This application claims priority to French Patent Application No. 1658070, filed on Aug. 31, 2016, which application is hereby incorporated herein by reference.
The present patent application relates to electronic chips, more particularly to electronic chips protected against attacks performed from the rear face.
Electronic chips containing confidential information, such as bank card chips, are liable to undergo attacks by hackers aimed at determining the operation of the chip and at extracting the confidential information therefrom.
The case is considered here where, in order to carry out an attack, a hacker hollows out a cavity from the rear face of the chip, for example, with an ion beam, while possibly having thinned the substrate previously. The hacker can then install in the cavity contacts with the components situated on the front face, and analyse the operation of the chip.
Embodiments of the invention provide a chip that can resist these types of attacks. For example, an embodiment provides a semiconductor chip comprising at least two insulated vias passing through the chip from the front face to the rear face in which, on the side of the rear face, the vias are connected to one and the same conducting strip and, on the side of the front face, each via is separated from a conducting pad by a layer of a dielectric.
According to one embodiment, the chip comprises a plurality of elements such as hereinabove whose conducting strips are parallel to one another.
According to one embodiment, the conducting strip forms a serpentine on at least one portion of the surface of the rear face.
According to one embodiment, the chip comprises decoy conducting pads or decoy vias.
According to one embodiment, the rear face of the chip is uniformly covered with an insulating material.
According to one embodiment, the dielectric layer is silicon oxide.
According to one embodiment, the conducting strip is made of copper, titanium or aluminium.
According to one embodiment, the insulating material covering the rear face is a polymer or silicon oxide.
An embodiment provides for a method for fabricating a semiconductor chip comprising the following steps: formation of conducting pads on the front face of a substrate; thinning of the rear face; etching of openings under the conducting pads from the rear face, stopping when the conducting pad is reached; deposition of a layer of a dielectric on the walls and the bottom of the openings; and formation of a conducting layer in the openings and of a conducting strip linking the conducting layers together.
According to one embodiment, each conducting pad is an N-type doped region.
According to one embodiment, the N-type doped regions have a height of between 1 μm and 10 μm.
These characteristics and advantages, together with others, will be set forth in detail in the following non-limiting description of particular embodiments, given in conjunction with the attached figures among which:
Like elements have been designated by like references in the various figures and, moreover, the diverse figures are not drawn to scale. For the sake of clarity, only the elements useful to the understanding of the embodiments described have been represented and are detailed.
In the description which follows, when reference is made to qualifiers of absolute position, such as the terms “front”, “rear”, etc., or relative position, such as the terms “upper”, etc., reference is made to the orientation of the figures in a normal position of use. In the views from above, the elements depicted dashed are seen through transparency of the chip considered.
As illustrated by
In a conventional manner, in order to carry out an analysis of the components situated between the pads 3 and 4, a hacker will attempt to thin the chip from the rear face. He will thus destroy the conducting strip 12 and this will be detected. Likewise, if the hacker performs a drilling which affects the strip 12, this will also be detected.
When the voltage Vin at the input of the flip-flop 22 and therefore across the terminals of the capacitor reaches the value Vlow, the flip-flop 22 toggles to a state such that its output Vout takes the value 0. The inverter 20 then toggles to a state such that the transistor 24 becomes passing, and the capacitor charges until Vin reaches the value Vhigh, triggering the change of state of the flip-flop 22 whose output toggles to Vdd. The inverter 20 then toggles to a state such that the transistor 26 becomes passing, and the capacitor discharges until Vin reaches the value Vlow, triggering the change of state of the flip-flop 22 whose output toggles to 0.
The capacitance C is measured by measuring the period T of the output signal of the flip-flop 22. The period T corresponds to a charging and a discharging at fixed current I of the capacitor C over a voltage span [Vlow, Vhigh]. The value of the capacitance C is therefore half the period T multiplied by the value I of the current and divided by the voltage difference ΔV=Vhigh−Vlow.
The protection device such as presented in conjunction with
In the structure of
The width of the strips 12 and the distance 32 separating the strips 12 are determined by taking into account the minimum size of drill hole possible with existing technologies, in such a way that a drilling 34, whatever its location, cuts at least one connection between two conducting pads. At present the size of a drill hole is, for example, 3×3 μm2.
The embodiment of
A hacker seeking to analyse the components of a semiconductor chip and being aware of the existence and the nature of a protection system will be able to use this information to seek to violate the protection system. It is proposed here to render awareness of the protection system more difficult by incorporating decoys thereinto.
The chip protection device such as described in conjunction with
The following step, illustrated by
The last steps, the deposition of a dielectric layer and the deposition of a conducting layer, are similar to the steps of the method described in conjunction with
By way of example, the dielectric 6 can be silicon oxide and the conductor 8 copper, titanium or aluminium.
It will be understood that the two methods described here are susceptible of numerous variants. It will be possible to use other methods to achieve the desired result.
Particular embodiments have been described. Diverse variants and modifications will be apparent to the person skilled in the art. In particular, the number of conducting pads 3 and 4 and the shape of the conducting strips 12 linking them to one another can vary in so far as any rear face drilling cuts at least one connection between two conducting pads linked together by a capacimeter. The conducting strip, instead of having a serpentine shape, may take the shape of a spiral, or more generally that of any space-filling curve whatsoever, such as, for example, a Peano curve or a Koch curve, extending over a portion of surface to be protected of the rear face of the chip, in such a way that a drilling, whatever its location on the surface to be protected, cuts the conducting strip. Comb structures can also be used.
Diverse embodiments with diverse variants have been described hereinabove. It will be noted that the person skilled in the art will be able to combine diverse elements of these diverse embodiments and variants without showing evidence of inventive step.
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