardware in order to ensure a high level of authentication for online transactions. Rather, the systems and methods described herein allow the use of standard equipment to achieve high level authentication.
Thus, authentication authority 110 can be configured to verify the presence of token 106 if terminal 102 is engaged in a transaction that requires authentication. Authentication authority 110 can, depending on the embodiment, include or be interfaced with an authentication database 112 configured to store information related to a plurality of tokens 106. The information stored in authentication database 112 can then be used to authenticate transactions involving the plurality of tokens' 106. For example, if token 106 comprises credit card information, then authentication database 112 can be configured to store valid credit card numbers. Authentication authority 110 can be configured to then verify both the presence of token 106 and the validity of a credit card number stored thereon.
Additionally, the person using terminal 102 can be required to provide a personal identifier, such as a PIN. In which case, information stored in authentication database 112 can also be used to verify the personal identifier provided. Thus, authentication authority 110 can be configured to supply two-factor authentication for electronic transactions involving terminal 102.
Verification of other factors can also be incorporated to provide even stronger multi-factor authentication. For example, if terminal 102 includes a biometric reader, such as a fingerprint sensor, then verification of a biometric can also be incorporated to provide multifactor authentication. Further, other authentication techniques can be included such as digital signature techniques or other public key-private key techniques.
Before authentication authority 110 can authenticate a token 106, however, the personal identifier, e.g., PIN, should be “linked” with authentication information available in, for example, a database such as authentication database 112. The process of linking the personal identifier with the account information can be referred to as an enrollment process. Preferably, enrollment is seamless from the point of view of the user. In other words, enrollment should occur or be initiated automatically, without requiring the user to affirmatively decide to enroll. And once the enrollment process starts, it should be quick, efficient and cause as little inconvenience as possible.
Because network 108 can be an unsecured network, e.g., the Internet, communications sent from terminal 102 to authentication authority 110 can be intercepted by an unintended party. For added security, communications between terminal 102 and authentication authority 110 can be encrypted.
Distribution of tokens 106 can be handled, or initiated, by an issuing authority such as a bank can distribute token 106. For reasons described in co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/347,114, token 106 often is not associated with a user until enrollment takes place.
As described above, token 106 can be any type of media that can be interfaced with terminal 102 through standard input device 104, The more ubiquitous the standard input device, the more likely token 106 will be adopted by the user. CD drives or their successors such as CD RIW drives, DVD ROM drives, and DVD±RIW drives are so ubiquitous that most personal computers come equipped with a CD compatible drive as a standard peripheral.
In one embodiment, token 106 can be a CD media that can be interfaced with terminal 102 through a CD drive.
Mini-CD 200 can include CD data on one side that can be read by a CD drive. The data capacity can be as high as 50 Megabytes (Mb), providing ample capacity to store the data required for enrollment and authentication as described for system 100. The typical capacity in mini-CD 200 can additional provide capacity to store advertising information, or other information which can be displayed to the user on terminal 102. Other information can include links to resources on a network such as hypertext links to webpages over the Internet. As described below, certain physical embodiments of token 106 can result in a more limited data capacity; however, clearly some minimum capacity will be needed. When the physical configuration reduces the capacity too much then the track pitch and/or scan velocity can be altered in order to obtain the requisite capacity.
To reduce the number of tokens a user must carry and keep track of, it is desirable to use token 106 for offline transactions in addition to online transactions. Because card readers are by far the most common standard interfaces in offline transaction, token 106 should be configured to be readable by a standard card reader. Unfortunately, a typical mini-CD is to thick to fit into a standard card reader; however, if mini-CD 200 is made thinner, conventional CD drives may have difficulty reading mini-CD 200.
In order to make thin mini-CD 304 compatible with conventional CD drives, token 106 comprises carrier 300 for thin mini-CD 304. Carrier 300 has cutout 302 shaped to receive thin mini-CD 304. Once thin mini-CD 304 is seated into carrier 302, the token can be loaded into a conventional CD drive. The thickness of thin mini-CD 304 and carrier 300 when assembled together can be made to equal that of a standard CD, i.e. 12 mm.
Referring to the top view shown in
An embodiment of mini-CD 304 where hole 310 is off-center can be used to accommodate a smart card chip, so that thin mini-CD 304 can be configured to work in a smart card reader as well as a CD drive. In order to comply with smart card standards, thin mini-CD 304 can be designed to accommodate a smart card chip of standard dimensions. If hole 310 were centered, there may not be enough room to accommodate a smart card chip on thin mini-CD 304. Therefore, hole 310 can be placed off-center to allow room to accommodate a smart card chip.
