Patent Grant
10523422
The present invention relates to a tampering detection technique for detecting data tampering in secure computation in which data processing is performed while concealing data.
An existing checksum technique used for tampering detection is the one described in Non-patent literature 1. The checksum technique described in Non-patent literature 1 includes addition and multiplication and can be efficiently applied to secure computation.
The checksum technique described in Non-patent literature 1 uses random numbers r∈F to generate a check sum c of values a0, . . . , aN−1∈F according to Formula 1 given below, where F is a field.
In Non-patent literature 1, the checksum c is verified according to Formula 2 given below.
If Formula 2 yields 0, then it is determined that none of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 have been tampered with. If Formula 2 yields a value other than 0, it is determined that at least one of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 has been tampered with.
Non-patent literature 1: S. Obana and T. Araki, “Almost optimum secret sharing schemes secure against cheating for arbitrary secret distribution”, ASIACRYPT, Vol. 4284 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 364-379, 2006.
In the tampering detection technique described in Non-patent literature 1, the probability of successful tampering is N/|F| when the field F is predetermined. Here, N represents the number of pieces of data for which the checksum is generated and |*| represents the number of the elements of *. Thus, since the probability of successful tampering is proportional to the number N of pieces of data, the probability of successful tampering increases as the number of pieces of data for which a checksum is generated increases.
An object of the present invention is to provide a tampering detection technique that can be efficiently applied to secure computation and can achieve a lower probability of successful tampering.
To solve the problem described above, a tampering detection device of the present invention includes: a parameter storage storing a parameter αijk for uniformly mapping from a ring R to a ring Rq, where i=0, . . . , q−1, j=0, . . . , q−1, and k=0, . . . , q−1; a division part dividing N values a0, . . . , aN−1 into sets of q values, starting from the first value, to generate value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1; a generation part using the value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 to generate a checksum c including addition and multiplication, where vector multiplication is a function f defined by the formula given below; a verification part comparing a verification value with the check sum c to determine whether or not any of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 has been tampered with, the verification value being generated using vector multiplication which is the function f; where N and q are integers greater than or equal to 2 and ρ is a minimum integer greater than or equal to N/q.
The tampering detection technique of the present invention can be efficiently applied to secure computation and can achieve a lower probability of successful tampering.
Embodiments of the present invention will be described below in detail. Like components are given like reference numerals throughout the drawings and repeated description of those components will be omitted.
[First Embodiment]
A first embodiment of the present invention is an embodiment in which the present invention is applied to a checksum technique including addition and multiplication described in Non-patent literature 1.
<Configuration>
An exemplary configuration of a tampering detection device 1 according to first embodiment will be described with reference to
<Checksum Generation Process>
An exemplary operation of a checksum generation process executed by the tampering detection device 1 of this embodiment will be described in detail in the order of procedure with reference to
Parameters αijk for uniformly mapping from two elements of a ring Rq to one element of the ring Rq (where i=0, . . . , q−1; j=0, . . . , q−1; and k=0, . . . , q−1) is stored beforehand in the parameter storage 19. The parameter αijk can be obtained by determining a ring R and the degree q. While there can be a plurality of parameters αijk, it is desirable to choose it parameters αijk that include q3 values including the most 0s. For example, efficient tampering detection can be achieved by choosing such parameters αijk that R is a field and Rq is an expansion field of the field R.
N values a0, . . . , aN−1∈R are input into the input part 11 of the tampering detection device 1 (step S11a). The input values a0, . . . , aN−1 are input into the division part 12. While the values a0, . . . , aN−1 may be any information, the values a0, . . . , aN−1 may be ciphertext of homomorphic encryption or shares of secret sharing. Homomorphic encryption is an encryption method that has homomorphism and enables calculation of the sum or product of original plain text from ciphertext without decryption. An example of homomorphic encryption is ElGamal cryptosystem. Details of the ElGamal cryptosystem are described in documents such as ‘T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and signature scheme based on discrete logarithms”, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 469-472, 1985 (Reference literature 1)’. Secret sharing is a technique by which data is transformed into multiple shares so that the original data can be reconstructed by using a certain number of shares or more but none of the original data can be reconstructed by using any number of shares less than the certain number. One example is Shamir's secret sharing. Details of Shamir's secret sharing are described in documents such as ‘A. Shamir, “How to share a secret”, Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, issue 11, pp. 612-613, 1979 (Reference literature 2)’.
