The present application relates to integrated electronic circuits, and more particularly to an integrated circuit equipped with a back-side device protecting the circuit.
Integrated circuits are sometimes subjected to attacks the aim of which is to determine the structure of the circuit, to modify the operation thereof or to extract confidential information therefrom. An attack may be carried out from the back side of a circuit equipped on its front side with components such as capacitors, diodes or transistors, coated with conductive tracks. During the attack, a section of the back side is first etched, approximately down to level with the wells in which the components are formed. A smaller aperture, for example of 2 μm×2 μm size, is formed in this section of the back side, approximately down to level with active zones and shallow trench isolations (STIs). In this aperture, cavities are produced, for example by ion beam, these cavities extending down to level with the components or conductive tracks on the front face. Electrical contacts with the components or tracks are then created in these cavities, and the pirates use these contacts to analyze the circuit in operation.
An integrated circuit liable to undergo such an attack may comprise several hundred decoupling capacitors. These decoupling capacitors serve to limit the influence of voltage fluctuations on the circuit. The decoupling capacitors may occupy more than 20% of the real estate of the integrated circuit and are, just like the other elements of the integrated circuit, arranged in cells. These cells are formed between a conductive line at a potential VDD and a conductive line at ground potential. These lines are generally common to many cells.
The cell is placed between conductive supply lines, for example a line 6 at a positive voltage VDD and a line 8 at ground potential (GND). Contacts 14 are formed on the line 6 and are connected, by conductive tracks 16, which have been depicted by dashed lines, to contacts 18 with the zone implanted in the well 2. Likewise, contacts 20 are formed on the line 8 and are connected, by conductive tracks 22, which have been depicted by dashed lines, to contacts 24 formed on the line 4 and on the substrate 3, connecting them both to ground.
A capacitor is therefore formed between the portion of the well 2 located under the conductive line 4 and this conductive line 4.
It is easy to dig holes through these decoupling capacitors without disrupting the operation of the circuit. Specifically, the cells containing the decoupling capacitors comprise few key elements and enough space for the passage of contacts. The sites in which the decoupling capacitors are located therefore run the risk of most particularly being targeted by pirates.
It would be desirable to protect decoupling capacitors from attacks of the type described above.
Thus, one embodiment provides a decoupling capacitor comprising: two capacitor cells sharing the same well; a first trench isolation passing through the well between the two cells without reaching the bottom of the well; and a contact with the well formed in each cell.
According to one embodiment, the cells are placed between two conductive supply strips, on either side of a central supply strip.
According to one embodiment, the capacitor is formed by the first trench isolation and by second trench isolations extending in the well in a direction orthogonal to that of the first trench isolation.
According to one embodiment, capacitors comprising a trench isolation are formed in the substrate in which the well is formed.
One embodiment provides an integrated circuit containing a decoupling capacitor such as described above and a circuit for detecting the impedance between the contacts with the well in each cell.
These features and advantages, and others, will be described in detail in the following description of particular embodiments, which description is nonlimiting and given with reference to the appended figures, in which:
Elements that are the same have been referenced by the same references in the various figures and, in addition, the various figures have not been drawn to scale. For the sake of clarity, only those elements that are useful to the comprehension of the described embodiments have been shown and are detailed.
In the following description, when reference is made to qualifiers of position, such as the terms “front,” “back,” “under.” “horizontal,” “vertical,” etc., reference is being made to the position of the elements in question in the figures. Unless otherwise specified, the expression “approximately” must be interpreted as meaning to within 10% and preferably to within 5%.
As was described above, each cell is placed between a conductive line at a potential VDD and a conductive line at ground potential (GND). The two cells C1, C2 shown are formed between two conductive lines 6 at the potential VDD on either side of a conductive line 8 at ground potential, the latter line being common to the two cells. The conductive lines 6 and 8 are for example metal lines that are separated from subjacent layers by an insulator 9, shown in
The two cells C1, C2 share the same well 25, which is doped n-type and formed in a substrate 26 that is doped p-type. A trench 27 is formed between the two cells, in the well 25. The trench 27 extends, under the conductive line 8, at least the entire width of the well 25, but to a depth that is smaller than the depth of the well 25, as may be seen in
The n-doped well 25 is covered with a highly n-doped layer 32. A contact 34, 35 is formed on each of the two portions of the layer 32, i.e., the two portions separated by the trench 27. A contact 36 connects the core 29 of the trench 27 to the conductive line 8, which is at the reference potential GND.
Provision is made here, intermittently, for example periodically, for the contacts 34 and 35 to be used to check the continuity of the well 25 between the two cells, for example by measuring the impedance between the two contacts, which is compared to a reference value. To do this, the contacts 34 and 35 are connected to a circuit 80 (
During a back-side attack such as described above, targeting such cells, the pirate etches, from the back side, into the well 25. The bottom of the trench 27 is approached and for example reached. This will cause a variation in the impedance between the nodes corresponding to the contacts 34 and 35, which will be able to be measured during a subsequent measurement. The measurements of the impedance between the contacts 34 and 35 are sufficiently close together to allow rapid detection of a back-side attack.
In the cells C1 and C2, which are protected from attacks as was indicated above, entirely conventional capacitors will possibly be formed. However, given that the cell already comprises a trench isolation 27, it is desirable, to minimize the number of fabricating steps, to form these capacitors in trench isolations 40 and 41 of the same type as the separating trench 27 between the cells. Thus, as may be seen in the top view of
In normal operation, the p-substrate 26 will be biased to a potential GND, the n-well 25 to a potential VDD and the conductor of the core 29 of the trenches 27, 40 and 41 to a potential GND. As is shown, the trenches 40 and 41 extend the length of the two cells and are preferably identical to the trench 27.
It will again be noted that, whereas, in normal operation, the well 25 common to the two cells C1 and C2 is at a single potential, VDD, during phases of detecting whether an attack is being carried out, the two well portions are for example placed at different potentials in order to detect the impedance between the contacts 34 and 35.
Above, in a general and simplified way, a pair of adjacent cells containing capacitors arranged so as to detect an attack was described. It will be shown below that not only, as was described above, is this arrangement effective, but furthermore a practical structure allowing this arrangement to be used is particularly simple to produce.
As
The objective of the description of
In the particular case shown in
The various embodiments described above can be combined to provide further embodiments. These and other changes can be made to the embodiments in light of the above-detailed description. In general, in the following claims, the terms used should not be construed to limit the claims to the specific embodiments disclosed in the specification and the claims, but should be construed to include all possible embodiments along with the full scope of equivalents to which such claims are entitled. Accordingly, the claims are not limited by the disclosure.
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17 51154 | Feb 2017 | FR | national |
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