1. Technical Field
The present invention relates to providing security to a logic system from attack through monitoring of observable features such as the power supply or electromagnetic radiation, in so called “side-channel attacks”. A side-channel attack may seek to obtain information concerning the contents of the system, such as a private key or crypto-engine data.
Any system that has a partially open clock data eye is susceptible to side-channel attack. It is not sufficient to close the eye partially: it must be filly closed to be secure. It is also not sufficient to add noise to a clock or data emitter to disguise the signal: statistical analysis of a noisy eye can determine very quickly what the data is with the noise removed. For a system to be secure from side channel attack, the emissions must be completely random, and this requires a closed clock eye diagram. Attempts described in the prior art all leave an open, or partially open, clock eye diagram. Reports that a synchronous system with a partially open clock eye diagram is resistant to attack has been due to limits in the abilities of the attacker rather than a formal basis for reliance on the system as being secure. For a provably secure system, the observable clock data eye must be closed.
2. Background of the Invention
Many logic circuits at this time are implemented in standard CMOS where the techniques for design of such logic circuits are well known. It is typical that in the design of standard CMOS logic circuit elements current is drawn from the positive supply when the output of the logic circuit element changes from a logic-0 state to a logic-1 state. As an example a typical CMOS inverter may consist of a PFET and a NFET, the source of the PFET connected to the positive supply, the drain of the PFET connected to the output, the gate of the PFET connected to the input, the source of the NFET connected to the negative supply, the drain of the NFET connected to the output and the gate of the NFET connected to the input. The PFET and NFET are generally implemented as enhancement mode devices. Typically the load on the output of a CMOS inverter is a capacitor comprising parasitic capacitance due to the routing of the output signal to other logic gates and input capacitance of other logic gates. A logic-0 state applied to the input of the CMOS inverter will turn on the PFET, turn off the NFET and charge any capacitance on the output raising the output voltage to a logic-1 state. A logic-1 state applied to the input of the CMOS inverter will turn off the PFET and turn on the NFET forcing the output voltage to the negative supply generating a logic-0 state. Current flows from the positive supply into the output load of the CMOS inverter when the input changes from a logic-1 state to a logic-0 state. Current flows from the load of the CMOS inverter when the input changes from a logic-0 state to a logic-1 state. Current may also flow from the positive supply to the negative supply when the CMOS inverter changes state due to a period when both the PFET and NFET may be both turned on. In a highly synchronous system where many logic elements change state under direction of a clock current peaks may be detectable in the system supply current. It is these current peaks that may enable an observer to determine aspects of the system design that the system designer would rather remain private for reasons of security.
A typical example of where covert monitoring of the power supply current may reveal information to a third party is in smartcard security. Smartcards employ encryption techniques to ensure that neither a PIN number or an encryption private key is revealed to a third party. The key in the encryption scheme has been shown to be readable by monitoring smartcard power supply current. Techniques known as simple power analysis, differential power analysis and higher order differential power analysis have been used to reveal the private encryption key, thereby rendering the security worthless.
It is not always necessary to use such an intrusive technique such as breaking the power supply connections of a smartcard and monitoring the electrical current flow. Electromagnetic emissions occur as a result of current flow and may also be monitored to reveal the temporal position of current peaks.
It has been explained that in standard CMOS logic gates as employed in an integrated circuit current peaks occur in the positive supply current when the output signal of a logic gate transitions from a logic-0 state to a logic-1 state. One attempt [U.S. Pat. No. 6,327,661] uses random noise generation and clock skipping to randomise the position of current peaks. Any form of introduction of random noise or changes in the clock rate will reduce the maximum data rate that can flow through the encryption engine. Such techniques also results in an increase of current consumption.
Another attempt [U.S. Pat. No. 6,507,130] to improve security relies on switching off the external supply during security-conscious operations and connecting to an internal capacitor which had previously been charged from the external supply. This method suffers from the requirement to have an on-card capacitor which may present a problem in terms of the card form-factor. The other problem with this approach is that it makes it possible to monitor the emissions from the capacitor using near field probes, which are nicely identified for the attacker simply by the switch in power.
Another attempt [U.S. Pat. No. 6,766,455] uses a zener diode and bipolar transistor as a rudimentary linear supply voltage regulator to isolate the internal supply and thereby current peaks from exiting the system. This method suffers from increased power consumption as well as not being suitable for the highest level of integration by using components that are non-standard in VLSI standard CMOS processes. There are other disadvantages and weaknesses created by this method.
