The present application claims priority to Japanese Patent Application No. 2021-098227 filed on Jun. 11, 2021, the entire content of which is incorporated herein by reference.
The presently disclosed subject matter relates to an unauthorized connection detecting device configured to detect an unauthorized device connection on a vehicle.
A user of a vehicle, a vehicle dealer, or the like may retrofit various optional devices prepared in advance to a vehicle, or may replace various devices according to preference of the user. Therefore, wire harnesses and various electronic control units (ECUs) are often provided with connectors for connecting the retrofit devices in advance, so that the user, the vehicle dealer, or the like can retrofit various devices to the vehicle.
However, an unauthorized device may be connected to the connector on the vehicle side. Such an unauthorized device may cause a malfunction in operation of the vehicle, increase a risk of vehicle theft, or lead to leakage of various information existing on the vehicle side. Therefore, it is necessary to detect the unauthorized connected device on the vehicle side.
An unauthorized connection detecting method and an unauthorized connection detecting system in the related art appropriately determine presence or absence of tool connection while sharing a communication line for determining the presence or absence of the tool connection with a normal communication line (see, for example, JP2014-143631A). Specifically, a monitor system that performs differential communication between a window electronic control unit and a monitor tool via a pair of communication lines includes a first step of applying a predetermined voltage to at least one of the pair of communication lines when the window electronic control unit and the legitimate monitor tool are connected to each other via the pair of communication lines, a second step of detecting a voltage generated in at least one of the pair of communication lines and a third step of determining whether or not the legitimate monitor tool is connected to the window electronic control unit via the pair of communication lines based on the voltage generated in at least one of the pair of communication lines detected in the second step.
Another related art discloses a technique of providing a pair of connectors that should be attached to each other and is capable of identifying each other and being individually managed, so as to implement a highly secure vehicle anti-theft system using the connectors (see, for example, JP2004-152543A). Specifically, the connector for electrically connecting a plurality of members is formed with a built-in tag chip. The tag chip is configured to include a storage unit that stores information and an antenna that transmits information wirelessly, so that information can be exchanged with an outside regardless of electrical connection by the connector. A range of the wireless information transmission is limited to a range of approximately several mm to prevent information leakage.
However, the former related art cannot be used when connecting a device that does not include a communication line to the connector on the vehicle side since it is indispensable to use a communication line to detect the unauthorized device connection.
When using the latter related art, the tag chip using a radio frequency identifier (RFID) is used, and thus an RFID reader that reads information from the tag chip of the connector is required, and a configuration of the ECU on the vehicle side is complicated and a cost goes up.
Illustrative aspects of the presently disclosed subject matter provide an unauthorized connection detecting device capable of detecting unauthorized device connection at a low cost when a device that does not include a communication line is connected to an ECU or the like on a vehicle side.
According to an illustrative aspect of the presently disclosed subject matter, an unauthorized connection detecting device configured to detect an unauthorized device connection at a connection part at which an electronic control unit mounted on a vehicle and an input and output unit are connected to each other is provided. The unauthorized connection detecting device includes a first connector mounted on the electronic control unit and a second connector mounted on the input and output unit, the first and second connectors being configured to be attached to each other, a protrusion formed on the second connector, a switch unit arranged on the first connector and configured to, when the first and second connectors are attached to each other, detect the protrusion and an unauthorized connection identification unit configured to detect an unauthorized connection based on a state detected by the switch unit. According to another illustrative aspect of the presently disclosed subject matter, an unauthorized connection detecting device configured to detect an unauthorized device connection at a connection part at which an electronic control unit mounted on a vehicle and an input and output unit are connected to each other, the unauthorized connection detecting device includes a third connector mounted on the electronic control unit and a fourth connector mounted on the input and output unit, the third and fourth connectors being configured to be attached to each other, a conductor pattern formed on the fourth connector, a conductor connection detecting unit arranged on the third connector and configured to be electrically connected to the conductor pattern and an unauthorized connection identification unit configured to detect an unauthorized connection based on a state detected by the conductor connection detecting unit.
