Patent Grant
11108562
The present disclosure relates to computer systems and methods for verifying a route taken by a communication. More particularly, the present disclosure relates to computer systems and methods for verifying identities of the entities on a route taken by a communication.
Public-key infrastructure (PKI) enables secure transfer of information between entities without using usernames, passwords, or shared secrets. However, a PKI deployment requires certificate authorities (CAs) and validation authorities (VAs), which are single points of failure. Therefore, if a CA or VA becomes disabled or compromised, every entity that relies on the CA or the VA may become more vulnerable to attacks, such as spoofing.
In one embodiment, a device for verifying a route taken by a communication may include one or more processors configured to obtain a communication transmitted by a source entity. The communication may include data and digital signatures, and each of the digital signatures may be generated based on at least the data. Further, the digital signatures may include a digital signature associated with the source entity, and a set of digital signatures associated with at least a subset of intermediate entities on a route taken by the communication. The one or more processors may be further configured to verify the digital signatures included in the communication, verify whether the entities associated with the digital signatures form an expected route for the communication, and process the data.
In another embodiment, a method for verifying a route taken by a communication may include obtaining a communication transmitted by a source entity. The communication may include data and digital signatures, and each of the digital signatures may be generated based on at least the data. Further, the digital signatures may include a digital signature associated with the source entity, and a set of digital signatures associated with at least a subset of intermediate entities on a route taken by the communication. The method may further include verifying the digital signatures included in the communication, verifying whether the entities associated with the digital signatures form an expected route for the communication, and processing the data.
In yet another embodiments, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that when executed by a computer cause the computer to perform a method for verifying a route taken by a communication includes obtaining a communication transmitted by a source entity. The communication may include data and digital signatures, and each of the digital signatures may be generated based on at least the data. Further, the digital signatures may include a digital signature associated with the source entity, and a set of digital signatures associated with at least a subset of intermediate entities on a route taken by the communication. The method may further include verifying the digital signatures included in the communication, verifying whether the entities associated with the digital signatures form an expected route for the communication, and processing the data.
Embodiments are described more fully below with reference to the accompanying drawings, which form a part hereof, and which show specific exemplary embodiments. However, embodiments may be implemented in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope. Embodiments may be practiced as methods, systems or devices. Accordingly, embodiments may take the form of an entirely hardware implementation, an entirely software implementation or an implementation combining software and hardware aspects. The following detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense.
The logical operations of the various embodiments are implemented (1) as interconnected machine modules within the computing system and/or (2) as a sequence of computer implemented steps running on a computing system. The implementation is a matter of choice dependent on the performance requirements of the computing system implementing the invention. Accordingly, the logical operations making up the embodiments described herein are referred to alternatively as operations, steps or modules.
Aspects of the disclosure pertains to computer systems and methods for verifying a route taken by a communication. More particularly, the present disclosure relates to computer systems and methods for verifying identities of the entities on a route taken by a communication. Further, the disclosed systems and methods may be capable of verifying that the route taken by the communication includes an expected set of entities in an expected order. The disclosed systems and methods may process data in the communication after verifying the identities of the entities on a route taken by a communication and/or verifying that the route taken by the communication includes the expected set of entities in the expected order. There are several potential applications for this technology, and the scope of this disclosure is not intended to be limited to any particular business concern.
An entity (e.g., source entity 110, destination entity 120, or an intermediate entity) may be any hardware or software capable of communicating via one or more network links represented by lines connecting the entities. For example, an entity may be a host device such as an internet-of-things device, laptop, tablet, cellular phone, server, or virtual machine. In another example, an entity may be a network device such as a gateway, router, switch, or hub. In some embodiments, an entity may be a service implemented on a cloud platform, such as Amazon Web Service, Google Cloud Service, and Microsoft Azure.
Network links may connect entities in network of entities 130 to each other. Two entities that are connected by a network link may communicate directly with each other. A network link may be a wired link or a wireless link. For example, a network link may be an Ethernet, Bluetooth, infrared, or fiber-optic link.
In system 100, source entity 110 may transmit communications that are destined for destination entity 120. Since source entity 110 is not directly connected to destination entity 120 by a network link in system 100, the communications may be delivered to destination entity 120 via a set of connected intermediate entities and network links connecting them (i.e., a communication route). As used herein, a communication route, or a route, refers to a set of connected entities that connect source entity 110 to destination entity 120. For example, as shown in
Although not illustrated in
In embodiments where multiple routes exist between source entity 110 and destination entity 120, the route taken by a communication may be selected in a number of ways. For example, a route may be selected from available routes based on the routes' performance, cost, and/or availability. In some embodiments, only a single route between source entity 110 and destination entity 120 may exist. In these embodiments, the only available route may be used for the communication between source entity 110 and destination entity 120.
