The present invention relates to a system and methodology for detecting tracking device tampering of the type wherein signal shielding material and/or a signal jamming device is used to interfere with the device's ability to receive signals from which the device's location is determined. The subject tracking devices are typically used in a location tracking system wherein each tracking device provides its received signals or its location, derived from such received signals, to a remote monitoring center.
In prior art location tracking systems, a tracking device provides its respective location, e.g., its latitude and longitude, or information from which such location can be determined, to a remote monitoring center. At the monitoring center, or some other associated place, the location of the tracking device is determined, if necessary, and then stored and/or processed. To this end, each tracking device receives signals from global positioning system (“GPS”) satellites and/or wireless signals from terrestrial antennas, hereinafter “other wireless signals”. Each tracking device is typically carried by an entity, hereinafter the “monitored entity”, and there may be many different types of monitored entities, including but not limited to, an individual, a moving vehicle, a product, or a product container. The information stored at the remote monitoring center or some other associated location may be used to provide a history of the location of the tracking device and its associated entity as a function of time.
Each tracking device can be implemented as a unitary device, the so-called “one-piece” tracking device, or as multiple devices that communicate with one another. In either case, each tracking device contains a GPS and/or other wireless signal receiver for respectively receiving GPS signals and/or other wireless signals. Either one or both of these signals may be used to determine the location of the tracking device. Further, GPS and other wireless signals may be used at the same time to determine device location or one signal may be used as a backup when the received strength of the other signal is not sufficient. The determination of the device's location may be performed by the device itself or at a remote location. A “dumb” location tracking device is one that merely retransmits the received GPS and/or other wireless signal to a remote location wherein the location of the tracking device is derived from these received signals. A “smart” location tracking device, on the other hand, possesses the capability of deriving its location from the received GPS or other wireless signals and subsequently transmits its determined location to a remote location. In either case, such transmissions to the remote location are typically periodic to reduce consumption of the tracking device's internal battery, but can be immediate, if desired or if one or more prescribed “alarm” conditions are detected. Alarm conditions include, but are not limited to, detection of tracking device tampering, or a determination that the device is located in a prohibited zone, i.e., an “exclusion zone” or that the device is outside of a permitted zone, i.e., a “inclusion zone”. Such zones can be set individually to match the requirements for the monitored entity. Smart or dumb tracking devices can be “passive”, “active” or a combination thereof. Active location tracking devices communicate their respective location or their received GPS or other wireless signals directly to a remote monitoring station. Passive location tracking devices transmit their respective locations or their respective received GPS or other wireless signals to an intermediary device, such as a docking station, which, in turn, transmits such signals via wired or wireless communications to the remote location. Some location tracking devices may operate so as to be active at certain times and passive at other times.
Tracking devices can be used in a variety of applications in which attempts to interfere with the operation of the location tracking device are made. One such application where this situation arises is where the tracking device along with a remote monitoring center is used to track the location of an “offender”, i.e., an individual who are part of a governmental program, such as parole or the like, wherein monitoring of the offender's location is required. Another application is the tracking of vehicles, such as delivery vehicles. In either application, the location tracking device is affixed to the entity to be monitored and generally can't be removed by other than authorized persons. Further, any attempt by an unauthorized persons to remove the tracking device or to disable its operation results in the transmission of an alarm signal to the remote monitoring station.
While existing tracking devices with these forms of tamper detection capability perform satisfactorily, they are unable to detect more subtle types of tampering which do not leave any permanent visible clues. For example, individuals have learned that the operation of a location tracking device can be thwarted by interfering with the device's ability to receive signals, e.g., GPS and/or other wireless signals, from which the location of the tracking device can be determined. One way of interfering with the signal-receiving capability of the location tracking device is to place signal-shielding material around the tracking device. Another way of accomplishing the same result is to utilize a signal-jamming device, i.e., a device that emits a jamming signal that extends across the frequency band of the GPS and/or other wireless signal from which the location of the tracking device can be determined. Because the signal magnitude of the jamming signal is substantially greater than that of the GPS or other wireless signal, the GPS or other wireless signal is “masked” or equivalently the signal receiver is shielded from properly receiving and processing these signals. The term “shielding” with respect to signals or tampering shall be used in this application to refer to the use of signal-shielding material and/or a signal jamming device to interfere with the operation of a location tracking device.
Signal shielding, if used on a permanent basis, will eventually create a reaction by the monitoring authorities. However, signal shielding is especially troublesome as it may be used temporarily. The shielding can be easily removed after placement about the tracking device and/or the jamming device can be turned off. In either case, there is no visual trace that either of these techniques have been used and there is no way to distinguish between temporary shielding and other non-tampering events, such as a temporary malfunction of the location tracking device or its temporary location in an area where GPS or other wireless signal reception is poor. Further, when shielding is temporarily used, it creates a window of opportunity during which the location of the monitored entity is unknown or not reliably known. Accordingly, it would be desirable if a mechanism could be devised for location tracking devices and systems that would distinguish between signal shielding and other plausible, unintentional non-tampering events.
