Patent Grant
12174968
The present disclosure relates generally to Information Handling Systems (IHSs), and relates more particularly to preventing IHSs from being configured with known vulnerabilities.
As the value and use of information continues to increase, individuals and businesses seek additional ways to process and store information. One option available to users is Information Handling Systems (IHSs). An IHS generally processes, compiles, stores, and/or communicates information or data for business, personal, or other purposes thereby allowing users to take advantage of the value of the information. Because technology and information handling needs and requirements vary between different users or applications, IHSs may also vary regarding what information is handled, how the information is handled, how much information is processed, stored, or communicated, and how quickly and efficiently the information may be processed, stored, or communicated. The variations in IHSs allow for IHSs to be general or configured for a specific user or specific use such as financial transaction processing, airline reservations, enterprise data storage, or global communications. In addition, IHSs may include a variety of hardware and software components that may be configured to process, store, and communicate information and may include one or more computer systems, data storage systems, and networking systems.
Groups of IHSs may be housed within data center environments. A data center may include a large number of IHSs, such as enterprise-class servers that are stacked and installed within racks. A data center may include large numbers of such racks that may be organized into rows, where the servers installed in each rack may be outwardly very similar looking, such that it may be difficult for administrators to effectively keep track of the configurations of any individual server in the data center. Moreover, administration of such large groups of servers may require teams of remote and local administrators working in shifts in order to support around-the-clock availability of the data center operations, while also minimizing any downtime.
Each server IHS within a data center may support a wide variety of possible hardware and software configurations. For instance, a server IHS may be manufactured accordingly to customized hardware and software configurations requested by a customer. In addition, upon manufacture and delivery to a customer, a received server may be provisioned for deployment according to the particular requirements of that customer. Additionally, throughout the lifetime of a server, replaceable hardware components of the server may be added, removed and repaired. Software and firmware may also be updated regularly as part of routine maintenance, to correct errors and/or to adapt the functionality of a server IHS to a specific computing task.
In some instances, these various configurations of a server IHS may themselves render the server vulnerable, even in scenarios where the configurations are intended as updates to the hardware and/or software of the server. Even though these configurations may be updated, the configurations may nonetheless be known to exhibit various types of known vulnerabilities, such as security vulnerabilities that can exploited by malicious actors and such as functional vulnerabilities that can result in errors or failures. Despite these vulnerabilities being publicly known, the administrator making the configuration changes may be unaware of these vulnerabilities, thus rendering the server configuration as vulnerable from the outset. Such issues may be exacerbated by the differing protocols and procedures that may be used in the administration of a server IHS throughout its lifetime. As different administrators configure a server according to changing policies, inconsistent configuration of the server tends to result in the server becoming increasingly vulnerable.
In various embodiments, IHSs (Information Handling Systems) may include: one or more CPUs utilizing one or more buses that connect to a plurality of hardware components of the IHS; and a remote access controller supporting remote management of the Information Handling System (IHS), the remote access controller comprising a logic unit and a memory device having instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the logic unit, cause the remote access controller to: detect the coupling of a new hardware component to the IHS; identify a profile to be used in provisioning the new hardware component that has been coupled to the IHS, wherein the profile comprises one or more configurations for the coupled hardware component; access a plurality of catalogs specifying known vulnerabilities of hardware components; determine whether any of the one or more of the configurations of the coupled hardware component are identified as vulnerable in one or more of the catalogs; and disable further use of the new hardware component by the IHS until the profile is modified to include no configurations with vulnerabilities identified in the plurality of catalogs.
In some IHS embodiments, the plurality of catalogs comprise a catalog of hardware component vulnerabilities known to a manufacturer of the IHS. In some IHS embodiments, the plurality of catalogs comprise a catalog of hardware component vulnerabilities known to a manufacturer of the new hardware component. In some IHS embodiments, execution of the instructions further causes the remote access controller to: identify one or more vulnerability proofing requirements for the new hardware component within a factory provisioned identity certificate of the IHS. In some IHS embodiments, procedures specified in the identity certificate for use when configurations of the new hardware component are identified as vulnerable comprise the disabling of further use of the new hardware component by the IHS until the configurations for the new hardware component are modified to include no configurations with vulnerabilities identified in the plurality of catalogs. In some IHS embodiments, the factory-provisioned identity certificate comprises digital signatures for authenticating instructions used by the new hardware component. In some IHS embodiments, the validation proofing requirements in the identity certificate further specify the plurality of catalogs of known vulnerabilities for use in identifying hardware component configurations that are vulnerable. In some IHS embodiments, the plurality of catalogs of known vulnerabilities specified in the identity certificate comprise one or more catalogs specified by a customer purchasing the IHS. In some IHS embodiments, the configurations of the new hardware component IHS comprise configurations for using specific versions of firmware in operation of the new hardware component. In some IHS embodiments, the vulnerability catalogs specify alternate firmware versions that are not associated with known vulnerabilities.
In various additional embodiments, methods are provided for vulnerability proofing the installation of new hardware components in an IHS (Information Handling System), wherein the vulnerability proofing is implemented by a remote access controller of the IHS that provides remote management of the IHS. The methods may include: detecting the coupling of a new hardware component to the IHS; identifying a profile to be used in provisioning the new hardware component that has been coupled to the IHS, wherein the profile comprises one or more configurations for the coupled hardware component; accessing a plurality of catalogs specifying known vulnerabilities of hardware components; determining whether any of the one or more of the configurations of the coupled hardware component are identified as vulnerable in one or more of the catalogs; and disabling further use of the new hardware component by the IHS until the profile is modified to include no configurations with vulnerabilities identified in the plurality of catalogs.
In some method embodiments, the plurality of catalogs comprise a catalog of hardware component vulnerabilities known to a manufacturer of the IHS. Some method embodiments may include, identifying one or more vulnerability proofing requirements for the IHS within a factory provisioned identity certificate of the IHS. In some method embodiments, procedures specified in the identity certificate for use when configurations of the new hardware component are identified as vulnerable comprise the disabling of further use of the new hardware component by the IHS until the configuration for the new hardware component are modified to include no hardware configurations with vulnerabilities identified in the plurality of catalogs. In some method embodiments, the configurations of the new hardware component IHS comprise configurations for using specific versions of firmware in operation of the new hardware component. In some method embodiments, the vulnerability catalogs specify alternate firmware versions that are not associated with known vulnerabilities.
In various additional embodiments, remote access controllers support remote management of an Information Handling System (IHS). The remote access controllers comprising a memory device having instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by a logic unit, cause the remote access controller to: detect the coupling of a new hardware component to the IHS; identify a profile to be used in provisioning the new hardware component that has been coupled to the IHS, wherein the profile comprises one or more configurations for the coupled hardware component; access a plurality of catalogs specifying known vulnerabilities of hardware components; determine whether any of the one or more of the configurations of the coupled hardware component are identified as vulnerable in one or more of the catalogs; and disable further use of the new hardware component by the IHS until the profile is modified to include no configurations with vulnerabilities identified in the plurality of catalogs.