The division part 12 divides the N values a0, . . . , aN−1 into sets of q values, starting from the first value, to generate p value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 (step S12a). The generated value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 are input into the generation part 14. If the number of elements of the last value vector Aρ−1 is not q as a result of the division, the value vector is padded with an arbitrary value so that the number of elements becomes q. For example, if the last vector is padded with 0 and N=11 and q=2, then a0, . . . , a10 may be divided as A0:=(a0, a1), A1:=(a2, a3), A2:=(a4, a5), . . . , A5:=(a10, 0).
The selection part 13 selects a random number r∈Rq (step S13). The selected random number r is input into the generation part 14. The selection part 13 may select one random number r at random at a time or may select a random number r from among a plurality of values generated and stored in the memory 102 beforehand in accordance with a rule. Furthermore, a random number may be a pseudorandom number generated from any encryption method or a hash function, instead of a true random number.
The generation part 14 uses the value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 and the random number r to generate a checksum c (step S14). The generated checksum c and the random number r are input into the output part 16. Specifically, the generation part 14 calculates the checksum c in accordance with Formula 4 given below.
Here the multiplication of the vectors is performed by using a function f defined by Formulas 5.
The output part 16 outputs the checksum c and the random number r (step S16a).
<Checksum Verification Process>
An exemplary operation of a checksum verification process executed by the tampering detection device 1 of this embodiment will be described in detail in the order of procedure with reference to
N values a0, . . . , aN−1∈R, a random number r∈Rq and a checksum c are input in the input part 11 of the tampering detection device 1 (step S1lb). The input values a0, . . . , aN−1 are input into the division part 12. The input random number r and checksum c are input into the verification part 15.
The division part 12 divides the values a0, . . . , aN−1 into sets of q values, starting from the first value, to generate value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 (step S12b). The method for the division is the same as the processing by the division part 12 in the checksum generation process. The processing at step S12b can be omitted by configuring to store the value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 generated in the checksum generation process.
The verification part 15 uses the value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 and the checksum c to generate a verification result indicating whether or not any of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 have been tampered with (step S15). The verification result is input into the output part 16.
Specifically, the verification part 15 evaluates Formula 6 given below. If Formula 6 yields 0, the verification part 15 determines that none of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 has been tampered with. If Formula 6 yields a value other than 0, the verification part 15 determines that at least one of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 has been tampered with.
Here the multiplication of the vectors is performed by using the function f defined by Formulas 5 as in the checksum generation process.
The output part 16 outputs the verification result (step S16b).
<Effect>
The checksum technique described in Non-patent literature 1 provides a probability of successful tampering of N/p at best, where N is the number of pieces of data for which a checksum is generated and p is the number of elements of a ring R. Assuming that the ring R is fixed and p=2, for example, the tampering detection has little effect.
The checksum technique in the first embodiment can achieve a low probability of successful tampering by calculation using value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1∈Rq as a unit. For example, if the ring R is a prime filed, i.e. Z/pZ, where Z is an integer ring, p is a prime number and q is an integer greater than or equal to 2, a probability of successful tampering as low as approximately N/pq can be achieved. Therefore an arbitrary low probability of successful tampering can be achieved by using a degree of field extension q which can be set to an arbitrary value.
[Second Embodiment]
A second embodiment of the present invention is an embodiment in which the present invention is applied to a checksum that can achieve a lower probability of successful tampering than the probability that can be achieved by the checksum described in Non-patent literature 1.