In order for mini-CD 304 to work in a standard card reader that are configured to read magnetic strips, thin mini-CD 304 can comprise a magnetic strip. Depending on the dimensions of the magnetic strip required, hole 310 can be placed in a different location allowing sufficient space on thin mini-CD 304 to accommodate the magnetic strip.
In other offline transactions, a merchant can require that a card or token have embossed lettering comprising information related to the users, such as an account identifier. This is often used in imprinting the card or token in certain situations. However, typical embossing techniques used in credit card manufacture can not be used on thin mini-CD 304, because typical embossing is achieved from the underside of the card or token and extending through the upper side. Such a process would render thin mini-CD 304 unusable on a typical CD drive because the CD readable data region would be damaged.
While the embodiment of the token depicted in
The following embodiments illustrate a single token which can be used in both standard card readers and standard CD readers.
As an optical medium, card 500 can be inserted into a computer's optical input device tray or drawer which then reads the digital information contained in the optical media. Included in the optical media data can be a unique digital certificate, signature, token, identification number or the like that can be used to verify physical possession of the card by the user. The optical media can also contain bootstrap and applications software that facilitate the verification process or related functions, and optionally additional cardholder personalization data that enhance the functionality of the card. The result is an optical payment card (OPC) with all the features and convenience of a standard payment card, plus the ability to facilitate secure interactive E-Commerce transactions through most any Internet connected computer or computing device that comprises an optical drive.
In the embodiment of the OPC shown in
As mentioned above, in some embodiments, the physical dimensions of Card 500 can result in an optical information area 510 that does not have sufficient capacity if standard track pitch and scan velocity are used. In such situations, the track pitch and scan velocity can be altered in order to provide adequate capacity. For example, in one embodiment, it was determined that at least 10 Mb of capacity was required for region 510; however, the physical dimensions of region 510 did not produce 10 Mb of capacity when standard track pitch and scan velocity was used. In order to overcome this issue, the track pitch and scan velocity were changed to produce at least 10 Mb of capacity in region 510.
Scan velocity can be changed by changing information stored in region 510. It will be understood that regions on a standard optical disk include information that can be read by the disk drive and that tell the drive what scan velocity to use. Thus, by altering this information one scan velocity can be changed.
In a standard optical media a centrally located hole enables mechanical centering of the disk in an optical input device. In order for the drive to initially engage the central hole, the disk should be approximately centered in the drive tray. Drive trays typically include two concentric indentations for positioning either standard 120 mm disks, or 80 mm “mini disks”. When the drive tray closes, the drive mechanism engages the 15 mm central hole and clamps the disk in the annular region lying between diameters of 29 mm and 31 mm. If the disk is not initially reasonably well centered in the tray, the clamping mechanism can damage the disk or fail to correctly operate. Card 500, in maintaining physical compatibility with standard optical input devices, can include hole 502, and a reliable mechanism for initially centering the card in the optical input device tray
The centering function can be accomplished using the two raised fairings 506 and 50 K. The two centering fairings are dimensioned to nest inside the smaller 80 mm mini-disk indentation, thereby centering the card in the tray. In addition to the two centering fairings 506 and 508, third raised portion 504 is provided on the bottom surface at the center of the card. The height, or vertical position, of the optical media is an offset to by the bottom surface of the media in the clamping region. Thus, raised portion 504, which is located between the inner hole and the outer perimeter of the annular clamping area, serves to set the card at the correct height to allow the optical stylus of the optical input device to focus on the data surface of the information area. Raised portion 504 can be used to compensate for the difference in thickness between a standard payment card, which has a thickness of 0.76 mm and that of a standard optical media disk, which has a thickness of 1.20 mm.
Raised portion 504, serves an additional important function in regard to the clamping function of the optical drive. Specifically, the standard optical drive is designed to engage a clamping area that is nominally 1.2 mm thick. The thickness increase of about 0.4 mm to card 500 due to raised region 504 ensures more reliable clamping, as well as being beneficial to the overall rigidity ruggedness of the card. Raised region 504 properly includes at least a portion of the annular clamping region lying between diameters of about 25 mm and 31 mm. The shape of raised region 504 can be annular in shape, a truncated annulus as shown in
Accordingly, fairings 506 and 508, as well as raised portion 504, and their specific dimensions and contours, allow card 500 to work in an optical drive as well as POS terminals. Thus, these features and their dimensions and contours allow strong two factor authentication in both the online and POS environments.