Other aspects and advantages of the presently disclosed subject matter will be apparent from the following description, the drawings and the claims.
A specific embodiment according to the presently disclosed subject matter will be described below with reference to the drawings.
A zone ECU 10 is a legitimate unit prepared for managing a predetermined zone on the vehicle, and is equipped with a microcomputer (CPU) 11 and a communication function as any ECUs generally have. The zone ECU 10 has a function for supplying power of the vehicle side to devices in a managed zone and a function for inputting and outputting a predetermined signal. Zones may be assigned by divisions of various areas in a space of the vehicle, or may be assigned by classifications of functions.
An input and output interface unit 20 is a legitimate unit prepared in advance, and is an in-vehicle device having a function of inputting or outputting signals to or from the zone ECU 10. However, in the present embodiment, since the input and output interface unit 20 is not equipped with a computer or a communication function, the zone ECU 10 cannot acquire a state on the input and output interface unit 20 side via a communication function. Therefore, the zone ECU 10 of the present embodiment detects that some unauthorized unit, instead of the input and output interface unit 20, is connected to the zone ECU 10 at a unit connection portion 30 without using any communication function.
The zone ECU 10 and the input and output interface unit 20 are physically and electrically connected via the unit connection portion 30. The unit connection portion 30 includes a connector 31 mounted on the zone ECU 10 side and a connector 32 mounted on the input and output interface unit 20 side. In the present embodiment, the connector 31 is a male type and the connector 32 is a female type, and the two connectors can be fitted to and combined to or separated from each other by insertion and removal operations to both.
The zone ECU 10 includes one or more control lines 15. The control line 15 is used for outputting a predetermined control signal from a microcomputer 11 to the input and output interface unit 20 side and inputting an input signal from the input and output interface unit 20 side to the microcomputer 11.
The unit connection portion 30 has a power line and ground wire connection function in addition to a connection function of the control line 15. In the zone ECU 10, a power line of the connector 31 is connected to a power line 12 via a power control switch 16. A ground wire of the connector 31 is connected to a ground 13 in the zone ECU 10.
A switch unit 14 is connected to the ground 13 of the zone ECU 10. The switch unit 14 includes a plurality of independent electric contacts incorporated inside the connector 31, which will be described later. A plurality of input ports of the microcomputer 11 are connected to the switch unit 14. The microcomputer 11 uses a state of the electric contacts of the switch unit 14 to identify whether the mating input and output interface unit 20 or the like is a legitimate unit.
The connector 32 on the input and output interface unit 20 side includes terminals of a power line 21, a ground 22, and a control line 23. The power control switch 16 is a switch that can be turned on and off by the microcomputer 11, and is used for switching on and off for a power supplied from the zone ECU 10 to the input and output interface unit 20 side.
When ignition (IG) of the vehicle is turned on, the microcomputer 11 executes Step S11 of the operations shown in
If there is registration information that matches the on or off state of the switch unit 14, the microcomputer 11 identifies the mating unit as a legitimate device and proceeds from S13 to S14. Then, the power control switch 16 is switched on to supply power to the input and output interface unit 20 (S14).
If there is no registration information that matches the on or off state of the switch unit 14, the microcomputer 11 identifies the mating unit as an unauthorized device and proceeds from S13 to S15. Then, the power control switch 16 is kept to be off. Therefore, in this case, no power is supplied to the mating unit connected to the connector 31 (S15).
Regarding the registration information on the zone ECU 10, it is assumed that the latest information is added or updated and registered in the zone ECU 10 as needed, using, for example, a vehicle diagnostic tester installed at a vehicle dealer, or the Over The Air (OTA) technique.
