Circuit boards and electronic packages with embedded tamper-respondent sensor

Information

  • Patent Grant
  • 10378925
  • Patent Number
    10,378,925
  • Date Filed
    Wednesday, October 17, 2018
    5 years ago
  • Date Issued
    Tuesday, August 13, 2019
    4 years ago
Abstract
Electronic circuits, electronic packages, and methods of fabrication are provided. The electronic circuit includes a multilayer circuit board, and a tamper-respondent sensor embedded within the circuit board. The tamper-respondent sensor defines, at least in part, a secure volume associated with the multilayer circuit board. In certain implementations, the tamper-respondent sensor includes multiple tamper-respondent layers embedded within the circuit board including, for instance, one or more tamper-respondent frames and one or more tamper-respondent mat layers, with the tamper-respondent frame(s) being disposed, at least in part, above the tamper-respondent mat layer(s), which together define the secure volume where extending into the multilayer circuit board. In certain embodiments, one or more of the tamper-respondent layers are divided into multiple, separate tamper-respondent circuit zones, with the tamper-respondent layers, including the circuit zones, being electrically connected to monitor circuitry within the secure volume.
Description
BACKGROUND

Many activities require secure electronic communications. To facilitate secure electronic communications, an encryption/decryption system may be implemented on an electronic assembly or printed circuit board assembly that is included in equipment connected to a communications network. Such an electronic assembly is an enticing target for malefactors since it may contain codes or keys to decrypt intercepted messages, or to encode fraudulent messages. To prevent this, an electronic assembly may be mounted in an enclosure, which is then wrapped in a security sensor, and encapsulated with polyurethane resin. A security sensor may be, in one or more embodiments, a web or sheet of insulating material with circuit elements, such as closely-spaced, conductive lines fabricated on it. The circuit elements are disrupted if the sensor is torn, and the sensor can be sensed in order to generate an alarm signal. The alarm signal may be conveyed to a monitor circuit in order to reveal an attack on the integrity of the assembly. The alarm signal may also trigger an erasure of encryption/decryption keys stored within the electronic assembly.


In the above configuration, the electronic package, or tamper-proof electronic package, may be difficult to test due to the presence of the security sensor wrapped fully around the enclosure. Additionally, in this configuration it is difficult to recover components from the electronic package, for instance, should a manufacturing defect in the package be detected.


SUMMARY

Provided herein, in one or more aspects, is a method of fabricating an electronic circuit. The method includes providing a multilayer circuit board, and providing a tamper-respondent sensor embedded within the multilayer circuit board. The tamper-respondent sensor defines, at least in part, a secure volume associated with the multilayer circuit board. The tamper-respondent sensor includes multiple tamper-respondent layers within the multilayer circuit board. The multiple tamper-respondent layers are spaced apart, parallel layers within the multilayer circuit board that facilitate defining the secure volume, at least in part, within the multilayer circuit board. The multiple tamper-respondent layers include at least one tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer encircling the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board, and at least one tamper-respondent mat layer forming a base of the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board. A tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer of the at least one tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer includes one or more conductive trace lines extending horizontally within the tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer within the multilayer circuit board and encircling the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board. The at least one tamper-respondent frame layer is disposed over the at least one tamper-respondent mat layer.


Additional features and advantages are realized through the techniques of the present invention. Other embodiments and aspects of the invention are described in detail herein and are considered a part of the claimed invention.





BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

One or more aspects of the present invention are particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed as examples in the claims at the conclusion of the specification. The foregoing and other objects, features, and advantages of the invention are apparent from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in which:



FIG. 1 is a partial cut-away of a conventional tamper-proof electronic package;



FIG. 2 is a cross-sectional elevational view of one embodiment of a prior art, tamper-proof electronic package comprising an electronic circuit;



FIG. 3 depicts one embodiment of a tamper-respondent trace pattern or circuit which may be employed within a tamper-respondent sensor, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 4A is a cross-sectional elevational view of one embodiment of a tamper-proof electronic package, which includes a tamper-respondent sensor embedded within a multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 4B is a top plan view of the multilayer circuit board of FIG. 4A, depicting one embodiment of the secure volume where defined within the multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 5A is a partial cross-sectional elevational view of a tamper-proof electronic package comprising an electronic circuit with a multilayer circuit board and embedded tamper-respondent sensor, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 5B is a schematic of a portion of the tamper-proof electronic package of FIG. 5A, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 5C depicts an alternate embodiment of an electronic circuit comprising a multilayer circuit board and an embedded tamper-respondent sensor, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 6 illustrates one embodiment of a process for fabricating a multilayer circuit board with an embedded tamper-respondent sensor, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 7 is a plan view of one embodiment of a tamper-respondent mat layer for a tamper-respondent sensor embedded within a multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 8A is a plan view of the tamper-respondent mat layer of FIG. 7, with conductive vias to an upper layer illustrated for electrically connecting to the conductive traces of the different circuit zones of the tamper-respondent mat layer, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 8B is a partial plan view of the tamper-respondent mat layer of FIG. 8A, showing a portion of the conductive traces provided within two adjacent circuit zones of the tamper-respondent mat layer, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 8C is a plan view of a wiring layer overlying the tamper-respondent mat layer of FIG. 8A, and illustrating an offsetting of the conductive vias from the tamper-respondent mat layer of FIG. 8A to selected locations within the wiring layer, which also accommodate (in the depicted example) external signal line vias facilitating communication to and from the secure volume associated with the multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 8D depicts a tamper-respondent mat layer above the wiring layer of FIG. 8C, and illustrates further offsetting of conductive vias, from one mat layer to the next, to enhance security of the tamper-respondent sensor, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 8E is a plan view of a first tamper-respondent frame above the tamper-respondent mat layer of FIG. 8D, which facilitates defining, in part, the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 8F is a partial depiction of conductive traces for a tamper-respondent frame such as illustrated in FIG. 8E, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention;



FIG. 8G is a plan view of a second tamper-respondent frame overlying the first tamper-respondent frame, and further facilitating defining the secure volume in association with the multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention; and



FIG. 9 is a schematic illustration of one embodiment of monitor circuitry and electrical interconnection of different circuit zones of different tamper-respondent layers of the tamper-respondent sensor within the secure volume associated with the multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention.





DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Aspects of the present invention and certain features, advantages, and details thereof, are explained more fully below with reference to the non-limiting example(s) illustrated in the accompanying drawings. Descriptions of well-known materials, fabrication tools, processing techniques, etc., are omitted so as not to unnecessarily obscure the invention in detail. It should be understood, however, that the detailed description and the specific example(s), while indicating aspects of the invention, are given by way of illustration only, and are not by way of limitation. Various substitutions, modifications, additions, and/or arrangements, within the spirit and/or scope of the underlying inventive concepts will be apparent to those skilled in the art for this disclosure. Note further that reference is made below to the drawings, which are not drawn to scale for ease of understanding, and wherein the same reference numbers used throughout different figures designate the same or similar components.


Reference is first made to FIG. 1 of the drawings, which illustrates one embodiment of an electronic package 100 configured as a tamper-proof electronic package for purposes of discussion. In the depicted embodiment, an enclosure 110 is provided containing, for instance, an electronic assembly, which in one embodiment may include a plurality of electronic components, such as an encryption module and associated memory. The encryption module may comprise security-sensitive information with, for instance, access to the information stored in the module requiring use of a variable key, and with the nature of the key being stored in the associated memory within the enclosure.