In some remote access controller embodiments, the plurality of catalogs comprise a catalog of hardware component vulnerabilities known to a manufacturer of the IHS. In some remote access controller embodiments, the execution of the instructions by the logic unit further causes the remote access controller to identify one or more vulnerability proofing requirements for the IHS within a factory provisioned identity certificate of the IHS. In some remote access controller embodiments, procedures specified in the identity certificate for use when configurations of the new hardware component are identified as vulnerable comprise the disabling of further use of the new hardware component by the IHS until the configuration for the new hardware component are modified to include no hardware configurations with vulnerabilities identified in the plurality of catalogs.
The present invention(s) is/are illustrated by way of example and is/are not limited by the accompanying figures. Elements in the figures are illustrated for simplicity and clarity, and have not necessarily been drawn to scale.
Upon delivery and deployment of a chassis 100, the chassis 100 may be modified by replacing and/or adding various hardware components, in addition to replacement of the removeable IHSs 105a-n, 115a-n that are installed in the chassis. In addition, once the chassis 100 has been deployed, firmware and other software used by individual hardware components of the IHSs 105a-n, 115a-n, or by other hardware components of chassis 100, may be modified in order to update the operations that are supported by these hardware components. In some instances, such updates may be used to enable and disable features of an IHS and/or chassis that have been licensed for use by an owner or operator of the chassis 100, where the features that have been enabled and conditions for use of the enabled features may be set forth in a service agreement that is associated with the chassis 100.
Chassis 100 may include one or more bays that each receive an individual sled (that may be additionally or alternatively referred to as a tray, blade, and/or node) IHSs, such as compute sleds 105a-n and storage sleds 115a-n. Chassis 100 may support a variety of different numbers (e.g., 4, 8, 16, 32), sizes (e.g., single-width, double-width) and physical configurations of bays. Embodiments may include additional types of sleds that provide various storage, power and/or processing capabilities. For instance, sleds installable in chassis 100 may be dedicated to providing power management or networking functions. Sleds may be individually installed and removed from the chassis 100, thus allowing the computing and storage capabilities of a chassis to be reconfigured by swapping the sleds with different types of sleds, in some cases at runtime without disrupting the ongoing operations of the other sleds installed in the chassis 100.
Multiple chassis 100 may be housed within a rack. Data centers may utilize large numbers of racks, with various different types of chassis installed in various configurations of racks. The modular architecture provided by the sleds, chassis and racks allow for certain resources, such as cooling, power and network bandwidth, to be shared by the compute sleds 105a-n and storage sleds 115a-n, thus providing efficiency improvements and supporting greater computational loads. For instance, certain computational workloads, such as computations used in machine learning and other artificial intelligence systems, may utilize computational and/or storage resources that are shared within an IHS, within an individual chassis 100 and/or within a set of IHSs that may be spread across multiple chassis of a data center.
Implementing computing systems that span multiple processing components of chassis 100 is aided by high-speed data links between these processing components, such as PCIe connections that form one or more distinct PCIe switch fabrics that are implemented by PCIe switches 135a-n, 165a-n installed in the IHSs 105a-n, 115a-n of the chassis. These high-speed data links may be used to support algorithm implementations that span multiple processing, networking and storage components of an IHS and/or chassis 100. For instance, computational workloads may be delegated to a specific processing component of an IHS, such as to a hardware accelerator 185a-n that may include one or more programmable processors that operate separate from the main CPUs 170a-n of computing sleds 105a-n. In various embodiments, such hardware accelerators 185a-n may include DPUs (Data Processing Units), GPUs (Graphics Processing Units), SmartNICs (Smart Network Interface Card) and/or FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays). These hardware accelerators 185a-n operate according to firmware instructions that may be occasionally updated, such as to adapt the capabilities of the respective hardware accelerators 185a-n to specific computing tasks. In some instances, firmware updates to hardware accelerators 185a-n may serve to adapt the hardware accelerator for a particular computing function, or for a particular operating environment.
Chassis 100 may be installed within a rack structure that provides at least a portion of the cooling utilized by the IHSs 105a-n, 115a-n installed in chassis 100. In supporting airflow cooling, a rack may include one or more banks of cooling fans that may be operated to ventilate heated air from within the chassis 100 that is housed within the rack. The chassis 100 may alternatively or additionally include one or more cooling fans 130 that may be similarly operated to ventilate heated air away from sleds 105a-n, 115a-n installed within the chassis. In this manner, a rack and a chassis 100 installed within the rack may utilize various configurations and combinations of cooling fans to cool the sleds 105a-n, 115a-n and other components housed within chassis 100.
The sleds 105a-n, 115a-n may be individually coupled to chassis 100 via connectors that correspond to the bays provided by the chassis 100 and that physically and electrically couple an individual sled to a backplane 160. Chassis backplane 160 may be a printed circuit board that includes electrical traces and connectors that are configured to route signals between the various components of chassis 100 that are connected to the backplane 160 and between different components mounted on the printed circuit board of the backplane 160. In the illustrated embodiment, the connectors for use in coupling sleds 105a-n, 115a-n to backplane 160 include PCIe couplings that support high-speed data links with the sleds 105a-n, 115a-n. In various embodiments, backplane 160 may support various types of connections, such as cables, wires, midplanes, connectors, expansion slots, and multiplexers. In certain embodiments, backplane 160 may be a motherboard that includes various electronic components installed thereon. Such components installed on a motherboard backplane 160 may include components that implement all or part of the functions described with regard to the SAS (Serial Attached SCSI) expander 150, I/O controllers 145, network controller 140, chassis management controller 125 and power supply unit 135.
In certain embodiments, each individual sled 105a-n, 115a-n-n may be an IHS such as described with regard to IHS 200 of
As illustrated, each sled 105a-n, 115a-n includes a respective remote access controller (RAC) 110a-n, 120a-n. As described in additional detail with regard to FIG. 2, remote access controller 110a-n, 120a-n provides capabilities for remote monitoring and management of a respective sled 105a-n, 115a-n and/or of chassis 100. In support of these monitoring and management functions, remote access controllers 110a-n may utilize both in-band and side-band (i.e., out-of-band) communications with various managed components of a respective sled 105a-n and chassis 100. Remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n may collect various types of sensor data, such as collecting temperature sensor readings that are used in support of airflow cooling of the chassis 100 and the sleds 105a-n, 115a-n. In addition, each remote access controller 110a-n, 120a-n may implement various monitoring and administrative functions related to a respective sleds 105a-n, 115a-n, where these functions may be implemented using sideband bus connections with various internal components of the chassis 100 and of the respective sleds 105a-n, 115a-n. In various embodiments, these capabilities of the remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n may be utilized in updating the firmware or other software utilized by hardware components of chassis 100 and/or of hardware components of the sleds 110a-n, 120a-n.
