Information stored on the internet may become available to unauthorized users who exploit security vulnerabilities. A common exploit involves a web site that includes two frames that a user may navigate to. One frame may select and cache an object in the other frame. When the one frame causes the other frame to navigate to another web site, the one frame may use the cached object to access unauthorized data in the other frame. The one frame may then upload the unauthorized data to the original web site.
For example, a hypertext markup language object includes a reference to a markup domain from which it was created. The object may be cached in one domain. During subsequent navigation to another web site, the markup domain associated with the object may change. The cached object may be exploited to access the contents of an inner document associated with the changed markup domain. An unauthorized user may exploit this security vulnerability to obtain information that is intended to be unavailable to the user.
The present invention is directed toward a method and system for validating access to a group of related elements. The group of elements may be associated with the same markup domain or separate domains when generated. The elements within the group include a reference to a security context associated with the markup domain. The security context is an identity associated with a web page when an element is created on the web page. The security context is accessed when a call is made to an element to authorize the call. An authorized call to an element is enabled such that the markup domain is navigated to a new web page. However, an unauthorized call is prevented or invalidated so that the navigation to the new web page is not permitted. Thus, objects that are cached from the old web page cannot be exploited to access unauthorized data associated with the new web page.
After the markup domain has been navigated to a new web page, the security context associated with the markup domain is invalidated. A new security context is generated and associated with the markup domain. The elements associated with the web page navigated from are inaccessible after navigation of the markup domain to the new web page. The association of the new security context with the markup domain prevents an unauthorized user from accessing any element that references the previous security context.
According to one aspect of the invention, a computer-implemented method validates access to a first element within a group of related elements. A security context is associated with each element within the group of related elements. Access to the first element is verified by comparing a security context associated with the first element with a security context associated with a second element that is requesting access to the first element. Access to the first element is invalidated when the security context associated with the first element does not match the security context associated with the second element.
According to another aspect of the invention, the security context associated with the second element is modified in response to navigating a markup page associated with the first element.
Briefly stated, a method and system for validating access to a group of related elements are described. The group of elements is associated with the same markup domain or separate domains when generated. The elements within the group include a reference to a security context associated with the markup domain. Calls to the elements may be validated against the security context. When a navigation to a new web page occurs, the markup domain navigated is associated with a new security context. The previous security context is modified such that any elements associated with it can no longer be used. The objects associated with the previous security context therefore become inaccessible because the checks against the security context before invoking an application program interface (API) on that object will no longer succeed. Accordingly, a previous security breach that allowed access to these objects is made secure by the present invention.
With reference to
Computing device 100 may have additional features or functionality. For example, computing device 100 may also include additional data storage devices (removable and/or non-removable) such as, for example, magnetic disks, optical disks, or tape. Such additional storage is illustrated in
Computing device 100 also contains communication connections 116 that allow the device to communicate with other computing devices 118, such as over a network. Networks include local area networks and wide area networks, as well as other large scale networks including, but not limited to, intranets and extranets. Communication connection 116 is one example of communication media. Communication media may typically be embodied by computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in a modulated data signal, such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism, and includes any information delivery media. The term “modulated data signal” means a signal that has one or more of its characteristics set or changed in such a manner as to encode information in the signal. By way of example, and not limitation, communication media includes wired media such as a wired network or direct-wired connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, RF, infrared and other wireless media. The term computer readable media as used herein includes both storage media and communication media.
Validating Access to a Group of Related Objects
For purposes of this application, markup page refers to a document that provides the parameters for the layout of a navigable site associated with a domain within a computer network. Element refers to an item within a markup page that a user may access and perform operations upon. A security context is an identity associated with a markup domain when objects are created within the markup domain. The security context addresses the vulnerability of exploiting an object in a cache to access unauthorized information while navigating the markup domain.
In Scenario 1, window 200 hosts markup page 202. Markup page 202 is associated with a particular domain (e.g., domain A). A navigation occurs to new markup page 204 within the same domain (e.g., domain A).
In Scenario 2, window 210 hosts markup page 212. Markup page 212 is associated with a particular domain (e.g., domain A). A navigation occurs to a new markup page 214 in a different domain (e.g., domain B).