In one or more implementations, a tamper-proof electronic package such as depicted is configured or arranged to detect attempts to tamper-with or penetrate into enclosure 110. Accordingly, enclosure 110 also includes, for instance, a monitor circuit which, if tampering is detected, activates an erase circuit to erase information stored within the associated memory, as well as the encryption module within the communications card. These components may be mounted on, and interconnected by, a printed circuit board or other substrate, and be internally powered via a power supply provided within the enclosure.


In the embodiment illustrated, and as one example only, enclosure 110 is surrounded by a tamper-respondent sensor 120, an encapsulant 130, and an outer, thermally conductive enclosure 140. In one or more implementations, tamper-respondent sensor 120 may comprise a folded, tamper-respondent laminate, and encapsulant 130 may be provided in the form of a molding. Tamper-respondent sensor 120 may include various detection layers, which are monitored via a ribbon cable (discussed below) by the enclosure monitor, against sudden violent attempts to penetrate enclosure 110 and damage the enclosure monitor or erase circuit before information can be erased from the encryption module. The tamper-respondent sensor may be, for example, any such article commercially available or described in various publications and issued patents.


By way of example, tamper-respondent sensor 120 may be formed as a tamper-respondent laminate comprising a number of separate layers with, for instance, an outermost lamination-respondent layer including a matrix of diagonally-extending, semi-conductive lines printed onto a regular, thin insulating film. The matrix of lines forms a number of continuous conductors which would be broken if attempts are made to penetrate the film. The lines may be formed, for instance, by printing carbon-loaded Polymer Thick Film, PTF, ink onto the film, and selectively connecting the lines on each side, by conductive vias at the edges of the film. Connections between the lines and an enclosure monitor of the communications card may be provided via, for instance, one or more ribbon cables. The ribbon cable itself may be formed of lines of carbon-loaded ink printed onto an extension of the film, if desired. Connections between the matrix and the ribbon cable may be made via connectors formed on one edge of the film. As noted, the laminate may be folded to define the tamper-respondent sensor 120 surrounding enclosure 110.


In one or more implementations, the various elements of the laminate may be adhered together and folded around enclosure 110, in a similar manner to gift-wrapping a parcel, to define the tamper-respondent sensor 120. The assembly may be placed in a mold which is then filled with, for instance, cold-pour polyurethane, and the polyurethane may be cured and hardened to form an encapsulant 130. The encapsulant may, in one or more embodiments, completely surround the tamper-respondent sensor 120 and enclosure 110, and thus form a complete environmental seal, protecting the interior of the enclosure. The hardened polyurethane is resilient and increases robustness of the electronic package in normal use. Outer, thermally conductive enclosure 140 may optionally be provided over encapsulant 130 to, for instance, provide further structural rigidity to the electronic package.


Note that, as an enhancement, within a sealed electronic package, such as the tamper-proof electronic package depicted in FIG. 1 and described above, structures and methods for facilitating heat transfer from one or more electronic components disposed therein outwards through the enclosure and any other layers of the electronic package may be provided.



FIG. 2 depicts in detail one embodiment of a tamper-proof electronic package 200. Electronic package 200 is defined by, for instance, a base metal shell 202 and a top metal shell 204. Outer surfaces of base metal shell 202 and top metal shell 204 may be provided with dimples 206, with an electronic assembly 208 resting on dimples 206 defined in base metal shell 202. Electronic assembly 208 may include, for instance, a printed circuit board 210 with electronic components 212 that are electrically connected via conductors (not shown) defined within or on printed circuit board 210.


Hollow spacers 213 may be placed below dimples 206 in top metal shell 204, and rivets 214 provided, extending through openings in dimples 206, through hollow spacers 213 and through openings in printed circuit board 210 to base metal shell 202 in order to fixedly secure electronic assembly 208 within the enclosure formed by base and top metal shells 202, 204. A security mesh or tamper-respondent sensor 216 is wrapped around the top, base, and four sides of the enclosure formed by base and top metal shells 202, 204. As illustrated, in one or more embodiments, top metal shell 204 may have an opening through which a bus 220 extends. One end of bus 220 may be connected to conductors (not shown) on printed circuit board 210, and the other end may be connected to conductors (not shown) on a printed circuit board 222. As bus 220 passes through the opening, the bus extends between an inner edge region 223 of the security mesh 216 and an overlapping, outer edge region 224 of the security mesh 216. A group of wires 226 connect, in one embodiment, security mesh 216 to conductors on printed circuit board 210. Circuitry on printed circuit board 210 is responsive to a break in security mesh 216, in which case, an alarm signal may be emitted on bus 220, and also encryption/decryption keys stored within electronic assembly 208 may be erased.


In one or more implementations, liquid polyurethane resin may be applied to security mesh 216 and cured. An outer, thermally conductive enclosure 228, such as a copper enclosure, may be filled with liquid polyurethane resin with the electronic assembly and inner enclosure and security mesh suspended within it. Upon curing the resin, the electronic assembly and inner enclosure and security mesh become embedded in a polyurethane block or encapsulant 230, as shown. The enclosure 228 is mounted on the printed circuit board 222, which can be accomplished using, for instance, legs 240 which extend through slots in printed circuit board 222 and terminate in flanges 242, which are then bent out of alignment with the slots. Bus 220 may be connected, by way of printed circuit board 222 to connectors 244 located along, for instance, one edge of printed circuit board 222.



FIG. 3 depicts a portion of one embodiment of a tamper-respondent layer 300 (or laser and pierce-respondent layer) for a tamper-respondent sensor or security mesh, for instance, such as described above in connection with FIGS. 1 & 2. In FIG. 3, the tamper-respondent layer 300 includes tracks or traces 301 of, for instance, carbon-loaded polyester ink printed onto one or both opposite sides of an electrically-insulating film 302. FIG. 3 illustrates traces 301 on, for instance, one side of film 302, with the traces on the opposite side of the film being, for instance, the same pattern, but offset to lie directly below spaces 303, between traces 301. The traces are of a width and pitch that piercing of the film 302 at any point results in damage to at least one of the traces. In one or more implementations, the traces are electrically connected in-series to define one or more conductors which are electrically connected to the enclosure monitor, which monitors the resistance of the traces or lines. Detection of an increase in resistance, caused by cutting one of the traces, will cause information within the encryption module to be erased. Providing traces 301 in a saw tooth or sinusoidal pattern advantageously makes it more difficult to breach film 302 without detection.


In the configuration of FIGS. 1-2, the electronic package, or tamper-proof electronic package, may be difficult to test due (in part) to the presence of the security mesh wrapped fully around the enclosure. Additionally, in this configuration, it is difficult to recover one or more electronic components from the electronic package should, for instance, a manufacturing defect in the package be detected.


Disclosed hereinbelow with reference to FIGS. 4A-9 are alternate approaches to creating a secure volume for accommodating one or more electronic components, such as one or more encryption and/or decryption modules and associated components of a communications card.



FIGS. 4A & 4B depict one embodiment of an electronic package, or tamper-proof electronic package 400, comprising an electronic circuit 415, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention.