As described in additional detail below, remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n may be configured to enforce validation proofing when installing new hardware components in respective IHS sleds 105a-n, 115a-n that are installed in chassis 100. As described in additional detail below, IHSs, such as sleds 105a-n, 115a-n, may include a significant number of replaceable hardware components, such as storage drives 175a-n and hardware accelerators 185a-n. Each time a new hardware component is installed in one of the sled IHSs 105a-n, 115a-n, opportunities arise for the new hardware component to be configured during its initial provisioning with known vulnerabilities. In embodiments, initial provisioning of a new hardware component that is being installed in a sled IHS 105a-n, 115a-n includes vulnerability proofing of the installation of the hardware component, such that the new hardware component cannot be used when attempts are made to configure it with known vulnerabilities.
Through such capabilities that are implemented in each of the sled IHSs 105a-n, 115a-n, opportunities are mitigated for a single hardware component of one of the sled 105a-n, 115a-n to be configured with known vulnerabilities in a manner that can result in increased vulnerability for the entire chassis 100. In embodiments, any provisioning of a new hardware component of sled 105a-n, 115a-n may be halted by the respective remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n if any known vulnerabilities are identified in the configurations to be applied during the initial provisioning of the hardware component.
In some embodiments, chassis management controller 125 may similarly utilize the vulnerability proofing described herein in order to ensure that replaceable components of chassis 100 are not configured with known vulnerabilities when new components are being installed. In some instances, sleds 105a-n, 115a-n, network controller 140, power supply 135 and various other components of chassis 100 may be replaceable. In some embodiments, chassis management controller 125 may require vulnerability proofing of new components being installed in chassis. The chassis management controller 125 may thus require vulnerability proofing for an new compute sled 105a as part of its installation in chassis 100, where the vulnerability proofing ensures that compute sled 105a does not include hardware or software configurations with known vulnerabilities.
The remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n that are present in chassis 100 may support secure connections with a remote management interface 101. In some embodiments, remote management interface 101 provides a remote administrator with various capabilities for remotely administering the operation of an IHS, including initiating updates to the software and hardware installed in the chassis 100. For example, remote management interface 101 may provide capabilities by which an administrator can initiate updates to the firmware utilized by all of the storage drives 175a-n installed in a chassis 100, or to the firmware utilized by all of the storage drives 175a-n of a particular model or manufacturer. In some instances, remote management interface 101 may include an inventory of the hardware, software and firmware of chassis 100 that is being remotely managed through the operation of the remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n. The remote management interface 101 may also include various monitoring interfaces for evaluating telemetry data collected by the remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n. In some embodiments, remote management interface 101 may communicate with remote access controllers 110a-n, 120a-n via a protocol such the Redfish remote management interface.
In the illustrated embodiment, chassis 100 includes one or more compute sleds 105a-n that are coupled to the backplane 160 and installed within one or more bays or slots of chassis 100. Each of the individual compute sleds 105a-n may be an IHS, such as described with regard to
As illustrated, chassis 100 includes one or more storage sleds 115a-n that are coupled to the backplane 160 and installed within one or more bays of chassis 100 in a similar manner to compute sleds 105a-n. Each of the individual storage sleds 115a-n may include various different numbers and types of storage devices. As described in additional detail with regard to
As illustrated, a storage sled 115a may include one or more DPUs (Data Processing Units) 190 that provide access to and manage the operations of the storage drives 175a of the storage sled 115a. Use of a DPU 190 in this manner provides low-latency and high-bandwidth access to numerous SSDs 175a. These SSDs 175a may be utilized in parallel through NVMe transmissions that are supported by the PCIe switch 165a that connects the SSDs 175a to the DPU 190. In some instances, PCIe switch 165a may be in integrated component of a DPU 190. The data storage and retrieval capabilities provided by such storage sled 115a implementations may be harnessed by offloading storage operations directed as storage drives 175a to a DPU 190a, and thus without relying on the main CPU of the storage sled, or of any other component of chassis 100. As indicated in
In addition to the data storage capabilities provided by storage sleds 115a-n, chassis 100 may provide access to other storage resources that may be installed components of chassis 100 and/or may be installed elsewhere within a rack that houses the chassis 100. In certain scenarios, such storage resources 155 may be accessed via a SAS expander 150 that is coupled to the backplane 160 of the chassis 100. The SAS expander 150 may support connections to a number of JBOD (Just a Bunch Of Disks) storage drives 155 that, in some instances, may be configured and managed individually and without implementing data redundancy across the various drives 155. The additional storage resources 155 may also be at various other locations within a datacenter in which chassis 100 is installed.
In light of the various manners in which storage drives 175a-n, 155 may be coupled to chassis 100, a wide variety of different storage topologies may be supported. Through these supported topologies, storage drives 175a-n, 155 may be logically organized into clusters or other groupings that may be collectively tasked and managed to support specific computing workloads. In some instances, a chassis 100 may include numerous storage drives 175a-n, 155 that are identical, or nearly identical, such as arrays of SSDs of the same manufacturer and model. Accordingly, any updates or other administration of storage drives 175a-n, 155 requires the updates to be applied within each of these topologies being supported by the chassis 100. Despite the large number of different storage drive topologies that may be supported by an individual chassis 100, the firmware or other software used by each of these storage devices 175a-n, 155 may be occasionally updated.
As illustrated, the chassis 100 of
Chassis 100 may similarly include a power supply unit 135 that provides the components of the chassis with various levels of DC power from an AC power source or from power delivered via a power system provided by a rack within which chassis 100 may be installed. In certain embodiments, power supply unit 135 may be implemented within a sled that may provide chassis 100 with redundant, hot-swappable power supply units. Power supply unit 135 may operate according to firmware instructions that may be occasionally updated, such as to adapt the power supply unit for operation according to different modes of operation.
Chassis 100 may also include various I/O controllers 140 that may support various I/O ports, such as USB ports that may be used to support keyboard and mouse inputs and/or video display capabilities. Each of the I/O controllers 140 may operate according to firmware instructions that may be occasionally updated, such as to adapt the I/O controller 140 for operation with different external systems. Such I/O controllers 145 may be utilized by the chassis management controller 125 to support various KVM (Keyboard, Video and Mouse) 125a capabilities that provide administrators with the ability to interface with the chassis 100. The chassis management controller 125 may also include a storage module 125c that provides capabilities for managing and configuring certain aspects of the storage devices of chassis 100, such as the storage devices provided within storage sleds 115a-n and within the JBOD 155.
In addition to providing support for KVM 125a capabilities for administering chassis 100, chassis management controller 125 may support various additional functions for sharing the infrastructure resources of chassis 100. In some scenarios, chassis management controller 125 may implement tools for managing the power 135, network bandwidth 140 and airflow cooling 130 that are available via the chassis 100. As described, the airflow cooling 130 utilized by chassis 100 may include an airflow cooling system that is provided by a rack in which the chassis 100 may be installed and managed by a cooling module 125b of the chassis management controller 125.