In system 100 of
Moreover, at least some of the communications transmitted by source entity 110 destined for destination entity 120 may be route-verifiable communications. As used herein a “route-verifiable communication” may be a communication that includes information on the route taken by the communication (i.e., route information). In some embodiments, the route information may be used by intermediate entities and/or the final recipient of the communication (e.g., destination entity 120 and/or intermediate entities) to: (i) verify identities of at least a subset of the entities on the route taken by the communication, (ii) verify the identity of the source entity, and/or (iii) verify that the route taken by the communication includes an expected set of entities in an expected order. The route information may be included, generated, and/or updated by source entity 110 and at least a subset of entities on the route taken by the communication. The use of route-verifiable communications may significantly increase the difficulty and the complexity of the attack needed to spoof a communication in system 100. For example, instead of attacking a single entity (e.g., source entity 110), an attacker may need to attack every entity on route 140 to spoof a route-verifiable communication.
In system 100, public/private key pairs are generated for source entity 110 and for at least one entity on route 140 using a public-key cryptography algorithm, such as an RSA. The generated private keys may be kept within the entities associated with the private keys, but the corresponding public keys may be distributed throughout system 100 so that various entities may access them.
While public/private key pairs have many different uses, in system 100, a private key may be used to generate a digital signature based on given data (i.e., to “sign the data”), and a corresponding public key (i.e., a public key that was generated with the private key using the public-key cryptography algorithm) may be used to verify that the generated digital signature is indeed generated by an entity that has access to the corresponding private key. Additionally, the corresponding public key may be used to further verify that the data has not been altered since the digital signature was generated.
In some embodiments, digital signatures of source entity 110 and/or at least one intermediate entity (e.g., entity 142) on the route taken by the communication (e.g., route 140) may be included in the route information. That is, the digital signatures of source entity 110 and/or at least one intermediate entity may be included in the communication, and the included digital signatures may be used by destination entity 110 to verify that the communication was delivered to destination entity 120 using route 140.
As shown in
Signature 314 may be a digital signature generated at least based on data 312 using a private key associated with source entity 110 (i.e., source private key 112). A digital signature may be generated in numerous ways. In one example, a digital signature may be generated by encrypting a hash value of given data (e.g., data 312) using a private key (e.g., private key 112). In this example, a corresponding public key (e.g., public key 122) may be used to decrypt the digital signature and obtain the hash value of the original data. Thus, if the decrypted digital signature matches the hash value of the received data, it may prove that (i) the data was signed with a private key that corresponds to the public key, and (ii) the data has not changed since it was signed. However, if the decrypted digital signature does not match the hash value of the received data, the data has been altered and/or the digital signature was created with a private key that does not correspond to the public key. In some embodiments, a digital signature may be generated by encrypting metadata (e.g., checksum) of given data using a private key. In another example, a digital signature may also be generated by encrypting a portion or all of the given data using a private key. Here, a corresponding public key may be used to decrypt the digital signature to obtain the portion of, the data or the entire data. Subsequently, the decrypted digital signature may be compared to the received data to determine (i) that the data was signed with a private key that corresponds to the public key, and (ii) that the data has not changed since it was signed. It may be advantageous in terms of performance, however, to generate a digital signature based on a hash value rather than a portion or all of the given data because the size of a hash value is typically smaller than the size of the data. As used herein, the process of using a public key to prove that (i) the data was signed with a private key that corresponds to the public key, and (ii) the data has not changed since it was signed is referred to as “verifying the signature.”
In system 100, signature 314 may have been obtained and included in communication 310 by source entity 110 before communication 310 was transmitted on the network link connecting source entity 110 with intermediate entity 142. In some embodiments, source entity 110 may have generated signature 314. Alternatively, source entity 110 may have caused generation of signature 314 and obtained the generated signature 314. For example, source entity 110 may have requested another entity with access to private key 112 to generate signature 314 and obtained the generated signature 314 from the entity. In some embodiments, private key 112 may be stored and/or signature 314 may be generated using a secure element (SE), trusted platform module (TPM), or a trusted execution environment (TEE).