Another attempt to make it more difficult to determine the internal workings of an integrated circuit is to use differential logic gates [IEEE Proceedings, ISCAS 2005, Low Power Current Mode Logic for Improved DPA-Resistance In Embedded Systems, Toprak and Leblebicic]. In differential logic gate there exists a true output and a complementary output, one of said outputs always generating a current spike in the positive supply when an output transition occurs.
Another attempt [U.S. Pat. No. 7,417,468] of reducing the current spikes is to employ specialised logic gates that have differential outputs, the differential outputs being reset to logic-0 and then pre-charged to a logic-1 prior to evaluation of the final logic output level. Again, current peaks occur at every logic transition.
Another attempt to de-correlate current peaks and logic state transitions [IEEE Proceedings, ISCAS 2005, A Novel CMOS Logic Style with Data Independent Power Consumption, Aigner et al] relies on using ternary logic levels.
The above methods have been shown to have some effect in improving the security of the integrated circuit in resisting attempts to obtain knowledge of the integrated circuit operation or contents. However, all of these methods rely on one or more of the following; balancing edge speed of the inputs, generating equal delays for the true output and complementary output rising edges, and balancing the load capacitance which also includes balancing the routing capacitance. Any imbalance reduces the effectiveness of the differential gate in generating constant amplitude current spikes thereby allowing an intruder to simply increase the complexity of the averaging algorithm to obtain the knowledge sought. These differential systems can be compromised simply by reducing the supply voltage to the point where the differential pair saturates.
Varying the supply voltage, varying the clock frequency or varying both the supply voltage and clock frequency have been shown an increase in resistance to intruder attacks [DATE 2005, Power Attack Resistant Cryptosystem Design, A Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Switching Approach, Yang et al]. The improvement comes from the voltage variation, due the way it is implemented. The method takes a lot of power as it is a linear power supply, and it has a high bandwidth. Near field probing of the supply can detect the feedback to the supply, providing the current information. The technique relies on the use of a linear power supply that may be modulated rapidly in time which may require custom designed cells not available in many standard CMOS processes. Yet further, the use of linear power supplies implies increased current consumption.
Methods that try to prevent power analysis by random frequency variations of a single clock can be comprised both by statistical analysis of the operation of the system on known plain text, or just by synchronizing the power monitor to the clock edge.
A common issue with all of the above methods is that there may be one or more penalties associated with the implementation namely power consumption, circuit processing speed or area increase. There is a need for a method to increase the resistance of an integrated circuit to intruder attacks with minimal penalty of speed, area or power consumption.
It is noted that in order for an intruder to successfully attack an integrated circuit the intruder is required to align multiple power consumption or current consumption traces and perform statistical analysis on the data. Randomising the position of current peaks reduces the ability of the intruder to align successive power consumption or current consumption traces.
Changing the clock frequency can move the position of current peaks associated with logic state changes temporally. However, it is obvious that in order to modulate the clock frequency it is necessary to operate the system at a lower overall frequency which is not generally beneficial. Further, in order to modulate the temporal position of current peaks over a wide time it is necessary to lower the clock frequency significantly which has ramifications on the overall performance of a system. Consider a synchronous logic system comprising of D-type flip-flops (DFF's) where a signal path exists between two DFF's passing through a block of combinatorial logic. The highest frequency that the system can be clocked is dependent to a large extent on the maximum propagation delay through the combinatorial logic. In a state-of-the art system where it is desired to operate the logic system at the highest possible clock speed the clock period is chosen so that it is slightly larger than the worst-case propagation delay through the combinatorial logic. Any attempt to modulate the clock to move the current peaks associated with state transitions within the logic system will require that the average clock speed is reduced. It is desirable that the system clock operates at the highest frequency for highest performance. It is also desirable that current peaks are moved well away from their nominal temporal position in order to make side channel attacks more difficult. These two desires are at odds with one another. It has thus been shown that it is desirable to be able to modulate the system clock with minimal impact to the speed of the logic system.
In a synchronous system such as shown in
Any systems with either internal clocks, or an external clock supplemented by an internal clock for the encryption engine can be compromised using a very near field probe. This form of attack is simplified by the packaging of smartcards, which generally used linished die, i.e. very thin due, and the rear surface is accessible after removing a local part of the package.