Referring collectively to FIGS. 4A & 4B, electronic circuit 415 includes a multilayer circuit board 410 which has a tamper-respondent sensor 411 embedded therein that facilitates defining, in part, a secure volume 401 associated with multilayer circuit board 410 that extends into multilayer circuit board 410. In particular, in the embodiment of FIGS. 4A & 4B, secure volume 401 exists partially within multilayer circuit board 410, and partially above multilayer circuit board 410. One or more electronic components 402 are mounted to multilayer circuit board 410 within secure volume 401 and may comprise, for instance, one or more encryption modules and/or decryption modules, and associated components, with the tamper-proof electronic package comprising, in one or more embodiments, a communications card of a computer system.


Tamper-proof electronic package 400 further includes an enclosure 420, such as a pedestal-type enclosure, mounted to multilayer circuit board 410 within, for instance, a continuous groove (or trench) 412 formed within an upper surface of multilayer circuit board 410. In one or more embodiments, enclosure 420 may comprise a thermally conductive material and operate as a heat sink for facilitating cooling of the one or more electronic components 402 within the secure volume. A security mesh 421, such as the above-described security meshes, may be associated with enclosure 420, for example, wrapping around the inner surface of enclosure 420 to facilitate defining, in combination with tamper-respondent sensor 411 embedded within multilayer circuit board 410, secure volume 401. In one or more implementations, security mesh 421 extends down into continuous groove 412 in multilayer circuit board 410 and may, for instance, even wrap partially or fully around the lower edge of enclosure 420 within continuous groove 412 to provide enhanced tamper detection where enclosure 420 couples to multilayer circuit board 410. In one or more implementations, enclosure 420 may be securely affixed to multilayer circuit board 410 using, for instance, a bonding material such as an epoxy or other adhesive.


As depicted in FIG. 4B, one or more external circuit connection vias 413 may be provided within multilayer circuit board 410 for electrically connecting to the one or more electronic components 402 (FIG. 4A) within secure volume 401. These one or more external circuit connection vias 413 may electrically connect to one or more external signal lines or planes (not shown) embedded within multilayer circuit board 410 and extending, for instance, into a secure base region of (or below) secure volume 401, as explained further below. Electrical connections to and from secure volume 401 may be provided by coupling to such external signal lines or planes within the multilayer circuit board 410.


As noted with reference to FIGS. 4A & 4B, secure volume 401 defined in association with multilayer circuit board 410 may be sized to house electronic components 402 to be protected, and be constructed to extend into multilayer circuit board 410. In one or more implementations, multilayer circuit board 410 includes electrical interconnect within the secure volume 401 defined in the board, for instance, for electrically connecting the multiple tamper-respondent layers of the embedded tamper-respondent sensor 411 to associated monitor circuitry also disposed within secure volume 401.


Note that the embodiment depicted in FIGS. 4A & 4B is presented by way of example only. In one or more other implementations, the electronic circuit may comprise multiple multilayer circuit boards, each with a tamper-respondent sensor embedded within the multilayer circuit board with an appropriate connector, located within a secure volume defined between two adjacent multilayer circuit boards, interconnecting selected wiring of the multilayer circuit boards. In such an implementation, the overlying multilayer circuit board could be hollowed out to accommodate, for instance, the connector and/or one or more other electronic components between the multilayer circuit boards. In addition, other configurations of enclosure 420, and/or other approaches to coupling enclosure 420 and multilayer circuit board 410 may be employed.


By way of further example, FIG. 5A depicts a partial cross-sectional elevational view of one embodiment of multilayer circuit board 410 and enclosure 420. In this configuration, the embedded tamper-respondent sensor includes multiple tamper-respondent layers including, by way of example, at least one tamper-respondent mat (or base) layer 500, and at least one tamper-respondent frame 501. In the example depicted, two tamper-respondent mat layers 500 and two tamper-respondent frame 501 are illustrated, by way of example only. The lower-most tamper-respondent mat layer 500 may be a continuous sense or detect layer extending completely below the secure volume being defined within multilayer circuit board 410. One or both tamper-respondent mat layers 500 below secure volume 401 may be partitioned into multiple circuit zones, as discussed further below. Within each tamper-respondent mat layer, or more particularly, within each circuit zone of each tamper-respondent mat layer, multiple circuits or conductive traces are provided in any desired configuration, such as the configuration described above in connection with FIG. 3. Further, the conductive traces within the tamper-respondent layers may be implemented as, for instance, a resistive layer which is difficult to attach shunt circuits to, as explained further below.


As illustrated, one or more external signal lines or planes 505 enter secure volume 401 between, in this embodiment, two tamper-respondent mat layers 500, and then electrically connect upwards into the secure volume 401 through one or more conductive vias, arranged in any desired location and pattern. In the configuration depicted, the one or more tamper-respondent frames 501 are disposed at least inside of the area defined by continuous groove 412 accommodating the base of enclosure 420. Together with security mesh 421 associated with enclosure 420, tamper-respondent frames 501 define secure volume 401 where extending, in part, into multilayer circuit board 410. With secure volume 401 defined, at least in part, within multilayer circuit board 410, the external signal line(s) 505 may be securely electrically connected to, for instance, the one or more electronic components 402 (FIG. 4A) mounted to multilayer circuit board 410 within secure volume 401. In addition, the secure volume 401 may accommodate electrical interconnection of the conductive traces of the multiple tamper-respondent layers, for instance, via appropriate monitor circuitry.


As illustrated by the schematic of FIG. 5B, added security may be provided by extending tamper-respondent mat layers 500 (and if desired, tamper-respondent frames 501) outward past continuous groove 412 accommodating enclosure 420. In this manner, a line of attack 510 may be made more difficult at the interface between enclosure 420 and multilayer circuit board 410 since the attack 510 would need to clear tamper-respondent mat layers 500, the bottom edge of security mesh 421 associated with enclosure 420, as well as the tamper-respondent frames 501 of the embedded tamper-respondent sensor.



FIG. 5C depicts a variation on the multilayer circuit board 410 of FIG. 5A. In this embodiment, the embedded tamper-respondent sensor again includes multiple tamper-respondent mat layers 500 and multiple tamper-respondent frames 501, such as described above. Additionally, a tri-plate structure is provided comprising one or more external signal lines or layers 505 sandwiched between an upper ground plane 506 and a lower ground plane 507. In this configuration, high-speed transfer of signals to and from the secure volume, and in particular, to and from the one or more electronic components resident within the secure volume, are facilitated.


Note also that, in this implementation, once within the secure volume is defined within multilayer circuit board 410, conductive vias within the secure volume between layers of multilayer circuit board 410 may be either aligned, or offset, as desired, dependent upon the implementation. Alignment of conductive vias may facilitate, for instance, providing a shortest connection path, while offsetting conductive vias between layers may further enhance security of the tamper-proof electronic package by making an attack into the secure volume through or around one or more tamper-respondent layers of the multiple tamper-respondent layers more difficult.


Each tamper-respondent layer of the embedded tamper-respondent sensor formed within the multilayer circuit board of the electronic circuit or electronic package may include multiple conductive traces or lines formed between, for instance, respective sets of input and output contacts or vias at the trace termination points. Any number of conductive traces or circuits may be employed in defining a tamper-respondent layer or a tamper-respondent circuit zone within a tamper-respondent layer. For instance, 4, 6, 8, etc., conductive traces may be formed in parallel (or otherwise) within a given tamper-respondent layer or circuit zone between the respective sets of input and output contacts to those conductive traces.


In one or more implementations, the multilayer circuit board may be a multilayer wiring board or printed circuit board formed, for instance, by building up the multiple layers of the board. FIG. 6 illustrates one embodiment for forming and patterning a tamper-respondent layer within such a multilayer circuit board.


