The field of the invention is cryptography, and more particularly the field of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
The following description includes information that may be useful in understanding the present invention. It is not an admission that any of the information provided herein is prior art or relevant to the presently claimed invention, or that any publication specifically or implicitly referenced is prior art.
Public key cryptography relies on trap door functions, algorithms that are relatively easy to process in one direction, but difficult to process in the opposite direction. The greater the spread between these two directions, the more secure the system.
The first viable public key cryptographic system using a trap door function was introduced in 1977, based upon the RSA and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithms. In the simplest version of RSA, data is encrypted using a quasi-prime public key, and data is decrypted using one of the prime number factors of the quasi prime.
Brute force can be used to factor small quasi-primes, by simply trying a series of prime numbers. Specialized algorithms such as the Quadratic Sieve and the General Number Field Sieve can be used to factor larger quasi-primes, but are still unable to efficiently crack 1024, 2048 bit and larger prime numbers.
In the late 2010s, the current inventor discovered relationships among prime numbers that permitted reliable factoring of 1024, 2048, and even 4096 bit prime numbers in seconds. Among the discoveries was the realization that prime numbers have an ordered distribution on the integer space. As shown in
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. Based up the difficulty of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), ECC allows much smaller keys than RSA for an equivalent level of security. ECC provides very fast key generation, fast key agreement, and fast signatures.
Public keys in ECC are EC points—pairs of integer coordinates {x, y}, laying on the curve. Due to their special properties, EC points can be compressed to just one coordinate+1 bit (odd or even). For example, the compressed public key, corresponding to a 256-bit ECC private key, is a 257-bit integer. Key generation in ECC cryptography can thus be as simple as securely generating a random integer in a certain range. Any number within the range can be a valid ECC private key.
ECC crypto algorithms can use different underlying elliptic curves. Different curves (e.g., Curve448, X448 and Ed448) provide different level of security (cryptographic strength), different performance (speed) and different key length, and also may involve different algorithms. See Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), https://cryptobook.nakov.com/asymmetric-key-ciphers/elliptic-curve-cryptography-ecc.
NIST has standardized elliptic curve cryptography for digital signature algorithms in FIPS 186 and for key establishment schemes in SP 800-56A Rev3. https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-3/final.
Alternatives include the Montgomery form:
and the Edwards form:
All of these forms are thought to be birationally equivalent (isomorphic). According to the modularity theorem (formerly called the Taniyama-Shimura conjecture, Taniyama-Weil conjecture or modularity conjecture for elliptic curves), every rational elliptic curve is also a modular form in disguise. Or, more formally, the conjecture suggests that, for every elliptic curve y2=Ax3+Bx2+Cx+D over the rationals, there exist nonconstant modular functions f(z) and g(z) of the same level N (the so-called j-conductor of the elliptic curve) such that [f(z)]2=A[g(z)]2+Cg(z)+D with the same Dirichlet L-series. See https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Taniyama-ShimuraConjecture.html.
Simplified for purposes herein, every elliptical curve corresponds to (is equivalent to, is consistent with, or can be characterized as) a simple modular equation in the general form:
For some integers p, q, r, and x, x is always a prime number and also the private key. However, since prime numbers exist in predictable positions in a mod 24 configuration, they are not randomly distributed, and cracking an elliptic curve based upon prime number exponents becomes relatively straightforward.
Although there appears to be no teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art for using a non-prime number for x, several individuals have questioned whether the modulus needs to be prime. See “Elliptic curve over finite non-prime fields”, https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/3811775/elliptic-curve-over-finite-non-prime-fields; and “Why are elliptic curves constructed using prime fields and not composite fields?” https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/43230/why-are-elliptic-curves-constructed-using-prime-fields-and-not-composite-fields. However, the answer to one of ordinary skill in the art is that use of primes is necessary to produce reliably stable elliptic curves. Using a non-prime modulo likely produces a ring instead of an elliptic curve. “Why is a prime number used in ECDSA?” https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/77884/why-is-a-prime-number-used-in-ecdsa.
These and all other publications referenced herein are incorporated by reference to the same extent as if each individual publication were specifically and individually indicated to be incorporated by reference. Where a definition or use of a term in an incorporated reference is inconsistent or contrary to the definition of that term provided herein, the definition of that term provided herein applies and the definition of that term in the reference does not apply.
What is still needed is a technology that resolves the basic weakness arising from use of prime numbers in constructing stable elliptic curve cryptography.