A magnetic strip can be deposited on personalization layer 604 using conventional techniques; however, in certain embodiments, the magnetic stripe can be printed onto layer 604 using printing techniques and conductive ink.
In addition to physical compatibility, card 500 and OPC 600 incorporates features to maintain optical compatibility with a standard optical disk. To illustrate the issues related to optical compatibility, an explanation of the operation of a standard optical media disk follows.
To compensate for radial run-out error due to disk warp, etc., industry standards require automatic focal distance compensation for vertical variations of up to ±0.35 mm from the nominal reference plane. Though the thickness of card 500 falls within this industry tolerance, it lies at the edge of the tolerance range which means without compensation card 500 will have little tolerance for disk warp and other factors. Furthermore, this would limit operable embodiments of card 500 be no thinner than about 0.85 mm, for example, OPC 600 would lie outside the tolerance range of the industry standard.
In order to compensate for the focal spot size variations resulting from the difference in thicknesses in card 500 or OPC 600 compared to standard optical media disks, raised portion 504 can be designed to provide the appropriate offsets as described above, which sets the nominal height of the data pit layer to lie near the center of the focal range of the optical stylus. Setting the proper card height allows the laser beam tracking system to accurately focus over an acceptable range of height variation as card 500 or OPC 600 spins in the optical drive.
The ray geometry analysis shown in
It is important that the exposed surface of the transparent substrate be of reasonable optical quality, which includes remaining relatively scratch free. By reducing the spot size incident on the card due to height compensation, for example, for OPC 600, the spot size is reduced from 800 μm to 432 μm, the effect of localized scratches is increased. Furthermore, the OPC is likely to incur more frequent handling and the attendant opportunity for scratching than is typical for a CD or DVD disk. On the other hand, it is well known that polycarbonate is a relatively soft polymeric material that is rather susceptible to scratching. To mitigate this problem, an embodiment of the OPC can have a hard coating applied to the transparent substrate surface by any of several means commonly used for this purpose, for example in the manufacture of eyeglass lenses. Materials commonly used to hard coat lenses include organo-siloxane colloidal silica compounds, cross-linked acrylics, or diamond-like films. The materials and methods for applying hard coatings to plastic surfaces in general and polycarbonate in particular are well known in the lens manufacturing art and are directly applicable in the present context. The thickness of such a coating typically does not need to exceed a few microns. A coating material of low refractive index can be used to reduce reflection, which is about 5% from an uncoated polycarbonate surface (n=1.55). As is well understood and widely practiced in the lens coating art, optical interference coatings can also be applied to optical surfaces, which would serve the dual purpose of reducing reflection while also improving resistance to scratching. Such coatings would also add the visual aspect of a colored appearance, which could enhance the aesthetic appeal of the card and help thwart counterfeiting.
The optical information area of the OPC can conform to current standards for CD and DVD optical media in terms of physical structure and composition as well as digital encoding schemes. Encoding is in the form of digital tracks that can be either data tracks or a combination of data and audio tracks. In addition to the user writable digital tracks, there are also required to be lead-in and lead-out tracks that contain information regarding the format and content of the user digital data. Various error correction techniques, including parity checking and data interleaving, are used when writing the data tracks to improve the robustness of the read-out process. In simple terms, a bit is represented by the transitions at the edges of pits in the spiral data tracks. Data pits are normally pressed into the upper surface of the transparent substrate as part of the overall fabrication process, usually by injection molding. This manufacturing technique is appropriate for mass production of a identical disk, but is not well suited to the present application where it is necessary to embed unique certificates or identification information and may be desirable to include personalized information unique to the individual card holder.