As illustrated in FIG. 6, in one or more implementations, a tamper-respondent layer, such as a tamper-respondent mat layer or a tamper-respondent frame disclosed herein, may be formed by providing a material stack comprising, at least in part, a structural layer 601, such as a pre-preg (or pre-impregnated) material layer, a trace material layer 602 for use in defining the desired trace patterns, and an overlying conductive material layer 603, to be patterned to define conductive contacts or vias electrically connecting to the pattern of traces being formed within the trace material layer 602, for instance, at trace terminal points. In one or more implementations, the trace material layer 602 may comprise nickel phosphorous (NiP), and the overlying conductive layer 603 may comprise copper. Note that these materials are identified by way of example only, and that other trace and/or conductive materials may be used within the build-up layer or stack 600.


A first photoresist 604 is provided over stack 600, and patterned with one or more openings 605, through which the overlying conductive layer 603 may be etched. Depending on the materials employed, and the etch processes used, a second etch process may be desired to remove portions of trace material layer 602 to define the conductive traces of the subject tamper-respondent layer. First photoresist 604 may then be removed, and a second photoresist 604′ is provided over the conductive layer 603 features to remain, such as the input and output contacts. Exposed portions of conductive layer 603 are then etched, and the second photoresist 604′ may be removed, with any opening in the layer being filled, for instance, with an adhesive (or pre-preg) and a next build-up layer is provided, as shown. Note that in this implementation, most of overlying conductive layer 603 is etched away, with only the conductive contacts or vias remaining where desired, for instance, at the terminal points of the traces formed within the layer by the patterning of the trace material layer 602. Note that any of a variety of materials may be employed to form the conductive lines or traces within a tamper-respondent layer. Nickel-phosphorous (NiP) is particularly advantageous as a material since it is resistant to contact by solder, or use of a conductive adhesive to bond to it, making it harder to bridge from one circuit or trace to the next during an attempt to penetrate into the protected secure volume of the electronic circuit. Other materials which could be employed include OhmegaPly®, offered by Ohmega Technologies, Inc., of Culver City, Calif. (USA), or Ticer™, offered by Ticer Technologies of Chandler, Ariz. (USA).


By way of example, FIG. 7 is a partial plan view of one embodiment of a tamper-respondent mat layer 500 of an embedded tamper-respondent sensor within a multilayer circuit board, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. In this implementation, tamper-respondent mat layer 500 is divided into multiple tamper-respondent circuit zones 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, of varying sizes. Within each tamper-respondent circuit zone 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, conductive traces of the same or different wiring patterns may be provided with, for instance, the larger circuit zones 701, 703, 705, having a same number of traces and similar resistance per trace, per zone. Note that other configurations of tamper-respondent sense zones may be employed, including, for instance, equal or standard-sized circuit zones within a common tamper-respondent layer.



FIGS. 8A-8G depict, by way of example, one embodiment of multiple tamper-respondent layers, and the electrical interconnect associated with the tamper-respondent layers, such as for, for instance, the embedded tamper-respondent sensor depicted in FIG. 5A.


As illustrated in FIG. 8A, blind contact vias 710, 711 are provided, by way of example, at the edge or boundary of each tamper-respondent circuit zone 701, 702, 703, 704, 705 within a lowermost tamper-respondent mat layer 500. Contact vias 710, 711 facilitate electrical connection from the ends of the conductive traces (not shown) of the depicted tamper-respondent layer upwards into the secure volume for connection to appropriate monitor circuitry in any desired configuration. Note with respect to FIG. 8A, that there are no penetrations through the lowermost tamper-respondent mat layer 500. As explained further below, in one or more implementations, electrical interconnect may be provided above the lowermost tamper-respondent mat layer to shift the overlying contact vias to, for instance, the centers of tamper-respondent circuit zones 702, 704, for instance, to prevent direct penetration of one tamper-respondent layer from passing through other tamper-respondent layers. As noted, any desired number and size of circuit zones of traces may be defined within a tamper-respondent layer. In one or more implementations, a tamper-respondent mat layer may include, for instance, 20, 30, 40, or more, tamper-respondent circuit zones within the layer, each with a same number of traces.



FIG. 8B is a partial enlarged depiction of tamper-respondent mat layer 500 of FIG. 8A, showing a partial boundary between two tamper-respondent circuit zones 701, 702, with input contacts or vias 710 depicted. In this example, an 8-band trace pattern of conductive traces or lines 800 is partially shown within circuit zones 701, 702. As noted, the pattern of conductive traces 800 may be provided in any desired configuration and include, for instance, saw-tooth or sinusoidal line portions within the respective circuit zones 701, 702. FIG. 8B depicts an example of the start of a pattern of the conductive traces 800 where connected to input contacts or vias 710. Configuring conductive traces 800 as illustrated further enhances security by making it harder to reach multiple vias to jump over or shut sections of circuitry within a particular tamper-respondent layer of the embedded tamper-respondent sensor. In one or more implementations the trace fill pattern is dense. Further, line-to-line or trace-to-trace spacing between the different circuit zones of a particular tamper-respondent layer may be the same as that employed within a particular tamper-respondent circuit zone.



FIG. 8C depicts an electrical interconnect layer over tamper-respondent mat layer 500 of FIG. 8A, with wiring illustrated to shift the conductive contacts to offset the vias to, by way of example, the middle of tamper-respondent circuit zones 702, 704. Additionally, this interconnect layer may comprise the external signal lines and contacts for connecting to and from the secure volume to external the secure volume, including, if desired, the provision of one or more high-speed interconnect circuits sandwiched between, for instance, respective ground planes, such as noted above with reference to the exemplary embodiment of FIG. 5C. As illustrated, conductive lines 811 may be provided in this layer electrically connecting contacts 710, 711 of the respective tamper-respondent circuit zones to offset vias 812, 813 disposed, for instance, in alignment 810 over tamper-respondent circuit zones 702, 704. In addition, one or more external signal line contacts 815 may also be provided in this electrical interconnect layer for facilitating electrical connection of the external signal lines into the secure volume.



FIG. 8D depicts a second tamper-respondent mat layer 500, which in this example, is disposed above tamper-respondent mat layer 500 discussed above in connection with FIGS. 8A & 8B. This second tamper-respondent mat layer 500 is similar to the first except, in the depicted embodiment, the sizes of the tamper-respondent circuit zones 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, are different from the tamper-respondent circuit zones 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, of the tamper-respondent mat layer 500 of FIGS. 8A & 8B. Thus, the boundaries between the tamper-respondent circuit zones between the different layers are offset. This advantageously reduces the opportunity to penetrate both tamper-respondent mat layers along a zone boundary or seam. Depending upon the implementation, electrical contacts to the depicted circuit vias or contacts in the tamper-respondent circuit zones depicted may extend directly upwards into the secure volume. Alternatively, contact vias may be further offset into, for instance, the center lines of tamper-respondent circuit zones 722, 724, in a manner similar to that described above in connection with FIG. 8C. As described above, within each tamper-respondent circuit zone 721-725, a pattern of conductive traces (not shown) is provided. In one or more implementations, tamper-respondent mat layer 500 depicted in FIG. 8D may again comprise any desired number of circuit zones, such as 20, 30, 40, or more, circuit zones, each of which electrically connects within the secure volume in any desired monitor circuitry configuration. Note also that, in one or more embodiments, contacts or vias from the signal layer(s) and/or the lowermost tamper-respondent may layer, may extend through this second tamper-respondent mat layer.