The inventive subject matter provides apparatus, systems and methods in which elliptical curve cryptography utilizes an elliptic curve consistent with the formula px mod q=r, where x is a private key having an irrational number component. The irrational component is employed to provide much greater entropy than would be achieved where x is a prime number.
As used herein, the term “an elliptic curve consistent with the formula px mod q=r” means that the elliptic curve can be expressed as “p” mod q=r″ according to the modularity theorem.
Also as used herein, the terms “key having an irrational number component” and “key having an irrational component” are used interchangeably to mean that the key is derived from, or includes a series of, at least 25 sequential digits contained in a mantissa of an irrational number.
One should appreciate that the technical effect of the inventive subject matter herein is to provide increased security in elliptical curve cryptography.
Various objects, features, aspects and advantages of the inventive subject matter will become more apparent from the following detailed description of preferred embodiments, along with the accompanying drawing figures.
In their paper “A Study of the Digits of π, e and Certain Other Irrational Numbers”, Dr. Johnson and Dr. Leeming discuss academic research conducted by the University of Victoria which demonstrates that irrational numbers are known to have a uniform distribution of digits (0-9) in their mantissas. This means that each digit is equally probable to occur at a given index in the mantissa, which makes it much more difficult to accurately predict.
The inventive subject matter takes advantage of this phenomenon to provide apparatus, systems and methods in which elliptical curve cryptography utilizes an elliptic curve consistent with the formula px mod q=r, where x is a private key having an irrational number component. The irrational component is employed to provide much greater entropy than would be achieved where x is a prime number. Essentially, every mod or every outcome is equally possible and therefore less predictable.
For any prime number x>2, 3x mod 24 is in the mod 3 position, which gives the following equation:
Therefore, knowing that x is prime number, it is relatively easy to establish that x=13.
However, if for example x were the sqrt of 14, then
Since (3{circumflex over ( )}(sqrt(14)) mod 17 lands on an irrational position, it is uniform in a mod 24 configuration and is more difficult to predict. This is due to the fact that sqrt(14) is an irrational number instead of a prime number.
For any prime number x>2, 5x mod 24 is in the mod 3 position, which gives the following equation.
Therefore, knowing that x is prime number, it is relatively easy to establish that x=11
However, if for example x were the sqrt of 14, then
Since (5{circumflex over ( )}(sqrt(15)) mod 19 lands on an irrational position, it is uniform in a mod 24 configuration and is more difficult to predict. This is due to the fact that sqrt(15) is an irrational number instead of a prime number.
For any prime number x>2, 7x mod 24 is in the mod 3 position, which gives the following equation.
However, if for example x were the sqrt of 20, then
Since (7{circumflex over ( )}(sqrt(20)) mod 19 lands on an irrational position, it is uniform in a mod 24 configuration and is more difficult to predict. This is due to the fact that sqrt(20) is an irrational number instead of a prime number.
In preferred embodiments, the irrational component comprises a portion of a root of a non-perfect square, for example portion of a square root of 2 or a square root of 5. Also in preferred embodiments, p in the formula px mod q=r is 3, 5, or 7.
In the above discussion, references are made regarding memories and digital logic circuitry. It should be appreciated that the use of such terms is deemed to include servers, services, interfaces, portals, platforms, or other systems formed from computing devices having at least one processor configured to execute software instructions stored on a computer readable tangible, non-transitory medium. For example, a server can include one or more computers operating as a web server, database server, or other type of computer server in a manner to fulfill described roles, responsibilities, or functions.
Also, as used in the description above, and throughout the claims that follow, the meaning of “a,” “an,” and “the” includes plural reference unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. Also, as used in the description herein, the meaning of “in” includes “in” and “on” unless the context clearly dictates otherwise.
Still further, all methods described herein can be performed in any suitable order unless otherwise indicated herein or otherwise clearly contradicted by context. The use of any and all examples, or exemplary language (e.g. “such as”) provided with respect to certain embodiments herein is intended merely to better illuminate the invention and does not pose a limitation on the scope of the invention otherwise claimed. No language in the specification should be construed as indicating any non-claimed element essential to the practice of the invention. Unless a contrary meaning is explicitly stated, all ranges are inclusive of their endpoints, and open-ended ranges are to be interpreted as bounded on the open end by commercially feasible embodiments.
It should be apparent to those skilled in the art that many more modifications besides those already described are possible without departing from the inventive concepts herein. The inventive subject matter, therefore, is not to be restricted except in the spirit of the appended claims. Moreover, in interpreting both the specification and the claims, all terms should be interpreted in the broadest possible manner consistent with the context.
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