<Configuration>
An exemplary configuration of a tampering detection device 2 of second embodiment will be described with reference to
<Checksum Generation Process>
An exemplary operation of a checksum generation process executed by the tampering detection device 2 of this embodiment will be described in detail in the order of procedure with reference to
The process from step S11a through S12a is the same as that in the first embodiment and therefore the description of steps S11a through S12a will be omitted here.
The selection part 23 of this embodiment selects M random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1∈Rq (step S23). The selected random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 are input into the generation part 24. The selection part 23 may select the M random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 at random at a time or may select the M random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 from among a plurality of values stored in the memory 102 beforehand in accordance with a predetermined rule.
The generation part 24 of this embodiment uses value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 and the random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 to generate a checksum c (step S24). The generated check sum c and the random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 are input into the output part 16. Specifically, the generation part 24 calculates the checksum c according to Formula 7 given below.
Here the multiplication of the vectors is performed by using a function f defined by Formulas 5 as in the checksum generation process.
In Formula 7, the function d(i, j) is a function that determines the order of the j-th random number rj for the i-th value ai. It is assumed here that d(i, j)≠d(i′, j) is satisfied with any j (where j<M), where i and j′ are natural numbers and i≠j′. In other words, combinations of the orders of the random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 need to be combinations that do not overlap each other for each Ai.
For example, if ρ=3 and M=2, then c=A0r0+A1r1+A2r0r1 may be calculated. If ρ=4 and M=2, then c=A0r0+A1r1+A2r0r1+A3r02r1 may be calculated or c=A0r02r1+A1r0r1+A2r1+A3r0 may be calculated.
While M may be any value that is greater than or equal to 2 and less than ρ, the highest efficiency is provided by choosing a minimum integer that exceeds log2ρ as M because all of the orders of random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 can be less than or equal to 1. For example, if ρ=7 and M=3, then c=A0r0+A1r1+A2r0r1+A3r2+A4r0r2+A5r1r2+A6r0r1r2 can be calculated and the orders of all of the random numbers can be less than or equal to 1.
The output part 16 outputs the checksum c and the random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 (step S16a).
<Checksum Verification Process>
An exemplary operation of a checksum verification process executed by the tampering detection device 2 of this embodiment will be described in detail in the order of procedure with reference to
The process from step S11b through step S12b is the same as that in the first embodiment and therefore the description of the steps S11a through S12b will be omitted here.
The verification part 25 uses the value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1 the random numbers r0, . . . , rM−1 and the checksum c to generate a verification result indicating whether or not any of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 has been tampered (step S25). The verification result is input into the output part 16.
Specifically, the verification part 25 evaluates Formula 8 given below. If Formula 8 is true, the verification part 25 determines that none of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 has been tampered with. If Formula 8 is false, the verification part 25 determines that at least one of the values a0, . . . , aN−1 has been tampered with.
Here the multiplication of the vectors is performed by using a function f defined by Formulas 5 as in the checksum generation process.
The function d(i,j) in Formula 8 is the same as the function d(i,j) in Formula 7.
The output part 16 outputs the result of the verification (step S16b).
<Effect>
If the checksum in the second embodiment is calculated using values a0, . . . , aN−1∈R as a unit, the probability of successful tampering is logN/p at best, where N is the number of pieces of data for which the checksum is generated and p is the number of elements of the ring R. Although this probability is lower than the probability achieved by the checksum technique described in Non-patent literature 1, the tampering detection has little effect if the ring R is fixed and p=2, for example.
By calculating the checksum in the second embodiment using value vectors A0, . . . , Aρ−1∈Rq as a unit, a low probability of successful tampering can be achieved. For example, a probability of successful tampering of approximately logN/pq can be achieved, where Z is an integer ring, p is a prime number, q is an integer greater than or equal to 2, and the ring R is a prime field, Z/pZ. Therefore, an arbitrary low probability of successful tampering can be achieved by using a degree of field extension q which can be set to an arbitrary value.