FIG. 8E depicts an exemplary embodiment of a tamper-respondent frame 501 of a tamper-respondent sensor, in accordance with one or more aspects of the present invention. Tamper-respondent frame 501 resides over the tamper-respondent mat layers 500 described above in connection with FIGS. 8A-8D, and is in one or more embodiments, a picture frame-type layer which completely encircles, and thus serves to define, the secure volume 401 (FIGS. 4A & 5A) within the multilayer circuit board. The tamper-respondent frame illustrated may be a first tamper-respondent frame 501, which provides protective sense wiring or traces, either on the inside or the outside of the enclosure 420 (see FIGS. 4A & 5A), where coupled to the continuous groove or trench within the multilayer circuit board.



FIG. 8F depicts an exemplary embodiment of conductive contacts or vias 710, 711 for tamper-respondent frame 501 of FIG. 8E, with four trace lines being depicted, by way of example only. As illustrated, the input contacts 710 and output contacts 711 at the trace terminal points in a particular zone may be disposed in close proximity with the trace lines 801 of tamper-respondent frame 501, and overlap or double back at the seam to minimize possibility of a successful attack through tamper-respondent frame 501 at the seam.



FIG. 8G depicts a second tamper-respondent frame 501, which in one or more embodiments, overlies the first tamper-respondent frame 501 of FIG. 8E (in the example of FIG. 5A), and which may be identical to the first tamper-respondent frame, except rotated 180° so that the wiring contacts 710, 711 are separated from the layer below, as illustrated. As with the tamper-respondent mat layers 500, tamper-respondent frames 501 may be divided into distinct circuit zones to, for instance, further enhance security. For instance, 2, 4, 6, or more, circuit zones may be defined within a particular tamper-respondent frame 501, each with a plurality of conductive traces defined between input contacts 710 and output contacts 711 at the trace terminal points.


The trace lines or circuits within all of the tamper-respondent layers, and in particular, the tamper-respondent circuit zones, of the embedded tamper-respondent sensor are electrically connected into monitor or compare circuitry 900 provided, for instance, within secure volume 401 of multilayer circuit board 410, as illustrated in FIG. 9. Monitor circuitry 900 may include various bridge or compare circuits, and conventional printed wiring board electrical interconnect inside the secure volume 401, for instance, located within the secure volume defined by the tamper-respondent frames 501 (FIG. 5A), and the tamper-respondent mat layers.


Note that advantageously, different tamper-respondent circuit zones on different tamper-respondent layers may be electrically interconnected into, for instance, the same comparator circuit or Wheatstone bridge of the monitor circuitry. Thus, any of a large number of interconnect configurations may be possible. For instance, if each tamper-respondent mat layer contains 30 tamper-respondent circuit zones, and each tamper-respondent frame contains four tamper-respondent circuit zones, then, for instance, the resultant sixty-eight tamper-respondent circuit zones may be connected in any configuration within the secure volume to create the desired arrangement of circuit networks within the secure volume being monitored for changes in resistance or tampering. Note in this regard, that the power supply or battery for the tamper-respondent sensor may be located external to the secure volume, with the sensor being configured to trip and destroy any protected or critical data if the power supply or battery is tampered with.


The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. As used herein, the singular forms “a”, “an” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms “comprise” (and any form of comprise, such as “comprises” and “comprising”), “have” (and any form of have, such as “has” and “having”), “include” (and any form of include, such as “includes” and “including”), and “contain” (and any form contain, such as “contains” and “containing”) are open-ended linking verbs. As a result, a method or device that “comprises”, “has”, “includes” or “contains” one or more steps or elements possesses those one or more steps or elements, but is not limited to possessing only those one or more steps or elements. Likewise, a step of a method or an element of a device that “comprises”, “has”, “includes” or “contains” one or more features possesses those one or more features, but is not limited to possessing only those one or more features. Furthermore, a device or structure that is configured in a certain way is configured in at least that way, but may also be configured in ways that are not listed.


The corresponding structures, materials, acts, and equivalents of all means or step plus function elements in the claims below, if any, are intended to include any structure, material, or act for performing the function in combination with other claimed elements as specifically claimed. The description of the present invention has been presented for purposes of illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the invention in the form disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention. The embodiment was chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of one or more aspects of the invention and the practical application, and to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand one or more aspects of the invention for various embodiments with various modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated.

