Theft deterrence using trusted platform module authorization

Abstract

A method for theft deterrence of a computer system is disclosed. The computer system includes a trusted platform module (TPM) and storage medium. The method comprises providing a binding key in the TPM; and providing an encrypted symmetric key in the storage medium. The method further includes providing an unbind command to the TPM based upon an authorization to provide a decrypted symmetric key; and providing the decrypted symmetric key to the secure storage device to allow for use of the computer system. Accordingly, by utilizing a secure hard disk drive (HDD) that requires a decrypted key to function in conjunction with a TPM, a computer if stolen is virtually unusable by the thief. In so doing, the risk of theft of the computer is significantly reduced.

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates generally to computers and more particularly to deterring the theft of computers.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Laptops and desktop computers are utilized extensively in many environments. It is important that unauthorized users be deterred from stealing the computers. For example, if someone steals a laptop or desktop computer, the system should not be usable for that person. The cost for making the system useable after a theft should be high enough to make the theft unprofitable.

Accordingly, what is needed is a system and method for deterring the theft of a laptop and desktop computer is required. The system should be easily implemented in existing systems and should be cost effective and easily adapted to existing systems. The present invention addresses such a need.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

A method for theft deterrence of a computer system is disclosed. The computer system includes a trusted platform module (TPM) and storage medium. The method comprises providing a binding key in the TPM; and providing an encrypted symmetric key in the storage medium. The method further includes providing an unbind command to the TPM based upon an authorization to provide a decrypted symmetric key; and providing the decrypted symmetric key to the secure storage device to allow for use of the computer system.

Accordingly, by utilizing a secure hard disk drive (HDD) that requires a decrypted key to function in conjunction with a TPM, a computer if stolen is virtually unusable by the thief. In so doing, the risk of theft of the computer is significantly reduced.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a flow chart which illustrates the setup of the system.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a computer system having a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).

FIG. 3 is a flow chart which illustrates the use of the computer in accordance with the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present invention relates generally to computers and more particularly to deterring theft of computers. The following description is presented to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention and is provided in the context of a patent application and its requirements. Various modifications to the preferred embodiments and the generic principles and features described herein will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and features described herein.

A system and method in accordance with the present invention includes a trusted platform module (TPM), an encrypted symmetric key and a secure hard disk drive (HDD) that requires the symmetric key to function. Through this system and method a computer if stolen is virtually unusable by the thief. To describe the features of the present invention in more detail, refer now to the following description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

The present invention takes advantage of these features to provide a system and method in accordance with the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 1, first the system has to be set up. First it must be assumed that a storage root key (SRK) exists that allows one to take ownership of the machine, via step 102. Next a non-migratable binding key is created in the TPM, via step 104. Then non-migratable binding key is stored (this key can only be used on this system), via step 106. Thereafter, using the binding public key, a symmetric key is wrapped, via step 108. Thereafter, the valid data of the encrypted symmetric key is stored in a secure storage medium such as a hard disk drive as a blob, via step 110.

After the system is set up, only the user can utilize the computer. FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a computer system 200 in accordance with the present invention. The system 200 includes a processor 206, a storage device 204 which is preferably a hard disk drive or alternately any other type of mass storage device, a Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) 210 and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 212.

TPM 212 is the hardware instantiation of a Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) subsystem. The TCPA subsystem, whose specification is described in TCPA Main Specification Version 1.1 and TCPA PC Specific Implementation Specification, Version 1.00, which are incorporated herein by reference, includes TPM 212 and software to control the TCPA subsystem. Coupled to the TPM 212, the processor 206, the storage device 204 is the BIOS 210, a circuit capable of interfacing and communicating with other devices (not shown), typically through a computer network. TPM 212 includes a TPM processor 218, which is capable of encoding/decoding messages received from I/O 202, as well as generating asymmetric pairs of public/private keys. Also included within TPM 212 is the stored root key (SRK) 220. The storage device 204 includes an encrypted symmetric key blob 214 and an encrypted encryption key blob 216 provided during set-up.

FIG. 3 is a flow chart which illustrates the use of the computer 200 in accordance with the present invention. Referring to FIGS. 2 and 3 together, first, the BIOS 210 loads the binding key, via step 302. Then the BIOS 210 prompts for binding key authorization, preferably via a password, via step 304. Once binding key authorization is obtained, the BIOS 210 sends an unbind command to the TPM 212 to provide the decrypted key, via step 306. The unbind command includes the encrypted symmetric key and an authorization digest which is derived from the password authorization prompt. The authorization digest is defined as using this payload for this command during this instance. Therefore using this encrypted symmetric key the authorization is approved.

After the BIOS 210 sends the TPM 212 the unbind command via step 306, the TPM 212 releases the decrypted symmetric key, via step 308. Thereafter the BIOS 210 passes the decrypted symmetric key to the storage device 204, via step 310, which allows for the use of the system.

Accordingly, by utilizing a secure hard disk drive (HDD) that requires a decrypted key to function in conjunction with a TPM, a computer if stolen is virtually unusable by the thief. In so doing, the risk of theft of the computer is significantly reduced.

Although the present invention has been described in accordance with the embodiments shown, one of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that there could be variations to the embodiments and those variations would be within the spirit and scope of the present invention. Accordingly, many modifications may be made by one of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for theft deterrence of a computer system, the computer system including a trusted platform module (TPM) and storage medium, the method comprising: providing a binding key in the TPM; providing an encrypted symmetric key in the storage medium to provide a secure storage medium; providing an unbind command to the TPM based upon an authorization to provide a decrypted symmetric key; and providing the decrypted symmetric key to the secure storage medium to allow for use of the computer system.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein the binding key is non-migratable.

3. The method of claim 1 wherein a basic input/output system (BIOS) prompts for binding key authorization.

4. The method of claim 3 wherein the unbind command includes the encrypted system key and an authorization digest.

5. A computer system comprising: an I/O; a processor coupled to the I/O; a trusted platform module (TPM) coupled to the I/O, the TPM including a binding key; a basic input/output system (BIOS) coupled to the I/O; and secure storage medium coupled to the I/O, the secure storage medium including an encrypted symmetric key blob which can only be decrypted via an unbind command provided from the BIOS to the TPM.

6. The computer system of claim 5 wherein the binding key is non-migratable.

7. The computer system of claim 5 wherein a basic input/output system (BIOS) prompts for binding key authorization.

8. The computer system of claim 5 wherein the unbind command includes the encrypted system key and an authorization digest.

9. A computer readable medium containing program instructions for theft deterrence of a computer system, the computer system including a trusted platform module (TPM) and storage medium, the program instructions for: providing a binding key in the TPM; providing an encrypted symmetric key in the storage medium to provide a secure storage medium; providing an unbind command to the TPM based upon an authorization to provide a decrypted symmetric key; and providing the decrypted symmetric key to the secure storage medium to allow for use of the computer system.

10. The computer readable medium of claim 9 wherein the binding key is non-migratable.

11. The computer readable medium of claim 9 wherein a basic input/output system (BIOS) prompts for binding key authorization.

12. The computer readable medium of claim 11 wherein the unbind command includes the encrypted system key and an authorization digest.