The present disclosure relates to integrated circuits, and more particularly, to an anti-tamper x-ray blocking package for secure integrated circuits and methods of manufacture and operation.
When using active x-ray spectrum analysis, a party can observe an integrated circuit under power and a voltage contrast and determine a functional state of the design. Further, it is possible to unlock a private key of devices once a decrypting step of the private key has occurred in a field programmable gate array (FPGA) and the register of the integrated circuit is first used. A known technique to prevent such unlocking can encompass package shielding, but this is still prone to tampering. Accordingly, known techniques have not been able to prevent uncovering of key technology and intellectual property in an integrated circuit.
In an aspect of the disclosure, a structure comprises: one or more devices on a front side of a semiconductor material; a plurality of patterned metal layers under the one or more devices, located and structured to protect the one or more devices from an active intrusion; an insulator layer between the plurality of patterned metal layers; and at least one contact providing an electrical connection through the semiconductor material to a front side of the plurality of metals.
In another aspect of the disclosure, a structure comprises: at least one device on a front side of semiconductor material; a metal-insular-metal capacitor on a backside of the semiconductor material; at least one contact connecting to a front side of the metal-insular-metal capacitor and which extends through the semiconductor material; and a logic circuit connecting to the plurality of metals via the at least one contact, and which is configured to detect a capacitance change in the backside patterned metal layer.
In another aspect of the disclosure, a method comprises: forming one or more devices on a front side of a semiconductor material; forming a metal-insulator-metal capacitor under the one or more devices, located and structured to protect the one or more devices from an active intrusion; and forming at least one contact providing an electrical connection through the semiconductor material to a front side of the metal-insulator-metal capacitor.
The present disclosure is described in the detailed description which follows, in reference to the noted plurality of drawings by way of non-limiting examples of exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure.
The present disclosure relates to integrated circuits, and more particularly, to an anti-tamper x-ray blocking package for secure integrated circuits and methods of manufacture and operation. More specifically, the present disclosure provides multiple buried metal layers forming back end of the line (BEOL) passive devices (e.g., metal-insulator-metal capacitor (i.e., MIM cap), inductor, resistor, etc.) to detect and prevent radio frequency (RF) or an optical probing attack, e.g., x-ray attack. Accordingly and advantageously, the devices described in the present disclosure can prevent an active x-ray attack from determining a functional state of a circuit design and thereby preventing the theft of key technology and intellectual property. In addition, the devices described herein allow RF probing detection, which adds an additional layer of security.
In known circuits, an attack and/or analysis of a circuit functionality can occur on a circuit from scanning a backside of a chip across a die. The attack and/or analysis can capture the function of the device which can then be re-constructed. For example, the analysis can be performed through active and passive optical probing using photo emission (PE), electro-optical frequency modulation, or laser voltage techniques. To avoid such attacks and/or analysis, a charge trap logic structure can be used; however, in this type of circuit, the attack and/or analysis can occur after the charge trap device has been bypassed. Further, package shielding can prevent the attack and/or analysis on a circuit; however, the package shielding is susceptible to tampering.
To solve these and other issues, the present disclosure provides multiple buried metal layers, e.g., buried patterned metal or a backside patterned metal, to “blind” the attacker's x ray system from getting a clear picture of the functional circuit. For example, two or more metals are provided as BEOL structures. These BEOL structures can be resistors, inductors or capacitors for backside attack detection. In use, for example, any tampering to remove the metal changes the capacitance or inductance (of respective capacitor and inductor), which is detected by logic of the integrated circuit. A series of these structures can be added to the chip to “prevent” localized attack. Also, the placement of passive devices in the backside can save valuable chip space on the top side of the wafer, which can now be used for more front end of the line (FEOL) devices or for reduction in overall chip footprint or area.
In more specific embodiments, active and passive devices are formed on a front side of a wafer. A patterned metal is buried between a buried oxide layer (BOX) and a handle wafer with at least two metals and/or a via in between. The patterned metal can be a buried MIM cap. A contact provides an electrical connection from the patterned metal to the front side of the wafer. Further, a logic circuit detects a capacitance change in the patterned metal (like the buried MIM cap) and generates a tamper signal to alter a circuit operation.
In further embodiments, a patterned metal is on a backside of a wafer and buried between a handle wafer and a top wafer with at least two metals and a via in between. A contact provides an electrical connection from the buried metal to the front side of the wafer, and a logic circuit detects a capacitance change in the patterned metal. In further embodiments, multiple structures as described herein can be placed across an integrated circuit to protect against narrow beam direct attacks. These structures can include buried capacitors, inductors, and resistors. The patterned metal layers have dielectric regions under the radio frequency (RF) devices.
The devices of the present disclosure can be manufactured in a number of ways using a number of different tools. In general, though, the methodologies and tools are used to form structures with dimensions in the micrometer and nanometer scale. The methodologies, i.e., technologies, employed to manufacture the devices of the present disclosure have been adopted from integrated circuit (IC) technology. For example, the structures are built on wafers and are realized in films of material patterned by photolithographic processes on the top of a wafer. In particular, the fabrication of the devices uses three basic building blocks: (i) deposition of thin films of material on a substrate, (ii) applying a patterned mask on top of the films by photolithographic imaging, and (iii) etching the films selectively to the mask.