In some embodiments, communication 310 may further include header data associated with signature 314. In these embodiments, signature 314 may be generated further based on the header data associated with signature 314. Thus, any changes to the header data after signature 314 is generated (i.e., after the header data is signed) may be detected during verification of signature 314. The header data associated with signature 314 may include any data available to source entity 110. In some embodiments, the header data associated with signature 314 may include a value indicative of an order in which signature 314 is generated and/or included in communication 310. For example, in the system of
Signature 412, similar to signature 314, may be a digital signature generated at least based on data 312 using a private key associated with intermediate entity 142 (i.e., private key 143). Thus, signature 412 may be used to prove that (i) the data was signed with private key 143, and (ii) the data has not changed since it was signed. In some embodiments, signature 412 may be generated further based on signature 314. In these embodiments, signature 412 may be used to prove that (i) data 312 and signature 314 was signed with private key 143, and (ii) data 312 and signature 314 have not changed since they were signed.
In system 100 of
In some embodiments, prior to obtaining and/or including signature 412 in communication 410 or prior to transmitting communication 410, intermediate entity 142 may have verified signature 314. For example, prior to generating signature 412, intermediate entity 142 may have verified using source public key 122 that signature 314 was indeed generated by source entity 110 and that data 312 has not been changed since it was signed by source entity 110. In these embodiments, intermediate entity 142 may have access to public keys that are associated with immediately neighboring entities that entity 142 is expected to receive communications from. For example, in system 100, entity 142 may have access to public keys associated with source entity 110, entity 144, and/or entity 146.
In some embodiments, the public keys may be stored on intermediate entity 142 or a data store accessible by intermediate entity 142. In some embodiments, the public keys may be stored on a shared data stores accessible by a plurality of entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142, intermediate entity 144, and/or destination entity 120).
In some embodiments, prior to obtaining and/or including signature 412 in communication 410 or prior to transmitting communication 410, intermediate entity 142 may verify that transmitting entity (e.g., source entity 110) is authorized to transmit communications via intermediate entity 142. For example, intermediate entity 142 may access a policy server and/or an authentication server to determine whether source entity 110 is authorized to transmit communications via entity 142. In another example, intermediate entity 142 may maintain, or have access to, a list of entities that are authorized and/or capable (e.g., physically connected to intermediate entity 142) of transmit communications via entity 142. In this example, intermediate entity 142 may verify that source entity 110 is included in such a list prior to obtaining and/or including signature 412 in communication 410 or prior to transmitting communication 410. In some embodiments, intermediate entity 142 may maintain, or have access to, a list of entities that are not allowed to communicate via entity 142. In these embodiments, intermediate entity 142 may verify that source entity 110 is not listed in such a list prior to obtaining and/or including signature 412 in communication 410 or prior to transmitting communication 410.
In some embodiments, communication 410 may further include header data associated with signature 412. In these embodiments, signature 412 may be generated further based on the header data associated with signature 412. Thus, any changes to the header data after signature 412 is generated (i.e., after the header data is signed) may be detected during verification of signature 412. The header data associated with signature 412 may include any data available to intermediate entity 142. In some embodiments, the header data associated with signature 412 may include a value indicative of order in which signature 412 is generated and/or included in communication 410. For example, in the system of
Signature 512, similar to signature 412, may be a digital signature generated at least based on data 312 using a private key associated with intermediate entity 144 (i.e., private key 145). Thus, signature 512 may be used to prove that (i) the data was signed with private key 145, and (ii) the data has not changed since it was signed. In some embodiments, signature 512 may be generated further based on signature 314 and/or signature 412. In these embodiments, signature 512 may be used to prove that (i) data 312, signature 314, and/or signature 412 were signed with private key 145, and (ii) data 312, signature 314, and/or signature 412 have not changed since they were signed. In embodiments where communication 510 includes the header data associated with signature 314 and/or the header data associated with signature 412, signature 412 may be generated further based on the header data associated with signature 314 and/or the header data associated with signature 412.
In system 100 of
In some embodiments, prior to obtaining and/or including signature 512 in communication 510 or prior to transmitting communication 510, intermediate entity 144 may have verified one or more signatures previously included in communication 510. For example, intermediate entity 144 may verify the signature of an entity immediately before intermediate entity 144 on route 140 (i.e., signature 412). In this example, intermediate entity 144 may have access to public keys that are associated with immediately neighboring entities that entity 144 is expected to receive communications from. In another example, intermediate entity 144 may verify signatures of all intermediate entities preceding intermediate entity 144 on route 140 (i.e., signature 412). In yet another example, intermediate entity 144 may verify all entities preceding intermediate entity 144 on route 140 (i.e., signatures 314 and 412). In these examples, intermediate entity 144 may have access to public keys that are associated with all entities that entity 144 is expected to receive communications from.