Each foregoing prior art counter-attack methods has one or more of the following drawbacks in an integrated circuit or other physical implementation of an encryption engine: insufficient protection, large physical size, high power consumption, non-standard design flow, library availability to the implementation of a robust and practical encryption engine with high immunity to attack through simple, differential power analysis or higher order differential power analysis.
Any system employing a spread spectrum clock can be comprised easily because the statistical eye diagram for the clock can never be closed. It must be open at least as wide as the maximum propagation path between two registers.
It is an objective of the present invention to reduce the sensitivity of logic systems to comprise from monitoring externally observable features, i.e. side channel attacks.
It is a further objective of the present invention to randomise the current peaks associated with state transitions to such an extent that the effective clock eye diagram is closed to form a noise mask
It is a further objective of the present invention to provide a synchronous logic system wherein the clock frequency reduction associated with randomising the clock transitions is maintained at a high proportion of the maximum clock frequency.
It is a further objective of the present invention to provide a clocking scheme for a synchronous logic system with improved security.
It is a further objective of the present invention to support design flows that can be implemented using standard CMOS libraries
The present invention relates to techniques and a method that uses multiple clock signals within a synchronous logic system to randomise the temporal position of current peaks associated with state changes at clock edges. This is achieved by applying a different clock to pipeline stages, such that the clock eye is open between two connected pipeline stages, but is closed over the whole pipeline.
Stages of the synchronous logic system are arranged in a pipeline which is common among algorithmic and structured synchronous logic systems, each stage of the pipeline being driven by a separate clock phase, where there is a random relationship between clock phases, that the clock eye diagram for each two connected stages is open, but for the pipeline the clock eye diagram is closed.
The randomisation of the clock edges improves the resistance of the synchronous logic system to attack methods such as power supply current monitoring, electromagnetic field monitoring or very field monitoring, as a means to gain an insight to the operation or contents of the system. When the effective clock eye diagram is closed by random jitter, there is provably no data content in the side-channels (current in the power supply, or electromagnetic emissions from the system).
A clock generator is used to provide a source of multiple clocks with a plurality of those clocks randomly modulated such that the effective clock eye diagram of the combination of all clock signals may be closed or tends towards closure.
Each successive pipeline stage has a clock eye that is open, and the overall reduction in the maximum clock frequency of the system due to a reduction in the overall clock eye by the introduction of jitter can be much with than other techniques, enabling the system to run faster at the same level of security.
For a better understanding of the present invention and the advantages thereof and to show how the same may be carried into effect, reference will now be made, by way of example, without loss of generality to the accompanying drawings in which:
A state storage element is characterised by one or more input signals, one or more output signals and, typically, a clock. A DFF is typical of a state storage element and is characterised by a single input signal to the D pin whereby the output signal Q takes on the value of the D input signal when the clock transitions, typically, from a logic-0 to a logic-1 state. The DFF may also have an additional output, designated nQ in this disclosure, which takes on the complementary value of the Q signal. The DFF may also have other input signals such as a set signal and/or a reset signal which may be used to initialise the DFF outputs into a preferred state e.g. as part of a power-up initialisation sequence. These additional signals may operate synchronously i.e. in conjunction with the clock transitions or asynchronously i.e. independent of the state of the clock or transitions in the clock signal.
In a typical synchronous logic system there may be a plurality of input signal's applied to a plurality of DFF's. Similarly a typical synchronous logic system may have a plurality of output signals. Without generalisation
In
One embodiment of clock generator 300 is shown in
In an alternative embodiment of clock generator 300 the phase locked loop components may be dispensed with and an alternative oscillator used to produce the clock signal input to the delay line, for example a relaxation oscillator or an inductor-capacitor based oscillator. The delay line could then be built from components used in the alternative oscillator to provide timing constant with process, voltage or temperature changes.