The insulating layer 130 is also formed by any suitable process, such as separation by implantation of oxygen (SIMOX), oxidation, deposition, and/or other suitable process. The insulator layer 130 comprises any suitable material, including silicon oxide, sapphire, or other suitable insulating materials, and/or combinations thereof. An exemplary insulator layer 130 may be a buried oxide layer (BOX). In embodiments, the semiconductor material 120 and the insulator layer 130 can have a thickness of about 100 nanometers; although other dimensions are also contemplated herein.
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By implementing the processes described herein, the present disclosure includes a SOI wafer and utilizes a layer transfer process to form patterned metals (e.g., which form a capacitive structure) between the insulator layer 130 (i.e., the BOX layer) and the handle wafer 220. Further, the buried patterned metallization (i.e., the first metal 180 and the second metal 210) with body contacts (i.e., contacts 150) is connected to a logic circuit. The logic circuit can be utilized to detect any tampering of the backside metal (i.e., the first metal 180 and the second metal 210). For example, any attempts to remove the handle wafer 220 and the buried metal (i.e., the first metal 180 and the second metal 210) will result in a higher capacitance measured by the logic circuit through contacts 150, which will trigger a tamper signal. The logic circuit for detecting capacitance changes can be any known circuit design.
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In alternative embodiments, the SiGe material 320 can remain on the semiconductor material 310 as shown representatively in
By implementing the processes described herein, patterned backside metallization (i.e., the first metal 180 and the second metal 210) with TSV contacts 330 connected to a logic circuit which can be utilized to detect tampering. For example, any attempts to remove the insulator 190 and the buried metal (i.e., the first metal 180 and the second metal 210) will result in a higher capacitance measured by the logic circuit through TSV contacts 330. This, in turn, will trigger a tamper signal. The logic circuit for detecting capacitance changes can be any known circuit design.
In still further embodiments, the first metal 180 and the second metal 210 can be used as resistors, capacitors, and/or inductors for detecting a backside attack. The location of the first metal 180 and the second metal 210 in the backside of the structures 100, 100a can save space on the top of a wafer. Further, a series of the structures 100, 100a can be added to a chip to prevent localized attacks. In further embodiments, a unique signature can be programmed into a system by applying a different photo composition on chips and/or wafers.
In further embodiments, a buried MIM capacitor as described above can be implemented with a planar inductor and a front end of the line (FEOL) circuit used as a simple inductance-capacitance (LC) oscillator. This is represented with the first metal 180, the second metal 210, and the insulator layer 190 (i.e., MIM capacitor) with an inductor and a FEOL circuit. In these implementations, electromagnetic (EM) or radio frequency (RF) injection probing attacks will change the inductance (L) or capacitance (C) of a circuit which can be detected by a change in an oscillation/resonant frequency of an LC oscillator. In an example, one plate or metal layer (i.e., backside) can be connected to one node of the LC circuit and can be used to detect a change in capacitance. If part of the metal layer is damaged in any way, it causes a change in capacitance of the system, which translates to a change in frequency that can be measured by a device (i.e., an inductance to digital converter (LDC) or a frequency digital converter (FDC) can detect a change in L/C or a filter can be used). Further, if there is a RF probe attack near the MIM capacitor or the backside of a chip, this can be detected using the MIM capacitor and/or an inductor.
An anti-tamper x-ray blocking package can be utilized in system on chip (SoC) technology. It should be understood by those of skill in the art that SoC is an integrated circuit (also known as a “chip”) that integrates all components of an electronic system on a single chip or substrate. As the components are integrated on a single substrate, SoCs consume much less power and take up much less area than multi-chip designs with equivalent functionality. Because of this, SoCs are becoming the dominant force in the mobile computing (such as Smartphones) and edge computing markets. SoC is also commonly used in embedded systems and the Internet of Things.
The structures and methods as described above is used in the fabrication of integrated circuit chips. The resulting integrated circuit chips can be distributed by the fabricator in raw wafer form (that is, as a single wafer that has multiple unpackaged chips), as a bare die, or in a packaged form. In the latter case the chip is mounted in a single chip package (such as a plastic carrier, with leads that are affixed to a motherboard or other higher level carrier) or in a multichip package (such as a ceramic carrier that has either or both surface interconnections or buried interconnections). In any case the chip is then integrated with other chips, discrete circuit elements, and/or other signal processing devices as part of either (a) an intermediate product, such as a motherboard, or (b) an end product. The end product can be any product that includes integrated circuit chips, ranging from toys and other low-end applications to advanced computer products having a display, a keyboard or other input device, and a central processor.
The descriptions of the various embodiments of the present disclosure have been presented for purposes of illustration, but are not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the embodiments disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The terminology used herein was chosen to best explain the principles of the embodiments, the practical application or technical improvement over technologies found in the marketplace, or to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.
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