In accordance with embodiments of the present invention, tamper detection capabilities for a location tracking system is enhanced through the utilization of circuitry within the location tracking device that detects signal shielding, i.e., activities that interfere with the ability of the location tracking device's ability to receive signals from which the location of the device can be determined. In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, a metal detection circuit is disposed in the location tracking device. A shielding indicator is then provided by examining the output of the detector circuit. Advantageously, the metal detection circuit is adapted to only detect the presence of metal within a small predetermined distance of the location tracking device. In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, the gain provided by an automatic gain control (“AGC”) circuit in the GPS or other wireless signal receiver is examined and used to provide a shielding indicator. Preferably, with either aspect of the present invention, the generation of a false shielding alarm signal is reduced by transmitting a shielding alarm signal only if a predetermined number of shielding indicators are generated within a predetermined time period or if a shielding indicator persists for a predetermined time. These two described aspects of the present invention can advantageously be deployed individually or together in a tracking device. In addition, the present invention is applicable for use in smart or dumb location tracking devices which are active, passive or a combination of active and passive.
Refer now to
Within device 100, conventional GPS receiver 101 receives GPS signals from which the location of device 100 is determined. GPS receiver 101 provides a signal having a predetermined level signal on lead 107 when receiver 101 is not receiving or is unable to properly decode a GPS signal. GPS receiver also provides a signal on lead 106 indicating the level of gain provided by an AGC circuit in GPS receiver 101. AGC circuits are routinely provided in GPS or other wireless signal receivers to maintain the level of the received GPS or other wireless signals within acceptable limits. The signals on leads 106 and 107 are coupled to microcontroller 102.
Location tracking device also incorporates a conventional metal detector 103 which provides an output signal on lead 108 when metal, such as tin foil or other ferrous or non-ferrous metal is detected. Detector 103 preferably utilizes the well-known two-coil amplitude modulation technique and also incorporates a trimmer so that only metal objects in a very close proximity to the tracking device, e.g., 2 or 3 cm, are detected. Location tracking device 100 also includes a memory 104 and a signal transceiver 105, the latter for communicating with a remote monitoring center.
Refer now to
At step 402, the signal level on lead 107 is examined to determine whether GPS receiver 101 is operating properly. If it is, no action is taken. If it is not, then processing proceeds to step 403 wherein a possible shielding tamper event is logged, preferably along with its date and time. The cumulative count of the number of such events is also maintained or the duration of this event is monitored. At step 404, this cumulative count or duration is compared to a predetermined threshold N and until this threshold is exceeded, no action is taken. Once this threshold is exceeded, processing proceeds to step 405 wherein a shielding alarm is stored. In addition, transceiver 105 is directed to transmit a shielding alarm signal to the remote monitoring center. This alarm signal is preferably repeated until transceiver 105 receives an acknowledgement signal from the remote monitoring center indicating successful receipt of the shielding alarm signal.
The shielding indications that are logged and the shielding alarms that are transmitted in accordance with the first and second aspects of the present invention may be distinct from one another so that shielding via the use of signal shielding material can be distinguished from the use of a signal jamming device.
During an alarm, the unit could also indicate via audible or visual cues to the offender that the unit is in this condition.
It should, of course, be understood that while the present invention has been disclosed in reference to specifically described embodiments, numerous alternatives will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. For example, while both shielding and jamming tampering is detected by the illustrative location tracking device, each of these tampering detecting techniques are independent of one another and may be used alone. Further, while in the disclosed embodiment, a shielding alarm signal is not transmitted by the location tracking device to the remote monitoring center until an associated threshold is exceeded, this threshold, designated as M and N may be the same or different and either one or both of these thresholds may be set to one. When set to one, a single shielding indicator causes a shielding alarm to be stored and transmitted. Finally, while embodiments of the present invention has been described with respect to the shielding of GPS signals, embodiments of the present invention is also applicable to detecting shielding of other wireless signals, such as cellular so that the present invention location tracking devices that receive other wireless signals, such as cellular, either alone or along with GPS to determine the location of the tracking device. In such devices, the signals from a wireless signal receiver in the location tracking device that are analogous to those on leads 106 and 107 can be used in lieu of or along with these signals to implement the first and second aspects of the present invention. That is, the processing shown in
This application claims priority of the U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/104,544, entitled “Technique for Detecting Tracking Device Tampering”, filed on Oct. 10, 2008 which is incorporated by reference herein. This application is also related to concurrently filed U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/579,090 entitled “Technique for Detecting Tracking Device Tampering Using An Auxiliary Device.”
Number | Name | Date | Kind |
---|---|---|---|
4656463 | Anders et al. | Apr 1987 | A |
5731757 | Layson, Jr. | Mar 1998 | A |
5892447 | Wilkinson | Apr 1999 | A |
6100806 | Gaukel | Aug 2000 | A |
6160481 | Taylor, Jr. | Dec 2000 | A |
6239743 | Lennen | May 2001 | B1 |
20040203461 | Hay | Oct 2004 | A1 |
20080316022 | Buck et al. | Dec 2008 | A1 |
20090104869 | Li | Apr 2009 | A1 |
20090186596 | Kaltsukis | Jul 2009 | A1 |
Number | Date | Country | |
---|---|---|---|
20100090825 A1 | Apr 2010 | US |
Number | Date | Country | |
---|---|---|---|
61104544 | Oct 2008 | US |