For purposes of this disclosure, an IHS may include any instrumentality or aggregate of instrumentalities operable to compute, calculate, determine, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate, switch, store, display, communicate, manifest, detect, record, reproduce, handle, or utilize any form of information, intelligence, or data for business, scientific, control, or other purposes. For example, an IHS may be a personal computer (e.g., desktop or laptop), tablet computer, mobile device (e.g., Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or smart phone), server (e.g., blade server or rack server), a network storage device, or any other suitable device and may vary in size, shape, performance, functionality, and price. An IHS may include Random Access Memory (RAM), one or more processing resources such as a Central Processing Unit (CPU) or hardware or software control logic, Read-Only Memory (ROM), and/or other types of nonvolatile memory. Additional components of an IHS may include one or more disk drives, one or more network ports for communicating with external devices as well as various I/O devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse, touchscreen, and/or a video display. As described, an IHS may also include one or more buses operable to transmit communications between the various hardware components. An example of an IHS is described in more detail below.
IHS 200 may utilize one or more system processors 205, that may be referred to as CPUs (Central Processing Units). In some embodiments, CPUs 205 may each include a plurality of processing cores that may be separately delegated with computing tasks. Each of the CPUs 205 may be individually designated as a main processor and as a co-processor, where such designations may be based on delegation of specific types of computational tasks to a CPU 205. In some embodiments, CPUs 205 may each include an integrated memory controller that may be implemented directly within the circuitry of each CPU 205. In some embodiments, a memory controller may be a separate integrated circuit that is located on the same die as the CPU 205. Each memory controller may be configured to manage the transfer of data to and from a system memory 210 of the IHS, in some cases using a high-speed memory bus 205a. The system memory 210 is coupled to CPUs 205 via one or more memory buses 205a that provide the CPUs 205 with high-speed memory used in the execution of computer program instructions by the CPUs 205. Accordingly, system memory 210 may include memory components, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), NAND Flash memory, suitable for supporting high-speed memory operations by the CPUs 205. In certain embodiments, system memory 210 may combine persistent non-volatile memory and volatile memory.
In certain embodiments, the system memory 210 may be comprised of multiple removable memory modules. The system memory 210 of the illustrated embodiment includes removable memory modules 210a-n. Each of the removable memory modules 210a-n may correspond to a printed circuit board memory socket that receives a removable memory module 210a-n, such as a DIMM (Dual In-line Memory Module), that can be coupled to the socket and then decoupled from the socket as needed, such as to upgrade memory capabilities or to replace faulty memory modules. Other embodiments of IHS system memory 210 may be configured with memory socket interfaces that correspond to different types of removable memory module form factors, such as a Dual In-line Package (DIP) memory, a Single In-line Pin Package (SIPP) memory, a Single In-line Memory Module (SIMM), and/or a Ball Grid Array (BGA) memory.
IHS 200 may utilize a chipset that may be implemented by integrated circuits that are connected to each CPU 205. All or portions of the chipset may be implemented directly within the integrated circuitry of an individual CPU 205. The chipset may provide the CPU 205 with access to a variety of resources accessible via one or more in-band buses. IHS 200 may also include one or more I/O ports 215 that may be used to couple the IHS 200 directly to other IHSs, storage resources, diagnostic tools, and/or other peripheral components. A variety of additional components may be coupled to CPUs 205 via a variety of in-line busses. For instance, CPUs 205 may also be coupled to a power management unit 220 that may interface with a power system of the chassis 100 in which IHS 200 may be installed. In addition, CPUs 205 may collect information from one or more sensors 225 via a management bus.
In certain embodiments, IHS 200 may operate using a BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) that may be stored in a non-volatile memory accessible by the CPUs 205. The BIOS may provide an abstraction layer by which the operating system of the IHS 200 interfaces with hardware components of the IHS. Upon powering or restarting IHS 200, CPUs 205 may utilize BIOS instructions to initialize and test hardware components coupled to the IHS, including both components permanently installed as components of the motherboard of IHS 200 and removable components installed within various expansion slots supported by the IHS 200. The BIOS instructions may also load an operating system for execution by CPUs 205. In certain embodiments, IHS 200 may utilize Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) in addition to or instead of a BIOS. In certain embodiments, the functions provided by a BIOS may be implemented, in full or in part, by the remote access controller 230.
In some embodiments, IHS 200 may include a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) that may include various registers, such as platform configuration registers, and a secure storage, such as an NVRAM (Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory). The TPM may also include a cryptographic processor that supports various cryptographic capabilities. In IHS embodiments that include a TPM, a pre-boot process implemented by the TPM may utilize its cryptographic capabilities to calculate hash values that are based on software and/or firmware instructions utilized by certain core components of IHS, such as the BIOS and boot loader of IHS 200. These calculated hash values may then be compared against reference hash values that were previously stored in a secure non-volatile memory of the IHS, such as during factory provisioning of IHS 200. In this manner, a TPM may establish a root of trust that includes core components of IHS 200 that are validated as operating using instructions that originate from a trusted source.
As illustrated, CPUs 205 may be coupled to a network controller 240, such as provided by a Network Interface Controller (NIC) card that provides IHS 200 with communications via one or more external networks, such as the Internet, a LAN, or a WAN. In some embodiments, network controller 240 may be a replaceable expansion card or other component that is coupled to a connector (e.g., PCIe connector of a motherboard, backplane, midplane, etc.) of IHS 200. In some embodiments, network controller 240 may support high-bandwidth network operations by the IHS 200 through a PCIe interface that is supported by the chipset of CPUs 205. Network controller 240 may operate according to firmware instructions that may be occasionally updated.
As indicated in
As indicated in
As illustrated, PCIe switch 265a is coupled via a PCIe link to a hardware accelerator 250, such as a DPU, SmartNIC, GPU and/or FPGA, that may be a connected to the IHS via a removeable card or baseboard that couples to a PCIe connector of the IHS 200. In some embodiments, hardware accelerator 250 includes a programmable processor that can be configured for offloading functions from CPUs 205. In some embodiments, hardware accelerator 250 may include a plurality of programmable processing cores and/or hardware accelerators, that may be used to implement functions used to support devices coupled to the IHS 200. In some embodiments, the processing cores of hardware accelerator 250 include ARM (advanced RISC (reduced instruction set computing) machine) processing cores. In other embodiments, the cores of DPUs 250a-b may include MIPS (microprocessor without interlocked pipeline stages) cores, RISC-V cores, or CISC (complex instruction set computing) (i.e., x86) cores. Each programmable hardware accelerator 250 may operate according to firmware or other instructions that may be occasionally updated.