By means of an example, but not restricted to, a phase locked loop is used to describe one means of generating a clock signal with a random content. Clock signal 331 is a first input to phase detector 350. VCO output 381 is a second input to phase detector 350. Phase detector 350 produces one or more output signals 351 to charge pump 360 carrying information about the phase difference between the first phase detector input signal and second phase detector input signal, said signal or signals being in digital form. Charge pump and loop filter 360 produce a linear output voltage or current 361. Signal 361 is, generally, linearly related to the difference in phase between clock input 331 and VCO output 381. Clock modulating source 340 produces an output 341 that is used to modulate the clock frequency, being combined with the charge pump/loop filter output signal 361 by summer 370. Summer 370 produces output signal 371 which is connected to the VCO 380 control input. By means of an example the VCO is shown as a plurality of differential inverter stages connected as a ring oscillator. It is clear to someone practised in the art that other embodiments of the phase locked loop and constituent components are possible including the use of an XOR phase detector, the use of differential charge pump and loop filter, the use of other types of VCO including but not limited to oscillators containing passive elements such as inductors, resistors and capacitors as well as active elements such as bipolar transistors and/or MOS transistors.
A first output of VCO 380 is converted to single-ended signal 381 with converter 384 and fed back to phase detector 350 second input. A second output of VCO 380 is maintained as differential signal 385 which serves as input to delay line 390. Delay line 390 comprises a cascade of delay elements 395 of the same design or of similar design to VCO delay elements 383 similarly controlled by VCO control signal and summer output signal 371 or some other control signal in an alternate clock generator scheme that does not use a phase locked loop. The delay produced by delay elements 395 is maintained at a constant fraction of the VCO frequency. Filter 320 is employed to filter out higher frequency variations of the modulated VCO control signal 371 producing a separate control signal 321 for delay elements 395 which is relatively unaffected by the modulating signal. The delay elements produce a plurality of clock signals, in a preferred embodiment of the clock generator four clock signals are produced, spaced in time by the delays associated with delay elements 395. Output converters 396 convert the delay line outputs into CMOS signals for use with standard CMOS logic cells in synchronous logic system 400.
In a preferred embodiment of the present invention the delay period between multiple clock signals 391, 392, 393 and 394 produced by delay line 390 are equal to or slightly greater than the maximum propagation delay of the conventional implementation of the synchronous logic system. By means of an example all times are now referenced to a conventional logic system with a single phase clock wherein the minimum clock period of said system is set by the maximum propagation delay between clock stages. The minimum clock period is then said to be 1.0 time units. The term “time units” is used rather than absolute frequency to show that the present invention is not limited to a fixed frequency or range of frequencies. Neither is the present invention limited in scope to these delays or modulation amounts within the constraints of maintaining sufficient timing margin at the DFF inputs.
In a preferred embodiment of the present invention the clock period is set to a nominal value of 1.25 time units with the delay between the clock signals 391, 392, 393 and 394 set to 1.0 time units. The clock is modulated randomly with a modulation of ±0.25 time units which results in a closed eye diagram for the composite clock of all clock signals overlapping modulo-1.25.
One issue arising with the present invention is the requirement to insert delays in signals that are fed back from one clock phase to another clock phase.
For example, to feed a signal back from a DFF clocked by CLK3, 393 to a DFF clocked by CLK1, 391 it is necessary to introduce a delay in the signal path equal to twice the modulation time. This ensures that the setup time is correctly maintained.
In a further embodiment of the present invention the clocking scheme where more than four pipeline stages are present the clocks are replicated with CLK1391 driving the 5th stage, CLK2392 driving the 6th stage and so forth. Increasing the number of clocks to equal the number of stages would not be beneficial as the spectral content of the clock would tend to approach that of a conventional synchronous logic system.
In a further embodiment the spacing between clocks need not be set nominally equally as in a preferred embodiment of the present invention where the spacing between clocks is set equally to the to the maximum propagation path in all combinatorial blocks. The delay between adjacent clocks need only be set to the maximum delay through the combinatorial blocks between the respective DFF's.
In a further embodiment correlation in the spacing between clocks 391, 392, 393 and 394 may be reduced by insertion of random delays rather than fixed delays. For example noise can be added to modulate the threshold voltage of the delay elements and thereby modulate the delay period.
It has herein been shown that in a preferred embodiment of the present invention that the use of multiple clocks with fixed or varying spacing may be beneficial to randomising the position of current peaks and rendering said synchronous logic system more resistant to monitoring of the current or electromagnetic emissions as a means to determine the internal secrets of said synchronous logic system without the significant decrease in clock frequency that would occur in a prior art synchronous logic system.
Number | Date | Country | |
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61347526 | May 2010 | US |