As shown in
As shown in
Although not shown in
The grooves 31c are formed at predetermined positions, for example, at a predetermined interval from each other. The plurality of tact switches 31d are arranged at predetermined positions in the groove 31c, for example, at a predetermined interval from each other. The plurality of tact switches 31d form the switch unit 14 in
Outer shape and size of a connector housing 32a of the connector 32 shown in
As shown in
As shown in
A plurality of downward protrusions 32c are formed on a bottom surface 32b of the connector housing 32a. These protrusions 32c are arranged at positions matching positions of the grooves 31c and arrangement positions of the tact switches 31d of the connector 31 on the male side. That is, with the connectors 31 and 32 fitted to each other, each protrusion 32c is arranged so as to press the button of any one or more tact switches 31d. When the connector housings 31a and 32a move relative to each other in the insertion and extraction direction Az, since each protrusion 32c passes through the groove 31c, movement of the protrusions 32c is not interfered.
A total number of the plurality of protrusions 32c actually provided in the connector housing 32a, a position where each protrusion 32c is arranged, and a length of each protrusion 32c are appropriately determined according to design specifications of the input and output interface unit 20. For example, by setting the total number and arrangement positions of the protrusions 32c to a predetermined state for each type of the input and output interface unit 20, the type of the input and output interface unit 20 can be expressed by differences in arrangement states of the protrusions 32c.
As described above, in the zone ECU 10 shown in
When configuring the unauthorized connection detecting device 100 shown in
A plurality of switch terminals 31f are arranged in place of the tact switches 31d described above in the grooves 31c of the connector 31A. Each switch terminal 31f is a conductive terminal capable of forming an electric contact by facing and contacting a conductor pattern 32f described later.
In the modified example, in order to achieve a stable contact pressure with the opposing conductor pattern 32f, each switch terminal 31f is configured by using an elastic metal such as a spring. Therefore, each switch terminal 31f is deformable, and a position of a top portion of the switch terminal 31f can be displaced in the height direction Ay. The switch terminals 31f are arranged so as not to hinder the relative movement of the connector housings 31a and 32a in the insertion and extraction direction Az. That is, the top portion of the switch terminal 31f is shaped so as not to protrude significantly from the groove 31c.
The connector 32A shown in
For example, a planar conductor pattern 32f as shown in
Actually, the electric contact is formed at each of a plurality of contact portions Psw shown in
The plurality of electric contacts formed by each switch terminal 31f and the conductor pattern 32f can be used as they are as the switch unit 14 in
Even when the conductor pattern 32f is open on the connector 32A side, if the switch terminals 31f of one or more common parts are always connected to the ground 13, the potential of the input port of the microcomputer 11 can be lowered to the potential of the ground 13 via the electric contacts formed by the plurality of switch terminals 31f and the conductor pattern 32f.
As described above, according to the unauthorized connection detecting device 100 shown in
By the microcomputer 11 performing the operations shown in
While the presently disclosed subject matter has been described with reference to certain exemplary embodiments thereof, the scope of the presently disclosed subject matter is not limited to the exemplary embodiments described above, and it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications may be made therein without departing from the scope of the presently disclosed subject matter as defined by the appended claims.
According to an aspect of the embodiments described above, an unauthorized connection detecting device (100) configured to detect an unauthorized device connection at a connection part (30) at which an electronic control unit (10) mounted on a vehicle and an input and output unit (20) are connected to each other is provided. The unauthorized connection detecting device (100) includes a first connector (31) mounted on the electronic control unit (10) and a second connector (32) mounted on the input and output unit (20), the first and second connectors being configured to be attached to each other, a protrusion (32c) formed on the second connector (32), a switch unit (31d) arranged on the first connector (31) and configured to, when the first and second connectors are attached to each other, detect the protrusion (32c) and an unauthorized connection identification unit (11) configured to detect an unauthorized connection based on a state detected by the switch unit (31d).