In the illustrated embodiment, the programmable capabilities of hardware accelerator 250 implements functions used to support replaceable storage drives 235a, such as SSDs. In such storage drive topologies, hardware accelerator 250 may implement processing of PCIe NVMe communications with SSDs 235a, thus supporting high-bandwidth connections with these SSDs. Hardware accelerator 250 may also include one more memory devices used to store program instructions executed by the processing cores and/or used to support the operation of SSDs 235a such as in implementing cache memories and buffers utilized in support high-speed operation of these storage drives, and in some cases may be used to provide high-availability and high-throughput implementations of the read, write and other I/O operations that are supported by these storage drives 235a. In other embodiments, hardware accelerator 250 may implement operations in support of other types of devices and may similarly support high-bandwidth PCIe connections with these devices. For instance, in various supported workloads, hardware accelerator 250 may support high-bandwidth connections, such as PCIe connections, with networking devices in implementing functions of a network switch, compression and codec functions, virtualization operations or cryptographic functions. In some instances, updates to firmware utilized by hardware accelerators 250 may enable and disable features supported by the hardware accelerators 250.
As illustrated in
As illustrated in
As described, IHS 200 includes a remote access controller 230 that supports remote management of IHS 200 and of various internal components of IHS 200. In certain embodiments, remote access controller 230 may operate from a different power plane from the processors 205 and other components of IHS 200, thus allowing the remote access controller 230 to operate, and management tasks to proceed, while the processing cores of IHS 200 are powered off. Various functions provided by the BIOS, including launching the operating system of the IHS 200, and/or functions of a TPM may be implemented or supplemented by the remote access controller 230. In some embodiments, the remote access controller 230 may perform various functions to verify the integrity of the IHS 200 and its hardware components prior to initialization of the operating system of IHS 200 (i.e., in a bare-metal state). In some embodiments, certain operations of the remote access controller 230, such as the operations described herein for validation proofing the installation of new hardware in IHS 200, may operate using validated instructions, and thus within the root of trust of IHS 200.
As provided above, remote access controller 230 may be configured to implement validation proofing procedures by which hardware being installed in IHS 200 may be validated as not being configured with any known vulnerabilities. Otherwise, in instances where remote access controller 230 identifies known vulnerabilities in the configurations of hardware component being installed in IHS 200, embodiments may halt any use of the new hardware component and/or any further use of IHS 200. In this manner, remote access controller 230 may prevent initial provisioning of a new hardware component being installed in IHS 200 with known vulnerabilities. For instance, during installation of a new storage drive 235a-b, remote access controller 230 evaluates the proposed configurations for the new storage drive against one or more catalogs of known hardware vulnerabilities, such as specific firmware versions that have been replaced due to security flaws or functional errors. If any vulnerabilities are identified in the firmware to be loaded and used to operate the new storage drive 235a-b, remote access controller 230 may halt further provisioning of the new storage drive, thus preventing the storage drive from being configured and installed in IHS 200 with known vulnerabilities.
In some embodiments, remote access controller 230 may include a service processor 230a, or specialized microcontroller, that operates management software that supports remote monitoring and administration of IHS 200. The management operations supported by remote access controller 230 may be remotely initiated, updated and monitored via a remote management interface 101, such as described with regard to
In some embodiments, remote access controller 230 may implement monitoring and management operations using MCTP (Management Component Transport Protocol) messages that may be communicated to managed devices 205, 235a-b, 240, 250, 255, 260 via management connections supported by a sideband bus 255. In some instances, the sideband management connections supported by remote access controller 230 may include PLDM (Platform Level Data Model) management communications with the managed devices 205, 235a-b, 240, 250, 255, 260 of IHS 200. In some embodiments, the remote access controller 230 may additionally or alternatively use MCTP messaging to transmit Vendor Defined Messages (VDMs) via the in-line PCIe switch fabric supported by PCIe switches 265a-b. For instance, remote access controller 230 may transmit firmware to managed devices utilizing inband signaling, such as VDMs that are transmitted using MCTP over the PCIe switch fabric that is implemented by PCIe switch 255, and/or utilizing sideband signaling, such as PLDM communications transmitted via sideband connections 255 supported by an I2C co-processor 230b of the remote access controller 230.
As illustrated, remote access controller 230 may include a network adapter 230c that provides the remote access controller with network access that is separate from the network controller 240 utilized by other hardware components of the IHS 200. Through secure connections supported by network adapter 230c, remote access controller 230 communicates management information with remote management interface 101. In support of remote monitoring functions, network adapter 230c may support connections between remote access controller 255 and external management tools using wired and/or wireless network connections that operate using a variety of network technologies. As a non-limiting example of a remote access controller, the integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC) from Dell® is embedded within Dell servers and provides functionality that helps information technology (IT) administrators deploy, update, monitor, and maintain servers remotely.
Remote access controller 230 supports monitoring and administration of the managed devices of an IHS via a sideband bus interface 255. For instance, messages utilized in device and/or system management may be transmitted using I2C sideband bus 255 connections that may be individually established with each of the respective managed devices 205, 235a-b, 240, 250, 255, 260 of the IHS 200 through the operation of an I2C multiplexer 230d of the remote access controller. As illustrated in
In certain embodiments, the service processor 230a of remote access controller 230 may rely on an I2C co-processor 230b to implement sideband I2C communications between the remote access controller 230 and the managed hardware components 205, 235a-b, 240, 250, 255, 260 of the IHS 200. The I2C co-processor 230b may be a specialized co-processor or micro-controller that is configured to implement a I2C bus interface used to support communications with managed hardware components 205, 235a-b, 240, 250, 255, 260 of IHS. In some embodiments, the I2C co-processor 230b may be an integrated circuit on the same die as the service processor 230a, such as a peripheral system-on-chip feature that may be provided by the service processor 230a. The sideband I2C bus 255 is illustrated as single line in
In various embodiments, an IHS 200 does not include each of the components shown in
In some instances, an IHS may be manufactured using a factory process that includes multiple phases of assembly, validation and provisioning that must be completed before the IHS is shipped to a customer. As described, an IHS such as a server may be purpose-built for a particular customer such that the server is assembled and provisioned according to specifications provided by the customer. The initial factory assembly of such server IHSs may include the selection of a chassis and the fastening of various hardware components to the selected chassis. Such a factory assembly process may include generating a manifest that tracks the individual hardware components that are installed in an IHS. As described above, the installed hardware components may include standard components and may also include specialized components that have been requested by a specific customer that has contracted for the assembly and delivery of an IHS. For example, a customer request an IHS with a specific set of hardware components installed, where each of the hardware components in the requested configuration operates using a specific firmware version.
Once the assembly of an IHS has been completed, the IHS may be subjected to manual and automated inspections that confirm the IHS has been properly assembled and does not include any defects. After confirming an IHS has been assembled without any manufacturing defects, factory provisioning of the IHS may be initiated. In some instances, the provisioning of an IHS at the factory may include various stages that may include stages for loading of firmware, configuring hardware components, and installing an operating system and other software. Various different aspects of this factory provisioning process may be conducted using a factory provisioning application, where this factory provisioning application may run on one or more servers and may interface with an IHS that is being provisioned once a requisite amount of firmware and software has been installed to the IHS.