In Scenario 3, window 220 hosts markup page 222 and markup page 224. Markup page 224 may not be a different page from markup page 222, but may instead be a frame within markup page 222. For example, markup page 222 may be the topmost page in window 220, and markup page 224 is a lower level page in a frame within window 220. Markup page 222 is associated with a first domain (e.g., domain A) and markup page 224 is associated with a second domain (e.g., domain B). In another embodiment, both markup pages 222, 224 are associated with the same domain (e.g., domain A). In this scenario, the top markup page (e.g., 222) is navigated to new markup page 226 associated with the same domain (e.g., domain A).
In Scenario 4, window 230 hosts markup page 232 and markup page 234. Markup page 234 may not be a different page from markup page 232, but may instead be a frame within markup page 232. For example, markup page 232 may be the topmost page in window 230, and markup page 234 is a lower level page in a frame within window 230. Markup page 232 is associated with a first domain (e.g., domain A) and markup page 234 is associated with a second domain (e.g., domain B). In another embodiment, both markup pages 232, 234 are associated with the same domain (e.g., domain A). In this scenario, the top markup page (e.g., 232) is navigated to new markup page 236 associated with a different domain (e.g., domain C).
In Scenario 5, window 240 hosts markup page 242 and markup page 244. Markup page 244 may not be a different page from markup page 242, but may instead be a frame within markup page 242. For example, markup page 242 may be the topmost page in window 240, and markup page 244 is a lower level page in a frame within window 240. Markup page 242 is associated with a first domain (e.g., domain A) and markup page 244 is associated with a second domain (e.g., domain B).
In Scenario 6, window 250 hosts markup page 252 and markup page 254. Markup page 254 may not be a different page from markup page 252, but may instead be a frame within markup page 252. For example, markup page 252 may be the topmost page in window 250, and markup page 254 may be a lower level page in a frame within window 250. Both markup pages 252, 254 are associated with the same domain (e.g., domain A). In this scenario, the lower level page (e.g., 254) is navigated to new markup page 256 associated with a different domain (e.g., domain B).
Before navigation, markup page 252 may access markup page 254 through window 250 or via document objects. Markup page 252 caches an object within markup page 254. After navigation to domain B, markup page 252 retains access to the cached object in new markup page 256. The invention prevents use of the cached object to read data from markup page 256.
Scenario 6 is described in greater detail with respect to
After navigation of subframe 330 to subframe 340 within domain B, the configuration of the in-memory components is modified, as shown in the lower portion of
Security checks are followed when accessing element 326 such that only authorized users in domain B are allowed to access element 326 from any element in markup page 310. However, the link between element 324 and element 326 (shown as path 350) has not been removed or placed under similar security, such that element 326 may be accessed using the object in the local cache (i.e., element 324) via element 320 in markup page 310. The presence of the object in the local cache permits unauthorized access to element 326 along path 350 and all associated elements (e.g., any elements associated with element 326) within subframe 340 without encountering any security checks. Thus, the security vulnerability of element 324 stored in the local cache may be exploited to gain unauthorized access to elements within domain B.
Markup page 420 is hosted by the network site and is associated with domain A. Elements 430-434 are located at markup page 420 in domain A. Elements 432, 434 are located within subframe 450 in domain A. Element 432 includes web page information associated with domain A. Element 434 is a cached object that is stored in a local cache in markup page 420 in domain A. Elements 430-434 may be any item that can be individually selected and manipulated during network navigation. In another embodiment, elements 430-434 may include nested frames created from a markup page.
Security context 1 410 is associated with element 430 in markup page 420. Security context 2 412 is associated with elements 432, 434 in subframe 450. Elements that could be created in the context of a markup domain associated with markup page 420 may inherit the same security context. If a new navigable markup page is created, it is assigned a unique security context.
Security context 1 410 provides context for actions taken on markup page 420. Security context 2 412 provides context for actions taken on subframe 450. For example, security context 2 412 is accessed to determine if an action taken on subframe 450 is permitted. If the action is not permitted, the action is invalidated. In one embodiment, when element 434 calls to element 432 along path 460, the call is directed to security context 2 412. Any time an element is called through an interface, the security context associated with the element is accessed to determine if the user is authorized to initiate execution of the call. Security context 2 412 enables or disables the call depending on whether the user who is navigating subframe 450 is authorized to access element 432 from element 434. For example, the call is disabled when an unauthorized user attempts to access element 432 from element 434 via element 430 in markup page 420 if markup page 420 is in a different domain than element 432.