Claims
  • 1. A method of fabricating an electronic circuit comprising: providing a multilayer circuit board, the multilayer circuit board being a single circuit board formed of multiple layers; anddisposing at least one electronic component on an uppermost surface of the multilayer circuit board, the multilayer circuit board including a continuous groove formed in the uppermost surface of the multilayered circuit board to facilitate attaching an enclosure to the multilayer circuit board, the at least one electronic component being within a surface area of the uppermost surface encircled by the continuous groove;providing a tamper-respondent sensor embedded within the multilayer circuit board, the tamper-respondent sensor defining, at least in part, a secure volume associated with the multilayer circuit board, and comprising: multiple tamper-respondent layers within the multilayer circuit board, the multiple tamper-respondent layers being spaced apart, parallel layers within the multilayer circuit board that facilitate defining the secure volume, at least in part, within the multilayer circuit board, and the multiple tamper-respondent layers comprising: at least one tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer encircling the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board and disposed below the surface area of the multilayer circuit board encircled by the continuous groove, a tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer of the at least one tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer comprising one or more conductive trace lines extending horizontally around the tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer within the multilayer circuit board and encircling the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board; andat least one tamper-respondent mat layer forming a base of the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board, the at least one tamper-respondent frame layer being disposed over the at least one tamper-respondent mat layer.
  • 2. The method of claim 1, wherein at least one tamper-respondent layer of the multiple tamper-respondent layers comprises multiple, separate tamper-respondent circuit zones, and wherein the multiple tamper-respondent layers, including the multiple, separate tamper-respondent circuit zones of the at least one tamper-respondent layer, are electrically connected to monitor circuitry within the secure volume associated with the multilayer circuit board.
  • 3. The method of claim 1, wherein at least two tamper-respondent layers of the multiple tamper-respondent layers each comprise multiple, separate tamper-respondent circuit zones, and wherein at least two tamper-respondent circuit zones within different tamper-respondent layers of the at least two tamper-respondent layers are electrically connected to a common monitor circuit within the secure volume associated with the multilayer circuit board.
  • 4. The method of claim 3, wherein the at least one tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer of the multiple tamper-respondent layers defines, at least in part, a side portion of the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board.
  • 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the multilayer circuit board comprises an external signal layer embedded within the multilayer circuit board, the external signal layer electrically connecting to the at least one electronic component disposed on the multilayer circuit board within the secure volume, and residing, at least in part, over a tamper-respondent mat layer of the at least one tamper-respondent mat layer.
  • 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the multiple tamper-respondent layers within the multilayer circuit board comprise at least two tamper-respondent picture frame-type layers, the at least two tamper-respondent picture frame-type layers defining, at least in part, a periphery of the secure volume where extending into the multilayer circuit board.
  • 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer embedded within the multilayer circuit board defines a periphery of the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board.
  • 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more conductive trace lines of the tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer of the at least one tamper-respondent picture frame-type layer encircling the secure volume within the multilayer circuit board are encircled or intersected by the continuous groove in the uppermost surface of the multilayer circuit board.
  • 9. The method of claim 8, wherein the tamper-respondent mat layer of the at least one tamper-respondent may layer extends from below the secure volume outward past the groove in the multilayer circuit board.
US Referenced Citations (301)
Number Name Date Kind
3165569 Bright et al. Jan 1965 A
4097894 Tanner et al. Jun 1978 A
4160503 Ohlbach Jul 1979 A
4211324 Ohlbach Jul 1980 A
4324823 Ray, III Apr 1982 A
4450504 Severson May 1984 A
4496900 Di Stefano et al. Jan 1985 A
4516679 Simpson May 1985 A
4542337 Rausch Sep 1985 A
4593384 Kleinjne Jun 1986 A
4609104 Kasper et al. Sep 1986 A
4653252 Van de Haar et al. Mar 1987 A
4677809 Long et al. Jul 1987 A
4691350 Kleijne et al. Sep 1987 A
4807284 Kleijne Feb 1989 A
4811288 Kleijne et al. Mar 1989 A
4847139 Wolf et al. Jul 1989 A
4860351 Weingart Aug 1989 A
4865197 Craig Sep 1989 A
5009311 Schenk Apr 1991 A
5027397 Double et al. Jun 1991 A
5060114 Feinberg et al. Oct 1991 A
5075822 Baumler et al. Dec 1991 A
5117457 Comerford et al. May 1992 A
5159629 Double et al. Oct 1992 A
5185717 Mori Feb 1993 A
5201868 Johnson Apr 1993 A
5201879 Steele et al. Apr 1993 A
5211618 Stoltz May 1993 A
5239664 Verrier et al. Aug 1993 A
5243162 Kobayashi Sep 1993 A
5389738 Piosenka et al. Feb 1995 A
5406630 Piosenka et al. Apr 1995 A
5458912 Camilletti et al. Oct 1995 A
5506566 Oldfield et al. Apr 1996 A
5568124 Joyce et al. Oct 1996 A
5594439 Swanson Jan 1997 A
5675319 Rivenberg et al. Oct 1997 A
5715652 Stahlecker Feb 1998 A
5761054 Kuhn Jun 1998 A
5813113 Stewart et al. Sep 1998 A
5858500 MacPherson Jan 1999 A
5880523 Candelore Mar 1999 A
5975420 Gogami et al. Nov 1999 A
5988510 Tuttle et al. Nov 1999 A
6121544 Petsinger Sep 2000 A
6195267 MacDonald, Jr. et al. Feb 2001 B1
6201296 Fries et al. Mar 2001 B1
6233339 Kawano et al. May 2001 B1
6259363 Payne Jul 2001 B1
6261215 Imer Jul 2001 B1
6301096 Wozniczka Oct 2001 B1
6355316 Miller et al. Mar 2002 B1
6384397 Takiar et al. May 2002 B1
6396400 Epstein, III et al. May 2002 B1
6420971 Leck et al. Jul 2002 B1
6424954 Leon Jul 2002 B1
6438825 Kuhm Aug 2002 B1
6469625 Tomooka Oct 2002 B1
6473995 Miyakawa et al. Nov 2002 B2
6512454 Miglioli et al. Jan 2003 B2
6686539 Farquhar et al. Feb 2004 B2
6746960 Goodman et al. Jun 2004 B2
6798660 Moss et al. Sep 2004 B2
6817204 Bash et al. Nov 2004 B2
6853093 Cohen Feb 2005 B2
6879032 Rosenau et al. Apr 2005 B2
6895509 Clark May 2005 B1
6929900 Farquhar et al. Aug 2005 B2
6946960 Sisson et al. Sep 2005 B2
6957345 Cesana et al. Oct 2005 B2
6970360 Sinha Nov 2005 B2