According to the unauthorized connection detecting device having a configuration as described above, when a legitimate device is connected with the pair of connectors fitted to each other, the switch unit can detect the mating protrusion in a predetermined state. However, when an unauthorized device is connected, the switch unit cannot detect the mating protrusion in a normal state. Therefore, the unauthorized connection identification unit can detect the unauthorized connection based on the detection state of the switch unit. Moreover, since the state of the mating protrusion can be detected only by the switch unit with no need to prepare a special reader, cost increase of the ECU can be prevented and the unauthorized connection of devices having no communication function can be dealt with.
The first connector (31) may include a plurality of rows of grooves (31c) extending in a moving direction (Az) of the first and second connectors (31, 32) when the first and second connectors (31, 32) are being attached to each other. The switch unit (31d) may be arranged in one of the grooves. The protrusion (32c) may be formed at a position on the second connector (32) such that the protrusion (32c) passes through the one of the grooves (31c) when the first and second connectors (31, 32) are being attached to each other.
With this configuration, since the protrusion is formed at a position where it is enabled to pass through the groove, it is possible to prevent the protrusion from hindering the insertion and removal of the pair of connectors, and it is possible to prevent occurrence of malfunction due to deformation of the protrusion and the like.
According to another aspect of the embodiments described above, an unauthorized connection detecting device configured to detect an unauthorized device connection at a connection part (30) at which an electronic control unit (10) mounted on a vehicle and an input and output unit (20) are connected to each other, the unauthorized connection detecting device includes a third connector (31A) mounted on the electronic control unit (10) and a fourth connector (32A) mounted on the input and output unit (20), the third and fourth connectors being configured to be attached to each other, a conductor pattern (32f) formed on the fourth connector (32A), a conductor connection detecting unit (31f) arranged on the third connector (31A) and configured to be electrically connected to the conductor pattern (32f) and an unauthorized connection identification unit (11) configured to detect an unauthorized connection based on a state detected by the conductor connection detecting unit (31f).
According to the unauthorized connection detecting device having a configuration as described above, if a legitimate device is connected with the pair of connectors fitted to each other, the conductor connection detecting unit can detect conduction of an electric circuit by the mating conductor pattern in a predetermined state. However, when an unauthorized device is connected, the conductor connection detecting unit cannot detect the conduction of the electric circuit by the mating conductor pattern in a normal state. Therefore, the unauthorized connection identification unit can detect the unauthorized connection based on the detection state of the conductor connection detecting unit. Moreover, since the state of the mating conductor pattern can be detected only by the conductor connection detecting unit with no need to prepare a special reader, cost increase of the ECU can be prevented and the unauthorized connection of devices having no communication function can be dealt with.
The third connector (31A) may include a plurality of rows of grooves (31c) extending in a moving direction (Az) of the third and fourth connectors (31A, 32A) when the third and fourth connectors (31A, 32A) are being attached to each other. The conductor connection detecting unit (31f) may be arranged in one of the grooves. The conductor pattern (32f) may be formed at a position (Psw) on the fourth connector (32A) at which the conductor pattern (32f) faces at least a part of the one of the grooves when the third and fourth connectors (31A, 32A) are attached to each other.
With this configuration, since the conductor connection detecting unit is arranged in the groove, for example, the conductor connection detecting unit can be deformably configured by using a conductive spring or the like. That is, since a position of the electric contact can be displaced in a depth direction of the groove, a good electric connection at the contact can be achieved. It is possible to prevent the conductor pattern and the conductor connection detecting unit from hindering the insertion and removal of the pair of connectors.
The electronic control unit may be a zone management unit (10) configured to manage a predetermined zone in the vehicle. The electronic control unit may be configured to supply power to the input and output unit (20) connected to the zone management unit (10) only when no unauthorized connection is detected by the unauthorized connection identification unit (S13 to S15).
With this configuration, since no power is supplied to the unauthorized device, it is possible to reliably prevent an electric circuit of the unauthorized connected device from adversely affecting the vehicle side. The zone managed by the zone management unit can be reliably protected from the unauthorized device connection.
Number | Date | Country | Kind |
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2021-098227 | Jun 2021 | JP | national |
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