A manifest of the individual hardware components that are installed in an IHS may be generated during assembly of the IHS. Such a manifest may be a file that includes an entry for each component installed to an IHS, where the entry may specify various characteristics of the component, such as model numbers and installation locations, and may also specify any unique identifiers associated with the component, such as a MAC address or a serial number. The manifest generated during assembly of an IHS is provided to the factory provisioning application that will being used to provision the assembled IHS, which includes installing firmware and other software on the IHS.
As part of the this factory provisioning, one or more firmware versions and associated firmware settings may be loaded for use by various hardware components of the IHS. In some embodiments, the one or more firmware versions that are loaded for use by each hardware component during factory provisioning may be determined based on a service agreement or other configuration for the IHS that was selected by a customer as part of the purchase of the IHS. Once the set of firmware versions for each of the hardware components of the IHS has been selected, the factory provisioning application may confirm the authenticity and integrity of the selected firmware versions based on digital signatures provided by hardware component manufacturers or other entities providing the firmware. The manifest of the IHS may then be updated to identify the firmware versions that are supported by each of the managed hardware components of IHS and may also be updated to include digital signatures associated with each of the supported firmware versions. In this manner, the factory-provisioning system may upload one or more supported firmware versions to at least some of the factory-installed hardware components of an IHS.
Based on the hardware inventory and firmware version information that is specified in the manifest of the IHS, the factory provisioning application may initiate the generation of an identity certificate that may be used to validate the detected hardware components of the IHS as the same hardware components that were installed during the factory assembly of the IHS. In addition, in some embodiments, an identity certificate may be further factory provisioned to also include vulnerability proofing instructions for use when new hardware components are being installed to the IHS. Once the IHS has been delivered, the inventory certificate may then be used to validate the authenticity of the detected hardware and software of an IHS, and to further validate the vulnerability proofing instructions in the inventory certificate, which may then be used in confidence to ensure that configurations for new hardware components installed in an IHS do not include known vulnerabilities.
As described with regard to
In some embodiments, the remote access controller generates a certificate signing request (CSR) for the generation of a digital identity certificate, where the request specifies the public key of the key pair generated by the remote access controller, and also specifies the factory installed hardware inventory from the manifest that was generated during assembly of the IHS, and also specifies an inventory of the authorized firmware for one or more of the managed hardware components of the IHS, and also specifies vulnerability proofing instructions for the installation of new hardware components to the IHS. The factory installed and provisioned hardware and firmware inventory information and vulnerability proofing instructions that are included in the CSRs may be signed by the remote access controller using the private key from the generated keypair. The CSR for the requested identity certificate may then be transmitted to the factory provisioning application.
The factory provisioning application may submit the CSR for signing by a factory certificate authority. Upon receipt of the CSR, the factory certificate authority may parse from the CSR: the hardware inventory information, the inventory of authorized firmware for the managed hardware components of the IHS, the vulnerability proofing instructions for the IHS, the public key generated by the remote access controller and the information specifying a requested signing key. Based on the information parsed from the CSRs, the factory certificate authority generates a digital identity certificate, referred to herein as an inventory certificate, that is associated with the public key provided by the remote access controller and that specifies the factory installed hardware inventory of the IHS and vulnerability proofing instructions for the installation of new hardware components to the IHS.
The factory certificate authority may submit the generated inventory certificate for signing by a hardware security module that may be a dedicated hardware component of a factory provisioning server that safeguards cryptographic keys and implements cryptographic functions utilized in the factory provisioning process. The hardware security module digitally signs the submitted inventory certificate, which is then returned to the factory provisioning application. In some embodiments, the factory provisioning application may retain a copy of the signed certificate. In some instances, copies of the inventory and device certificate may be retained to reference data store utilized in providing ongoing support of the IHS once it has been shipped and has been deployed by a customer, such as in issuing updated certificates for an IHS in response to changes to the IHS that result in changes to the authorized hardware and/or software supported by the IHS, and in response to changes in vulnerability proofing requirements to be used during the installation of new hardware components to the IHS.
The signed inventory certificate may then be loaded to the assembled IHS as part of the factory provisioning of the IHS. In some embodiments, the signed inventory certificate may be uploaded to a secured memory of the remote access controller, such as described with regard to
Once a received IHS has been provisioned for operation within a datacenter, at 315, the IHS is initialized. As part of the initialization of the IHS, various procedures may be implemented for validating the authenticity of the hardware components of the IHS. As described, an IHS may be factory provisioned to include an inventory certificate that specifies the factory installed hardware components of the IHS. At 320, such a factory-provisioned inventory certificate may be utilized to validate the hardware components detected during initialization of the IHS. Each detected hardware component is identified by the IHS and the hardware component may be initialized only if its detected identity matches a hardware identity specified in the factory provisioned inventory certificate. In this same manner, the factory-provisioned firmware for these hardware components may also be validated against one or more firmware identities specified in the inventory certificate.
One of the hardware components that may be validated in this manner is a remote access controller of an IHS, where both the identity of the remote access controller and the firmware instructions loaded for use by the remote access controller may be validated based on the signed inventory certificate. At 325, these validated instructions may be used in initializing the remote access controller. Once initialized, at 330, the remote access controller collects an inventory of the detected managed hardware components of the IHS. As described with regard to
Based on this collected inventory, at 335, the remote access controller identifies any new hardware components that have been coupled to the IHS since the last time the IHS was initialized. For instance, the remote access controller may detect such devices through information provided by a BIOS of the IHS and/or by detecting devices requesting access communication busses managed by the remote access controller, such as new hardware components connected to any of the sideband management buses supported by the remote access controller. Once a new hardware component has been detected by the remote access controller, some embodiments may halt all further initialization of the IHS until vulnerability proofing of the new hardware component can be completed. In some embodiments, the remote access controller may interrogate the new hardware component for information such as firmware versions to be loaded and configurations for the component.
In some instances, new hardware components may be added to an IHS during the time it is deployed within a datacenter. In some cases, the new hardware components will be newly received hardware components that have never been installed in any IHS. In other cases, the new components may be repurposed hardware components that are being moved from another IHS. In some cases, the new hardware component may replace another component that has been removed. In all such cases, an IHS may be temporarily removed from service which an administrator makes the changes and couples the new hardware component to the IHS, either by opening the IHS and accessing internal circuit boards and connectors, or by external couplings of the IHS. As part of adding a new hardware component to the IHS, an administrator may select a profile for provisioning the new hardware component, where the profile may specify firmware to be used by the component and may also specify various other settings and configurations for the hardware component.