In some embodiments, the public keys may be stored on intermediate entity 144 or a data store accessible by intermediate entity 144. In some embodiments, the public keys may be stored on a shared data stores accessible by a plurality of entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142, intermediate entity 144, and/or destination entity 120).
Similar to communication 410, in some embodiments, prior to obtaining and/or including signature 512 in communication 510 or prior to transmitting communication 510, intermediate entity 144 may verify that the transmitting entity (e.g., source entity 110) and/or one or more preceding intermediate entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142) are authorized to transmit communications via intermediate entity 144. For example, intermediate entity 144 may access a policy server and/or an authentication server to determine whether source entity 110 and/or intermediate entity 142 are authorized to transmit communications via entity 144. In another example, intermediate entity 144 may maintain, or have access to, a list of entities that are authorized and/or capable (e.g., physically connected to intermediate entity 144) of transmit communications via entity 144. In this example, intermediate entity 144 may verify that source entity 110 and/or intermediate entity 142 are included in such a list prior to obtaining and/or including signature 512 in communication 510 or prior to transmitting communication 510. In some embodiments, intermediate entity 144 may maintain, or have access to, a list of entities that are not allowed to communicate via entity 144. In these embodiments, intermediate entity 144 may verify that source entity 110 and/or intermediate entity 142 are not listed in such a list prior to obtaining and/or including signature 512 in communication 510 or prior to transmitting communication 510.
In some embodiments, the list(s) maintained by intermediate entity 144 may be synchronized with the list(s) maintained by other entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142). In some embodiments, the list(s) accessed by intermediate entity 144 may be the same as the list(s) accessed by other entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142). For example, the list(s) may be stored on a shared data store accessible by a plurality of entities.
In some embodiments, communication 510 may further include header data associated with signature 512. In these embodiments, signature 512 may be generated further based on header data associated with signature 512. Thus, any changes to the header data after signature 512 is generated (i.e., after the header data is signed) may be detected during verification of signature 512. The header data associated with signature 512 may include any data available to intermediate entity 144. In some embodiments, the header data associated with signature 512 may include data indicative of order at which signature 512 is generated and/or included in communication 510. For example, in the system of
At step 602, destination entity 120 may obtain communication 510 transmitted by source entity 120. The communication may include data 312 and digital signatures. Each digital signature may be generated based on at least data 312. As discussed above, the digital signatures may include a digital signature associated with source entity 110 (e.g., signature 314), and a set of digital signatures associated with at least a subset of intermediate entities on route 140 taken by the communication (e.g., signatures 412 and/or 512). As discussed above, the digital signatures may have been obtained and/or included in communication 510 by the associated entities on route 140.
At step 604, destination entity 120 may verify the plurality of signatures included in communication 510. For example, destination entity 120 may verify signature 314, signature 412, and 512 included in communication 510. As discussed above, verifying a signature associated with an entity may include decrypting the signature using a public key associated with the entity and comparing the decrypted signature with a hash value or at least a portion of the signed data (e.g., data 312, signature 314, and/or signature 412). In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may verify the signatures of source entity 110 and the intermediate node immediately preceding destination entity 120 (i.e., intermediate entity 144). In an alternative step, destination entity 120 may verify the signature of the intermediate node immediately preceding destination entity 120.
In some embodiments, the public keys for verifying the signatures may be stored on destination entity 120 or a data store accessible by destination entity 120. In some embodiments, the public keys may be stored on a shared data stores accessible by a plurality of entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142, intermediate entity 144, and/or destination entity 120). In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may have access to all public keys of entities that can communicate with destination entity 120.
At a step 606, destination entity 120 may verify whether the entities associated with signatures included in communication 510 form an expected route for communication 510 transmitted by source entity 110. For example in system 100, destination entity 120 may expect that communications from source entity 110 to take route 140. Thus, destination entity 120 may verify that the entities associated with the signatures include intermediate entity 142 and intermediate entity 144. Destination entity 120 may further verify that a signature associated with source entity 110 is included in communication 510.
In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may determine the expected route for a communication based on a network map of system 100. The network map may include, for example, entities of system 100, network links connecting the entities, and/or costs/performance/availability associated with network links. In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may have access to a look-up table that includes expected routes corresponding to a source entity. The look-up table may be stored in destination entity 120 or on another entity/data store connected to destination entity 120, for example.