6982642 Cesana et al. Jan 2006 B1
6985362 Mori et al. Jan 2006 B2
6991961 Hubbard et al. Jan 2006 B2
6996953 Perreault et al. Feb 2006 B2
7005733 Kommerling et al. Feb 2006 B2
7007171 Butturini et al. Feb 2006 B1
7015823 Gillen et al. Mar 2006 B1
7054162 Benson et al. May 2006 B2
7057896 Matsuo et al. Jun 2006 B2
7094143 Wolm et al. Aug 2006 B2
7094459 Takahashi Aug 2006 B2
7095615 Nichols Aug 2006 B2
7156233 Clark et al. Jan 2007 B2
7180008 Heitmann et al. Feb 2007 B2
7189360 Ho et al. Mar 2007 B1
7214874 Dangler et al. May 2007 B2
7247791 Kulpa Jul 2007 B2
7304373 Taggart et al. Dec 2007 B2
7310737 Patel et al. Dec 2007 B2
7465887 Suzuki et al. Dec 2008 B2
7475474 Heitmann et al. Jan 2009 B2
7515418 Straznicky et al. Apr 2009 B2
7549064 Elbert et al. Jun 2009 B2
7640658 Pham et al. Jan 2010 B1
7643290 Narasimhan et al. Jan 2010 B1
7663883 Shirakami et al. Feb 2010 B2
7671324 Fleischman et al. Mar 2010 B2
7672129 Ouyang et al. Mar 2010 B1
7731517 Lee et al. Jun 2010 B2
7746657 Oprea et al. Jun 2010 B2
7760086 Hunter et al. Jul 2010 B2
7768005 Condorelli et al. Aug 2010 B2
7783994 Ball et al. Aug 2010 B2
7787256 Chan et al. Aug 2010 B2
7868411 Eaton et al. Jan 2011 B2
7898413 Hsu et al. Mar 2011 B2
7901977 Angelopoulos et al. Mar 2011 B1
7947911 Pham et al. May 2011 B1
7978070 Hunter Jul 2011 B2
8006101 Crawford Aug 2011 B2
8084855 Lower et al. Dec 2011 B2
8094450 Cole et al. Jan 2012 B2
8101267 Samuels et al. Jan 2012 B2
8133621 Wormald et al. Mar 2012 B2
8199506 Janik et al. Jun 2012 B2
8287336 Dangler et al. Oct 2012 B2
8325486 Arshad et al. Dec 2012 B2
8345423 Campbell et al. Jan 2013 B2
8393918 Cheng et al. Mar 2013 B2
8516269 Hamlet et al. Aug 2013 B1
8589703 Lee et al. Nov 2013 B2
8646108 Shiakallis et al. Feb 2014 B2
8659506 Nomizo Feb 2014 B2
8659908 Adams et al. Feb 2014 B2
8664047 Lower et al. Mar 2014 B2
8716606 Kelley et al. May 2014 B2
8797059 Boday et al. Aug 2014 B2
8836509 Lowy Sep 2014 B2
8853839 Gao et al. Oct 2014 B2
8879266 Jarvis et al. Nov 2014 B2
8890298 Buer et al. Nov 2014 B2
8947889 Kelley et al. Feb 2015 B2
8961280 Dangler et al. Feb 2015 B2
9003199 Dellmo et al. Apr 2015 B2
9011762 Seppa et al. Apr 2015 B2
9052070 Davis et al. Jun 2015 B2
9166586 Carapelli et al. Oct 2015 B2
9298956 Wade et al. Mar 2016 B2
9554477 Brodsky et al. Jan 2017 B1
9555606 Fisher et al. Jan 2017 B1
9560737 Issacs et al. Jan 2017 B2
9578735 Fisher et al. Feb 2017 B2
9578764 Fisher et al. Feb 2017 B1
9586857 Cabral, Jr. et al. Mar 2017 B2
9591776 Brodsky et al. Mar 2017 B1
9661747 Brodsky et al. May 2017 B1
9681649 Busby et al. Jun 2017 B2
9717154 Brodsky et al. Jul 2017 B2
9858776 Busby et al. Jan 2018 B1
9877383 Brodsky et al. Jan 2018 B2
9881880 Busby et al. Jan 2018 B2
9894749 Brodsky et al. Feb 2018 B2
9904811 Campbell et al. Feb 2018 B2
9911012 Brodsky et al. Mar 2018 B2
9913362 Brodsky et al. Mar 2018 B2
9913370 Busby et al. Mar 2018 B2
9913416 Fisher et al. Mar 2018 B2
9916744 Busby et al. Mar 2018 B2
9924591 Brodsky et al. Mar 2018 B2
9930768 Fisher et al. Mar 2018 B2
9936573 Brodsky et al. Apr 2018 B2
9949357 Fisher et al. Apr 2018 B2
9978231 Isaacs May 2018 B2
9999124 Busby et al. Jun 2018 B2
20010049021 Valimont Dec 2001 A1
20010050425 Beroz et al. Dec 2001 A1
20010056542 Cesana et al. Dec 2001 A1
20020002683 Benson Jan 2002 A1
20020068384 Beroz et al. Jun 2002 A1
20020084090 Farquhar Jul 2002 A1
20030009683 Schwenck et al. Jan 2003 A1
20030009684 Schwenck et al. Jan 2003 A1
20030198022 Ye et al. Oct 2003 A1
20040218366 Speigl Nov 2004 A1
20050068735 Fissore et al. Mar 2005 A1
20050111194 Sohn et al. May 2005 A1
20050161253 Heitmann et al. Jul 2005 A1
20050180104 Olesen et al. Aug 2005 A1
20060034731 Lewis et al. Feb 2006 A1
20060049941 Hunter et al. Mar 2006 A1
20060072288 Stewart et al. Apr 2006 A1
20060080348 Cesana et al. Apr 2006 A1
20060196945 Mendels Sep 2006 A1
20060218779 Ooba et al. Oct 2006 A1
20070038865 Oggioni et al. Feb 2007 A1
20070064396 Oman et al. Mar 2007 A1
20070064399 Mandel et al. Mar 2007 A1
20070108619 Hsu May 2007 A1
20070125867 Oberle Jun 2007 A1
20070211436 Robinson et al. Sep 2007 A1
20070223165 Itri et al. Sep 2007 A1
20070230127 Peugh et al. Oct 2007 A1
20070268671 Brandenburg et al. Nov 2007 A1
20070271544 Engstrom Nov 2007 A1
20080036598 Oggioni Feb 2008 A1
20080050512 Lower et al. Feb 2008 A1
20080061972 Hwang et al. Mar 2008 A1
20080086876 Douglas Apr 2008 A1
20080128897 Chao Jun 2008 A1
20080144290 Brandt et al. Jun 2008 A1
20080159539 Huang et al. Jul 2008 A1
20080160274 Dang et al. Jul 2008 A1
20080191174 Ehrensvard et al. Aug 2008 A1
20080251906 Eaton Oct 2008 A1
20080278353 Smith et al. Nov 2008 A1
20090031135 Kothandaraman Jan 2009 A1
20090073659 Peng et al. Mar 2009 A1
20090152339 Hawkins et al. Jun 2009 A1
20090166065 Clayton et al. Jul 2009 A1
20090212945 Steen Aug 2009 A1
20100088528 Sion Apr 2010 A1
20100110647 Hiew et al. May 2010 A1
20100134959 Fife et al. Jun 2010 A1
20100177487 Arshad et al. Jul 2010 A1
20100319986 Bleau et al. Dec 2010 A1
20110001237 Brun et al. Jan 2011 A1
20110038123 Janik et al. Feb 2011 A1
20110103027 Aoki et al. May 2011 A1
20110241446 Tucholski Oct 2011 A1
20110299244 Dede et al. Dec 2011 A1
20120047374 Klum et al. Feb 2012 A1
20120050998 Klum et al. Mar 2012 A1
20120052252 Kohli et al. Mar 2012 A1
20120068846 Dalzell et al. Mar 2012 A1
20120117666 Oggioni et al. May 2012 A1
20120140421 Kirstine et al. Jun 2012 A1
20120319986 Toh et al. Jun 2012 A1
20120170217 Nishikimi et al. Jul 2012 A1
20120185636 Leon et al. Jul 2012 A1
20120244742 Wertz et al. Sep 2012 A1
20120256305 Kaufmann et al. Oct 2012 A1
20120320529 Loong et al. Dec 2012 A1
20130021758 Bernstein et al. Jan 2013 A1
20130033818 Hosoda et al. Feb 2013 A1
20130058052 Arshad et al. Mar 2013 A1
20130104252 Yanamadala et al. Apr 2013 A1
20130141137 Krutzik et al. Jun 2013 A1
20130154834 Busca et al. Jun 2013 A1
20130158936 Rich et al. Jun 2013 A1
20130208422 Hughes et al. Aug 2013 A1
20130235527 Wagner et al. Sep 2013 A1
20130283386 Lee Oct 2013 A1
20140022733 Lim et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140027159 Salle et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140028335 Salle et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140033331 Salle et al. Jan 2014 A1
20140160679 Kelty et al. Jun 2014 A1
20140184263 Ehrenpfordt et al. Jul 2014 A1
20140204533 Abeyasekera et al. Jul 2014 A1
20140206800 Wu et al. Jul 2014 A1
20140233165 Farkas et al. Aug 2014 A1
20140296410 Cheng et al. Oct 2014 A1
20140306014 Salle et al. Oct 2014 A1
20140321064 Bose et al. Oct 2014 A1
20140325688 Cashin Oct 2014 A1
20150007427 Dangler et al. Jan 2015 A1
20150120072 Marom et al. Apr 2015 A1
20150143551 Tiemeijer May 2015 A1
20150163933 Steiner Jun 2015 A1
20150213243 Hughes et al. Jul 2015 A1
20150235053 Lee et al. Aug 2015 A1
20150244374 Hadley Aug 2015 A1
20150307250 Sokol Oct 2015 A1
20160005262 Hirato et al. Jan 2016 A1
20160012693 Sugar Jan 2016 A1
20160262270 Isaacs et al. Sep 2016 A1
20170006712 Matsushima et al. Jan 2017 A1