In some instances, an administrator may utilize an existing provisioning profile for provisioning a new hardware component. For example, rather than define a new profile from scratch for provisioning a new hardware component, an administrator may identify a previously used profile used to provision a similar hardware component, where the profile can also be used, possibly with some changes, to provision the new hardware component. As a known profile is used repeatedly in this manner for provisioning new hardware components, some profiles are relied upon as “golden” configurations that have been used successfully and are thus trusted by the administrator. However, such reliance on use of existing profiles may result in the hardware components being provisioned from the outset with known vulnerabilities. As described in additional detail below, various entities may publish information identifying discovered vulnerabilities of an IHS, specific hardware components and/or specific hardware and software configurations.
By utilizing an existing profile for provisioning of a new hardware component, an administrator may be unaware that configurations included in the profile may have known vulnerabilities. For example, a profile may specify use of a particular firmware version by a network controller that is being installed in the IHS, but an administrator may be unaware that a security vulnerability has been identified in this particular firmware version. Unless the administrator actively investigates whether any vulnerabilities have been identified in the configurations of an existing profile that is being used to provision a new hardware component, and unless the administrator addresses any identified vulnerabilities, the new hardware component will be provisioned at the outset with known vulnerabilities. Accordingly, at 345, embodiments may continue with the remote access controller determining vulnerability proofing requirements for the new hardware component.
As described above, in some embodiments, vulnerability proofing instructions for new hardware components of an IHS may be specified within a factory provisioned inventory certificate. For instance, an inventory certificate may specify that all new hardware components to be installed to an IHS must be provisioned with no known vulnerabilities. In some instances, an inventory certificate may specify that certain types of hardware components, such as all storage drives, to be installed to an IHS must be provisioned with no known vulnerabilities. In some instances, an inventory certificate may specify that certain types of hardware components must be proofed for certain types of known vulnerabilities, such as all hardware accelerators must be provisioned with no known security vulnerabilities, in light of the use of the hardware accelerators in implementing a cryptographic security protocol used to secure communications by the IHS. In this manner, the vulnerability proofing instructions included in an inventory certificate may specify that provisioning of a new hardware component requires that no known security vulnerabilities may be identified in a proposed provisioning profile, but provisioning of the new hardware component may proceed with identified functional vulnerabilities, such as an known software bugs that are not exploitable as security loopholes, such as a bug that results in a graphics controller using non-calibrated display settings that distort color outputs of a display monitor.
In some embodiments, the inventory certificate may also specify one or more catalogs of known vulnerabilities that are to be consulted when provisioning a new hardware component. In some embodiments, the inventory certificate may specify types of vulnerabilities that are to evaluated and responses to the different types of vulnerabilities. As described, the inventory certificate may be factory provisioned to the IHS and may specify catalogs of known vulnerabilities that must be investigated when adding new hardware components to the IHS. In this manner, a customer that manages a large number of IHSs may specify requirements for vulnerability proofing the installation of new hardware all of their IHSs using catalogs of known vulnerabilities that are controlled by the customer and that are securely stored by the individual IHSs. Updating the catalogs that are evaluated for vulnerability proofing of new hardware components cannot be circumvented without a factory provisioned update to the inventory certificate that specifies the catalogs that must be investigated for known vulnerabilities. In this manner, datacenter administrators tasked with maintaining support for the IHSs are assured that the installation of new hardware to the IHSs does not inadvertently introduce vulnerabilities that could impact the entire datacenter.
Once the vulnerability proofing requirements for provisioning a new hardware component of the IHS have been identified, at 350, the remote access controller determines whether any of the proposed configurations for the new hardware component include known vulnerabilities.
At 410, the remote access controller identifies one or move catalogs 420 of known vulnerabilities, that may include hardware, software and/or workload configurations with known vulnerabilities. A catalog may be any collection of structured data, such as a database, data structure or a file, such as an XML file. A catalog is intended to be generally available to the public and is intended as available to data center administrators. One or more different entities may generate and maintain catalogs 420 specifying known vulnerabilities of hardware and/or software components that may be installed in an IHS. For instance, the manufacturer of an IHS may maintain one or more catalogs specifying known vulnerabilities identified in IHS models sold by the manufacturer, known vulnerabilities of factory installed hardware components of IHSs sold by the manufacturer, known vulnerabilities in hardware and/or software configurations supported by these hardware components and known vulnerabilities in workload configurations supported by IHSs sold by the manufacturer. Similar catalogs 420 of known vulnerabilities may be maintained by other entities, such as third parties that publish known security vulnerabilities that have been identified in products sold by various different manufacturers. In some instances, catalogs 420 of known vulnerabilities may be maintained by entities contracted to provide technical support for an IHS or for a network of IHSs, such as for one or more data centers. In some instances, catalogs 420 of known vulnerabilities may be maintained by hardware component manufacturers, such as a manufacturer of network controllers that maintains a catalog of vulnerabilities that have been identified in its supported products.
As described, an IHS may be factory provisioned with an inventory certificate that specifies vulnerability proofing instructions for new hardware components that are installed to the IHS. In some embodiments, the vulnerability proofing instructions may also specify the catalogs for use in identifying known vulnerabilities in new hardware components, where the validity of this catalog information included in the inventory certificate can be confirmed based on the digital signatures included in the inventory certificate. In some embodiments, the catalogs that are used in identifying known vulnerabilities in new hardware components may be supplemented through the generation of an updated inventory certificate that adds to the catalogs that must be searched for vulnerabilities by the vulnerability proofing procedures implemented by the remote access controller. For instance, based on a new hardware component being shipped to a customer for installation in an IHS, the inventory certificate of that IHS may be updated to specify an additional catalog that must be consulted when validation proofing new hardware components that are being installed to the IHS. In this example, the new catalog may be supported by a manufacturer of the new hardware component that is being shipped for installation in the IHS. In this manner, the inventory certificate may be used to configure vulnerability proofing on an individual IHS such that the IHS is provided with the best known sources of vulnerability information for hardware components being added to the IHS.
Despite the existence of such vulnerability catalogs, their use is not enforced within existing procedures for provisioning new hardware component being installed in an IHS, thus providing the described opportunity for the new hardware component to be provisioned at the outset with known vulnerabilities. Even if consulting such catalogs of known vulnerabilities is technically a required step in manual provisioning of a new hardware component being installed in an IHS, such requirements cannot be enforced. Moreover, even when an administrator attempts to consult the vulnerability catalogs, the highly tedious task of determining whether any of the hardware or software configurations of a profile are present in any of the available vulnerability catalogs is an error-prone task. Additionally, such vulnerability catalogs may be updated at any time, thus requiring an administrator to repeat a complete search for vulnerabilities for each and every IHS that is provisioned. Despite the difficulty of enforcing the use of these vulnerability catalogs, such catalogs are still an effective way of disseminating information specifying known hardware and software vulnerabilities to a wide array of customers.