Writeable optical media can be used. With this newer technology, a laser beam is used to write the equivalent of pits into an organic dye layer. The “pits” formed by laser heating of the dye layer alter the reflectivity of very small regions of such media allowing the disk to be read by a standard optical drive. Optical drives or “burners” capable of writing data onto writeable or re-writeable media in either CD or DVD format or both have now become quite popular as are the media they use. The OPC can make use of one of these media types in its information area for the added the convenience and utility associated with writeable and re-writeable optical media. Once the data is written to the information region of the card, it may be desirable to prevent further data writing, which can be accomplished by write-protecting some portion of the media by a method that is widely known in the industry and which is a standard option that can be invoked with most of the popular software applications used in conjunction with CD and DVD burners. The increasing popularity of optical burners on home and business computers opens up the further possibility of use this feature to write information to the OPC during transactions so as to enable much of the functionality of smartcards with writeable memory.
Copy protection of optical disks is an important issue that has received extensive attention throughout the computer software and entertainment industries. This is an issue that has particular relevance in the present context, since it would generally be undesirable for a third party to be able to read and copy the contents of an OPC and to thereby fraudulently acquire its functionality and unique identity. Various schemes for copy protection are currently being used with varying degrees of success for protecting commercial software programs, games, and music CD's. Content Protection for Recordable Media (CPRM) is an industry standard copy protection scheme that thwarts copying to other media by tying a recording to the media on which it is recorded. The method is based on a unique 64-bit media ID etched in the Burst Cutting Area (BCA), which is a zone near the disk hub that is reserved for a barcode that can be etched into-the disc by a high-powered laser. Because barcode cutting is independent of the stamping process, each disc can have unique data recorded in the BCA, such as a serialized ID. When protected content is recorded onto the disc, it can be encrypted, for example with a 56-bit C2 (Cryptomeria) cipher, derived from the media ID. During playback, the ID can be read from the BCA and used to generate a key to decrypt the contents of the disc. If the contents of the disc are copied to any other media, the ID will be absent or incorrect and the data will not be decrypted.
Alternatively, a code can be included in the Absolute Time In Pregroove (ATIP) area of the optical media in region 510. In such an embodiment, the code may not be available to all optical drives. For example, currently the code would be available to CD-R/CD-RW, DVD±R, and DVD±RW drives, but not necessarily to all CD-Rom drives. Accordingly, the method depicted in the flowchart of
First, in step 1002, terminal 102 can be configured to check whether the ATIP exists and is readable. If the ATIP is readable, then in step 1004, the code stored therein can be extracted. The extracted code can then, in step 1006, be compared with the stored, or known code. If the codes match, then normal processing of the payment or other transaction can proceed. If the code is not the same, then in step 1012 processing of the transaction can be ended.
If the ATIP is not present and/or not readable, then the drive type can be checked to see if the ATIP should be present in step 1014. For example, currently, if the drive type is a CD-R, CD-RW, DVD-ROM, DVD-RAM, DVD±RW RO, or A DVD±RW SR, then the ATIP should be present. If it is not, or of it is not readable, then this can be considered and indication that the inserted card is a copy, or counterfeit. In which case, processing can be ceased in step 1012.
If it is determined in step 1014 that the drive is, e.g., a CD-ROM, however, then an ATIP normally is not present. In this case, risk that the card is copied needs to be managed. Thus, in step 1016, it can be determined whether the risk is acceptable. If the risk is acceptable, then processing can continue in step 1008. Otherwise, processing can be ended in step 1012. In one embodiment for example, processing can always be allowed to continue when the ATIP is not expected top be present. At the other extreme, processing can always be ended. In other embodiments, however, some intermediate action is taken to assess the risk. For example, different authentication techniques can be used, or the authentication profile can be changed, or lowered to take into account the inability to verify the code, or that the card is not a copy.
Other protection schemes include embedding a digital “watermark” or requiring the user to manually enter a Personal Identification Number (PIN) to carry out a transaction. The preceding copy protection methods presented here are by way of example only. Any copy protection method that is developed for conventional optical media disks can be adapted to the OPC. No doubt as technology improves to provide better copy protection and combat new threats, new methods will evolve which can be incorporated into OPC's.
While certain embodiments of the inventions have been described above, it will be understood that the embodiments described are by way of example only. Accordingly, the inventions should not be limited based on the described embodiments. Rather, the scope of the inventions described herein should only be limited in light of the claims that follow when taken in conjunction with the above description and accompanying drawings.
This application is U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/347,114, entitled “Token For Use in Electronic Online and Offline Transactions”, filed Jan. 16, 2003, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/338,822, entitled “Systems and Methods for Secure Authentication of Electronic Transactions,” filed Jan. 7, 2003, both of which are incorporated herein in the entirety as if set forth in full.