20170019987 Dragone et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170068881 Camper et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170089729 Brodsky et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170089977 Warnock et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170091491 Dangler et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170094783 Dangler et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170094803 Dangler et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170094804 Brodsky et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170094805 Dangler et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170094808 Brodsky et al. Mar 2017 A1
20170103683 Yazdi et al. Apr 2017 A1
20170108543 Brodsky et al. Apr 2017 A1
20170111998 Brodsky et al. Apr 2017 A1
20170156223 Fisher et al. Jun 2017 A1
20170171999 Fisher et al. Jun 2017 A1
20170286725 Lewis Oct 2017 A1
20180061196 Busby et al. Mar 2018 A1
20180070444 Brodsky et al. Mar 2018 A1
20180082556 Dragone et al. Mar 2018 A1
20180092203 Dragone et al. Mar 2018 A1
20180092204 Dragone et al. Mar 2018 A1
20180096173 Brodsky et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180098423 Brodsky et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180098424 Busby et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180102329 Busby et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180103537 Brodsky et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180103538 Brodsky et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180107848 Campbell et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180108229 Busby et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180110142 Fisher et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180110165 Fisher et al. Apr 2018 A1
20180235081 Brodsky et al. Aug 2018 A1
Foreign Referenced Citations (31)
Number Date Country
2014-30639 Mar 2010 CN
10-4346587 Feb 2015 CN
19816571 Oct 1999 DE
19816572 Oct 1999 DE
10-2012-203955 Sep 2013 DE
0 056 360 Oct 1993 EP
0 629 497 Dec 1994 EP
1 734 578 Dec 2006 EP
1 968 362 Sep 2008 EP
2 104 407 Sep 2009 EP
1 672 464 Apr 2012 EP
2 560 467 Feb 2013 EP
61-297035 Dec 1986 JP
2000-238141 Sep 2000 JP
2007-173416 Jul 2007 JP
2007-305761 Nov 2007 JP
2013-125807 Jun 2013 JP
2013-140112 Jul 2013 JP
WO 1999003675 Jan 1999 WO
WO 1999021142 Apr 1999 WO
WO 2001063994 Aug 2001 WO
WO 2003012606 Feb 2003 WO
WO 2003025080 Mar 2003 WO
WO 2004040505 May 2004 WO
WO 2009042335 Apr 2009 WO
WO 2009092472 Jul 2009 WO
WO 2010128939 Nov 2010 WO
WO 2013004292 Jan 2013 WO
WO 2013189483 Dec 2013 WO
WO 2014086987 Jun 2014 WO
WO 2014158159 Oct 2014 WO
Non-Patent Literature Citations (28)
Entry
Holm, Ragnar, “Electric Contacts: Theory and Application”, Spinger-Verlag, New York, 4th Edition, 1981 (pp. 10-19).
Clark, Andrew J., “Physical Protection of Cryptographic Devices”, Advanced in Cyprtology, Eurocrypt '87, Springer, Berlin Heidelberg (1987) (11 pages).
Halperin et al., “Latent Open Testing of Electronic Packaging”, MCMC-194, IEEE (1994) (pp. 83-33).
Simek, Bob, “Tamper Restrictive Thermal Ventilation System for Enclosures Requiring Ventilation and Physical Security”, IBM Publication No. IPCOM000008607D, Mar. 1, 1998 (2 pages).
NIST, “Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules”, FIPS Pub. 140-2, Issued May 25, 2001.
Pamula et al., “Cooling of Integrated Circuits Using Droplet-Based Microfluidics”, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), GLSVLSI'03, Apr. 28-29, 2003 (pp. 84-87).
Saran et al., “Fabrication and Characterization of Thin Films of Single-Walled Carbon Nanotube Bundles on Flexible Plastic Substrates”, Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 126, No. 14 (Mar. 23, 2004) (pp. 4462-4463).
Khanna P.K. et al., “Studies on Three-Dimensional Moulding, Bonding and Assembling of Low-Temperature-Cofired Ceramics MEMS and MST Applications.” Materials Chemistry and Physics, vol. 89, No. 1 (2005) (pp. 72-79).
Drimer et al., “Thinking Inside the Box: System-Level Failures of Tamper Proofing”, 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, (Feb. 2008) (pp. 281-295).
Loher et al., “Highly Integrated Flexible Electronic Circuits and Modules”, 3rd International IEEE on Microsystems, Packaging, Assembly & Circuits Technology Conference (Oct. 22-24, 2008) (Abstract Only) (1 page).
Sample et al., “Design of an RFID-Based Battery-Free Programmable Sensing Platform”, IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 57, No. 11, Nov. 2008 (pp. 2608-2615).
Jhang et al., “Nonlinear Ultrasonic Techniques for Non-Destructive Assessment of Micro Damage in Material: A Review”, International Journal of Prec. Eng. & Manuf., vol. 10, No. 1, Jan. 2009 (pp. 123-135).
Anonymous, “Consolidated Non-Volatile Memory in a Chip Stack”, IBM Technical Disclosure: IP.com No. IPCOM000185250, Jul. 16, 2009 (6 pages).
Isaacs et al., “Tamper Proof, Tamper Evident Encryption Technology”, Pan Pacific Symposium SMTA Proceedings (2013) (9 pages).
Wikipedia, “Toughened Glass”, http://web.archive.org/web/20140605093019/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/toughened_glass, downloaded/printed Jun. 5, 2014 (4 pages).
Anonymous, “Selective Memory Encryption”, IBM Technical Disclosure: IP.com IPCOM000244183, Nov. 20, 2015 (6 pages).
Zhou et al., “Nonlinear Analysis for Hardware Trojan Detection”, ICSPCC2015, IEEE (2015) (4 pages).
Harting Mitronics, “Saftey Caps for Payment Terminals”, http://harting-mitronics.ch/fileadmin/hartingmitronics/case_studies/Saftey_caps_for_payment_terminals.pdf, downloaded Aug. 2016 (2 pages).
Gold Phoenix Printed Circuit Board, “Why multilayer pcb is used so widely?”, May 7, 2012, accessed online @ [http://www.goldphoenixpcb.com/html/Support_Resource/others/arc_110.html] on Feb. 15, 2017.
Busby et al., “Enclosure-to-Board Interface with Tamper-Detect Circuit(s)”, U.S. Appl. No. 15/901,985, filed Feb. 22, 2018 (59 pages).
Brodsky et al., “Tamper-Respondent Sensors with Liquid Crystal Polymer Layers”, U.S. Appl. No. 15/944,898, filed Apr. 4, 2018 (59 pages).
Busby et al., “Tamper-Proof Electronic Packages with Stressed Glass Component Substrate(s)”, U.S. Appl. No. 16/045,868, filed Jul. 26, 2018 (53 pages.
Busby et al., “Tamper-Proof Electronic Packages with Stressed Glass Component Substrate(s)”, U.S. Appl. No. 16/045,880, filed Jul. 26, 2018 (55 pages).
Busby et al., “Multi-Layer Stack with Embedded Tamper-Detect Protection”, U.S. Appl. No. 16/048,622, filed Jul. 30, 2018 (64 pages).
Busby et al., “Multi-Layer Stack with Embedded Tamper-Detect Protection”, U.S. Appl. No. 16/048,634, filed Jul. 30, 2018 (65 pages).
Busby et al., “Multi-Layer Stack with Embedded Tamper-Detect Protection”, U.S. Appl. No. 16/048,650, filed Jul. 30, 2018 (68 pages).
Brodsky et al., “Circuit Boards and Electronic Packages with Embedded Tamper-Respondent Sensor”, U.S. Appl. No. 16/136,589, filed Sep. 20, 2018 (45 pages).
Brodsky et al., “List of IBM Patents and Patent Applications Treated as Related”, U.S. Appl. No. 16/162,679, filed Oct. 17, 2018, dated Oct. 17, 2018 (3 pages).
Related Publications (1)
Number Date Country
20190049269 A1 Feb 2019 US
Continuations (2)
Number Date Country
Parent 14941908 Nov 2015 US
Child 16162679 US
Parent 14865610 Sep 2015 US
Child 14941908 US