Embodiments may continue, at 425, with the parsing of the profile that includes the hardware and software configurations for the new hardware component being installed in the IHS. As illustrated in
Also from the parsed profile information, at 435a, the remote access controller identifies any hardware configurations for the new hardware component. For instance, provisioning of a new storage controller being installed in an IHS may include configuring the storage controller for operation within a specific storage cluster that is operating within a data center, such as configuration of the new storage controller as a part of cluster of servers implementing a RAID storage system. At 435b, the remote access controller determines whether this RAID configuration when used by this particular storage controller that is being installed has been associated with any known vulnerabilities that are specified in any of the one or more catalogs that are being consulted as part of the vulnerability proofing. If no vulnerabilities are identified, provisioning of the new hardware component using the configurations specified in the profile may continue. However, as indicated in
Also from the parsed profile information, at 440a, the remote access controller identifies any operating system configurations to be made in support of the new hardware component. For instance, use of certain graphics functions supported by a newly installed GPU may require use of a particular version of an operating system on the IHS. Accordingly, the profile for use in provisioning a new hardware accelerator may include a configuration that upgrades the operating system of the IHS to a new version. At 440b, the remote access controller determines whether this operating system version or any of the operating system setting have been associated with any known vulnerabilities that are specified in any of the one or more catalogs that are being consulted as part of the vulnerability proofing. If no vulnerabilities are identified, provisioning of the operating system configurations specified in the profile for the new hardware component may continue. However, as indicated in
Also from the parsed profile information, at 445a, the remote access controller identifies any workload configurations to be made as part of the installation of the new hardware component. For instance, provisioning of a hardware accelerator being installed in the IHS may include configurations for use of the hardware accelerator for machine learning workloads, such as training neural networks used in machine vision. At 445b, the remote access controller determines whether any of the configurations that are part of this workload configuration have been associated with any known vulnerabilities that are specified in any of the one or more catalogs that are being consulted as part of the vulnerability proofing. If no vulnerabilities are identified, provisioning of the new hardware component for use in the workload specified in the profile may continue. However, as indicated in
As indicated in
In instances where the identified remediation procedures can be utilized by the IHS, the proposed profile for provisioning the new hardware component is amended based on the remediation procedures, and provisioning of the new hardware component continues, at 365, using the remediated profile. In some embodiments, remediation procedures that will be used to amend the proposed profile may be specified to the administrator that is provisioning the new hardware component, such as via a graphical interface of the remote management interface being used by the administrator. In some embodiments, the administrator may be notified of the identified vulnerabilities in the proposed profile for the new hardware component and may be further notified of the remediation procedures that have been identified and confirmed as available for use by the IHS. In some embodiments, the administrator may be asked to confirm the amendments to the profile to be used in provisioning the new hardware component.
Once the new hardware component has been provisioned for operation in an IHS, at 370, the IHS is deployed and put back into service within the data center, now utilizing the newly provisioned hardware component. By preemptively addressing known vulnerabilities in the profile presented by the administrator for provisioning the new hardware component, once the new hardware component is deployed it is ready for immediate use. In existing systems, a new hardware component may be provisioned without addressing known vulnerabilities. Once the new hardware component is deployed, various tools may be used to identify and address these vulnerabilities. However, if the new hardware component is deployed with known vulnerabilities, opportunities are provided for these vulnerabilities to be exploited before they are actually addressed. Additionally, deferring remediation of the vulnerabilities until a new hardware component has been deployed will result in the hardware component and/or IHS being taken back out of service to address the vulnerabilities, thus immediately reducing its availability. Embodiments thus provide capabilities by which a new hardware component may be provisioned by a customer in a manner that addresses all known vulnerabilities in the hardware and software configurations for the new hardware component that are proposed for use by the customer, thus preventing the new hardware component from the provisioned without addressing known vulnerabilities.
As indicated, in scenarios where the identified vulnerabilities cannot be remediated, at 360, further provisioning and use of the new hardware component may be disabled, or at least restricted. In some instances, repeated attempts may be made to identify available remediation procedures that can used to address identified vulnerabilities and that are available for use on the IHS. However, in scenarios where no remediation procedures are available, embodiments may prevent further provisioning of the new hardware component. In some embodiments, the remote access controller may suspend bus communications by the new hardware component for all buses that are mastered or are otherwise controllable by the remote access controller. Additionally or alternatively, the remote access controller may notify the processors, TPM, BIOS, operating system of the untrusted state of the new hardware component that is still physically coupled to the IHS. Based on such notifications, all bus communications by the new hardware component are disabled.
As described above, instructions specifying vulnerability proofing requirements for new hardware components installed in an IHS may be specified in an inventory certificate that is used to validate the authenticity of the detected hardware and software of the IHS. In some embodiments, successful validation of such an inventory certificate may further require addressing the vulnerability proofing requirements that are specified in the inventory certificate. In this manner, complete validation of the inventory certificate requires both validation of the authenticity of the hardware and software in use and also validation that no known vulnerabilities are present in new hardware components that have been installed. In such embodiments, without addressing vulnerability proofing requirements specified in the inventory certificate, the inventory certificate validation process fails and further initialization of the IHS cannot be completed since a root of trusted components of the IHS has not been established. In this manner, an IHS may be prevented from being used when new hardware components installed to the IHS includes known vulnerabilities.
It should be understood that various operations described herein may be implemented in software executed by logic or processing circuitry, hardware, or a combination thereof. The order in which each operation of a given method is performed may be changed, and various operations may be added, reordered, combined, omitted, modified, etc. It is intended that the invention(s) described herein embrace all such modifications and changes and, accordingly, the above description should be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.
Although the invention(s) is/are described herein with reference to specific embodiments, various modifications and changes can be made without departing from the scope of the present invention(s), as set forth in the claims below. Accordingly, the specification and figures are to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense, and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention(s). Any benefits, advantages, or solutions to problems that are described herein with regard to specific embodiments are not intended to be construed as a critical, required, or essential feature or element of any or all the claims.
Unless stated otherwise, terms such as “first” and “second” are used to arbitrarily distinguish between the elements such terms describe. Thus, these terms are not necessarily intended to indicate temporal or other prioritization of such elements. The terms “coupled” or “operably coupled” are defined as connected, although not necessarily directly, and not necessarily mechanically. The terms “a” and “an” are defined as one or more unless stated otherwise. The terms “comprise” (and any form of comprise, such as “comprises” and “comprising”), “have” (and any form of have, such as “has” and “having”), “include” (and any form of include, such as “includes” and “including”) and “contain” (and any form of contain, such as “contains” and “containing”) are open-ended linking verbs. As a result, a system, device, or apparatus that “comprises,” “has,” “includes” or “contains” one or more elements possesses those one or more elements but is not limited to possessing only those one or more elements. Similarly, a method or process that “comprises,” “has,” “includes” or “contains” one or more operations possesses those one or more operations but is not limited to possessing only those one or more operations.
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