In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may further verify that the entities associated with signatures indicated as having been included in communication 510 in an expected order. For example, destination entity 120 may verify that signature associated with intermediate entity 142 is indicated as having been included before signature of intermediate entity 144. Destination entity 120 may further verify that signature associated with source entity 110 is indicated as having been included before signature of intermediate entity 142. As the indicators of the order in which the signatures are included in communication 510, destination entity 120 may use one or more values included in the headers data that may be associated with digital signatures. As discussed above, the header data may include, for example, a value indicative of the order in which the associated signature is included in communication 510.
If destination entity 120 determines that the entities associated with signatures included in communication 510 do not form the expected route for communication 510 transmitted by source entity 110, destination entity 120 may halt process 600. In some embodiments, communication 510 may be discarded if the entities associated with signatures included in communication 510 do not form the expected route. In some embodiments, communication 510 may be stored and/or transmitted for future examination (e.g., by an administrator) if the entities associated with signatures included in communication 510 do not form the expected route. In some embodiments, destination entity 120 transmit a communication destined for source entity 110, indicating that communication 510 was not accepted and/or processed by destination entity 120.
In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may verify that the transmitting entity (e.g., source entity 110) and/or one or more preceding intermediate entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142 and intermediate entity 144) are authorized to transmit communications destined for destination entity 120. For example, destination entity 120 may access a policy server and/or an authentication server to determine whether source entity 110, intermediate entity 142, and/or intermediate entity 144 are authorized to transmit communications destined for destination entity 120. In another example, and intermediate entity 144 may maintain, or have access to, a list of entities that are authorized and/or capable (e.g., physically connected to intermediate entity 144) of transmit communications destined for destination entity 120. In this example, destination entity 120 may verify that source entity 110, intermediate entity 142, and/or intermediate entity 144 are included in such a list. In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may maintain, or have access to, a list of entities that are not allowed to communicate with destination entity 120. In these embodiments, destination entity 120 may verify that source entity 110, intermediate entity 142, and/or intermediate entity 144 are not listed in such a list.
In some embodiments, the list(s) maintained by destination entity 120 may be synchronized with the list(s) maintained by other entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142 and/or intermediate entity 144). In some embodiments, the list(s) accessed by destination entity 120 may be the same as the list(s) accessed by other entities (e.g., intermediate entity 142 and/or intermediate entity 144). For example, the list(s) may be stored on a shared data store accessible by a plurality of entities.
At step 608, destination entity 120 may process data 312 included in communication 510. In some embodiments, destination entity 120 may begin processing data 312 prior to step 608 and finish processing data 312 at step 608. For example, destination entity 120 may finish processing the data after verifying the digital signatures and verifying that entities associated with the digital signatures included in communication 510 form the expected route for communication 510.
Data structure 800, as shown in
While illustrative embodiments have been described herein, the scope of any and all embodiments having equivalent elements, modifications, omissions, combinations (e.g., of aspects across various embodiments), adaptations and/or alterations as would be appreciated by those skilled in the art based on the present disclosure. The limitations in the claims are to be interpreted broadly based on the language employed in the claims and not limited to examples described in the present specification or during the prosecution of the application. The examples are to be construed as non-exclusive. Furthermore, the steps of the disclosed routines may be modified in any manner, including by reordering steps and/or inserting or deleting steps. It is intended, therefore, that the specification and examples be considered as illustrative only, with a true scope and spirit being indicated by the following claims and their full scope of equivalents.
This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/588,533, filed on May 5, 2017, titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR ENABLING TRUSTED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ENTITIES,” which claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/332,271, filed on May 5, 2016, titled “DEVICE AUTHENTICATION USING A CENTRAL REPOSITORY.” This application also claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/469,346, filed on Mar. 9, 2017, titled “METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR IDENTITY MANAGEMENT.” Further, this application is related to U.S. application Ser. No. 15/652,098, titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR ENABLING TRUSTED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CONTROLLERS,” U.S. application Ser. No. 15/652,108, titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR MITIGATING AND/OR PREVENTING DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS,” and U.S. application Ser. No. 15/652,089, titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR DISTRIBUTING PARTIAL DATA TO SUBNETWORKS,” which are filed concurrently with this application. The disclosures of the above applications are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety for all purposes.
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| Child | 15652114 | US |