If the user requesting access to element 432 is authorized, the call to element 432 is enabled. A new subframe associated with element 432 is navigated when the call to element 432 is a navigation to different markup domain (e.g., domain B). The lower portion of
Security context 3 414 is created and associated with element 436 when subframe 455 is navigated in domain B. Security context 3 414 is associated with all subsequent elements created in subframe 455. In one embodiment, security context 3 414 may be created even if subframe 455 is located in the same domain as subframe 450 (e.g., domain A). The creation of security context 3 414 prevents an unauthorized user from accessing any object that references security context 3 414. For example, a user who is only authorized to access objects associated with security context 2 412 is not permitted to access objects associated with security context 3 414. Execution of a call to any object associated with security context 3 414 is denied because security context 2 412 is invalidated with regard to elements associated with security context 3 414.
After navigation of subframe 455, path 460 is invalidated by the creation of security context 3 414 because element 436 is associated with security context 3 414. Elements associated with one security context may not access elements associated with a different security context. Therefore, an unscrupulous user with access to the object in a local cache can no longer exploit the security vulnerability described in reference to
The security context may have a large number of associated elements. All of the elements associated with the security context may be easily invalidated by modifying the security context. Thus, a large group of elements may be rendered inaccessible without having to reference the objects individually because all the elements are linked to the same security context.
Many elements may be created that are associated with one markup page. Some elements may include a direct reference to the markup page. Thus, it is unnecessary to cache the security context on such elements because the associated security context is included with the original markup page, which may be easily referred to by such elements. A direct reference to the markup page also provides an indirect reference to the corresponding security context.
For some elements, providing a reference to the markup page may not be secure, or it may not be possible to reference the markup page at all times. In these cases, the security context remains linked to the element such that the element may be locally cached safely. Every element remains associated with the correct security context whether the security context is a local cache or a reference to the markup page.
The security context of the present invention as described in reference to
Proceeding to block 510, a call is made to one of the elements. Moving to block 520, the security context associated with the element is accessed by the scripting engine. The security context is accessed whenever an element is called through an interface.
Advancing to decision block 530, a determination is made whether the call to the element is authorized. The determination is performed by inspecting the security context associated with the element. If the security context permits authorization of the call, processing moves to block 550. If the call is not authorized, processing continues at block 540.
Transitioning to block 540, the call to the element is disabled. In one embodiment, an “access denied” error occurs when a subsequent unauthorized call is made to the element along the same navigation path. The process then terminates at an end block.
Continuing to block 550, the call to the element is enabled. Moving to decision block 560, a determination is made whether the call results in web page navigation. If the call results in web page navigation, processing continues at block 580. If the call does not result in web page navigation, processing continues at block 570.
Proceeding to block 570, the call is executed without navigating to a web page. For example, reading a title of a page is a type of call in which the title element is protected but web navigation is not required. The process then terminates at the end block.
Moving to block 580, the new page associated with the markup domain is navigated. In one embodiment, the new page that is navigated may be a subframe or a web page located in the same domain as the markup domain.
Advancing to decision block 590, a determination is made whether the new web page is located in a different domain than the markup domain. If the new web page is located in a different domain than the markup domain, processing continues at block 595. If the new web page is located in the same domain as the markup domain, processing terminates at the end block.
Transitioning to block 595, the security context associated with the element is invalidated. In one embodiment, the security contexts of the elements that could navigate the markup domain are also invalidated. In another embodiment, the security context is invalidated by modifying the security context to create a new security context associated with the element. Modifying the security context invalidates all associated elements such that the new security context prevents an unauthorized user from accessing any element that references the previous security context. The process then terminates at the end block.
The above specification, examples and data provide a complete description of the manufacture and use of the composition of the invention. Since many embodiments of the invention can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, the invention resides in the claims hereinafter appended.
This application is a continuation of, and claims priority to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/867,338, filed on Jun. 14, 2004, the disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein.
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Number | Date | Country | |
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20120304316 A1 | Nov 2012 | US |
Number | Date | Country | |
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Parent | 10867338 | Jun 2004 | US |
Child | 13570044 | US |