[Example Application]
The tampering detection technique of the present invention can find a wide variety of applications. For example, the technique can be used when ciphertext generated by homomorphic encryption or share data generated by secret sharing is entrusted to a server managed by a third party. In such a case, there are risks such as the risk of the data being tampered with by a malicious attacker accessing the server, the risk of the entrusted data being maliciously tampered with by the server itself, and the risk of data being tampered with by malware infecting the server. Generating and adding a checksum of the present invention to data to be entrusted enables the server to perform data processing on the concealed data while concealing the data and prevent data tampering.
[Program and Recording Medium]
It would be understood that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit of the present invention. Furthermore, the processes described in the embodiments may be performed not only in time sequence as is written or may be performed in parallel with one another or individually, depending on the throughput of the apparatuses that perform the processes or requirements.
If processing functions of any of the devices described in the embodiments are implemented by a computer, the processing of the functions that the devices should include is described in a programs. The program is executed on the computer to implement the processing functions of the devices on the computer.
The programs describing the processing can be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium. The computer-readable recording medium may be any recording medium such as a magnetic recording device, an optical disc, a magneto-optical recording medium, and a semiconductor memory.
The program is distributed by selling, transferring, or lending a portable recording medium on which the program is recorded, such as a DVD or a CD-ROM. The program may be stored on a storage device of a server computer and transferred from the server computer to other computers over a network, thereby distributing the program.
A computer that executes the program first stores the program recorded on a portable recording medium or transferred from a server computer into a storage device of the computer. When the computer executes the processes, the computer reads the program stored on the recording medium of the computer and executes the processes according to the read program. In another mode of execution of the program, the computer may read the program directly from a portable recording medium and execute the processes according to the program or may execute the processes according to the program each time the program is transferred from the server computer to the computer. Alternatively, the processes may be executed using a so-called ASP (Application Service Provider) service in which the program is not transferred from a server computer to the computer but process functions are implemented by instructions to execute the program and acquisition of the results of the execution. Note that the program in this mode encompasses information that is provided for processing by an electronic computer and is equivalent to the program (such as data that is not direct commands to a computer but has the nature that defines processing of the computer).
While the inventive device is configured by causing a computer to execute a predetermined program in the embodiments described above, at least some of the processes may be implemented by hardware.
| Number | Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-006692 | Jan 2013 | JP | national |
| Filing Document | Filing Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/JP2014/050651 | 1/16/2014 | WO | 00 |
| Publishing Document | Publishing Date | Country | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| WO2014/112550 | 7/24/2014 | WO | A |
| Number | Name | Date | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8515058 | Gentry | Aug 2013 | B1 |
| 8837715 | Troncoso Pastoriza | Sep 2014 | B2 |
| 20050210260 | Venkatesan | Sep 2005 | A1 |
| 20080168564 | Lerouge | Jul 2008 | A1 |
| 20080208560 | Johnson | Aug 2008 | A1 |
| 20090204802 | Araki | Aug 2009 | A1 |
| 20130301827 | Mueller | Nov 2013 | A1 |
| 20130339728 | Ikarashi | Dec 2013 | A1 |
| 20150180666 | Minematsu | Jun 2015 | A1 |
| Number | Date | Country |
|---|---|---|
| 2008 001628 | Jan 2008 | WO |
| Entry |
|---|
| Obana, S., et al “Almost Optimum Secret Sharing Schemes Secure Against Cheating for Arbitrary Secret Distribution”, ASIACRYPT, vol. 4284 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (2006), pp. 364-379. |
| International Search Report dated Mar. 11, 2014 in PCT/JP2014/050651 Filed Jan. 16, 2014. |
| Number | Date | Country | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20150358152 A1 | Dec 2015 | US |
